2t Caroe 8-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

SOVIET EMPIRE

000

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1


42°
48°
54°
52°
44°
36°
48°
54°
60°
Volga
Ural R.
Ural
Emba R. (11m)
SEA
CASPIAN
Mangyshlak P.
-426'
ARAL SEA
160'
UST YURT
Sarikamish Depression
-200'
KARA BOGHAZ
Krasnovodsk P.
-92'
Ozboy
KARA KUM
Kopet Dagh
Atrek R.
PERSIA

OLAF CAROE SOVIET EMPIRE (MACMILLAN & CO. LTD.)

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

133
102



60°
66°
72°
78°
Ural Mts.
Northern Steppe
Ishim R.
Turgay Gap
Turgay R.
BETPAK DALA
(Hungry Steppe)
Chu R.
Talas
ARAL SEA
160'
Sir Darya (Jaxartes) or Seihun
Kara Tau
Yani Darya (old bed)
KIZIL KUM
Mirza Chōl
Amu Darya (Oxus) or Jaihun
Zarafshan
Kashka D.
KARA KUM
Tejen R.
Murghab R.
60°
66° East of Greenwich
72°

- ii (B) -

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

133
102


SOVIET
CENTRAL ASIA
Physical
Miles
0
100
200
300
400
International boundary
Mountains, over 2000 metres
Mountains, 500 to 2000 metres
Sea level to 100 metres
Below sea level
72°
84°
90°
52°
44°
36°
78°
84°
L. BALKHASH
YED
Jungarian Gate
Ili Darya
Issik Kul
Naryn
Khan Tengri 24,000
Tarim Basin

- 22(2)

SOVIET EMPIRE

000

THE TURKS OF CENTRAL ASIA
AND STALINISM

BY

OLAF CAROE

> Surely it is within the Central Asian regions of Russia, and the Central Asian borders of Russia, that the real problems of the immediate future are going to develop.
>
> CHESTER WILMOT, 1952

LONDON
MACMILLAN & CO LTD
NEW YORK · ST. MARTIN'S PRESS
1953

- iii - (pp. iv = blank)

PREFACE

ABOUT the middle of the XIXth century the shadow 000
of Russia in Central Asia began to fall across the vision of a Britain which had just succeeded to the Sikhs in the Panjab and was occupied in the consolidation of territories which became known as the North-West Frontier. From that date the external policy of the British government in India was directed mainly to the stabilization of Middle Eastern frontiers and to safeguarding the continued existence of Persia and Afghanistan against the forces of Russian expansion. As a result of that policy the Russian advance was halted, where it still stands, on the Oxus and along the fringe of the Turkmen mountains.

In due course the Soviets succeeded the Tsars in the Turkish lands of Central Asia, and Britain withdrew her forces from a partitioned Indian continent. In Southern and South-Western Asia the bonds of the Commonwealth are now loosened. In Central Asia Soviet Russia remains in control of many million Muslims of Turco-Iranian stock. These /101
territories, once known as Turkistan, are in fact an overlap /121
between the Islamic and the Soviet world. It is the purpose of this book at a moment of solvency brought on by Stalin's death to weigh old influences with new, and estimate the part which these peoples are destined to play in the struggle between the Communist world and the West.

For concentrated historical or contemporary thought on 000
Russian Central Asia in English it is necessary to go back at least fifty years. It is extremely hard today to uncover modern sources of real value in a field of peculiar importance and little known outside Soviet Russia. The gap has to be filled mainly from Russia and Turkey. In respect of one period in particular — the uneasy interregnum between the October Revolution and the consolidation of Soviet power — I have

000 drawn, among others, on the writings of Professor Togan of Istanbul University, himself a chief actor in the field and the author of a notable book in Turkish entitled *Bugünkü Türkili* (Turkistan today). Page references to this book would not help the English reader and I have therefore been compelled, with the author's ready permission, to include a number of translated passages. I am also greatly in the debt of Mr. W. E. D. Allen, who has given ungrudgingly of the great store of his own knowledge in this field of orientalia, and of Dr. Stefan Wurm of Vienna University, whose knowledge of Turkic linguistics is unrivalled in any country. The linguistic map is his work. No Turcologist myself, I can plead that a lifetime spent among the neighbouring Muslim peoples of the Afghan borderland provides some of the conditions in which insight can do something to fill the gaps in knowledge. Russia in Transoxiana was never far from the thought of those who looked outward towards the Oxus from Peshawar. To English readers the Oxus is so much more familiar than the Amu Darya that I have been tempted to use the names indiscriminately, as the context suggests.

101
128 The accepted linguistic and ethnic classifications of the Turks are somewhat more complex than those adopted in this book, which does not aim at the precise resolution of such problems. The connotation of *Turkey* is clear enough; where distinction is necessary, I have included the Turks of Turkey in the definition *Western Turks*, which also covers the *Aẓeris* of Azerbaijan and (linguistically though not geographically) the *Turkmens*. On the Volga, in the Urals and in part of the Crimea (before the deportations) the term *Tatar*, or *Turco-Tatar*, has the sanction of usage. In those parts of Central Asia formerly known as *Turkistan* — the real hub of this book — I have avoided the doubtful appellation *Turkistani*, replacing it by *Eastern* or *Central Asian Turk*, and confining the word *Türki* to those Eastern Turks who live in Sinkiang under Chinese dominion. Where more precision is needed in references to the Turks of Russian Central Asia, I have particularized them as *Uẓbeks*, *Kaẓaks*, and so on. Except in

a few cases, clear from the context, my choice between *Turkish* 101
and *Turkic* is determined by a convention whereby scholars 128
seek to allot the one to peoples and the other to languages.

The transliteration of names in a Turkic tongue is not to be simply resolved by reference to the canons of Arabists or the Hunterian system. An explanation of the method adopted in the text will be found in an appendix.[1]

In quoting from the great Russian historian Barthold I have used a French translation, which he authorized. It will be stronger thus, without further distillation. If what follows fails to give the picture, it is because (as Barthold truly wrote) —

> L'histoire turque exige des connaissances qui ne se trouvent que rarement réunies chez une seule personne. Il ne suffit donc point d'être turcologue pour écrire l'histoire des peuples turcs. Suivant l'époque qu'on étudie, il faut être également ou bien sinologue, ou bien arabisant, ou bien iranisant.

For the Western writer even that is not enough, for he should be able to go through the Russian medium also. In this region many studies meet and cross.

O. C.

March 1953

The author is greatly indebted to Mr. Edgar Newgass for help in the compilation of the index.

[1] [See cat. 116, pp. 269-272-- Analyst]

[p. viii is blank]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

CONTENTS

000

PAGE
Preface v
I. Introductory 1

PART I

THE MUSLIM PERIOD AND THE TSARS

II. The Turanian Basin 13
III. Pattern of Peoples 29
IV. Crucible of Empires 48
V. Tsarist Conquest 70

PART II

THE TRANSITION

VI. The 1917 Revolutions 95
VII. Enver and the Basmachis 114

PART III

SOVIET PRESSURES

VIII. New Approach 133
IX. Nationalism and the Soviet Colonial Empire 139
X. Russianization 162
XI. Collectivization and the Suppression of Nomadism 173
XII. Industrialization and Public Works 189
XIII. Heritage of Chaghatai 215
XIV. Deviationism 230

00

CONTENTS

PAGE

XV. World War II 243

XVI. Conclusion 257

Appendix on Transliteration 269

Bibliography 273

Index 283

MAPS

I. Soviet Central Asia — Physical *frontispiece*

II. Russian advance in Central Asia *page* 73

III. The Railway network in Soviet Central Asia *facing page* 192

IV. Linguistic Map of Soviet Central Asia and Borderlands *facing page* 272

I

INTRODUCTORY

ALMOST in the centre of Asia, and far removed from 101 the oceans, are two great natural basins of continental 133 land, known until quite recent times as Russian and Chinese Turkistan. Much of the perimeter of both these territories is ringed round by some of the highest mountains in the world, and where the mountains stop the plains fade into desert or inland sea; both are traversed by rivers which do not reach the ocean; both are inhabited in the main by peoples in whom a Turkish strain (though overlaying and overlaid by others) may still be said to predominate. To distinguish these Transcaspian peoples from the Turks of Turkey and the Caucasus it is convenient to speak of them as the Eastern or Central Asian Turks.

The two parts of this Turkistan are divided from one another by the great mountain transept culminating on the Pamirs, from which spring all the biggest ranges of the world. In a general way this water-parting, linking the Tienshan with the Hindu Kush and Karakoram, is also the political frontier between Russian Turkistan and the Chinese Turki dominion now known as Sinkiang.

Of Sinkiang much is known and much has been written. 000 In earlier centuries there was a parallel movement in the history of the Central Asian Turks in the oasis civilizations both west and east of the Pamirs. Certain dynasties held sway on both sides of the mountains, while, farther north, the Ili gap supplied a route for migration, conquest and trade. More recently Sinkiang opened its gates more widely to the West. For the half-century before 1947 the government in India maintained a consulate in Kashghar on behalf of the British government, and until the other day there were British

000 and American representatives in the capital, Urumchi. In the sands of Khotan in the Tarim basin the great archaeologist, Aurel Stein, discovered the lost cities that made his name. Since his time a succession of travellers have made it their business to describe what they were able to learn of the tangled politics of the Tarim and Jungarian oases from the time of the fall of the Manchus up to the rise to power of Communism in China. Only then, some three years back, did Sinkiang become inaccessible to the West. Before then it shared with the more remote parts of the Himalayas the distinction of being the favourite goal of the more enterprising travellers in Asiatic lands. Some may think that for that reason it has attained a quite spurious importance.

131/162 With Russian Turkistan — now become the five Socialist Soviet Republics of Central Asia — the case is otherwise. The Eastern Turks of the Oxus region have always dwelt in a strange isolation, and the Russians have only drawn closer the veils which for centuries shrouded a forbidden land. Relatively to the size of the country and the antiquity of its history, it is true to say that the West knows less of Soviet Central Asia than of any part of the civilized world. In extent alone it is impressive. Including the steppe up to the northern limits of modern Kazakistan, the aggregate territory is larger in area than India before partition[1] and more than half the size of the United States; and, although in a land of which much is desert the population in 1939 was under seventeen million,[1]

---

[1]

	Area	Population (last census)	
		Total	'Native'
	(sq. miles)		
Kazakistan	1,073,000	6,146,000	3,090,000
Uzbekistan	158,000	6,282,000	4,980,000
Tajikistan	56,000	1,485,000	1,220,000
Kirghizia	77,000	1,459,000	880,000
Turkmenia	189,000	1,254,000	830,000
Total	1,553,000	16,626,000	11,000,000

Note that the 'Native' population figures given are the figures of Kazaks, Uzbeks etc., *for the whole USSR.* The 1939 census, unlike that for 1926, did not give figures by nationality separately for each republic. But, although there is some inter-

that figure greatly outstrips such important countries as 131
Canada or Australia. It is, moreover, an organized popula- 162
tion in tightly packed groups, gathered either on patches
of intensive cultivation to which water can be brought, or
in urban centres where the new industry flourishes. Yet it is 000
strange to compare the extent of modern Western knowledge
of these peoples with that which has been gathered about
Afghanistan or Persia, to both of which Turkistan is im-
mediately adjacent. With Pakistan or India the comparison
is more startling still.

The isolation of the great Turanian basin between the 101
Caspian and the Tienshan becomes all the more remarkable
when it is realized that these lands were once the springboard
of the Turkish race, and were also the seat of a renowned
Muslim civilization which in its time rivalled the civilizations
of Baghdad, Damascus and Cordova. From the date of the
Arab conquest late in the VIIth century Maveraunnahr, or
Transoxiana, became a part of the Muslim East. Today it
never figures in the many definitions of that region, but it is
time to claim it as the marginal overlap, both geographical and
cultural, between the continental system of Russia and a
Turco-Iranian system of South-Western Asia, in which at one
time it played an important part.

In regions of overlap there will be stresses; Poland, 000
Alsace, the North-West Frontier come to mind. Those
stresses will be greater if, as in this case, the peoples inhabiting
the region of overlap are alien to the Power to which they are
for the time being subject and akin to their neighbours on the
other side. In this instance too the overlap is adjacent to a
frontier south of which lie the vast populations of the Indian
sub-continent and the resources of the Middle East. Remem-
bering this, it is not difficult to understand how Russia has
come to determine on a policy of steady assimilation. Under
the Russians, more particularly when the Soviets succeeded
to the Tsars, the people of Turkistan have for this reason

mingling of nationalities as between the five republics, the figures are near enough. The difference between the two sets of population figures is due mainly to Russian immigration, which in Kazakistan accounts for approximately half the total population.

000 undergone pressures of an unusual intensity, designed to force them into a mould quite other than the pattern which they formerly knew. And since an operation of assimilation is easier when the graft is cut off from the original stock, it has suited the new rulers to exploit old tendencies and impose a system of isolation even more rigorous than that which existed in ancient times.

175 The curtain had fallen on Turkistan long before the days
177 of Soviet rule, even before the Tsars. The fanatical exclusive-
184 ness of the Bukhara Emirs made of that city, and even more of its neighbour Samarkand, a legend remote from ordinary life. A few Russian agents were able to visit Khiva or Bukhara in the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries, but many were caught and enslaved; indeed the enslavement of Russians by the Khiva Khans was a prime cause of the wars against that State. European names other than Russian are few. The best-known are the intrepid Alexander Burnes,[1] who reached Bukhara by way of Merv in 1832 and was favourably received, Abbott of North-West Frontier fame who visited Khiva in 1840, those two unfortunates Stoddart and Conolly,[1] who reached Bukhara in 1841 only to die a horrible death at the hands of the Emir Nasrullah, and lastly Dr. Wolff,[1] who at great risk to himself penetrated to the same city, two years later, to clear up the fate of the Englishmen who had preceded him. The Hungarian Vambéry,[1] scholar enough to pass as a dervish, found in 1863 a country cut off from contact with other Muslim lands to the south, living in an atmosphere of isolation and suspicion which nearly cost him his life. The seclusion of Samarkand was even more striking. According to the American, Schuyler,[1] from the time of González de Clavijo,[2] who was there in 1404 on an embassy to Timur from Henry III of Castile, until the journey of Khanikov in 1841, Samarkand remained unvisited by Europeans except by a single Russian envoy in 1620 and a chance Russian non-commissioned

---

[1] For these and future references see Bibliography at the end of this book. Burnes, I, 15; Conolly, I, 25; Wolff, I, 100; Vambéry, I, 94; Schuyler, I, 84 (i, 240 and 360). References outside Bibliography are to Togan's book, which is in Turkish.

[2] Bib. I, 22.

officer in 1774 — two visits in over four hundred years. No 177
wonder that it had a halo of romance and piqued the curiosity 175 114
of the Western world.

It was therefore not surprising that the Russian capture of Tashkent in 1865, of Samarkand three years later, and of Khiva in 1873, should have caused a stir. Now at last, it was thought, the mysteries of these magic cities would be unveiled. But no, it was only the privileged, and those carefully shepherded, who were allowed to pass the barriers. Among 114
these Schuyler and Curzon were pre-eminent. There were indeed a number of French correspondents to whom the Franco-Russian accord of the time provided opportunities for what Curzon dismissed as a luxuriant crop of descriptive literature of little note, and one, the Vicomte de Vogüé, who was recognized even by Curzon as more distinguished, but whose articles, 'though characterized by an agreeable fancy and by all the picturesqueness of the Gallic idiom, added little to our previous stock of knowledge on the subject'.[1] Curzon's own book[1] has not so much colour as Schuyler's; he did not travel so widely in the countryside nor had he equal opportunity to meet and talk with the people. But it is a fitting companion volume both to Schuyler and to his own great classic on Persia, and it contains passages where the balance of his style and the sweep of his exposition aspires to the heights of his obvious exemplar, Gibbon.

But Schuyler and Curzon were little more than flashes in 177
the darkness. Although the study of the Central Asian peoples was most diligently pursued by Russian scholars under the Tsars — the names of Radloff and Barthold are of wide-world renown — little was done up to the time of World War I to facilitate European or American travel and research north of the Oxus. There seemed always something to conceal, a rebellion, a massacre, an advance not to be at once avowed. The Tsar's government consistently looked with jealousy and irritation upon the intrusion of others into its Asiatic territories, and kept a strict hand on all the controls. The new

---

[1] Bib. I, 27 (p. 8).

177 railways, regarded as strategic, did not become the highways of international commerce, and permits to travel were notoriously difficult to obtain. During the first part of World War I the seclusion became even more rigorous; the government first used the country as a convenient prison-house for Austro-Hungarians captured on the front in Europe, and later became involved in the bloody suppression of a bitter rebellion leading to famine and pestilence on a vast scale. It took the two revolutions of 1917 to raise the curtain high enough to reveal to the outside world a confused scene fitfully illumined by the torches of many factions, each struggling against a dark background of terror to plant its own light on the ramparts and herald a new dawn. A brief glimpse only, and the curtain fell again.

It is the Soviet habit to allude angrily to the years 1918 to 1920 as the Period of Intervention, meaning it to be inferred that the chaos of these years of transition was brought about by British machiavellian intrigue in a colonial sphere which should have concerned the Russians only. That period in due course I shall consider: here it is enough to say that the limit of British penetration into Turkistan reached no farther than Merv, while the time was far too short to afford any real insight into, much less any control over, the forces then
114 striving for mastery in Russia's Asiatic Empire. It is rather to the men of Central Asian stock, with a Russian education superimposed on their Muslim upbringing, that we must look for insight into a period of intense struggle, during which they themselves for a short time figured as founders or upholders of independent national States. These are they who not only knew the inspirations and capacities of their own peoples, but had sufficient indoctrination in revolutionary thought to aspire to give a new form to an old pattern. The fact that this fresh inspiration was quickly followed by the bitterest disillusion over the failure of Bolshevik practice to live up to early promises, does not mean that the positive

reality of the one is necessarily to be measured by the negations of the other. The new thought had come to stay. But at that time events were too strong for native reformers who were unable to turn their opportunities to lasting account. Fortunately some of those men have left memorials in writing, most revealing of their earlier hopes and endurances, and suggestive of what their peoples may yet achieve, should history once more turn in their favour. Among these are Mustafa Chokai and Zeki Velidi Togan (known to the Russians as Chokaiev and Velidov), leaders of the Eastern Turks during the interregnum period, who, first in attempted understanding with the Soviets, and later in conflict with them, strove to win political freedom for the peoples of Turkistan.

For a short time in 1917–18 Chokai presided over an independent government at Kokand in the Farghana Valley, now part of Uzbekistan. In the period between the Wars he wrote and lectured effectively in Western Europe, and was the author of a short book in Russian[1] describing his country's reactions to Soviet domination. I shall return to the story of his death in Germany in 1941 : here it need be said only that he is less likely to be remembered for his writings than for having founded and inspired a national operation which later in World War II in other hands attained a considerable momentum.

Togan is that rare product, the professional historian who has been able to record a series of dramatic events in which he had his own, not negligible, part. Not directly from Turkistan himself but a Bashkir (in Turkish, Bashkurd), he came first to prominence as the mainstay of the short-lived republic of Little Bashkiria in the Urals. In the early years of the Revolution he was admitted to the confidences of the high priests of Soviet colonialism, Lenin and Stalin. Turning from them in disillusion in 1920, he spent the next three years behind the scenes in and around Bukhara in an attempt to organize resistance to the re-establishment of Russian rule in its Soviet guise. During that time he saw much of Enver Pasha. After

---

[1] Bib. III, 9.

114 Enver's death he withdrew to Afghanistan to find his way ultimately to Turkey, where, after some vicissitudes, he attained academic distinction as a professor at the Istanbul University. There he now is. In 1929 he published in modern (Western) Turkish his story of the Eastern Turks,[1] entitled *Bugünkü Türkili*, or *Turkistan today*, adding a fascicule in 1940.

This work is a serious history of the peoples of Turkish stock east of the Caspian, written by a Central Asian Turk with a wide historical sweep and with practical experience gained in the service of these people. It contains long-term reflections based on a study of the traditions of a land little known to Western historians, reflections from the mind of a scholar in Turkic comparative history and literatures. Of the cause and inspirations of the struggles of that time the author has much that is new to relate. His story ranges from intimate discussions with Lenin and Stalin themselves to the epic of Enver Pasha, and from the tribal organizations of the Eastern Turks to the programme of social democratic reform which, like the Young Turks a decade earlier in Istanbul, he and coadjutors drew up for their compatriots. And through it all there runs a flame of ardent patriotism, a spirit that moves upon the waters. The question he poses is whether there are those remaining who can still hear that voice and respond to that spirit. Many of those who might have heard have been crushed beneath the heel of an iron tyranny.

I had thought originally that Togan's book might be brought to English readers by means of a simple translation. But the book is a formidable one, and much of it deals with details of old tradition and tribal organization which would have no meaning for the general reader. Moreover, one of its merits as a scholarly thesis is a certain diffuseness, which, however valuable to the Turkish student, would fail to attract the outside reader, interested in the background and prospects of an almost legendary land. Its message can best be brought to the West by means of a new interpretation, using the author's ideas but compressing and sorting them out and, where necessary, relating them to other material. Such a treatment involves a number of changes of presentation and emphasis, which may not represent the views of the original. Yet, just as this treatment enables the interpreter to be more objective, it also gives him the right to be generous in reference to his source. On balance, for readers outside Turkey, the gain may outweigh the loss. 114

---

[1] *Bugünkü Türkili* (Istanbul, 1942–7). *Türkili* (Turkic word *il*—tribe or country) is the equivalent of the Persian *Turkistan*.

Other guides indeed there are. Some of these are refugees, both of the older emigration who fled the land shortly after the establishment of Soviet rule, and of younger groups whom the conditions of World War II enabled to escape the prison-house. Their names will appear as the story unfolds. There are, too, fitful gleams from behind the curtain. The most rigid frontier defences cannot prevent news filtering through to neighbouring countries whose affinities beget a natural sympathy, welcoming a steady stream of refugees. All these have light to shed. Sometimes too an even brighter illumination proceeds from the statements and admissions of the Kremlin, and particularly of Stalin himself. There is also Soviet publicity, always so sedulous to replace the old with new that it gives prominence to the old things which it would uproot. From time to time informed men [1] from the West have seized an unexpected chance to traverse Turkistan and been able to record what they have understood. But it still remains for someone to gather up the old with the new, and strike a balance which shall determine how far the process of continental assimilation has gone, and to what degree it has altered out of recognition an identity which was the child of a Turco-Iranian history of over one thousand years. In terms of ultimate ideologies, the question is one of the faith which shall prevail in the end, Communism or Islam; or, perhaps more subtly, there is need of a forecast of the several positions, gradations or compromises which may be expected to result from the interaction of the two extremes. 000 114

A word of caution will not be amiss. The refugees' books 114

---

[1] Cf. Bib. I, 5, 40 and 65 — Bailey, Goldman, Fitzroy Maclean.

114 are patriots' visions of the land and peoples of their origin and their dreams, seen by them as suffering under a yoke cruel and intolerable. A writer approaching his subject in this spirit will underrate the material progress and prosperity attained under the foreign dominion, setting the profits low in the scale against the loss of freedom. He is likely to belittle the material achievement of the Russians, whether Tsarist or Soviet. Nor will he adequately appraise the work of the many Russian scholars and historians of distinction who have made the study of Central Asian peoples and problems a field peculiarly their own. An attempt has here been made to correct this perspective. But, where Togan or others are cited, the reader should remember that a seer does not rate at their worldly value the achievements, or even the power, of the kings whom he denounces. He counts on greater than worldly values. Other nations, resting on their prophets, have preserved a tradition, spiritual and political, against all oppressions. Then why not the Eastern Turks?

p.11

000

PART I

THE MUSLIM PERIOD AND THE TSARS

[page 12 - blank]

II

THE TURANIAN BASIN

Something too of marvel, if not much of beauty, must there be in a country which presents to the eye a succession of bewildering contrasts; where the scarp of precipitous mountains frowns over an unending plain; where spots of verdure lie strewn like islets amid shoreless seas of sand; where mighty rivers perish in marsh and swamp; where populous cities are succeeded as a site of residence by tents of felt, and sedentary toil as a mode of life by the vagrant freedom of the desert. 000

CURZON

THERE is no State or Republic of Turkistan on modern maps of the world. Even on maps of the Victorian era Turkistan was divided into its Russian, Chinese and Afghan components, and of the Russian territories a large part east of the Caspian Sea was then known as Transcaspia. The Chinese name of Sinkiang — the New Dominion — came to be applied even in European parlance to the Tarim basin and Jungaria. In Russia, the name of Turkistan during the Basmachi rebellion of the early Soviet days had become a watchword of a larger Turkish nationalism and, with the Kremlin's establishment of what are ostensibly tribal Republics in Central Asia, Russian Turkistan as the name of a region finally disappeared from the atlases. In the USSR the name is now confined to the town near the Sir Darya (Jaxartes) in ancient times known as Yese or Yassi, the home of the celebrated saint Ahmed Yesevi, who lived there in the XIIth century. Thus there remains no territory of Turkistan on the map of today except the relatively small Afghan districts sandwiched between the Amu Darya (Oxus) and the mountains of the Hindu Kush. It is to take the place of the outmoded term that local pride has suggested a 101

101 substitute, Türkili, the Turkish homeland.

In a sense this new habit is a return to the geographical thought which obtained in the early XVIth century, when Babur left his home in the vale of Farghana to become by conquest the ruler of Kabul and later the first Mughul Emperor of Hindustan. In the whole of his Memoirs Babur speaks[1] of Turkistan only three times and that in the connotation of the town of Yese. To him the territories now collectively known as Russian Central Asia were centred on Maveraunnehr, an Arabic term meaning the land beyond the river. This is the *duab* or mesopotamia bounded by the rivers called by the Greeks Oxus and Jaxartes, known to Arab geographers as the Jaihun and Saihun, and to Persians as the Amu and the Sir Darya. European writers conveniently translate Maveraunnahr as Transoxiana.[2]

The lands south of the Amu Darya up to the Hindu Kush Babur knew as Balkh or (farther east) as Badakhshan, while those north of the Sir Darya were roughly divided into Chach or Shash (the country round Tashkent) and Mughulistan (the Ili valley and Jungaria). Northern Persia and the western Afghan plateau then, as now, were known as Khorasan, the eastern Afghan country was called after its chief towns Kabul, Ghazni and Kandahar. The upper valley of the Sir Darya (known to Babur as the Saihun) then, as now, was called Farghana, while the lower stretches of both the great rivers, then possibly connected in one network of waterways, made up the famous delta country of Khorezm, with its capital at Urgench. These old names are woven into the history and aptitudes of the land and its peoples; without them there can be no understanding of the reactions which followed the Tsarist conquest or of the later development under the pressures of the Soviet system.

133 Just as Tigris and Euphrates give life and meaning to the riverain basin of Irak, so do the Amu Darya and the Sir Darya to the much greater Turanian basin. There are other

---

[1] Bib. I, 12 and 61.

[2] Scholars seem unable to decide between Transoxiana and Transoxania. Barthold and G. Kirk use the former, Arnold Toynbee and M. Czaplicka the latter, Schuyler and Mrs. Beveridge both!

analogies. Like Irak, Turan is ringed round with great mountains on much of its circumference, and away from the rivers the flat lands tail off into inhospitable desert — the Karakum or Black Sands between the Amu and the Caspian, the Kizilkum or Red Sands in the *duab* between the rivers and the Aral sea, and, north of the Sir, the half-desert steppe known as the Betpak[1] Dala, or Plain of Misfortune.

This is a land buttressed by immense mountains. The cathedral nave of the Tienshan, with its southern aisles the Alai and Transalai, is a system of high alpine structures, running parallel in a general direction from east to west. It is joined with the Hindu Kush and Karakoram by the Sarikol transept, which runs tranversely north and south. West of the Sarikol is the well-known upland of the Pamirs. There are peaks in the north around Khan Tenri, and southward in the Pamir-Sarikol region, some 24,000 feet in height.[2] These ranges are on a scale only surpassed by the Himalaya and Karakoram, and they contain some of the biggest glaciers in the world outside the Arctic circle. They form the watershed between Western and Eastern Turkistan, the Russian and the Chinese dominions. Both the great rivers watering Russian Central Asia rise west of that watershed, the Sir Darya in various gorges of the Alai south of the lake Issik Köl, and the Amu Darya in Karategin and the Pamirs.

The upper waters of the Amu proper are known to the Tajiks of that region as the Ab-i-Panja or Pianj. It is joined from the north by four large tributaries, the Aksu, the Vakhsh (Turkic Oghush) running out of Karategin, the Kafirnihan and the Surkhan. The Sir Darya is made up of three main streams, the muddy and turbulent Narin from south of Issik Köl, the clear Karasu with its affluents the Tar and Kara Kulja from the east, and the Sukh from the south, all joining in the Vale of Farghana.

---

[1] A corruption of the Persian word *badbakht*.

[2] Khan Tenri, just under 24,000 ft., is right on the frontier of Chinese and of Russian Turkistan. The Russians claim to have discovered another peak close to it, and within their territory, of greater height. Two peaks in the Pamir region, now named after Lenin and Stalin, are of some 24,000 ft.

Turkistan is also a land of vast stretching plains and deserts, with a very gentle decline from the mountain-skirts to the Aral and the Caspian Seas. The fall from the point where the two great rivers issue from the mountains, the Amu near Kelif and the Sir at Begovat, a new town just west of Khojent,[1] is not more than a few hundred feet in many hundreds of miles. The flatness of the plain causes the lower courses of the rivers to be much beset by reedy marshes, which split up their channels and render them difficult for navigation. Towards the Caspian the Turanian basin sinks to nearly 100 feet below sea-level. The Sarikamish depression between the two seas is another earth-hole deeper than the Caspian, and there is a point on the Mangishlak Peninsula on the north-eastern shore of the Caspian over 400 feet below the sea.

The southern mountain-rim of this great basin is formed by the Kopet Dagh barrier, a westward continuation to the Caspian of those Paropamisus outliers of the Hindu Kush which form a shield in front of the Afghan city of Herat. The Kopet Dagh is the traditional limit between Iran and Turan, and its crest still roughly defines the frontier between the USSR and Persia. Its highest point is not much more than 8000 feet and in itself, seen from the plain, it is a range of barren spires, reminiscent of a lunar landscape. But to one who approaches the Turanian basin from the Iranian plateau this escarpment offers a prospect wonderful and revealing. The edge of the plateau is like the shore of a land facing a limitless sea. The mountains form the rim of a vast bowl, a rim on which the traveller stands gazing over undulations of sand to a horizon without more feature than the ocean. His eye wanders farther, until in imagination he can discern across the Black Sands the low cliffs of the Ust Yurt plateau, lying between Caspian and Aral, and one of the most desolate regions on earth. In one or two favoured spots a stream descends from the plateau to form a string of green oases across a plain which finally engulfs it. But at most places, as the caravan reaches the top, men and animals find themselves on the extreme edge of one world, looking into the void of another. This rim was always the natural dividing-line between two geographical regions and two climates: from time to time, it has been a boundary between two ways of life. Across it certainly in history Arab, Turk, Mongol and Persian have carried their several ways of life in pursuit of conquest and trade, and there has been wide action and reaction on both sides of the line. Indeed the Persian poet Firdausi, writing at the end of the Xth century, was able to claim the Amu Darya rather than the mountain-rim as the limit between the two lands and civilizations that he was the first to name Iran and Turan,[1] and since then the tides of conquest and assimilation have ebbed and flowed many times over these mountains. Even so, it is like a cliff, opening on the land-ocean of the desert, and it remains the geographical symbol of a barrier far older than the frontier defences set up by the Soviet Empire.

---

[1] The Soviets have renamed the ancient city of Khojent as Leninabad. It is amusing to think how Babur, who wrote of Khojent and its virtues about the year 1500, would have smiled at the idea of this new prophet and his name.

The two great rivers are not the only waterways of the Turanian basin. At the point on the Afghan frontier where the Kopet Dagh joins the outliers of the Hindu Kush, the Tejen (the Hari Rud of Khorasan) and the Murghab spill out to the desert to irrigate the lands around Merv and to be lost in the sand. In Transoxiana, between the two great rivers are two streams as famous as they — the Kashka Darya, on the banks of which Tamerlane (Timur)[2] was born, and the even better known Kohik or Zarafshan, the Gold-Scatterer which waters the rich lands of Samarkand and Bukhara. The name Zarafshan is by some attributed to the richness of the cultivation; others point to the gold-washings to be had from the river's sand. One of the river's sources is a large glacier, another the Iskandar Köl Lake, nearly 7000 feet above the sea, and there is a legend that the lake was formed by Alexander, who set across the valley a golden dam to form a reservoir and regulate the

---

[1] This distinction appears in the Avesta, but Firdausi gave it popular expression for the first time.

[2] Tamerlane = Timur Lang = Timur the lame = (in Turkish) Aksak Temür.

133 river's flow. Both Kashka and Zarafshan sink into the sand before reaching the Amu Darya. North of the Sir Darya and the Kara Tav prolongation of the Tienshan comes the real steppe, much of it half-desert and known as the Betpak Dala (Plain of Misfortune) but part of it watered by yet other rivers, the Talash and the Chu. The Chu possibly at one time drained Lake Issik Köl, but now it passes some miles from it and down the Bum gorge into the plain. Like the Zarafshan, both these northern rivers sink into the sand.

133 Up to this point, going northward and eastward, the
131 watershed has been broadly coincident with the frontier between China and the Russian Empire, and the basins of the two great rivers lie wholly in Russian territory. But to the north-east of the Betpak Dala lies Lake Balkhash with Yedisu (in Russian, Semirechye, the Land of the Seven Rivers) to the east of it. The main affluent to this basin is the River Ili, flowing past Kulja out of Sinkiang. Occupied by the Tsar's forces in 1876 during Yakub Beg's period of rule in Kashgharia, Kulja was surrendered to the Manchu Empire on the resumption of Chinese control a few years later, and since then has been beyond the formal frontier of Russia.[1] As things are, this part of the Russian frontier has no mountain-screen. It lies open not only to an approach down the Ili Valley, but through the gaps in the lower hills which connect the Tienshan with the Altai farther north. These are the passages leading to Jungaria, along which the tides of conquest, and later the trade-routes, moved westward and eastward under Chingiz and Timur. They are known as the gap of Chuguchak, the Jungarian Gate and the Iron Gate (or Talki Pass), and the Ili River Valley itself. Together they offer an easier entrance than the passes farther south from Kashghar into Farghana by Irkishtam, the most practicable of which, the Terek Davan, rises to 13,000 feet.

000 It is in the mountains above the Ili Valley that we find

---

[1] For the reality as between Russian and Chinese control on this frontier, even in the period between the Great Wars, see Fitzroy Maclean, *op. cit.* Since then the advent to power of the Mao régime in China, for the time at least, has further deprived this frontier of its meaning.

"It is in the mountains above the Ili valley that we find" 173
the legendary springboard of the Turkish races. 'God has chosen the Turks as his own army, and settled them in the highest parts of the earth with the best air, that he may send them at his chosen time against any nation in the world.'[1] These are the words of Mahmud Kashghari, a native of the Issik Köl country, writing in Baghdad in the XIth century. They suggest not only the early movements of the Turkish clans, issuing from the highlands of the great mountain systems of the Tienshan and the Altai, but the disasters of the more terrible Mongol flood which was to succeed the Turks. The Turkic name for the Tienshan is the Tenri Taghi,[2] with its central peak the Khan Tenri, marking the boundary with Chinese Turkistan. This was the land sanctified by the epics, the Askar mountain beyond Issik Köl and the pastures of Yulduz, used by Timur as a summer retreat between campaigns. Here he summoned the clans to celebrate his victories. Even today the Osmanlis sing, 'I mounted my horse and rode to Askar, the most beautiful, for I loved it, the shining one'.[3] The Khans from the east and the Khans from the west would gather in summer on these highlands, the central position from which government and conquest, east and west, were planned. For these reasons the epics spoke reverently of the high mountains, giving them names after Afrasiab or Kök Türk, or the divine attributes of a Turkish Olympus, Khan Tenri or Muztagh Ata. The idea of a nation riding out of the dawn, and moving in cavalcade towards the sunset, is familiar in Turkish poetry and legend. Later, when the conquering hordes had gone by, these passages became the main caravan routes for trade; the Silk Road of Marco Polo went this way, passing across Turkistan. In a sense Turkish Central Asia, then on the highway of commerce, had become the centre of the world. It was soon to decline.

West of Balkhash, and as far as Aral, lie hundreds of miles of open steppe, stretching down from the Siberian flatlands 133

---

[1] Cf. Togan, *op. cit.* p. 13.

[2] Tenri = Tanri = God. Tagh (alternative Tav) = dagh = mountain.

[3] *Atima bindim de gittim Askara çok güzel sevdim de aydin askara.* Cf. Togan, *op. cit.* p. 7.

133 in the north, and becoming more and more barren with the southern latitude until it merges with the Betpak Dala. But, as the caravan goes north, the traveller reaches first the low hills of the Ulu Tav and Orta Tav, excellent seasonal pasturage when the snows melt, and the favourite summer resort of the Kipchak clans, from whom many of the true Uzbeks, Kazaks and Bashkurds trace descent. As he goes north, the pastures in spring become greener and are starred with flowers, the north of Kazakistan being in the temperate zone, and enjoying a precipitation sufficient to support agriculture and tree-growth. Almost all the well-known specie tulips of our gardens have their home on these steppe-lands. The best recent description in English of this land comes from the American pen of Littlepage:[1]

> We pushed along day after day through some of the finest pasture land I have ever seen, all well-watered, with rivers and lakes enough to support herds which probably could feed the whole of Europe . . . plateaus brilliant with green grass and sprinkled with multicolored wild flowers. The weather was warm and the skies cloudless and the only drawback the clouds of mosquitoes which gave us little peace.

There is a geographical feature of this steppe which at some future time may be of great account. Round about latitude 51 degrees there is an imperceptible west to east watershed, north of which all the waters flow towards the Arctic Ocean. From west to east the rivers are Tobol, Ishim and Irtish, all headwaters of the great Arctic river Ob. There are those who think in terms of a possible diversion of water running to waste in the Arctic Ocean to fertilize the arid deserts of Turkistan.

133 311 Another fact of geography looming large in the thought of all who write of Turkistan is the broad Vale of Farghana or Kokand, the heart of the scanty oasis country of Transoxiana. Schuyler[2] in 1876 described in vivid language the contrast between the desert and the sown, saying that even in Zarafshan

---

[1] Bib. I, 62, p. 185.

[2] *Op. cit.* i, 284.

and Farghana, the most fertile regions, it was possible then to ride long distances without so much as seeing a blade of verdure, so small was the extent of country irrigated by the rivers. Since then much has been achieved, but even now it would be instructive and curious to see a map of these regions on which the arable lands were carefully marked, so narrow would be the strips along the rivers and at the foot of the mountains. In Farghana the irrigated areas, and even the *lalmi* [1] lands dependent on rainfall, cover broader acres than elsewhere in Turkistan. Its predominance as the agricultural, and now one of the industrial, centres of this country has a certain inevitability. The surrounding mountains with their fertilizing streams give it a climate relatively mild in summer and winter, and an alluvial soil on the deposits which fan out from the river mouths. In these oases intensive cultivation by a large population has always been possible — the cluster of townships is apparent from any map. The lie of the land has favoured the construction of many ancient irrigation channels, now supplemented by great modern works. Climate, latitude and water provide exactly the right environment for the cultivation of cotton and of the mulberry-trees on which the silk-worm thrives. The rapid transition from high mountain valley to open plain offers many natural sites for the harnessing of water-power for the production of electricity. The more recent discovery of oil and coal and quantities of valuable non-ferrous and other mineral resources in and around the valley, combined with the Soviet policy of moving textile factories to the site of production of raw material, has given it a new industrial significance not lost upon any who contemplate this land. Kokand, its old capital, and the hills around the valley were the main focus of the Basmachi movement of 1918–24 for the independence of Turkistan.

In its way the natural beauty of the oasis country is greater and certainly more intense than that of the steppe

---

[1] It is interesting to note that the Eastern Turks use here the same word as the Pathans of Peshawar for unirrigated cropped land. They also use *kashar*, a helping party of friends at harvest-time, and *baramta*, a raid and seizure of an enemy's flocks to indemnify oneself for a wrong; both words in common use in Pashtu.

000 meadows in springtime. The fields are well watered, the watercourses well planted with mulberry, poplar and willow against a drop-scene of violet-coloured hills rising to spires of ever- [137] lasting snow. From the mountain-skirts descend many clear streams, and springs well out shadowed by immemorial *chenars*.[1] Often, sheltering in a well-planted grove and watered by a rivulet, there stands a mosque antiquely carved in commemoration of the shrine of some local saint. Schuyler describes with delight the beauties of a refuge of this kind, reached after a thirsty march across a desolate valley strewn with gravel. He writes with understanding of the sense of refreshment to be gained from repose on ground so hallowed, whose beauty is the greater set against what Curzon describes as the wide and doleful plain, the sorrowful waste of a desert once at the bottom of a larger Caspian Sea. But there are none to tell us now whether the people can still find rest from the stridencies of Soviet life in garden cloisters such as this, holy places long before the advent of Islam. According to the Soviet press, the beauties of nature are banned as a subject for discourse or poetry.

132 There are other aspects of physical geography not without interest to the life of modern Turkistan. One of these is the influence on the movements of man of changes of climate that in this region took place either just before or after the opening of history. The clearest illustration is to be found in the discoveries of Aurel Stein in the archaeological field in Sinkiang. The remains of the cities he found buried in the Taklamakan sands prove that the water supply of the Tarim basin, when those cities flourished, was far more plentiful than it is today. There has in fact been a process of desiccation which, developing after the time when civilized man dwelt in cities, has led to mass migration out of Central Asia to more favourable

---

[1] The *platanus orientalis*, the eastern plane, possibly the finest of all deciduous types. At its best in Kashmir, it flourishes from northern India in the east right across the Iranian and Anatolian plateaux as far as the Balkans in the west.

climes. Because of the distance from the sea, precipitation even 132 on the mountains around the Tarim basin is low, and there is ground for the belief that the glaciers are still shrinking, with a resultant steady diminution of the fertilizing water. In other words, the recession of the ice-age is to this extent and in this area linked with history.[1] A process which is working in Sinkiang has its application also to the very similar conditions of soil and climate obtaining in Russian Central Asia.

Another change, in this case historical, is that in the 133 courses of the two great rivers Amu Darya and Sir Darya, and possibly even of other waters which empty into the Turanian basin. The records state that more than once in historical times the Oxus[2] (Amu Darya) at least has changed its course as between the Caspian and the Aral Sea. This is an aspect of physical geography at which all who write of Transoxiana glance again and again, with never-failing fascination. The idea runs like a thread through the literature of the region. The general thesis has the support of the Russian historian Barthold, who explains the decline of Khorezm by the shifting of the rivers' course in the XVIth century. He and others write as if they saw the Oxus with the eyes of Matthew Arnold — the great river moving mysteriously across the plain, seeming now to be lost and broken up in little channels 'a foiled circuitous wanderer', yet in the end flowing inevitably forward to release in the Aral Sea — a symbol of the history of the land.

According to Togan,[3] at the time of the Arab conquest the main waters of the Amu Darya (Oxus) flowed not to the Aral but to the now dry Özboy bed, after filling up the Sarikamish depression in the north of the Karakum desert and just below the Ust Yurt escarpment. At that time only one arm reached the Aral Sea, which was a great reed-swamp much smaller than

---

[1] Bib. I, 87, Sir C. Skrine.

[2] The name Oxus can be variously derived from Ak-su, the White Water, a [103] tributary; or from Oghush (Arabic Vakhsh), the main tributary from the Terskey Alai and Karategin. In its upper course the Oghush is called the Surkhab or Kizilsu — Persian and Turkish for Red River — by the Tajiks and Turks respectively who live on its banks.

[3] *Op. cit.* pp. 108 *et seqq.*

133 it is at present. After the Arab conquest, the Amu Darya changed its course to carry all its water as at present into the Aral Sea, where previously only one arm had debouched. The Ōzboy Channel dried up, and the waters that had once filled Sarikamish were diverted into the Aral. But in 1221, when the Mongols captured Urgench, then capital of Khorezm, the Amu Darya had reverted to its old course, and once more flowed to the Caspian by the Ōzboy as its main branch, thus opening up a very important channel of trade from east to west. The Sir Darya (Jaxartes), or more probably a large arm of it, flowed through the now dried up Yeni Darya, which began above Ak Mechit (Kizil Orda) and, moving to the south-west past the Aral Sea, debouched into the Amu Darya to swell its waters on their way through the Ōzboy to the Caspian. Muslim authority is quoted to establish that it was only in exceptional years of flood that the combined Oxus and Jaxartes — a sort of 'Shatt-al-Turk' — reached the Caspian, flowing through the Balkhan gap to the gulf by what is now Krasnovodsk. The river usually sank into the Karakum at a point known to Arab geographers as Kalat-us-sin (in Mongol times Rebat Tamgach) near the present Kurtish and over 100 miles east of the Balkhan hills. At this point there is a fault in the desert, with a declivity a few feet high, over which the combined river flowed whenever its volume sufficed to take it on to reach the Caspian.

133
175 This[1] continued until 1573, when the Amu Darya and the Sir Darya settled into their present courses to the Aral Sea, and trade on the Ōzboy and Yeni Darya came to an end. The alteration in the course of the rivers Togan counts as the great catastrophe of the XVIth century affecting Turkistan.

He continues:

> Before 1573 goods could be shipped direct by boat from Azerbaijan and from the Volga by the Ōzboy to the waterfalls near Rebat Tamgach, and trans-shipped thence to Urgench. As long as the route by Urgench on the Ōzboy and Yeni Darya remained open, the towns on the rivers Talash, Chu and Ili grew immensely

[1] alternate changes in river beds -- see pp 23-24 cf. 116 -- Ana

in importance. Chinese authorities of the VIIth–IXth centuries, 133
and Arab geographers of the Xth century, give us the names of 175
many towns and settlements in the Talash and Chu country. The
scholar Jemal-ul-Karshi tells us the names of many scholars of his
own time who lived in the towns on the lower Sir Darya, and
reports on their service to science. Among the MSS. in the libraries
of Istanbul there are many religious and literary works of this
Mongol period — unfortunately not so far examined. If the Amu 185
Darya were to flow once more into the Caspian, and the lower parts 133
of the Chu, which now sink into the sands, could be made useful
for sowing, then in some future Turkistan there might be a revival
of the lower Sir Darya, the Özboy, the lower Talash and Chu, and
Urgench, Akmechit and Tokmak become once more administrative
and cultural centres.

At first sight it is not apparent how a diversion in the lower course of the Amu Darya could affect the prosperity of the upper piedmontane tracts watered by the Ili, Chu and Talash rivers. But separate passages[1] indicate that the writer is seeing a vision of some kind of triple canal project as worked out in the Panjab. He has in view the weaving together of a network of rivers and link canals, leading the Chu and Lake Balkhash through the Betpak Dala to reinforce the Sir Darya, the Sir Darya into the Amu Darya, and the combined rivers into the Caspian Sea.

It is clear from Schuyler[2] that the early Russian engineers were of the same mind. According to him, the theory was based originally on surveys made by an early Tsarist officer, Colonel Tchaikovsky. Schuyler makes two observations, first that the Özboy is in line with the Yeni Darya, and secondly that there is indubitable evidence to the level of Issik Köl having once been several hundred feet higher than it was when he visited the country. It could then have acted as a reservoir at the source of the Chu River. This evidence was held to support a proposition that the volume of water in the Chu might have been so increased as to discharge into the Sir Darya, and thence in line into the Yeni Darya, so forcing the Amu into the Özboy bed and towards the Caspian

---

[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 21 and 580 *et seqq.*

[2] *Op. cit.* i, 50 *et seqq.*

185 Sea. The subsequent depression of Issik Köl greatly reduced
123 the volume of the Chu, with the result that the rapid current in the Sir Darya, no longer turned by a river coming from the east, impinged upon the opposite bank, creating swamps and finally struggling through them along the level steppe until it emptied as at present into the northern end of the Aral Sea. In the same way the Amu Darya, forming marshes about the places where it formerly turned into the Özboy, found a new outlet at the southern end of the Aral Sea.

Togan's idea is that, by another change to be engineered by man, the economic future of his Türkili could be assured. We shall see that Soviet engineers have put forward a great engineering project for diverting the Amu Darya to the Caspian to irrigate the Karakum, and the natural deduction from this would be that they believe water did once reach the Turkmen desert from the river. But the latest Soviet theory seems to be that the Oxus has not changed its course since the Tertiary Period, when it was turned to the Aral by an earth movement along the axis of the Caucasus uplift.[1] In this view, which is at variance with many records, Soviet savants are unlikely to be relying on what others have said. It is more credible, I think, that they are upheld by the dogma that it is left to Soviet man alone to change the face of nature. The Tertiary Period is safe enough; but historical convulsions are a different matter. They cannot be admitted to have occurred if they in any way detract from the inevitable movement of a Five-Year Plan. When it comes to history, it must be Soviet man who is the first to put things straight.

175 There were, however, reasons for the decline of Turkistan from its position held in the Middle Ages other than changes in the course of the rivers. Although these reasons are historical, they are of a general nature, and since they are connected with the use by man of geographical sea-routes in preference to land-routes as the medium of commerce, it is

---

[1] Bib. II, 1, Professor J. Bernal.

175

convenient to refer to them at this point.

In the XIIIth century the Mongol Chingiz Khan conquered China, Turkistan and Persia. The Empire of Chingiz was divided between his four sons: here it will suffice to say that the Ilkhan dynasty which established itself in Persia and Irak on the ruins of the Caliphate and the Seljuks was founded by Hulagu, who belonged to the same branch of Chingiz' family as Kublai the Great Khan of China, both being sons of Chingiz' fourth son Tului.

It was therefore in the interests of Kublai to conclude, if possible, with his brother Hulagu an arrangement for the transport of goods between the Tului family dominions in the east and in the west, and this in fact is what was done as soon as Kublai Khan was able to seize the ports in southern China. Trade entered the Persian Gulf. This led to the enrichment of Hormuz as the port on the Gulf, and to the rise of the great and prosperous city at Herat. For a time Herat became the principal clearing centre for the trade of Central and Western Asia and a distinguished culture flourished there under the later Timurid princes. The countries to the north of the Oxus, allotted without any very clear definition to the elder branches of Chingiz' family (the Golden Horde and the Chaghatai Horde), were left in the cold. This process had been accelerated by the utter destruction of Khorezm itself at the hands of Juchi, Chingiz' eldest son. The products of the Far East now came up to the Oxus by way of Baluchistan and Hormuz. The Far Eastern traffic had thus been diverted from the caravan to the sea, and in so far as caravan routes in Turkistan were needed to serve it these ran from north to south, and not through the mountain passes. But still some trade with Europe and the West remained.

With the rounding of the Cape by the Portuguese at the end of the XVth century, and the formation of British, Dutch and French companies a century later, the trade by caravan through Turkistan to Europe also died. Except for local commerce, even the Persian Gulf became a backwater, and Herat lost its pre-eminence. The economic axis had swung

175 from a latitudinal to a longitudinal direction. The maritime age had succeeded that of the caravan, and Turkistan was no longer a centre of power or commerce. In a seaman's age its place had been taken by Western Europe.

Once the through routes were empty of traffic, the only remaining attraction keeping Turkistan within a southern orbit was the gravitational pull of a common Islamic tradition. Even this began to weaken as communications broke down. Religious and cultural bonds began to snap, and local religions to spring up. Shiah votaries will dispute Togan's conclusion, given as an instance of this tendency, that the spectacular rise of the Shiahs of Persia in Safavid times from being mainly a mountain sect to the position of a State religion was due to this cause. Small principalities began to arise in Turkistan. The process was hastened by the internecine wars between the two Turkish houses, the Ottomans in Istanbul and the Safavids in Isfahan — also Turks from Erdebil in Azerbaijan. The Turkish world was disintegrating, and the way was open for European pressure from the south and Russian pressure from the north.

000 Some of these ideas are curiously like the theme developed in one of the essays of Arnold Toynbee.[1] He too sees the world in terms of a caravan age succeeded by a maritime age, and to him also Farghana in the caravan age appears as a central point of the world. Can it be, Toynbee asks, that in an air age it may once more become so? This, he judges, may come about for the reason that in an air age a world centre of gravity is likely to be determined not by physical but by human geography, and to be situated at a point equidistant from two main poles of world population. If so, it will not be because Farghana is a void. Like Kashmir and Peshawar farther south, it is itself a jewel of fertility, ringed round by the world's greatest mountains and deserts. It is remarkable that one of the greatest of contemporary historians has seen the same light, spreading from the past and casting a beam into the future.

[1] Bib. I, 93.

III

PATTERN OF PEOPLES

Few cases, perhaps, in romance or history, can sustain a close collation with this as to the complexity *of its separate interests.* 000

DE QUINCEY, Revolt of the Tartars

WE see a land wide and open like the ocean, closed in by the barriers of high mountain on one side and the unharvested desert or inhospitable inland waters on the other. Before the railways were built, in one quarter only, the north-east, was there comparatively easy passage from outside. And in restricted regions only, along the foothills of these mountains, and within their glens, or farther along the rivers which issue from them, is there a certain livelihood to be won through a settled agriculture. Elsewhere the steppe and the hillside offer a life only to the nomad, equipped to move his flocks and herds in pursuit of a precarious rainfall and an uncertain season. We shall expect then to find two forms of subsistence, the intensive cultivation of the oasis by the farmer bound to traditional uses, and the wandering life of the stockbreeder on the Alpine pasture or the steppe.

Many of the flatlands of what is now Russian Central Asia 132
are farther from the sea than any part of the world land- 233
mass save Sinkiang alone. Hence the uncertain precipitation in all but the mountain regions, and the need for the herdsman to wander far afield in search of pasture for his flocks. There are recurrent years of famine without winter snow or spring rain, years which are really reminders of the peril of desiccation
hanging over these countries. It is this that has driven the 000
pastoralist in history to become a nomad, wandering over the steppe almost as urgently as the tribes of Arabia in their

000 deserts. And this without doubt is the predisposing cause of the migrations over Central Asia from the dawn of history.

114 The history of what I have called the Turanian basin up to the time of the Russian conquest is extraordinarily confusing. Even the Russian orientalist, V. V. Barthold, who made this field peculiarly his own, was driven to exclaim: 'L'historien qui cherche à l'expliquer se trouve fort embarrassé de distinguer entre les causes et les effets'.[1] It is indeed a pitfall for the unwary, even for one who has spent many months in the country itself. An instance of this is to be found in the heroic journey of the Hungarian Vambéry, who penetrated to Transoxiana in 1863 in the guise of a dervish. When, after his return, he published, among other works, a *History of Bokhara* without adequate knowledge of the labours of Russian scholars in this field, he was mercilessly assailed by a company of *critici furiosi*, among others the Russian orientalist Grigoriev. That the criticism was influenced by professional and national jealousies is indicated by the verdicts of Curzon and the American diplomat Schuyler, the former speaking of the profound sensation caused by Vambéry's voyage and works, and the latter confessing to having indulged in harsh criticism. But Vambéry had in the end to admit that his local knowledge did not equip him to pose as an historian. Like Burton, he was a traveller first.

An immense amount of learning and research has gone into these subjects from the Russian side, both in Tsarist and in Soviet times. The names of Radloff, Barthold and Samoylovich are particularly remarkable in the Central Asian field.[2]
000 Yet it remains true that a popular and comprehensible analysis of the story of these lands in English does not exist. What follows cannot claim to be more than an essay in history: the most that can be done within the narrow limits of a contemporary book is to sketch in historical background enough to enable any who now approach these peoples and problems for the first time to understand something of the forces that have

---

[1] Bib. I, 7, p. 189.

[2] The reader is referred to the Bibliography at the end of this book.

000

gone before. For it would be a profound mistake to imagine that the Sovietization of Central Asia and its populations has wiped clean the earlier drawings on the slate. The Soviet press itself shows otherwise.

The investigator of Turkish and Mongol history in this part of the world is like a man standing on an upper floor, watching the unpredictable and disordered movement of a crowd gathered on some great occasion. Groups meet and coalesce, groups melt and dissolve; a sudden interest draws a mass in one direction, only to split up again; a bidder or leader may for some moments gather a knot of adherents; political or personal causes lead to rioting; a regiment goes past and there is slaughter and destruction, or even for a time a sense of purpose and direction of effort. To use another metaphor, the succession of rulers and tribes, with their gatherings, their severances and their overlap, resembles the raindrops on a moving window-pane, meeting but to dissolve and fade away, and streaming together across the glass only when a storm of rain blows up and carries all before it. In such a picture it is hard to trace the beginnings or the purposes of the forces that move across the vision, the more so in a land whose terrain has until recently imposed nomadic habits on its populations, so that the forces themselves have been perpetually on the move. For an example of this we may look to the last great Timurid, Babur. He succeeds to his hereditary kingdom of Farghana, moves on to capture Samarkand, only to lose it again more than once in a short decade. There follows the astonishing contrast of his conquest of Hindustan, where he is able to found an Empire and become the first in a succession in the direct line lasting for over three centuries. During the first two of these, his successors were among the most firmly established rulers in the world. In his Turkish home a wandering soldier of fortune, here one year and gone the next; in Hind the first of a mighty line of kings, the shadow of whose name and policies can be seen in the Indian field of administration to this very day.

115 The central points in the earlier history of Turkistan are two. The first is the Mongol deluge which, under Chingiz Khan, swept over the land in the years 1219–24; the second the thunderbolt launched by Timur nearly two centuries later (1379–1405). Timur, though of Mongol antecedents, used Chaghatai Turkish as his mother tongue and belonged to what Barthold [1] called *la tribu mongole turquisée* of the Barlas, established at the ancient twin city of Kesh [2] where the Kashka Darya issues from the mountains.

000 It will be found that the human material, and the forces applied to it, will fall into a more comprehensible order if viewed in periods divided by these two outstanding events in the history of Central Asia. But, before embarking on any analysis of these periods, there are a number of general distinctions and definitions that I must make, if there is to be any understanding of the people mixed together in the crucible which is Central Asia.

197 A reference to the map at the end of this book will show the reader the disposition of the peoples of Russian Central Asia, arranged as it stands today in accordance with the various languages, Turkic and Iranian, spoken by the agglomerations known loosely as Uzbeks, Kazaks, Karakalpaks, Kirghiz, Turkmens (all Turkish) and the Tajiks (Iranians). It will be seen that in more than one case the speakers of these languages overlap across the international frontiers into China, Afghani-
[191] stan and Persia. There are also areas within the country in which Uzbek mingles with Tajik, Turkmen or Karakalpak, Kirghiz with Uzbek, and so on. Bilingualism in Uzbek and Tajik is common in areas of overlap, especially so in the towns
[194] from Khojent to Bukhara. Turkic Uzbek in the towns has lost its vowel harmony under Iranian influence, but has preserved it in the north of the Uzbek linguistic territory, where there was no such influence. On the other hand, the juxta-

---

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 168.

[2] The modern name of these cities is Shahr-i-Sabz and Kitab. They are separated from Samarkand by the Takhta Karacha pass over a spur of the Hissar mountains.

position and overlapping of Uzbek, Turkmen and Karakalpak 197
in the Khorezm area, and of Uzbek and Turkmen in the area
along the eastern frontier of Turkmenia, has produced border
dialects which show strong traces of mutual influence, particularly
in phonetics. The only sharp 'language frontier' is
indeed that between the Kazaks and the Uzbeks — a fact
which suggests the social and ethnic divergence between the
steppe-dwellers and the more sedentary population of the
south. Stock-origins are confused by migration and exchange,
but this language frontier today is clear enough. It is not 563
blurred by the existence of small Kazak groups, usually known
as Kipchak Uzbeks, on Uzbek linguistic territory within
Uzbekistan. The language there has sometimes been mistakenly
regarded as the true Uzbek, but is in fact just a Kazak
dialect and it is noteworthy that, in spite of the geographical
overlap between these people and their Uzbek surroundings,
they do not mix or intermarry much with their neighbours,
so carrying the language distinction into their social life.

General ethnology provides us with numerous examples of 000
cases in which speakers of any particular language have taken
over their present tongue from other speakers, partly or
completely losing their own in the process. The language of
a particular tribe or people is, therefore, not necessarily an
indication of that people's stock-origin and relations, and any
evidence of the kind can only be used with the greatest care.
Nevertheless, I venture to affirm that, for the greater part of the
population in this part of the world, language does in fact give
some indication of the peoples' stock-origin. This conclusion
is justified if we bear in mind an important social factor,
namely, that nomadic, semi-nomadic, or forcibly settled tribes
speaking a Turkic language can safely be regarded as being of
Turkish origin. This is because the Turk entered history as
a nomad; it follows that, if nomadic antecedents are still
attributable to him and he still speaks a Turkic tongue, that
is strong evidence of his Turkish stock.

With sedentary and town populations speaking Tajik it 174
can as safely be accepted that they are of Iranian stock-origin.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL2

174 This conclusion of course requires qualification in the case of the relatively few sedentary and town populations speaking only a Turkic language: in that case language is not a safe criterion, for these 'Turks' may be, and often are, turkized Tajiks. History shows many instances of other peoples adopting Turkish ways, but until recently very few of the adoption
[191] by Turks of the dress of other civilizations.[1] Many more of the
[101] town-dwellers are bilingual in Uzbek and Tajik; in their case this bilingualism points even more strongly to the Tajik or mixed origin of the individuals concerned. It was to sedentary dwellers of this kind, whether bilingual or speaking only Tajik, that the true Turks formerly applied the pejorative appellation of 'Sart'.

197 At the same time, the Iranization of the Turkic tongues in the
191 southern cities is an illustration of the mingling of the raindrops of which I have spoken.[1] Lastly, the bilingualism of the oasis-strip from Khojent to Bukhara identifies specific points at which the Turkish flood passed on to leave Iranian islands unswamped by the inundations from the steppe and the mountains.

000 Behind all the parade of ethnology and linguistics it is well to look always for the essential difference between the settled cultivators and townsmen of the scattered oases of Transoxiana and the nomads of the northern and the western steppe (now the Kazak and Turkmen country). That is the indispensable fact, without which no insight can be obtained into the tangle of events passing for history in Central Asia. It is the old antithesis of Cain and Abel, so clear to eastern thought, a distinction always before the local leaders, on whose minds it was indelibly impressed by the events of the Basmachi struggle
177 of 1918–24. We shall see in the subsequent analysis of periods
175 that the settled population, whatever its ethnic origin, was for
771 centuries exposed to Persian influence and immigration from the south, and was indeed for the first three hundred years after the Muslim conquest actually controlled by Persian rulers. One result of this contact was an indoctrination with the

---

[1] A notable exception is the Indianization of the Turks who followed Babur to India, due partly to the conscious policy of his grandson Akbar, but mainly to the small infusion of Turkish blood into India's vast body.

[1] [for metaphor, see cat. 116, pp 31-- Analyst]

orthodox tenets of the most rigid form of Hanafi Sunniism — 177
for the Samanids and others who controlled this country from 175
the south were orthodox, and long centuries had yet to elapse 771
before the rulers of Persia took to Shiism as the Persian State religion under the influence of Shah Ismail, founder of the Safavid dynasty of Persia in the XVIth century. A sedentary oasis population is peculiarly prone to the excesses of a morose clericalism, such as flourished in Transoxiana at least as long as the early part of the present century. On the other hand, the nomads of the steppe — the successors of the Mongol *ulus* or hordes, themselves not Islamized for the best part of a century after Chingiz Khan — naturally sit lightly to established orthodoxy or indeed to congregational worship of any kind. It is easy to simplify and the margins are blurred, but it is true in the broad to say that one of the essential differences of Persian and Turk is visible in the attitude of each to religion — an excessive formalism susceptible to the fanatical appeal, set against an easy nonchalance which may indeed recognize the immanence of God, but sees him more clearly upon the mountain than within the mosque.

But the nomad's influence on events in Central Asia, and 000
beyond Central Asia, is not attributable only to his attitude to the things of the spirit. It is in fact he who (until the Russian coming) supplied the driving force which altered the course of history right across Asia and into Europe. As the analysis proceeds through the list of dynasties who from time to time held sway over the settled regions, we shall observe, without finding it easy to explain, the sudden emergence at more or less regular intervals of hosts which march out of the sunrise on the steppe, ruthless and disciplined, and in a few years sweep away the carefully gathered fruits of the sedentary peoples. Who are these nomads? What is the meaning of this outer nomadism? And what have they left behind in the way of flotsam and jetsam after the day of their glory has passed? And, lastly, how far have the nomadic and the settled peoples become intermingled in the course of the movements of the centuries?

[illegible] After the Turks came flooding in the Mongols. Much ink
has been spilt by the learned in discussing the relationship
between Mongol and Turk in Central Asian history. Confusion
reigns in the use of such terms as Mongol, Tatar, Turk,
Sart, Kazak and Uzbek, and there is a tendency to complicate
the discussion still further by an approach through linguistics.
For instance, Chuvash, a Turkic language spoken on the
Volga, has a distinct admixture of Bulgar terms, and it is sometimes
sought therefore to distinguish its speakers as the true
representatives of the Golden Horde, who mingled with the
Bulgars — an earlier-than-Mongol stock — upon the Volga.
175 But even if the armies of Chingiz were themselves pure
Mongols (and there is reason to believe they were not), the
ultimate truth is that at that date this was a Turkish sea into
which the Mongol rivers flowed. The Mongol civilization
was absorbed by the Turkish civilization in Transoxiana, just
as it was absorbed by the higher culture of China and Russia.
[197] The name of Chaghatai, the second son of the Mongol Chingiz,
even became that of the literary Turkic language of the
Eastern Turks, and, less than two centuries later, Timur himself,
belonging to a tribe of Mongol origin, had become in
all essentials a Turk. Perhaps the best way of setting this
question in its true light is again to point to the last great
Timurid, the Emperor Babur. Himself described on his
father's side as descended in the fifth generation from Timur,
and on his mother's side in the thirteenth generation from
Chaghatai the second son of Chingiz — and so of Mongol
ancestry on both sides — he writes in Turkish, and in his
Memoirs[1] speaks with disdain of the Mughul (Mongol) race:
'Of all others', he says, 'the wretches of Mughuls were most
active in unhorsing and stripping the stragglers'. And later
in verse:[2]

Were the Mughuls angels, they would be bad,
Written in gold, evil would be the name Mughul.

---

[1] Bib. I, 61, p. 150.

[2] The verse may be an interpolation by Babur's son, the Emperor Humayun. But the argument stands.

It is ironical that Babur's line should have come to be 175 known in India as the Mughul dynasty! The truth, of course, is summed up in Barthold's phrase *Mongol turquisé*. The real lasting antithesis, owing little to ethnological differences between Turk and Mongol, is that which existed between the sedentary population of the oases and the nomads of the steppe.[1]

With Babur as guide I conclude that in this region the ethnic distinction of Turk and Mongol has had no ultimate meaning; for, even if much of the impulse for the migrations came from Mongolia, the movements set on foot were significantly Turkish. Who, then, were these Turkish tribes of the steppe who created a force which at least four times in history — under the Seljuks, under Chingiz, under Timur, and under the Ottomans, carried the banners of Central Asia into the heart of other continents?

Much interesting detail is forthcoming[2] as to the identity 174 of the various Turkish tribes and their relationship with one [illegible] another; but for the general reader this would obscure the canvas. The ramifications are endless and confused. But two names may be taken as typical of the whole — the Oghuz, the tribal ancestors of the warriors who carved out two empires, the Seljuk and the Ottoman, and the Kipchak who succeeded to the Oghuz in the northern steppe. The Oghuz are thus the fathers of the Western Turks and of the Turkmens, their remnant east of the Caspian; while the Kipchak are one of the main tribal components of the 'Kazak', true Uzbek and Nogai clans. The name Kipchak is to be found ranging across the steppe north of the Sir Darya from the Irtish to the Urals and beyond, and as far south as the Vale of Farghana. Barthold suggests that the migrations of the Oghuz may have been prompted by Kipchak pressure, itself set in motion by the Mongol threat from farther east. I take then the name Kipchak as a type of the shifting Turkish organizations which occupied

---

[1] Those desirous of pursuing this line of thought will find interesting material in Elias and Ross, Bib. I, 31. See also Bib. I, 13, pp. 37 and 67.

[2] Cf. Togan, *op. cit.* chap. ii, from p. 23 onwards for over sixty pages.

174 101 the steppe between the sedentary kingdoms of Maveraunnahr and the Mongols of the east. It was into this reservoir that the Mongol river poured, only to raise its level and cause it to overflow. The range of the reservoir was roughly coincident with the present Soviet Republic of Kazakistan. When the seasons pressed and nomadic life became hard, the tribes would prey on the sedentary population. Conversely, their numbers were often increased by the accession of groups who had rebelled against the authority of the dynasties in the oases, preferring a rover's life to submission, and it was to such groups that the name Kazak [1] came later to be applied. The steppe offers freedom to the venturesome, and many elements at different times were fused in these wandering populations. Ethnically, the farther removed from the towns with their underlying Persian stock, the closer to the traditional Tatar, [197] thick-bodied, small-eyed and with scanty hair. The Kipchak language was of the Turkic family. Many of Chingiz' soldiers were undoubtedly of this Turkish stock, and the Mongol way of life was slowly absorbed in that of the Turks, who were in a position to draw on the mixed Irano-Turkish culture of the sedentary populations.

It was these vagrants who would gather in loose confederations sometimes to plunder the resources of Maveraunnahr itself, sometimes in alliance with newcomers to sweep beyond Central Asia into farther fields.

As these processes worked themselves out, the various stocks crossed and mingled, joined and separated like the rain- 369 drops on the window. But, just as even today the nomad Turkish and Mongol cross can be seen in the typical Kazak, it is still possible to pick out in the sedentary population of the oases of Transoxiana a type which is in all respects, physical, mental and moral, at odds with the Kazak or the Turkmen of the steppe. The man of the oasis is often small-

---

[1] *Kazak* is an old Turkish word meaning a vagabond, and later a partisan or guerrilla. It means an outlaw who refuses to live a settled life, or who has fled from tyranny. Some have traced its derivation from *Kazmak*, to dig (but digging is just what Kazaks do not do), others from *Kaz*, a goose. Either derivation seems far-fetched. The word Cossack was taken from it and applied to the Russian who lived a similar life.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1
Tadjik

The man of the oasis is often small- boned, loose-limbed, hirsute, with long narrow head and nose, [142] the man of the steppe stocky, round of head, with scanty 369 beard. The one is a careful cultivator and good craftsman; the other has been bred with flocks and is tied to no plot of land. The one is often a fanatic; the other sits, or rides, easily to dogma. The men of the oasis were once commonly 101 called *Sarts* by the men of the steppe, and as the currency of the Turkic language ousted the Persian, this name later made no distinction between the townsman or cultivator who spoke as a Turk and him who spoke Persian.[1] Still later the appellation Sart came to be used in a pejorative sense, and there has been a tendency to shun it. The picture is familiar to all who know the towns of the Pathan province of Pakistan, the old North-West Frontier. There too the town populations, though many of them speak Pashtu, do not belong to the dominant stock of the Pathans but are remnants of the *indigènes* or the camp followers of the conquests that passed that way; the Pathan tribesmen know them familiarly as 'townees'. Barthold[2] claims a similar origin for the word *Sart*, saying it was borrowed from India and used by the Turks in the sense of 'merchant', with a pejorative innuendo like that to be found in the Indian word *banya* of today. A latter-day pride has led the Turkic-speaking Sarts to arrogate to themselves the name of Uzbek, making language the criterion to distinguish between Turk and Tajik.

The Tajiks who still speak Persian live either in the towns or on the oases that are under the most intensive cultivation (as around Khojent in Farghana), or in the remote Pamir valleys now known as Gorno (Hill)-Badakhshan, where the Turks have never penetrated. Many of the Tajiks of the mountains, like their neighbours in Gilgit and Chitral, belong to the Ismaili[3] sect of Shiism, which venerates the Agha

---

[1] Cf. Barthold, *op. cit.* p. 190.

[2] *Op. cit.* p. 34. Another derivation is to connect 'Sart' etymologically with the Persian *Shahr*, a city. See Schuyler, *op. cit.* i, 104.

[3] Ismailis form a great part of the population in Afghan Wakhan and in Gilgit and Chitral. Chitral is in Pakistan: Gilgit is included in that part of Kashmir at present in Pakistan occupation.

Tajiks
Kent Turks

101 Khan, and Soviet publicists, of design or in ignorance, have
sought for this reason to affirm that they are not Muslims.
There is also a tendency to play up their Persian speech as a
counter to Turkish nationalism, and we find all the great
Persian poets, even Saadi and Hafiz of far-away Shiraz,
186 figuring in Soviet history as honorary Tajiks. As fighters the
Turkish stocks hold the Tajiks in derision, and the annals
of the Basmachi period have an amusing description [1] of a
Tajik detachment which turned out in support of Enver Pasha:

> They were followers of the Sheikhs and Mullahs, well-fed and fat and quite useless for fighting. They wore large wooden clogs with soles two inches thick, had carpets on their saddles, and tea-kettles hanging from them. When they started to run in battle, all this naturally fell off.

Here is the inspiration for the White Knight of Lewis Carroll.

[191] Most of the townsmen and many of the settled cultivators
101 south of the Tienshan speak both a Turkic tongue and the
Tajik form of Persian. Togan [2] calls them Kent-Turks or
Town-Turks, and is inclined to claim them as being of pure
Turkish stock, unmixed with Iranian blood or influence. This
insistence is odd and hard to reconcile with the fact of the
long-established Persian influence in Transoxiana. Moreover,
he himself is constrained to attribute the fanatical attitudes of
the town-bred *ulema* to Persian influences, and to note their
physical resemblance — strong growth of beard and so on —
[617] to the Persian and Afghan people farther south. He observes
that the new Russian ethnical division of his Türkili has caused
the settled Turks to call themselves Uzbeks, and here perhaps
is the key to his case.

> Possibly it is they [he writes] who cling most passionately to
> the name. They who once regarded the Uzbeks as barbarians,
> now take an interest in the literature of the Uzbek tribe which is
> 000 replacing the too subtle legends of Persia. It may be that the
> language of the real Uzbeks will impress itself on the Iranized Kent
> dialect,[3] and the genuinely Uzbek qualities come to life again.

---

[1] Togan, *op. cit.* p. 440.

[2] *Op. cit.* p. 48 *et seq.*

[193] [3] Long association with Persian has caused the Uzbek spoken in Bukhara and Samarkand to lose the vowel harmonies, and debased the gerund and participial constructions characteristic of all genuine Turkic languages.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Kipchak
Uzbek
Nogai

The Kent-Turks may even grasp that they are one nation with other Turks. . . . Seen from this point of view the extended use of the name Uzbek may be a stepping stone to the use of the name Turk to describe the national unity of Turkistan. OCO

The Turkmen with his Oghuz ancestry I have already noted. He is rather to be grouped with the Western Turks. As for the Eastern Turks, I have put forward the tribal name Kipchak as typical of the Turkish stock of the steppe, upon which the Mongol deluge descended. After the Mongol conquest Kipchak disappears as the name of an *ulus*[1] from the pages of the Muslim chronicles. But the Kipchaks, with others like them, supplied the fundamental Turkish element which, overlaid by the Mongol invasion and having joined the Mongols in the wanderings of the Golden Horde, produced in time a mingled Turco-Mongol agglomeration of tribes. From this rough fashioning the Uzbek and the Nogai — also known as the Mangit — issued as pre-eminent. The process worked itself out over the whole range of country from Maveraunnahr, over the Urals, and down to the Volga and the Don, and it is on this ground some of the emigration claim that the cause of the Kazan Tatars of the Volga, and of the Bashkurds[2] in the Urals is one with that of the peoples who were later to be known as the Uzbeks and the Kazaks in Turkistan. 101

It is interesting, and typical of the Mongol-Turk confusion, that the Uzbek and the Nogai, Turkish tribes, took their name from eponymous Mongol princes of the house of Juchi, Chingiz' eldest son and father of the Golden Horde. The imaginative have given the name Uzbek an alternative derivation from the words *öz*, essence, spirit, self, and *beg*, a master — one who is captain of his soul. To each his choice, but Uzbek Khan (1312–40) was an historical prince of the line of Juchi. The picture emerging, which in the main conforms

---

[1] A Mongol or Turkish nation or tribe. The Pathans too use the word.

[2] The ethnologists set the Bashkurds in the Finno-Ugrian group. But the Bashkurd language belongs to the Turkic, not the Finno-Ugrian, branch of the Altaic system, and their country lay across the way of the Turco-Mongol migrations of the Golden Horde.

[197]

8t Caroe 8-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Uzbek
Nogai
Kazak

101 with Barthold's views, in that it was these Uzbek and Nogai clans, and others of their kind, who became the forerunners of the true (*ulugh*) Uzbeks, of the Tatars of Idel-Ural, and of the Kazaks alike. Those of them that became masters of the cities in succession to the Mongol and Timurid houses naturally assimilated some degree of the Persianized manner and habit of mind, body and speech prevailing among the sedentary population, until in the end the Turkic-speaking Sarts
181 claimed enlistment under the Uzbek banner. But, as the Basmachi troubles showed as late as 1920, there were many Uzbeks left in the villages and hill-country who retained all their ancient prowess as warriors up to the time of the coming of the Soviets to Turkistan.

Of the Uzbeks proper Togan writes :[1]

> They do not display that Muslim fanaticism and pride in an effete civilisation which is almost a disease among the Kent-Turks. Although today the Uzbeks live a settled life, their tribal divisions have not entirely lost their political and social importance. They are serious, peaceable and honest, but in war they are as courageous and pitiless as ever they were. They love hard exercise and games on horseback called Kökbori. They have retained their aptitude for war, as they shewed in the Basmachi rebellion, and it is surely they who will one day play the chief part in the political life of Turkistan.

101 Those who remained on the steppe took to themselves in time the generic name of Kazak. As stated, the word Kazak means a vagabond or outlaw — one beyond the pale; it is not a tribal name. The process is not unlike that whereby the branches of the great Ghilzai clans, which cross the North-West Frontier in annual migration from homes in the Afghan highlands to the softer climate of the Indus Valley, are known not by the tribal name of Ghilzais but as Powindahs or graziers. Just as the word *Sart* was used to designate a cultivator or townsman, so Kazak was applied without tribal significance to the nomads of the steppe. In such a country with such a history the ancestry of the Kazaks has been tangled

---

[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 46-7.

RL1
Kazak

beyond unravelling by a Western hand, but their physique 101
suggests that they retain a larger infusion of Mongol,[1] or, more particularly, Kalmuck, blood than the clans which entered the oases. There is, moreover, a wide distinction between the 000
languages of the steppe and those of the settled regions. Attempts are now being made to study how far a common lingua franca could be developed, based perhaps on the old Chaghatai, but Soviet pressure bears hardly on such efforts and it remains to be seen how far in practice a reconciliation of language can be achieved or would be welcomed by the people themselves.

The Kazaks fought under famous Khans in their struggle 619
against Russian domination, but these Khans were only leaders in the steppe; they never ruled in Turkistan as did the Uzbeks. In their own country they were like the Oghuz, who came from the same stock: '*Ce furent précisément ces tribus qui ne réussirent jamais à s'unifier pour former une unité politique, qui fondèrent les empires turcs les plus puissants*'.[2] But these empires were beyond Central Asia: those who remained and came to be called Kazaks had but a loose tribal organization. Togan writes of them:[3]

> The Russians used to try to persuade themselves that the Kazaks had never really embraced Islam, and it was thought that for this reason anti-God propaganda would succeed among them. The hope has not been realized.

and again of the good and bad features of their tradition:

> A cool head and dislike of haste or excitement, moderation, 181
> courage, delight in command, ruthlessness in battle but respect for conditions of a truce, sparing but selling prisoners — a simple mind but not so simple as to be exploited by the foe — encouragement of the blood-feud between individuals, families and even tribes — and the custom of selling children in times of stress.

Schuyler,[4] writing in 1876, has a pleasing picture of an Uzbek of the old régime, Jüre Beg, once Governor of the

---

[1] For a succinct definition of Mongol tribal subdivisions, ancient and modern, see Howorth (Bib. I, 44), i, 557. Today the main groups are *Khalkha*, *Oirats*, *Buriat* and *Kalmuck*.

[2] Barthold, *op. cit.* p. 81.

[3] Togan, *op. cit.* p. 534.

[4] *Op. cit.* i, 85.

181 combined region of Kitab and Shahr-i-Sabz before the Russians came. He found him a man whose word he could implicitly trust, possessed of much delicacy of mind and feeling, with an appreciation of what is due to himself and of an aristocratic bearing in every look and movement. In appearance Jūre Beg was tall and handsome, simply dressed but exquisitely neat, with a thin beard, pleasant dark eyes, and a serious face — a strict Muslim, but altogether without fanaticism — an excellent judge of character, with the politeness of Asia at his finger's end, yet with dignity to act as he thought right. He conformed indeed, says Schuyler, to his notion of perfect breeding. Togan, writing sixty years later of the same man, speaks of the great respect in which Jūre was held by his own people and Russians alike. He came of a nomad Uzbek tribe, like the Kazaks not greatly influenced by Persian manners, but he had a fine library which he was proud to show to Barthold, whom he allowed to catalogue it. To the Russian Barthold, he said, 'The Russian administration in Turkistan is very like that of the Mongols; they choose the worst men from among us and use them against their fellow countrymen'.

186 No writer on the Turks of Central Asia can avoid a reference to the slogans under which various forces interested in this region have from time to time sought to enlist the interest of the Eastern Turks in a larger political union. Different banners have been unfurled, beneath which a Turkic renascence should take place. The following definition [1] is that given in Togan's work, with a conclusion that no one creed offers, as it stands, a worthy or practicable goal for the Turks.

The three terms, pan-Islamism, pan-Turanism and pan-Turkism, are first stated. The first, the religious appeal, which would draw in other peoples of the Muslim world, is seen as a strand only of a more real and deep Turkish patriotism. Generally, pan-Islamism is dismissed as a political force, partly because most of these writers and thinkers themselves started

---

[1] Op. cit. pp. 360 et seqq.

a[i.e. by Togan, see cat 116. pp. 7-9 -- Analyst]

186

very much to the left, and partly no doubt in deference to the inspirations of modern Turkey. While therefore it is possible to speak in moving terms of Islam in the hearts of the people, far beyond the confines of the mosque or the conceptions of the *ulema*, as a political watchword it is regarded by the new nationalism as a mirage of imperialists.

The pan-Turanian idea is defined as a Hungarian proposal for a league of all Turkish, Mongol, Hungarian and Finno-Ugrian stocks — a sort of political Altaics. This has only to be stated to be dismissed as theory empty of political content, because it lacks the necessary social and geographical nexus.

Lastly, pan-Turkism is defined as originally the product of the mind of the Hungarian Vambéry. As a political force it is discounted, but the new nationalism finds attractions in the idea of an entente of races of strictly Turkish stock. There is a search for a cultural and social image of a sort to appeal to those lost in the desert, who need a well whereby to quench their thirst and recover their bearings. Togan himself by no means envisages a unified Turkic State, federal or otherwise, under the hegemony of Turkey; indeed he quotes sayings of that protagonist of such impulses, Enver Pasha, recognizing that, although there should be a common inspiration for peoples of Turkish stock, and all Turks, west and east, should be free of foreign domination, it is no use to look forward to a formal unity, even of language. He does not say it, but he seems to look forward to a loose gathering of the clans not unlike the modern conception of the Commonwealth, in cultural harmony, a group of adults, acting together in danger but under no formal obligations. The inspiration of his thought is best imparted in his own words.[1]

> The movement for Turkish unity [he writes], is not a fancy that all the Turks will ever create a political structure. When we talk of a Turkish world we think of a civilization of Turkish complexion and Turkish spirit. In Turkey, as in Turkistan, there was research into Turkish history, national literature and custom. It aroused intense interest not only in Turcological publications by

---

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 558.

186 European scholars, but also among Europeans generally as giving an increased insight into the Turkish world. The question of the historical unity of Turkish culture is being more and more explained. The two mystics, Ahmed Yesevi of the XIIth century in Yese [the town now itself called Turkistan near the Sir Darya] and Yunus Emre 150 years later in Anatolia, represented one and the same school and culture. The ancient enmity typified by the war between Bayezid and Timur, the respective national heroes of the Western and Eastern Turks, began to lose its force. The national literature of Azerbaijan shows how Chingiz and Timur are becoming the greatest heroes of a national consciousness common to all Turks. There is no doubt that Ismail Gaspirali's [1] work had an influence in Turkey, and was the first sign of the reforms which took shape 50 years later under Atatürk.

The Yesevite School of Ahmed Yesevi in the realm of religion; the epics of Oghuz Khan, Dede Korkut and Köroghlu [2] in the domain of literature; the works of art and monuments of the East Turks and the West Turks; all these are a pledge of the universal significance of Turkish civilization. [340] Until recently historians of the art of the Osmanli period held the Green Mosque at Bursa to be purely an Osmanli work; it now transpires that it is ornamented by Tabriz tile-artists who knew the art of the Ilkhans, and by a Bursa decorator who had learned his craft in the time of Timur at Samarkand. The monuments of the Ilkhan period at Tabriz, the mosques of the Timurids at Meshed and Herat, the glorious *medreses* at Samarkand, Yese and Urgench are of one and the same Turkish civilization.

000 In the Caucasus a pan-Turkish ideal arouses jealousies among those who are not Turks, or even Muslims. But that is another story; here in Turkistan emphasis on this ideal need not weaken the national resistance from Europe against the Great Russians, nor should Georgians and Armenians suspect motives which inspire those who seek the independence of the homelands of the Turks.

On the narrower stage of Turkistan east of the Caspian, there are the contrasts between tent-dweller and settled cultivator, townsman and mountaineer, Turkish tribal custom (the *Yasa* or *Yasak*) and the Islamic *Sheriat*, between the Khorasani culture of the south and the legends of the Turkish horsemen of the north, even between the pure Turkic languages of the steppe and the Persianized speech of Maveraunnahr. It is necessary to distinguish Kazaks, Uzbeks, Kirghiz, Turkmens and Town-Turks. But the constant effort of writers like Togan is to work towards a common nationality for all the people of Turkistan. To some extent this is special pleading with a political motive, and they display a clear tendency to overstress the theme that the Town-Turks are of pure Turkish stock. They criticize too the artificial division of Turkistan by the boundaries drawn under the Soviet settlement of 1924, and indeed there is reason to hold — to this I shall return — that Soviet policy has been directed to breaking down the country into linguistic units with one object at least of countering any tendency towards a wider nationalism which should embrace all Turkistan. But there remains an impression, confirmed by the writings of some groups of a younger emigration which have fled from the Russians, that, in seeking to establish a single tradition, refugees have overdone the stress on unity and underrated the diversities. It is as if Panjabis, Gurkhas, Sikhs, Marathas, Pathans had been lumped together in the Army of the old India. It may not be impossible to seek unity through diversity, and to work towards institutions which recognize these differences.

---

[1] Crimean writer, XIXth century. See Chapter XIII, p. 226.

[2] Old epics of the Uzbek, Kazak and Turkmen tribes handed down by word of mouth. Soviet scholars have done much to reduce them to writing, but usually to Russian and not in the original. The latest Ukase is that this is the literature of a bygone feudal age, teaching a false bourgeois nationalism and must be shunned.

On this subject see Bib. II, 7, Dr. Wiener.

But it is not yet time to see the picture whole. The attempt up to this point has been to sort out and set in order against a physical background the various strains and layers of humanity which have gone to make up this amalgam, observing that, in spite of a natural diversity, there have not been lacking certain forces making for coalescence. Nevertheless, in passing to review some of the events of a tangled past, it will be well to bear in mind how enduring is the influence of the two environments, one of the desert and the other of the sown.

IV

CRUCIBLE OF EMPIRES

000

> *We are dead but our living was great: we are dumb, but*
> *a song of our State*
> *Will roam in the desert and wait with its burden of long,*
> *long ago. . . .*
>
> FLECKER

175 I HAVE remarked that the history of the Eastern Turks after the Arab conquest falls into clearer relief if it is grouped round the two violent upheavals caused by the invasion of the Mongols under Chingiz Khan early in the XIIIth century and the conquests of Timur issuing from his base at Kesh, near Samarkand, at the end of the XIVth century. The periods before the Russian pressure began early in the XVIIIth century then become:

(i) The pre-Mongol era, 700–1200.
(ii) Chingiz Khan and his successors, 1200–1350.
(iii) Timur and the Timurids, 1350–1500.
(iv) The Uzbek conquest under the Shaibanids, with the period of growing disorder and dissolution into the three petty States of Khiva (Khorezm), Bukhara and Kokand, 1500–1750.

(i) *Pre-Mongol Era*

Transoxiana as far as the Saihun (Sir Darya) was conquered by the Arabs during the reign of the *Umayyid* Caliph Abdul Malik in the last decade of the VIIth century. The conquest was the natural extension to the north of the overrunning of Sassanian Persia and was achieved by the Emir Kotaiba ibn Muslim with armies of which Arabs formed the spearhead only, reinforced by many thousands of troops from almost every part of Persia.

Not more than fifty years later grave disaffection broke out among the virile peoples of this north-eastern part of the Arab dominion, stirred by an oppressive Umayyid policy which refused to accord equal rights even to Muslim converts who were not Arabs. The estrangement of Khorasan and Transoxiana was adroitly used by the *Abbasids* of Baghdad, who with aid from Persia succeeded round about 750 in supplanting the Damascus house of the Umayyids. It was during the Abbasid period that a second centre of urban civilization was firmly planted in Transoxiana under Muslim auspices. Abbasid rule was largely in the hands of Khorasanis, so that Persian influences, as representing the new faith, became dominant in the oasis-cities along and between the Jaihun and the Saihun. What had taken place in fact under the impact of the faith was a Persian invasion and consolidation of the settled Turkish lands in the Turanian basin. Indeed Barthold holds that Persian population and influence in and over this region predated Islam and were evident under the Sassanian dynasty, during which Turkish tribes near the rim of the bowl had adopted Zoroastrianism.[1]

When towards the end of the IXth century the *Samanids* (874–999) succeeded to the Abbasid heritage in the frontier provinces of Khorasan and Transoxiana, the result was to clamp down the Persian yoke and influence even more tightly on the homelands of the Turks. Until the Turkish tribes adopted Islam they were in no position to aspire to rule, and up to this time Islam had had no success with them. There was indeed a period of about 300 years (last decade of VIIth to last decade of Xth century) between the Muslim conquest of Transoxiana and the first certain testimony to the adoption of Islam by Turks of any marked political influence. Up to that time Arab writers consistently number the Turkish tribes as enemies of the faith.

The Samanids came from Balkh and enforced a rigorous

---

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 33.

175 form of Hanafi Sunniism,[1] perhaps stimulated by the struggle which Islam had had to conduct with Buddhism for the mastery of that region. In the Hindu Kush, not far south of the rim, the great idols of Bamian, hewn in the rock, still stand to attest the strength which Buddhism once had on the southern fringe of Turan, and it has been suggested that the prevalence of theological schools (*medreses*) in Bukhara and other Turkish cities is to be explained as a relic of Buddhist [103] influence. The Sanskrit word *vihara* means a monastery, and the name Bukhara is probably derived from it.

The first Turkish house to embrace Islam was that of the *Karakhanids*, in the somewhat legendary person of Bughra Khan of Kashghar (d. *circa* A.D. 960). They are known to some historians as the *Ilak Khans*. The domains of this house extended to the north over Yedi Su, and its capital came later to be at a place named Balasagun, now unknown but probably on the Chu River. Bughra Khan's grandson, Harun, succeeded in the year 999 in taking Bukhara and Samarkand from the Samanids, thus supplanting an Iranian by a Turkish power for the first time for at least three centuries. Flushed with success the Karakhanids tried to carry their conquests farther south but were defeated by Mahmud of Ghazni,[2] with the result that the Amu became the dividing-line between the Karakhanid and the Ghaznavid realms. Early in the XIth century and not long after the establishment of Turkish rule in Transoxiana by the Karakhanids began the famous thrust of the *Ghuzz* or *Oghuz* Turks from the regions north of the Saihun (Sir Darya).

It was this great agglomeration of Turkish tribes, divided into twenty-four clans, which was destined to produce three of the most famous peoples in Islamic history. The first of

---

[1] The *Hanafi* is regarded as the school of the Sunnat, as opposed to the Shiah, in the most orthodox descent. There are three other Sunni schools, the Hanbali, the Shafii and Maliki. The Hanafi doctrine was that professed by the Ottomans, by the Turks of Transoxiana and by the great majority of Indian and Afghan Muslims.

[2] The first Ghaznavid with his seat at Ghazni between Kabul and Kandahar, the patron of the Persian poet Firdausi and the curse of India in the XIth century.

these was the *Khalij* or *Khalji*,[1] the forerunners of the great Ghilzai tribe of eastern Afghanistan who gave a dynasty to Delhi and, centuries later, having adopted the Afghan language and custom, crushed the Safavid dynasty of Persia and disputed with the Durranis the mastery of Afghanistan. The second was the *Seljuks* (1038–1150), who pressed down into Khorasan from across the Oxus with armies whose discipline astonished the Muslim world, becoming converted to Sunni Islam as they did so. Having conquered Persia, they entered Baghdad to release the degenerate Abbasid caliphs from tutelage to Turkish mercenary bodyguards, and went on into Syria and Armenia. In 1071, Alp Arslan, their chief, defeated the Byzantines at Melasgird and for a few years their rulers controlled an Empire which was bounded by the Oxus and the Persian Gulf to north and south and by the Indus and the Mediterranean to east and west. The *Turkmens* of the lower Oxus and Turkmen steppe are their descendants. Great Seljuk rulers were Tugrul Bey, Alp Arslan and Malik Shah. They succeeded to the Samanid heritage of strictly orthodox Hanafi Sunniism, and persecuted not only Shiahs but the devotees of all other Sunni schools. Like other hordes which poured off the steppes of Central Asia, the Seljuk Empire could not survive the death of one or two great war-leaders and started to break up by A.D. 1100. It left as its most important segment in the west the Konia sultanate in Anatolia, and in the east the hereditary governorate of Khorezm (Khiva) under a line which came to be known as the Shahs of Khorezm. The Mongol invasion of the XIIIth century gave both of these their death-blow, the Anatolian kingdom yielding place to a third offshoot of the Oghuz tribal confederacy.

In Anatolia these were the *Ottomans*. A small border Khan Othman, acting as Khan of a fief of Turkdom on the Byzantine frontier, in 1326 obtained control of Bursa and founded the Ottoman Empire. His exploits and those of his immediate successors fall in a period more than a century after the Mongol invasions of Turkistan and are not directly related to the pattern of events in Central Asia. But it is necessary to mention them in order to indicate the stages in the spread of Turkish influence. More important for our purposes is the fact that, however far the Anatolian Turks (including in this context Osmanlis and Turks of the Caucasus) [1] may have diverged from those of Transcaspia, in the Turkmens, also descendants of the Oghuz, may be found a connecting link between Eastern and Western Turk.

---

[1] For a very clear exposition of the identification of the Khalij with the Ghilzai see Fraser-Tytler, Bib. I, 36. His argument is strengthened by the fact that in the Pashtu language these tribes are not called *Ghilzai*, a Persianized form, but *Ghalji* or *Khalji*.

There remains yet another ruling house which held sway in parts of Transoxiana before the Mongol deluge. This is the *Kara Kitai* (*circa* 1137–1200). On their passage through Transoxiana the Seljuks had given but passing attention to affairs nearer home, bent on conquest far afield. But the tumult of their going had weakened the Karakhanids of Samarkand, exposing them to attack from powerful forces from the east. These new arrivals were the Kitai, who, issuing from North China (where their dynasty had been known as the Leao), established themselves in Mongolia and, passing on thence by the usual Ili Valley route, succeeded early in the XIIth century in defeating the Karakhanids (with whom they are not to be confused), and established themselves both in Transoxiana and in Kashghar. The Kara Kitai were Chinese in appearance, tradition and culture, and they never embraced Islam. Their chief claim to remembrance is that, although their dominion lasted less than a century, they gave a name to China, which many Muslims and all Russians to this day know as Kitai.

After Chingiz Khan the Kitai disappear from history, and the survival of their memorial in the name they gave to China is therefore the more extraordinary. It can only be explained by saying that, being the only conquering people reaching

---

[1] The Azerbaijanis are the most important Caucasian Turks. Having been subjected for many years to the Safavid dynasty of Persia, they, along with their brethren in what is still Persian Azerbaijan, have been induced, alone among Turks, officially to embrace Shiism.

175

as far as Maveraunnahr out of China proper, they deeply impressed their Turkish subjects with the Chinese culture of which they were representative. So, when thinking of China, the thoughts of an Eastern Turk would turn to the Kitai.

Making their capital at Balasagun, the forgotten site in the Chu region, they defeated the Karakhanids at Khojent in 1137, and even at one time carried their arms successfully against Sanjar, the last great Sultan of the Seljuks, who by that time had attained to a vague overlordship over the Karakhanid chiefs. The Kitai prince took the title of Gurkhan, and at the height of their power this dynasty controlled the country as far as Khorezm. Their administration was Chinese in fashion, and they permitted the local chiefs, including the Karakhanids, a limited authority subject to payment of tribute. The district of Khorezm became a border battleground between the Muslim Seljuk rulers, who maintained there an important governorship, and the 'infidel' Kitai. It was the importance of Khorezm as the Muslim outpost that led to this appointment becoming hereditary in the line of the Seljuk governors known as the Shahs of Khorezm, who in the years immediately preceding the Mongol deluge maintained a fruitless and inconclusive struggle against the Kitai masters of the upper rivers.

Some of the Kitai professed Christianity in the Nestorian tradition. Many scholars have identified them with the legends of Prester John, but in the event it is the name of this dynasty, and not its faith, which constitutes its right to remembrance. The poetry of our own tongue still knows the name Cathay.

The *Shahs of Khorezm* (1097–1220) by the beginning of the XIIIth century had attained a considerable magnificence. As the Russians found later, the oasis of Khiva on the lower Oxus (which was once Khorezm) is ringed round on all sides by deserts and sea, the passage of which is rendered harder by the winter blizzards and the intolerable summer heats. We have seen[1] that at about this time (1220) there is some reason to think that the Amu may have reverted to its old course to the Caspian, and a branch of the Sir may have reached across towards the Khorezm capital Urgench, making of the 'hushed

1 [See cat. 11c p. 23-24 -- Analyst]

173

THE DYNASTIES DESCENDED FROM CHINGIZ KHAN

173

p. 54


GOLDEN HORDE
EURASIAN STEPPE
MIDDLE HORDE
TURKISTAN
MONGOLIAN
HORDE
KHAKANATE
OF CHINA
(YUAN DYNASTY)
1250–1367
ILKHANS
OF PERSIA
& IRAK
CHINGIZ d. 1227
Juchi d. 1227
Chaghatai d. 1241
Ogodai d. 1241
Tului
d. 1232
Orda
Batu
d. 1256
Berke
d. 1266
Shaiban
(after 4 generations)
Uzbek Khan (1312–40)
(after many
generations)
Shaibani Khan
d. 1510
Shaibanids (1500–99)
Jan = daughter
Janids (1599–1784)
daughter = Emir Masum
Mangits (1784–1921)
Mutuka
Borak d. 1270
Dava d. 1306
Isan Bugha d. 1318
(after 6 generations)
Kutluk Nigar,
mother of Emperor
Babur (d. 1530)
Kebek
d. 1326
Yasavur
Kazan
d. 1347
Alger
Kuyuk
d. 1248
Kaidu
Chapar
Mangu
d. 1257
Kublai
d. 1294
Timur
Uljaitu
Hulagu,
captured
Baghdad
1258.
First of
ILKHANS
d. 1265

Those underlined became Khakan

175 Chorasmian waste' a fertile network of canals. Entrenched in this fertility, and protected by the sands, had arisen an intellectual and Islamic life of a high order. Here was laid the foundation of that Eastern Turkic literature in a language which later took the Mongol name of Chaghatai. The Khorezm eastern frontier reached across the Kizilkum as far as the town of Otrar on the Sir Darya, and it was near here in the town of Yese that the mystic Ahmed was born and flourished (d. 1167).[1] Muhammad, the last Shah of Khorezm, became wealthy and powerful, and succeeded in obtaining a somewhat uncertain control over Bukhara and Samarkand, having defeated the Kitai on the Talash in 1210. This victory encouraged the Shah to a show of self-esteem; he posed as Caliph and Protector of the Faith, arrogating to himself the name and titles of the last Seljuk and even of Alexander the Great. When, a few years later, the challenge came from Chingiz Khan, he fancied himself strong enough not only to defy it but to take the initiative against the Mongols. But his kingdom was like that of the Chaldees.

(ii) *Chingiz*[1] *and the Mongols*

Chingiz Khan rose to power in Mongolia in the year 1205 after defeating his rival Jamuga, who had tried to unite the popular party against him. According to Soviet historians,[2] Chingiz, like others after him, decided on war to distract attention from civil strife between contending Mongol factions at home. His first assault was directed on Turkish tribes, the Kirghiz of the Yenisei, the Merkit and the Naiman, whom by 1209 he had subdued. The remnants fled westward, the Merkit towards the Kipchak country, the Kirghiz to the Tienshan and the Alai, where they now are, and the Naiman farther south into the kingdom of the Kitai, then, as we have seen, engaged in a struggle with the Shah of Khorezm for predominance in Maveraunnahr. Chingiz then turned his

[cat. 116, pp. 272 -- Analyst]

---

[1] For spelling see Appendix, final paragraph.

[2] The official theory is crystallized in a Soviet novel which won the Stalin prize, *Jenghiz Khan*, by V. Yan. Bib. I, 106.

1 [For the importance of Ahmed Yesevi, see cat. 116, pp. 45-46 -- Analy

arms eastward, overran China and in 1215 took Peking. While he was doing this he left his eldest son, Juchi, in command on the western frontier, and it was when Juchi was in pursuit of the fleeing Merkit on the Kipchak steppe that his troops first clashed with the borderguards of the Khorezm Shah. At this time Muhammad, the last Shah, had reached the peak of his arrogance and, seeing himself as the champion of Islam and encouraged by his victory over the Kitai, he dreamed of the conquest of China, and held the intervening Mongols in contempt. Embassies of merchants passed between Chingiz and Muhammad; finally, with a total disregard of good faith or the consequences, a caravan sent by Chingiz was treacherously slaughtered by Muhammad's order at the frontier town of Otrar (close to the modern Aris) in 1218.

This brought the Mongol down on Khorezm in the following year. Leaving a column under his son Juchi to storm Otrar, he himself took Bukhara and Samarkand and other of the oasis-cities, sacked and burned them, and slaughtered the populations. The Shah Muhammad fled to a Caspian island, where he died; his son Jalaluddin, after putting up a gallant fight, was forced to flee by way of Ghazni into India, and after a last desperate battle barely escaped his pursuers by swimming the Indus into safety. Meanwhile Chingiz had carried his arms far and wide to the Caucasus, the Don, and Kiev, slaughtering and burning all the way. Juchi meanwhile had sacked all the cities of Khorezm. In 1225 the tale of destruction was complete and Chingiz returned to Mongolia to die two years later at the age of 65.[1] He was predeceased by a few months by his eldest son Juchi, the father of the Golden Horde.

The dominions of the great Mongol descended to the branches of his four sons, Juchi, Chaghatai, Ogodai and Tului. Each area was known as the *ulus* or tribe, and, as is natural with a nomadic organization, the allotment was tribal rather than territorial. For this reason the limits of each are difficult to trace and there was much merging at the margins. But the general pattern is clear enough [1] if only because the allotment from west to east happened in this case to follow the order of seniority of the conqueror's sons. Thus Juchi's patrimony, which owing to his death descended direct from Chingiz to Juchi's sons Orda and Batu, was dominion over all the country farthest to the west, from the Sir Darya over the Urals to the valleys of the Volga and Don. This was the Golden Horde.

---

[1] Some historians give Chingiz' age at death as 72. I follow Howorth, Bib. I, 44

The domain of Chaghatai embraced most of Turkistan, that is to say, Maveraunnahr, Farghana and Yedisu, but it included also what is now Sinkiang and, to the south, a large part of Khorasan. It thus comprised most of the settled populations of the agricultural districts, and all the most flourishing cities of Central Asia, Bukhara, Samarkand, Tashkent, Khojent, Kashghar, Herat and Ghazni. Chaghatai's *ordu* or capital was at Almalik, a lost encampment in the valley of the Ili, probably near the site of the present Kulja but placed by some at the modern Alma Ata.

Ogodai, the third son, succeeded to the country of the original Mongols, where he established his *ordu* at Karakoram, near the present Ulan Bator, and held at first the supreme authority, or Khakanate, of the Mongol Empire. The limits between the dominions of Chaghatai and Ogodai were ill-defined as all boundaries between nomadic hordes must be, but the subsequent struggle for power indicates a shifting frontier somewhere in the Jungarian region on the Ili. As the house of Ogodai declined, most of this region was merged with the territories of the Chaghatai Khans.

The descendants of Tului, the fourth and youngest son, inherited the Far-East conquests of Chingiz in China, with capital at Peking. It was not long before the Khakanate was usurped by this branch, which developed into the famous Yüan dynasty of China.

Chaghatai and Ogodai both died in 1241, depriving two of the four *ulus* of leadership and setting the brood at one

---

[1] See Genealogical Table with this chapter. [cat. 116, p.54--[illegible]]

175

another's throats. Although Ogodai's son Kuyuk maintained a precarious position as Khakan for a few years, and his nephew Kaidu was later to come near to retrieving the position, in the end the chief power fell in 1251 into the hands of Mangu, the eldest son of Tului, from him descending to his brother Kublai — Marco Polo's Great Khan and Emperor of China — in 1257. Tului had three famous sons, Mangu, Kublai and Hulagu, and it was the third of these, the notorious Hulagu, who was sent by Mangu to the south-west. He it was who captured and sacked Baghdad in 1258, finally destroying the shadow of the Abbasid Caliphate and setting up the Il Khan dynasty of Persia to dispute with Chaghatai's descendants the dominion of Turkistan. In the meantime Mangu, succeeded by Kublai, had established himself in the supreme Khakanate, with its base now in China and not on the Mongol steppe. We have seen, how communication between the eastern and western branches of the Tului *ulus* was opened by sea to the detriment of the Chaghatai *ulus* which, after a number of vicissitudes, at this period had contrived to retain the major control over Transoxiana and the caravan routes.

The position reached in Turkistan at the close of the XIIIth century must be viewed in two aspects, that of the *ulus* of the steppe, and that of the *ulus* of the settled country. On the steppe the descendants of Juchi and Batu, the Golden Horde, were still in control of all the country right into the heart of Russia. In 1236–40 Batu had extended his grandfather's conquests even farther: passing over a prostrate Russia he pillaged Poland, Hungary and Bohemia, and the terror of his banners was spread as far as the gates of Udine near Venice. Owing to their distance from the Mongol homelands, the Golden Horde, at the western limits of the Empire, were able to develop their own policies untouched by the struggles of the other branches of the Mongol house. Since they controlled only a small part of the settled area — Khorezm for a while was subject to their Khans — and severed, as they were, by the interposing steppe from the troubles of High Asia, they were free to cope with the Russian princes and to

1 [See col 116, p 37 – [illegible]]

establish a power in the west as far as the Crimea.[1] They became indeed the ancestors of the Turco-Tatar tribes of the Eurasian steppe on both sides of the Caspian and in the Urals. Although the Mongol element no doubt transfused and enriched the original Turkish stock, it was gradually absorbed in it, until the name Tatar as distinct from Turk remains one of the few reminders of the mingled heritage. This process was aided and accelerated by the gradual adoption of Islam as the faith of these peoples. Berke (1257–66) was the first prince of the Golden Horde to embrace Islam, but a century had elapsed from Chingiz' death before Islam became universally acknowledged by the Mongol hordes. Shaiban, Batu's and Berke's brother, and Uzbek, a descendant of this branch, appear in the genealogies as the eponymous ancestors of the Shaibanids and the Uzbek tribes, thus further demonstrating what Barthold calls the *turquisation* of the descendants of Chingiz. It was indeed the Golden Horde which, after Timur's Empire had failed, was destined to supply the Uzbek chieftains who restored Turkish power in Transoxiana. 175

In the settled areas of the two rivers the position was not so simple.

It is hard to devastate the steppe, nor was it the Mongol way, for they needed flocks and herds for the subsistence of their terrible armies. With the oases it was otherwise. The sack of cities and mass slaughter of the inhabitants is one aspect and the better known. But there is another. The flocks were let loose on the rich irrigated lands as pasturage, after a tradition not yet entirely dead, that of the outspoken contempt of the herdsman for the cultivator. Clavijo, ambassador from the Spanish Court to Timur in 1404, has left a vivid description of this nomadic spirit, each band following its own fancy, pasturing its herds where crops were finest, so that Timur in his time had to intervene to protect the sedentary population.

---

[1] In 1475, shortly after their capture of Constantinople in 1453, the Ottomans occupied the Crimea. Thus the two horns of the advancing Turks, western and eastern, had joined.

The factional struggles between the rival *ulus* led to the sacking of cities not only once but again and again. Thus Khorezm passed from the Golden Horde to the Chaghatai Horde, and back again. Urgench and Otrar were subject to constant pillage and the canals decayed. The irruption of Hulagu into Khorasan led to internecine strife between the Ilkhans (his dynasty) and the Chaghatai, with one result that Bukhara, destroyed by Chingiz in 1220 and rebuilt, was again razed to the foundations in 1272 and lay for ten years a ruin. Other cities suffered a like fate, the situation in Turkistan being rendered more confused owing to the uncertain power of the Chaghatai and Ogodai domains squeezed between the stronger forces on the flanks, that of the Golden Horde in the north-west and that of the sons of Tului exercised both from China in the north-east and from Persia under Hulagu's descendants in the south. Commerce too suffered terribly, one insane Mongol method of warfare being for each prince to murder the traders from his rival's domain who happened to be within his power. Thus in 1262 Hulagu decreed the slaughter of every merchant from Berke's territory, and Berke retaliated by executing Hulagu's merchants.

Yet all the time behind the carnage a slow process of *turquisation*, accompanied or perhaps caused by the conversion to Islam, was being worked out in the naturally wealthy areas which formed the heart of the Chaghatai domain. There were Muslim Governors commanding Mongol respect such as Mahmud Yalavash and his son Masud Beg who were able in the cities of the plains to ensure for themselves a position which confounded their savage masters, and to preserve the essence of an Islamic civilization, already in Transoxiana six centuries old.

The first Muslim Khan of the Chaghatai was Borak, and he and his successor Dava are in the direct Chaghatai line, from which was descended Kutluk Nigar, the mother of Babur. After Dava's death the situation became more and more confused, the nominal power passing rapidly down a line of shadow-princes, of whom the last of any note was Kazan

(d. 1347). The real power fell into the hands of Turkish governors, wielding authority in the Chaghatai name. The distinction between princes and vezirs was marked by title, the Chaghatai prince being known as *Khan*, and the vezir as *Beg*. Like Timur himself, and Babur after him, there is no doubt that many of these *Begs* were of an ancestry inextricably mixed, but by Timur's time, in Western Turkistan at least, their *turquisation* had become complete. Thus they began to take the name of Chaghatai to distinguish themselves and their country from Jungaria and Eastern Turkistan, which came to be known to Babur and others as Mughulistan. There is of course what may be called a Tamerlane legend, written up by a group of chroniclers at the direct orders of Timur himself, and sycophancy has obscured the facts by glorifying the ancestry of Timur and identifying him with the Mongol princes who had gone before. In practice, what had happened was that there remained a pride in Mongol antecedents as shown by the retention of the name Chaghatai itself, but that by the end of the XIVth century the atmosphere had become definitely both Muslim and Turkish. 175

The Mongol dominion in its prime achieved a staggering immensity. Indeed Chingiz and his four sons, in an age of horse transport, had established across Asia and Europe the vastest continental empire ever known until it was rivalled by the empire of the Russias and their satellites seven centuries later. Like Russia, the Mongol power stretched from China to the Black Sea; the Mongol threat, like Russia today, overhung both Western Europe and the Indian peninsula. To us, and viewed in the perspective of time, the Mongols seem to have come and gone in a fleeting moment, so that historians are accustomed to speak of their rule as a passing phenomenon. But in their passing they threw on the screen a shadow premonitory of a dominion which was to be as extensive in bounds and as lacking in mercy as their own. So too the new Eurasian empire, as dependent as that of the Mongols on the life of one man and on singleness of aim within a small and jealous palace circle, may prove to be as ephemeral as theirs. 000

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

(iii) *Timur and the Timurids*

175 Timur, born in 1335, usurped the Chaghatai power in Transoxiana in 1369. He belonged to the Barlas tribe of turcized Mongols, resident at Kesh on the Kashka Darya south of Samarkand. The fact that he came from an irrigated and settled part of the country is significant: while he maintained the tradition of close relations with the nomads who, with their horses and arms, provided the sinews of war, he was attracted by the garden pleasances and the flavour of the already hoary civilization whose cities were grouped along the mountain-skirts where the fertilizing waters spring. In the matter of martial tradition, Timur may have felt himself closer to the men of the steppe than to the people of the towns and villages, but, as Barthold says, he had recourse to a procedure gravely suspect in Chaghatai and Mongol eyes, for he chose a great city to serve as his dwelling-place, and he began to
346 construct in it great buildings. Nor was it only in Samarkand
175 that Timur is remembered for the splendid architecture that bears his name. At Yese too he built a magnificent shrine over the grave of the mystic Ahmed, and at Shahr-i-Sabz, his native place, there still stand the immense piers of the Ak Serai, the white palace of his dreams. Though after the manner of his kind Timur carried fire and terror across all Western Asia, his memorials attest not only a passion to build grandiosely, as have many conquerors before and after him, but something more intimate. He had a feeling for the setting of a shrine — at Yese in the plain beneath the Kara Tav not far from the flowing Sir Darya, at Samarkand the jewels in a green garden against a mountain background. Man of violence himself, his grandsons, and their grandsons, had that peculiar touch and feeling after beautiful things, the work of nature, the product of man's artistry, that we associate with the Muslim spirit at its best. Most famous is the Registan in Samarkand with its three *medreses*, the oldest built by Timur's grandson Ulugh Beg. Of it Curzon said he found it still in his time, even in ruin, the noblest public square in the world, a triumph of massive simplicity and grandeur with which nothing in Europe, save

perhaps the Piazza of St. Mark's at Venice, and that on a 175
humbler scale, could even aspire to compete. Others have 346
written of the tombs of the city, the Shahzinda[1] mausoleum and the rest. Every witness has striven, as did Curzon, to pass on a vision of the Samarkandian tiles — 'turquoise and sapphire, green, plum-coloured and orange, crusted over with a rich siliceous glaze, and inscribed with mighty Kufic letters — by which these glorious structures were once wholly and are still in part adorned'.[2]

In Tsarist times it was complained that the Russians had 000
done nothing to preserve these great relics from demolition and decay, and further damage was done during the interregnum between the fall of Tsardom and the consolidation of Soviet power. Fortunately, there is reason to believe from later observation, reinforced by the evidence of local publications, that the Soviets have awoken to this heritage. The climate itself, dry and comparatively soft, is probably as favourable to ancient buildings as any in the world; the damage comes from earthquakes, which in that country are frequent and severe.

In the eyes of Eastern Turks Timur is the great assimilator. 829
The policy they see worked out in the conqueror's hands is that of the adaptation of Turkish culture to the traditions of Islam, a synthesis of Turkish valour with Arab-Persian civilization. Timur, having conquered, set aside his barbarities, and aimed at the ennoblement of the Turkish political tradition by infusing it with the stream of Islamic thought, in his time modern. But this was a confluence, not a blending, of two living currents, each indeed colouring the other at the margins, but flowing side by side and apart towards the sea. This twofold influence, they hold, has enabled the most representative Turks of this and indeed of all ages, to remain conscious of the things of the spirit, but to draw a clear distinction between religion and politics.

The conquests of Timur in the field of battle were more 175
fleeting than those of Chingiz who preceded him. Even the

---

[1] Cf. Bib. I, 54, p. 86.

Op. cit. p. 326.

175 clash between Eastern and Western Turk at Ankara, where Timur defeated the Ottoman Bayezid in 1402, had small significance. He returned to die three years later at Otrar on the Sir Darya, while the Ottomans, girding up their loins, half a century later finally shattered the Byzantines by storming Constantinople, and went on to thunder at the gates of Vienna. Yet it is rightly said that Timur left a heritage, greater than that of a warrior. It is enough to name his grandson Ulugh Beg, builder, scientist and astronomer; the [538] Timurid the Sultan Hussain Baikara (1438–1506), with his splendid city at Herat and the great literature fostered there by the poet Alishir Nevai; Hussain's cousin that other Timurid, Babur (1482–1530), author of the Memoirs and founder of the Chaghatai Empire in Hindustan. All these men were Turks self-confessed, they thought and spoke and wrote in the Eastern Turkic language called by the Mongol name Chaghatai. The annals of this house were rendered illustrious by the names of poets, philosophers and theologians, still household words throughout the East.[1]

000 It was a glorious flowering. There is need to live in Muslim lands in order to understand how close are the deeds and words of the men of the classic age to the minds of men today, closer in some strange way than are the Elizabethans to us. The reason for this nearness may be found perhaps in the fact that deeds and words in the East have been handed on so much by word of mouth, and a man will speak of forebears who lived centuries ago as if he had known them as a child. Thus the flowering of the Timurid age is to the Eastern Turks what the Elizabethans are to us, and more: it was a positive achievement for all time which cannot be annulled, a guarantee which later men may strive to redeem. To those who are lost it still provides a rallying-point.

(iv) *Period of Dissolution*

175 Much of the first part of Babur's Memoirs is occupied with stirring accounts of his struggles against Shaibak or Shaibani

---

[1] Cf. Bib. I, 88, p. 180.

Khan for the mastery of Samarkand, and indeed of the whole of Transoxiana. He was Babur's enemy, and Babur came off second-best. But, although Babur thought Shaibani a barbarian, condemning him for his rough and rude ways of dealing with the women-folk of those he defeated, he was too great a man to blacken an opponent. Shaibani appears in his story as a prince of great valour and of no mean military talent, whose defeat and death at Merv at Persian hands Babur is inclined to deplore. Shaibani traced his descent through his grandfather Abul Khair back to Juchi, the Mongol father of the Golden Horde, and was in the same line as Uzbek Khan. His ancestry may have been direct from Chingiz, but he was in fact an Uzbek and a Turk and was so regarded by Babur. His Uzbeks formed, as it were, a backwash from the Golden Horde, who during 300 years of mastery in Eastern Europe since Chingiz had not succeeded either in subduing the Russians or in assimilating themselves with them. The Uzbeks were a returning wave; they had gone out under Mongol leadership, they returned as Turks. It was this prince who after many struggles defeated Babur and Hussain Baikara and took from them the whole of Transoxiana, Balkh and that part of Khorasan dependent on Herat. His successes encouraged him to challenge Ismail, the founder of the Safavid dynasty of Persia (1502–1736), and he was defeated and killed at the battle of Merv in 1510, some years before Babur entered India. The result was the loss of Khorasan and all the land south of the Amu to the Safavids, and the relegation of the newly arisen Uzbek power to the country north of that river. It was at this time that the pattern of the present frontier was laid down. Shah Ismail took Bukhara and Samarkand, but later negotiated with the next Shaibanid a frontier along the Amu and the mountains not very different from that now existing between the USSR and the Middle East. Herat and Balkh went to Persia, eventually to be incorporated in the Durrani Afghan Kingdom, the Amu and the Kopet Dagh becoming the limit of Uzbek rule to the south. Moreover, the growth of Shiism in Safavid Persia set up a theological barrier

175 between the orthodox of Bukhara and the Shiahs whom they regarded as Isfahani heretics, thus for the first time since the Arab conquest severing Transoxiana in the realm of thought from the south.

778 It is seldom realized how great has been the difference in outlook and ideology between Sunni and Shiah. Vambéry in 1863, on his way from Turkey through Persia in the garb of an Istanbul dervish, found himself spat upon as a supposed Sunni by Shiah wayfarers, while ten years later Schuyler in Turkistan was surprised to find that the orthodox pilgrim from Bukhara travelled to Mecca always by Istanbul or India rather than expose himself to Shiah taunts on the direct road through Persia. Thus even in Muslim times a curtain had begun to drop along the Oxus.

175 The Shaibanids ruled for a century from Bukhara, their greatest Khan being Abdullah, who before his death in 1598 succeeded in uniting Khorezm with Transoxiana. Like Akbar and Elizabeth of England, his contemporaries, Abdullah ruled for nearly half a century. He conquered Meshed, Herat and Badakhshan, and at the height of his power even had designs on Akbar's India. After his death began a period of anarchy, confused by fighting with the Persian Safavids for the possession of Khorezm, which in the end became independent under another line of Uzbek Shaibanids, of whom the best known was the historian Abulghazi (d. 1663). He and his successors reversed the tables, making Khorezm for a time the overlord of Bukhara. But, as we have seen, its prosperity had been undermined before this time — according to some in 1573 — by a change in the course of the river, a disaster which led to the abandonment of the old capital at Urgench and the rise of a new city at Khiva. By this name the Khanate was thereafter known.

At Bukhara, after Abdullah's death, the power of the Shaibanids rapidly waned. It gave way first to the Janids, and then to the Mangits, both Uzbek houses tracing descent from Shaibani on the distaff side. Two centuries of nonentities are lit by a single high-light, the invasion in 1740 of the great

Persian usurper Nadir Shah, himself of Turkmen blood of the Afshar clan, but Persianized. Nadir had just returned from his sack of Delhi and, having found the Ottoman Turks too hard a nut to crack, formed the ambition of carrying his arms to the north to the farthest point reached by Darius' Persia, beyond the Sir Darya. This he did unchecked by any serious reverse, but, except for building a gateway to the Bukhara citadel and (as legend tells) attempting the violation of Timur's tomb at Samarkand, he left no memorial other than an increased dislike for the Persian invader from the south. He himself was murdered by his Kizilbash troops in 1747, and his empire over Turkistan did not pass to the Kajars who succeeded him. But he left in Turkistan what he had left in India, native dynasties in slow decay, and a determination now stronger than ever to seal off Transoxiana from contact with the heretics of Khorasan. The curtain had already begun to fall.

A temporary revival after a period of disorder led to the rise of the last dynasty, the Mangit Emirs, in the person of the Emir Masum in 1784. This dynasty lasted until 1921. These nominally Uzbek chieftains of Bukhara had to face a threefold danger, the first from various tribal confederacies of the north which had never entered the oases and by then were called Kazaks, the second from rebellious Tajik subjects in the more hilly regions to the east, the third a continuous threat, both to Khiva and Bukhara, from the Turkmens dwelling in the Merv, Tejen and Akhal oases south of the Karakum. These sometimes raided in their own interest, at others they were enlisted as mercenaries by contending Khans. Though of the race from which came the founders of the most powerful Turkish Empires, the Seljuk and the Ottoman, in their own country the Turkmens never succeeded in establishing anything more than the loosest of tribal organizations. But, as the Russians found later at Gök Tepe, they were no mean warriors, and they kept the sedentary people of city and oasis in continual alarm. This state of things gave birth to a sort of feudal system very like that of the Khans and Begs before the rise of Timur, the Bukhara Emir relying increasingly on local chiefs,

2: Caroe 4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 his own writ being circumscribed by the edges of the cultivation around the city. The cities became more and more Tajik in character, and the Emirs themselves, as their portraits show, took on the appearance of Tajiks, losing their Turkish ruggedness. Within the city a fanatical priesthood fulminated from three hundred mosques and *medreses*, and the methods of government, jealous of all foreign influence, were scarcely even medieval. The condemned were torn to pieces or hurled to death from the Great Minar, and torture was the indispensable accompaniment of justice. The Emir Nasrullah (1826–60) is remembered chiefly for his vermin-chamber, the bug-pit to which in 1842 he condemned the two Englishmen, Stoddart and Conolly, to suffer in agony for months before beheading them. Under such a government Bukhara was soon unable to control even the Farghana Valley, in which a hereditary line of Khans, known as the Min, was established at Kokand about the year 1700 and became independent before the century had passed.

At the opening of the XVIIIth century the country under some form of Eastern Turkish domination still extended from the Caspian in the west almost to the Gobi in the east, and from the Hindu Kush and Kuenlun in the south to the Russian frontiers in Siberia in the north. Over against this the Russian outposts had stretched out right across Siberia early in the XVIIth century, and reached the Pacific almost simultaneously with the rise to power of the Manchu or Ching dynasty in China in 1643. (The actual year in which a Russian Cortez first stared at the Pacific is variously given; 1638 seems the best authenticated.) But all this great territory of the Eastern Turks was in a state of cultural decadence and military confusion. In the Turanian basin itself the control over the sedentary population was in the hands of the three petty rulers, the Emir of Bukhara and Khans of Khiva and Kokand; on the Kazak and Turkmen steppe companies of armed graziers wandered without much cohesion, sometimes banded together to meet emergencies under Khans who were able to impose a loose authority by force of character or temporary wealth. I have tried to show how the decline of Turkistan had begun with the substitution of sea-routes for caravan-roads by the Il Khans after the Mongol invasion; this process was carried further by the European discovery of the maritime route to India round the Cape and the establishment of the Dutch, French and English Companies in the XVIIth century. Even so the land-routes across Asia might have retained a limited importance. But the Silk Road received its death-blow when the Russians pushed their power eastward to China and the Pacific. Russian domination in Siberia had now provided a new land-route from west to east passing north of Turkistan. The old caravan routes on which prosperity had depended were almost forgotten, the petty wars between the little States and the raids from the steppe scarcely permitting of their use even for local commerce. Turkistan was in eclipse and seclusion. There remained on the steppe incomparable human material, but no adequate equation had been worked out between that rough material and the culture, most rich in its way, of the cities at the steppe's edge. Here was a political vacuum which would in the end be filled from without.

Meanwhile, unconscious of the fate impending and closely walled from the steppe, there remained only the shell of past glories, a string of flat-roofed cities, fed by a rich but scanty cultivation, the haunt of a narrow bigotry, and dominated by minarets which served for the execution of criminals and the call to prayer alike.

V

TSARIST CONQUEST

The circumstances of their hard and trying position under the jealous surveillance of an irresistible lord paramount, in the person of the Russian Czar, gave a fiercer edge to the natural unamiableness of their disposition, and irritated its gloomier qualities into action under the restless impulses of suspicion and permanent distrust.

De Quincey, Revolt of the Tartars

TAKING a stand on the foothills that run down to what is now the Kazak steppe, we have watched the Mongol flood out of Asia rolling westward beyond the Caspian into the heart of southern Russia until it reached the Black Sea. After three centuries we can see the return-wash of the same flood slowly seeping back, a Turkish flood now, until it has submerged the sources on the mountain-skirts whence it originally flowed. That is a greatly simplified picture of the story of the Golden Horde, the sons of Juchi who, returning as Uzbeks and Nogai, succeeded to the heritage of the Chaghatai in the settled cities of the oases. The nomads of the tent had thus assumed the wardenship of a civilization which, in Muslim terms alone, was a thousand years old by the end of the XVIIth century. But it was a civilization of which the arteries had become hardened. For some reason, perhaps the isolation of the country from fresh influences, the nomadic virtues, great as they were, proved at that time unable to give fresh life to a tired body. The country was severed into two parts. There was the steppe-ocean over which virile and pastoral people still roamed, in years of scant rainfall preying on neighbouring tribes and on cities alike; and there was the sedentary population along the rivers where the rulers, though of pastoral stock, had succumbed to the

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1
Kalmyk

biddings of a narrow priesthood. The fact that, for decades 000
or even for centuries, the steppe acted as an insulator between Russia and its Siberian prolongation on the one hand and the fertility of Farghana, Zarafshan and the two rivers on the other goes far to explain the almost 'Erewhon' character of the culture of Transoxiana. For the steppe-ocean was no longer a path of commerce; unlike the sea it separated and did not unify.

To the south there should have been for compensation 101
the gravitational attraction of the other Islamic lands ranged between India and Istanbul. But where communications to the south and west were easy, as into Persia and Azerbaijan, the effect of this attraction was neutralized by the Shiah tradition which repelled rather than attracted the Sunnis of Bukhara. Farther east Kabul and India were divided from Turkistan by the barrier of the Hindu Kush, which Babur was the last of the great conquerors to surmount. A limited trade by caravan between Bukhara and Peshawar was continued into the XXth century, but the empire of Babur's successors in India, and after them the Afghan Durranis in Kabul, jealously kept the Uzbeks at arm's length. The Uzbeks themselves broke into small pieces, a fragmentation which made their absorption inevitable at the hands of any expansionist State in a position to overcome the obstacles of geography. At first there seemed some doubt whether that State would be China or Russia; in the end it proved to be Russia.

The resistance of the Kazaks on the northern steppe was 175
greatly weakened by the Kalmuck migrations, first from Mongolia to the Volga a little before 1700, and then back again in response to a Chinese invitation in the year 1771. The Kalmuck story in all its hideous horror has been immortalized in De Quincey's famous essay, 'Revolt of the Tartars'. These people were a remnant (*Kalmak* meaning in Turkish 'to remain') of the Oirat Mongol confederacy which, for two centuries between 1450 and 1650, stubbornly disputed with China the mastery of Peking. They seem to have been used

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1
Kalmyk

175 as a pawn in the struggle for position between China and Russia which followed the Russian advance to the Pacific. Unlike their Mongol predecessors under Chingiz, they were never absorbed in Turkdom nor did they embrace Islam; they took title and inspiration from the Dalai Lama of Tibet and remained Buddhists of the Greater Way. But although they maintained their High Asian tradition and their identity, their story provides yet another instance of those raindrops on the window which separate only to meet. The bitter slaughter which went on between Kalmuck and Kazak weakened both and opened the steppe to penetration. But there was also an element of attraction, for at the same time Kazaks constantly married Kalmuck women abducted from Jungaria or the Volga steppe, and their sturdy Mongol physique and appearance is to be attributed to this coalescence.[1]

Throughout the XVIIIth century the Russians, moving in where all was disorder on the steppe, were busily engaged in strengthening the right flank of their long line of communication through Siberia (they had reached the Pacific in the XVIIth century). They had only to carry into Asia the tactics so well proved against the Golden Horde during the conflicts of five centuries on the Volga steppe. In 1716 they built Omsk in the Irtish basin, in 1718 Semipalatinsk, in 1724 Orenburg (now Chkalov), in 1734 Orsk, in 1753 Petropavlosk[2]. These places are situated roughly on, or along the southern flank of, the subsequent alignment of the Trans-Siberian Railway, and for many years the advance was confined to this west-east line. But, as Russia recovered from the Napoleonic invasion, her outposts in Asia moved gradually farther south, until in 1842 the frontier had reached the northern coasts of the Aral Sea and in 1847 had been pushed forward to command the lower reaches of the Sir Darya. In 1853 control was assumed of the waterway of the Sir Darya for a distance of 280 miles

---

[1] Cf. Schuyler, *op. cit.* i, 34-5. (Where he speaks of Kirghiz he uses the old Tsarist nomenclature, meaning Kazak.)

[2] See Railway map on p. 192.

175
102

Page 73



RUSSIAN ADVANCE IN CENTRAL ASIA 1734 to 1920

54°
66°
78°
44°
36°
1734 to 1842
To 1847
To 1853
L. BALKHASH
YEDI-SU AND ILI
1854
CASPIAN SEA
ARAL SEA
Sir Darya
UST YURT
1863
KHIVA
1873
TRANSOXIANA AND SAMARKAND
1868
CHIMKENT AND ISSIK KÖL
L. ISSIK KÖL
Chimkent 1863
TASHKENT 1865
Tashkent
KOKAND
1875-6
Kokand
1877
TRANSCASPIA
1881
BUKHARA
Bukhara
Samarkand
1920
(Reduced to Vassalage 1869)
Amu Darya
MERV
1884
Merv
PAMIRS
1895
CHINA
PERSIA
PENJDEH
1885
Penjdeh
AFGHANISTAN
INDIA

Adapted from Fraser-Tytler's Afghanistan

EMERY WALKER LTD., SC.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date). 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 from its mouth, and in the following year a Russian expedition penetrated into the Ili Valley. The Crimean War then arrested progress, but by 1863 the line had reached Chimkent and the northern oases, and included parts of the Tienshan and Lake Issik Köl.

175 These advances on the Kazak steppe and into the mountains
538 had not been achieved without a struggle. A strenuous
829 resistance was put up by the Kazak Khan, Kine Sari, whose
name is celebrated in many a ballad as the hero of these tribes. He was the grandson of the famous Abilay Khan, who late in the XVIIIth century had succeeded in delaying the Russian advance by means of a diplomatic alliance with China. Abilay's grave is beside that of Ahmed Yesevi in the shrine built by Timur at Yese, and his name has been eclipsed in Kazak story only by that of Kine Sari, his descendant. Kine Sari is to the Kazaks what the hero Shamil was to the people of the North Caucasus in their fifty years' struggle against Russian penetration ending in 1860. Until recently the Soviets looked favourably on the ballads and chronicles which extol the glory of these chieftains, but for the last few years the word has gone forth that literature of this kind is the worst form of bourgeois-nationalism. The Academies are forbidden to exalt writers who seek to hallow men who were nothing but feudal brigands engaged in a selfish warfare for their own pockets, a warfare directed not only against their big Russian brother but against the true interests of their own people. The Soviet press, central and local, is full of fulminations against the glorification of the misguided bandits who in the name of a petty tribalism resisted what is represented as the inevitable absorption of their country in a higher culture.

Kine Sari's period of renown lasted for the decade 1837 to 1846. His resistance was based on tribal fastnesses set up in the recesses of the Kara Tav and the northern part of the Ulu Tav, and for a while he maintained his position against the Russians as far west as the Ural River. In the end he fell in fratricidal strife with the Kirghiz of the Issik Köl region. He is famous for his exchange of words with the envoy sent

by Beymembet, a Kazak who had gone over to the Russians 175
and came to him with proposals for an armistice. In his letter 538
Beymembet had written — Can the horned ram, head of a 829
great herd though he be, overcome the lion? The end of rebellion is evil. Kine Sari quietly read the letter, turned to the envoy, and replied — He who sets a trap awry leaves his manhood in it. Is it not better to die in battle or upon the wastes of the steppe than face dishonour and be a slave?[1]

Even the Kirghiz who later slew him, and the Sarts of Tashkent who took him prisoner and murdered his father Kasim, revere Kine Sari as the national hero of all Turkistan. His death at the hands of the Kirghiz shows well enough how futile in action was this inchoate tribal resistance to the Russian advance. But that his name lives on today in the peoples' hearts is clear from the childish iterations of a Russian propaganda that never ceases to condemn his legend as a shameful survival from an unregenerate age.

The Russian Chancelleries felt that these successive 175
advances, culminating in the capture of Chimkent, needed some justification before world opinion. This was provided in the well-known memorandum of the Tsar's Chancellor, Prince Gorchakov, addressed in 1864 to the governments of the States with which Russia was in diplomatic relations. The substance of this memorandum is clear from the following citation:

> The position of Russia in Central Asia is that of all civilized states which come into contact with half-savage wandering tribes possessing no fixed social organization. It invariably happens in such cases that the interests of security on the frontier, and of commercial relations, compel the more civilized state to exercise a certain ascendancy over neighbours whose turbulence and nomad instincts render them difficult to live with.

Having so stated the problem in general terms, Gorchakov went on to claim that the solution had been found by moving the frontier beyond the nomads to locate it in a fertile country with a sedentary population. In this way he justified the

---

[1] Togan, *op. cit.* p. 314.

175 assumption of authority on the Sir Darya and the capture of Chimkent. The nomads, he said, were now surrounded and the Russians 'found themselves confronted by a solid and compact social organization, offering conditions favourable to colonization and the supply of their garrison'.

Thus far, according to Gorchakov, and no farther. But the very next year saw the capture of Tashkent. Samarkand, forcibly detached from Bukhara, followed three years later. Bukhara itself at the time of Schuyler's visit in 1873 had been reduced to vassalage, and there followed in that same year the conquest of Khiva. Russian power was now on the Oxus and up against the Afghan frontier. Except for the Pamir region, too remote for penetration by the now satellite Bukharan State — a frontier settlement was made there between Russia and the Afghans under British auspices in 1895–6 — there remained only the Merv and Tejen oases on the Turkmen steppe between the Oxus and the Kopet Dagh. The absorption of these was delayed a few years by Russia's war with Turkey, and to some extent by the British advance into Afghanistan in the Second Afghan War. But during the decade that followed the Afghan War the Russians once more pressed forward to crush a spirited Turkmen resistance, until, after the conquest of Penjdeh in 1885, 'the only thing which could stop this expansion — the upward thrust of some equally powerful empire — challenged and arrested the mighty steam roller of Russia'.[1]

000 The play and counterplay of Russian and British forces in this region is more properly a part of the history of Persia and Afghanistan. Although Gorchakov failed to press his own argument to its conclusion, he was right in claiming a certain inevitability for the absorption by Russia of Central Asia up to the limit where some counter-force of stabilization should be encountered. The points at which the two forces did in fact meet are sufficiently demonstrated by the map, both on the southern and the eastern sides. It is now more profitable to consider how far the withdrawal of British power from

---

[1] Fraser-Tytler, *op. cit.* p. 129, likely to become the *locus classicus* on this subject.

India has made to quiver once more a balance that had come 000 to rest. For the moment it is enough to observe that of all her land frontiers this, with that of Transcaucasia, is the only one on which Soviet Russia has not, whether by annexation or by means of satellites, advanced her outposts beyond the line established by the Tsars.

The campaigns in Khiva, Kokand (Farghana) and on the 175 Turkmen steppe were conducted with much ferocity on both sides.[1] The capture of Khiva in 1873 was scarcely opposed by the people of the oasis; the difficulties were due to the great ring of desert surrounding it, and the fierce Turkmen raiders who roamed upon the desert. Up to 1717 there had already been three Cossack expeditions which fared disastrously. On one of these the Cossacks, laden with spoils and a thousand women, were cut off from water and perished to a man; on another the Cossacks lost the road and were reduced by hunger to kill and eat each other. In 1717 Prince Bekovich succeeded in reaching and occupying the city for Peter the Great, only to have his troops set upon and exterminated after peace was made. The Prince's head was cut off and sent as a present to the Bukhara Emir, who refused to accept it! This disaster deterred the Russians for over 100 years: in 1839 an expedition under Perovsky, thinking Russian soldiers could endure the cold, advanced in midwinter but had to return, its goal unreached, after losing the whole of its camel transport and more than half its men. Throughout the next thirty years the Khivans showed their defiance by making captive and enslaving all the Russians who came into their hands. In 1873 Kaufmann, the Governor-General and after Chernaiev[2] the father of Russian Central Asia,

---

[1] There are good accounts in Schuyler of the Kokand and Khiva campaigns, and in Curzon of the Turkmen campaign. Barbarities on the Russian side are vouched for by the chief Russian actors themselves. Schuyler gives the Perovsky expedition the date 1829, ten years too early.

[2] *Chernaiev*, the first Governor-General (1865, and again in 1882–4), a gallant and chivalrous soldier whom all admired. The Uzbeks spoke of him familiarly by the nickname *Shernaib*, the Lion Viceroy. *Kaufmann*, Governor-General 1867–82, cold, calculating, ruthless, vastly ambitious, a very able consolidator. His name stinks in Central Asia to this day. The last Governor-General was *Kuropatkin* (1914–17), the Varus of the Russo-Japanese war.

175 determined on the *coup de grâce*. Four separate columns were to converge on Khiva, from Chekishler on the Caspian near the Persian frontier, from the Mangishlak Peninsula farther north, from Orenburg and, under Kaufmann himself, from Tashkent. The command of the whole was under Kaufmann, who gave strict orders that any other column reaching its goal before he himself arrived was to defer its assault.

Of these only the Orenburg column, better provided and marching down the west coast of the Aral Sea, succeeded in arriving at its destination without terrible losses from heat and thirst. On the way its commander managed to pick up the Mangishlak column, and on reaching Khiva found himself compelled to attack the city before the Tashkent column could arrive. It was only by a happy chance and not good management that Kaufmann reached Khiva at all, his troops decimated by hardships encountered in the Kizilkum on the way. The Chekishler column had to turn back, harried by Turkmen horsemen and stricken by sunstroke, the troops having thrown away their arms and abandoned their camels in the Karakum desert. The expedition was not the first to establish the incapacity of Russians to provide for campaigning under a pitiless sun. But the success of the Orenburg column, for which Kaufmann himself could claim no credit, enabled him to obtain the surrender of the Khan and the reduction of Khiva to Russian vassalage.

The campaign was marred by the subsequent measures taken by Kaufmann to subdue what he called the pride and license of the Turkmens who had hovered on the flanks of his columns and caused them many losses. He first imposed on them a fine in cash which he knew the Turkmens, whose property was in kind, could not pay. Then, by a breach of faith, he directed his forces to attack them before the date given for payment of the fine had run out. Worst of all, he issued orders, in writing as all his campaign orders were [1]—

---

[1] Schuyler explains how the excessive Russian habit of writing formal orders on campaigns compelled every commander to carry a large secretariat in the field. He saw masses of great volumes comprising the orders for this campaign. Cf. *op. cit.* ii, 357.

and there is therefore no escape — 'to give over the Yomud [Turkmen] settlements, and their families, to complete destruction'. He followed this up by orders for extermination in case of the least resistance. The execution of this order resulted in a slaughter by the Cossacks, sparing neither age nor sex. MacGahan, the American freelance and hero of the *Ride to Khiva*, who was present on the occasion, describes how the subordinate commanders in the field proceeded to an indiscriminate butchery, and how he saw women and children go down before the Cossacks who rushed about like madmen. 175

Savagery of this order lives in the memory of later generations.

The most distinguished Russian officer in the Turkistan wars was undoubtedly Skobelev. He was present at Khiva, and took a leading part in the later Kokand campaign, where he brought resistance to an end by a ruthless bombardment of the cities and bazaars. The new Russian city in the Farghana Valley, founded near Margilan after the Kokand campaign, was named Skobelev after him (the Soviets changed it first to New Margilan, and later to Farghana). It was Skobelev too who in January 1881, after Lomakin had failed, finally overcame Turkmen resistance at Gök Tepe, the famous Tekke fortress. The curious reader will find the full details given in Curzon's work,[1] much of it reproduced from Skobelev's own words. When the fortress was stormed in the face of the utmost gallantry on the part of ill-armed defenders, the order was given to pursue the retreating enemy and give no quarter, an order pursued with savage precision over eleven miles until darkness fell. The morning found 8000 persons of both sexes and all ages cut down in rows like fresh-mown hay. Within the fort too all who did not escape were slaughtered to a man.

Skobelev himself explained his policy by saying:

> I hold it a principle that in Asia the duration of peace is in direct proportion to the slaughter you inflict upon the enemy.

---

[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 78 *et seqq.*

175 Strike hard, and keep on striking till resistance fails; then form ranks, cease slaughter and be kind and humane to the prostrate enemy.

000 Curzon remarks that no greater contrast could be imagined to the British method, which is to strike a series of taps, to prohibit slaughter, and to abstain no less wholly from subsequent fraternization. Much could be written on the practical and moral issues involved in this debate, but one thing must surely be clear. The memory of deliberate cruelty does not fade.

Skobelev was a character whom Gibbon would have delighted to portray. He rode to battle clad in white, scented and curled as a bridegroom to a wedding, his voice tremulous, his eyes gleaming so that the Turkmens knew him as Göz Kanli — Bloody-eyes. His white uniform he matched against his horse, always a grey, and mounted he seemed magnificent. Boulangier, a French engineer, writing of him at the crisis of the siege of Gök Tepe, says that at that solemn moment Skobelev shone so splendidly in the eyes of his men that he seemed to their imagination to be the god of war. After Gök Tepe, like Alexander, he exclaimed against boredom, protesting there was nothing left for him to do. His exploits in the field attest his personal courage and his contempt for danger, and, like Napoleon, he exercised a magnetic influence over his troops by his mere presence. His friends he treated with alternate affection and contempt, the transition being reflected in his countenance, which was now beautiful, now ugly, and in his physical condition, which oscillated between masculine vigour and nervous exhaustion. He was for years the darling of the army and a political idol whom to criticize was blasphemy. Yet, a general at 30, he died in a low haunt and discreditably at the age of 38.

In a prophetic passage written more than sixty years ago, Curzon claims Skobelev as typical of the Russian nation, with one foot planted in a barbarian past, the past of Chingiz Khan, while the other is advancing into a new world of ideas and action. And, surely, this extraordinary man was not only a meteor; he was the lodestar of a creed destined to sway many 000 worshippers. It is not visionary to suggest that those who made him their idol must even then have been troubled by a sense of strain mingling with their hero-worship, not unlike that atmosphere of anxious adoration which was to surround a later figure, in the Kremlin.

But here too, even beside the blood and horror of Gök Tepe, there appears a worthier record of the essential kindliness of the Russian common man. After the butchery soldiers were to be seen patting and comforting the few children surviving after their parents had been slaughtered, and there is evidence that the Russian fighting man's spirit of comradeship after the war won affection and respect from the very tribesmen who, a few years before, had most stoutly contested his advance. Even from the ranks of Tartary there comes an unwilling tribute[1]— The Russian himself is not really such a bad fellow: what makes him a nightmare to his neighbours is his notion of imperialism which for four centuries has preached to him the possibility of growth and expansion.

The defeat of the Turkmens at Gök Tepe in 1881 was the 175 first thrust of the final Russian deployment which was to round off the occupation of the entire Turanian basin up to the point where the advance came face to face with the protective shield held out by the British from India. It was followed by two small advance-guard actions only, designed to test the firmness of British resistance, that to Merv in 1884, and the defeat of the Afghan force by Komarov at Penjdeh on the road to Herat on 30th March 1885. This famous incident almost brought Russia and Britain into war, but in the event wisdom on both sides prevailed. The Russians had reached the outer fringes of the mountain barrier south of Turkistan and had subdued their most doughty opponents, the Tekke Turkmens; the British were still able to support an Afghan kingdom behind the Hindu Kush and the Oxus, which should

---

[1] Togan, *op. cit.* p. 592.

175 be free of Russian interference and so act as an effective buffer to their empire in India. A bargain between two equal sides was concluded by diplomacy, and the balance swung to rest. The final agreement, signed in July 1887, still left Balkh, inhabited by people of Turkish stock, and most of Badakhshan, inhabited mainly by Tajiks, to Afghanistan.

175 (2) There now remained only a small mountain area never penetrated by Turkish peoples. This was the high table-land of the Pamirs east of the Bukhara mountain country, hitherto a no-man's-land too distant for effective management by the Mangit Emirs of Bukhara and beyond the limits attained either by the Manchus working from Sinkiang or by the British from the Panjab. This remote region also finally fell to Russia, a narrow tongue of Afghanistan known as Wakhan being left as a cartographical buffer — it is little else — between the limits of British expansion in Gilgit and Chitral and Russian expansion on the Pamirs. Many writers have left the impression that there exists a point in this region where met 'the frontiers of three empires', namely, Russia, China, India[1] and indeed a fourth, Afghanistan. This was never the case. The Russian and Indian empires were parted by the finger of Wakhan, the Russian frontier having been so demarcated by a joint Anglo-Russian commission in the summer of 1895, rounding off the Russian dominion towards India but in this sector as elsewhere leaving Afghan territory in between. At one point the Wakhan tongue is only eight miles wide. Here, however, it is buttressed on the Pakistan side by the massive chain of the Hindu Kush, which in Tirich Mir rises to 25,000 ft. At another point farther east is an easy 12,000 ft. pass, the Baroghil, leading from northern Chitral into Wakhan, whence it is possible to look straight across on to Russian territory on the Pamirs. The Russian territory north of Wakhan is now known as Gorno-Badakhshan, or Hill Badakhshan, and is inhabited by Tajiks and pockets of odd mountain peoples, like their neighbours in Gilgit and Chitral not of Turkish stock and often Ismailis, followers of the Aga Khan.

---

[1] Now Pakistan, which succeeded to the hegemony of Chitral and controls the Gilgit passes north of Kashmir.

Chitral not of Turkish stock and often Ismailis, followers of the Agha Khan.

We see then that the whole process of the Russian occupation of the Turanian basin occupied nearly 200 years from the early XVIIIth century, when the posts were established east of the Urals along the direct road through Siberia, to the occupation of the line of the Oxus and the Kopet Dagh. It took place in two stages. The first part of the process, in its beginning, was nothing but an eastward expansion over the same Eurasian continent of the gradual Russification of the Tatar steppe, which had already taken place west of the Urals. In the second and subsequent movement there was something new, for the Russians, having conquered the Kazak steppe, moved on into Transoxiana and Farghana, and brought the sedentary populations also under their control. One result of the earlier pressures on the Kazaks was to force the nomads southward into the irrigated areas, so increasing the sedentary population, and leaving vacant spaces on the northern steppes. And there is an important distinction between north and south, to be constantly borne in mind. The Kazaks on the steppe have now been mingled with Russians for over two hundred years, while the conquest of the south was achieved only in 1865–86 and is therefore less than a hundred years old even today. Indeed the actual annexation of Khiva and Bukhara to the Russian Empire did not take place until after the Soviet reconquest of these States during the period 1918–24. We may therefore affirm that the final consolidation of Turkistan under Russian rule is barely thirty years old, and had to wait for the fall of Tsardom to be achieved.

But that is to anticipate. The effect of the Russian impetus under the Tsars was to bring the whole of the Turanian basin, except Balkh and the Bukhara and Khiva satellites, under direct Russian administration from a capital at Tashkent. The Kokand State in Farghana had been destroyed, and Samarkand had been wrenched from Bukhara, both Samarkand and Farghana therefore being Russian territory. Bukhara and Khiva survived as vassal States under close Russian control in

175 their external relations, but without much interference at that time with the anachronistic orientalism of their governments in the administration of justice within the limits of each State. 000 Indeed it has been held that, while the Russians under the Tsars posed as protectors of the Muhammadan law, the Sheriat, there is reason for attributing to them a real policy of maintaining the conditions of the Middle Ages in a city such as Bukhara, a hotbed of clerical reaction. The object of such a policy would be to encourage societies of this kind to rot internally and finally to break up of themselves under a new impact, like a mummy exposed to the air. It is not without interest to observe that a visit to Bukhara just before World War II led Fitzroy Maclean[1] to ascribe the same continuing motive to the Soviets in that city.

175
166 The distinction noted between the steppe and the oases was carried through into Russian policy. The Kazak nomads of the vast northern *dala*, already disorganized by the Kalmuck invasions and lacking the stability afforded by a settled cultivation with its attendant towns and forts, fell easy prey to the invaders. Many of them were forced south, and their places were taken by Russian and Ukrainian colonists, the settlement of whom became the fixed policy of Petersburg and proceeded steadily up to 1914. Towards the close of the XIXth century a scientific investigation was made of the availability of Kazak land for purposes of European colonization, ostensibly not without regard to the then existing population of Kazaks (these were wrongly known to the Russians of that time as Kirghiz). This subject formed the terms of reference of two weighty commissions of enquiry under two investigators named Shcherbina and Kuznetzev. These commissioners produced monumental reports in the best Germanic manner, complete with maps and extending to many volumes. But, says the commentator, though these claim to be highly scientific, they are thoroughly tendentious, and from beginning to end are written from the executioner's point of view. The authors set out to prove that the Kazaks are not the original

---

[1] Bib. I, 65, p. 149.

owners of the land, and their needs for a minimum subsistence 175
are reckoned with a view to getting rid of them. On this 166
basis 14 million hectares on the steppe were confiscated by decree, and two million Russian immigrants brought in. A [000]
more humane, and less scientific, Russian named Zwilling in 1911 compared these methods to that of the Jew who tried to accustom his ass to lower standards of nourishment by giving it a lower and lower ration, and eventually nothing at all. When the ass got used to eating nothing, it died.[1]

The real policy comes out in the outburst of Kriukov,[2] 175
President of the Agricultural Administration in 1907, in which he accused the Kazaks of being the descendants of Chingiz and Timur and therefore deserving only of destruction. When in 1916 the Kirghiz rose against the Tsar's conscription order, and their old leader, Kanat son of Ayuke, was captured on the Chu River and brought to trial, he accused his Russian judges of leaving him and his people no place to lay their heads, and later in despair committed suicide by dashing himself against the prison wall.

When in the period 1865–86 Transoxiana and the Turkmen steppe in their turn fell to the Russians, the government at first compromised with tradition by leaving Bukhara (with its mountainous extension to the east) and Khiva as 'native states' under their princes. The rest of the oasis country was brought under direct administration but there was not at that time a serious attempt to do much here in the way of Russian colonization. Indeed, as is usual in the oases of Asia, the already existing sedentary population was thick on the ground, and was engaged in an intensive system of agriculture little above subsistence level. But, just as Tsarist pressure on the steppe had taken the form of infiltration, so in the southern and submontane regions it was exercised by means of a turnover from grain to cotton cultivation, particularly in the rich Farghana Vale with its suitable climate and the natural irrigation brought from the rivers issuing from the surrounding mountains. Already emerging into leadership under the Min

---

[1] Togan, *op. cit.* pp. 301-3.

[2] *Ibid.*

175 Khans, Farghana in the Russian era has achieved first place in the economic life of Turkistan, agricultural and more recently industrial also. In many respects, ringed round by protecting hills and watered by streams from every quarter, it is like a larger and even more fertile edition of the vale of Peshawar farther south, even to the narrow exit for the waters at Khojent (Leninabad) — a northern Attock — and its central desert only waiting for the water that gives life — another Yusufzai *maira*.[1]

There was much behind this policy. It was not only cotton that the Russians needed; they sought to impose a measure of economic dependence. The cultivation of cotton was pressed by the appeal of higher prices and the fact that it requires less water and less labour than that of grain — much less water than rice. The consequent diminution in the area under grain entailed the import of corn from Russia to meet a marginal deficiency which was high enough at the time of the Revolution to bring famine to the country when grain imports failed owing to breakdown in communications. This policy could not fail to set Turkistan in economic tutelage to Russia in the elementary matter of the basic food supply.

175 If it was to become the main source of the all-important 496 raw material of cotton, Turkistan required above all a means of rapid transport to Europe. We have seen how the Russian advance came from the north along the line of the Sir Darya, and pre-dated by some decades the conquest of the Turkmen steppe. At first the plan was to use the Sir Darya, and after the conquest of Khiva and the practical absorption of Bukhara in 1873 the streams of the Amu Darya, as channels of river navigation, both fed by a flotilla on the Aral Sea. But the Sir Darya was so beset with shoals that even today the difficulty of navigating it has not been properly surmounted and, although the Amu Darya is rather more satisfactory as a waterway, it too did not then provide the solution that was needed, nor indeed is the Aral Sea ideally situated as an

---

[1] Pashtu word for a barren rolling plain or steppe, equivalent to Persian *dasht* Kazak *dala*.

entrepôt of commerce. It followed that the practical problems 175
of railway construction had to be faced, and were indeed met, 496
by Tsarist Russia in Turkistan before they had presented themselves in the other parts of her Asiatic Empire. It is interesting that the Trans-Siberian Railway was not undertaken until 1891 and did not reach Vladivostok until just before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. The Trans-Caspian line, on the other hand, was begun in 1880 from an original terminus at Uzun Ada (later extended to Krasnovodsk), and reached Samarkand in 1888, whence it was extended subsequently both to Tashkent, the capital, and up the Farghana Valley to Andijan.

Thus railway construction in Russian Central Asia was carried out in inverse order to the initial penetration by force of arms. The Turkmen country, which was the last to be subdued, was the first to enjoy rail communications with the west, and that in spite of the interruption caused by the need to break the journey for the Caspian crossing from Baku. It was not until the end of 1905 that uninterrupted communication with the Russian railway network was achieved by means of a line skirting the Aral Sea and traversing the original road of the Russian advance up the Sir Darya and past the town of Turkistan to Tashkent.

The Russians had at first envisaged the initial approach as leading up the Sir Darya from the north, and did not commit themselves to the Trans-Caspian line without much thought and in the face of strong opposition from Chernaiev[1] and others. The Trans-Caspian project was largely tactical at the outset: it was put forward by their engineer Annenkov as a means of supplying the forces engaged against the Turkmens which had failed disastrously under Lomakin. When Skobelev took over in 1880, he lent his powerful support to the idea, not so much because he needed it to win his campaign — indeed he boasted, and fulfilled the boast, that he would subdue the Turkmens without such adventitious aids — as that his eyes had been opened to what seemed to him its strategic possibilities. It would afford a rapid means of consolidating and

[1] [first Governor-General of Turkistan (1865, 1882-84)-- Analyst

175
496
advancing his successes on the Afghan frontier, and might even take him on to Herat. And, above all, it would enable him, from Transcaspia, to reach out to the heart of the country in Tashkent and Farghana. It would provide the rapid transport needed for supplying the farther outposts of the empire in Central Asia. As Curzon said — with the successes of Skobelev Transcaspia threw down her challenge to Turkistan.[1]

It is worth stressing the energy that the Russians put into railway construction in this area in the time of the Tsars.[2] For not only were the two main lines, the Trans-Caspian and the so-called Trans-Aral Railways, in being by 1906, but the Tsars had already proceeded far in the survey of the trunk now known as the Turk-Sib to join the Central Asian railways with Siberia by means of a line from Aris, near Chimkent, passing through Semipalatinsk to meet the Siberian Railway at Novosibirsk in the Kuzbas. Five-year plans seldom give credit for the actual work, or the preliminary survey, carried through by the régime which preceded them. The Turk-Sib is an instance of this tendency. Much advertised as a triumph of Soviet engineering, it was in fact completed not before 1930 on the basis of preparatory work carried out many years before under the Tsars. We shall see later that, in comparison with the pioneer work done in earlier times, railway construction by the Soviets in Central Asia has lagged behind.

175
669
It remains to record two scenes in the act which closes when the curtain of the Russian Revolution drops over Central Asia.

The first of these was the rebellion in Farghana in 1898, known as the revolt of Dūkchi Ishan. Dūkchi Ishan was a village priest in the countryside near Andijan. His knowledge of theology was small, but he had a winning tongue and a strong faith both in his Islamic tenets and in the destiny of his people. There is a picture of him in Castagné's *Les Bas-*

---

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 293.

[2] Cf. sketch map, Chapter XII, facing p. 192.

175
669

matchis, a benign figure, heavily bearded and of a dark complexion, with big capable hands upon his knees, a typical *imam* of the old school, like many whose names have become household words among the Pathan tribes of the North-West Frontier. He was a curious mixture of Gandhi and St. Paul. A maker of ropes and tents whose purity and faith won the people's affection, he built his house upon a hill. Here he planted trees and made the hill blossom by carrying up water which he gave indiscriminately to his garden and to the thirsty wayfarer. Asked why he consorted with the poor, he replied that he had no trust in the well-to-do, and it was for a man to seek those like him and befriend those who draw near to him.

His following was composed of hill Kazaks and Kirghiz around the Narin displaced by Russian immigrants, and bankrupt farmers overtaken by a cotton slump. There was a sudden agrarian revolt by peasants and herdsmen often armed only with spades and pitchforks. They set the shaikh on a white horse and, proclaiming him as their Khan, attacked the barracks outside Andijan and massacred a number of troops.

Of course in Russia the revolt was crushed by troops, and its leader put to death. But nothing was done to ascertain the causes of it or to take measures which would remove the underlying discontent. Property became concentrated in official hands; poverty and crime increased. The province of Farghana became in Turkistan what Peshawar once was in India and that not only in its physical contours; its tale of violent crime was greater than that of any part of the Russian Empire. The fuse had been laid for the Basmachi rebellion of later years.

The second revolt was the immediate precursor of the Revolution itself, and broke out in 1916. It was directed against the Tsarist order calling up the people for non-combatant military service in World War I, and was known as the *Merdikar*[1] Revolt. Togan says that ostensibly as an

---

[1] The word means 'man of work' in Persian. The suggestion is that it was used in the sense of conscript labour. Is it not possible that it was a slogan, 'Man of action', used by the rebels themselves?

175 669 act of grace, but really because the Russians had been alarmed by the prowess of Kine Sari and his like, the tribes of Turkistan had been exempted from military service, and, in his view foolishly, regarded this as a privilege. Foolishly, because this charter did not exempt them from confiscations and plunder in kind, and, in any case, the exemption was in the end withdrawn. The Tsar's order directing mobilization of all males between 19 and 43 was regarded as the fatal and final spark which led to a general explosion.

The Kipchaks of the Kazak steppe came into prominence again under a leader Abdul Ghaffar, who for a short time succeeded in reviving the enthusiasms of the days of Kine Sari, eighty years before. There were sporadic revolts also in Farghana and the rest of the Uzbek country down the Amu as far as Khiva, and small bodies of Russian troops or colonists were murdered wherever found. The action taken in reprisal by the last Governor-General, Kuropatkin, was in the tradition of Skobelev, whose pupil he was, thousands of tribesmen being exterminated or driven into the wastes to die. There is no doubt that the strenuous military effort required of the Tsar's government to crush this rebellion at a time when Russia was at the crisis of her great struggle with Germany and Austria affected the course of the War. Internally, too, it may even be said that the diversion of troops was in itself a contributory cause of the fall of the Tsar and the success of the revolutionaries.

829 669 In the earlier years of the Soviet régime, when lip service was still paid to nationalism, it was fashionable for Soviet writers to refer with enthusiastic approval to these nationalist movements of the pre-revolutionary era.[a] Even the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* in its first edition commended them as risings of the workers against the oppression of the Tsar's government. But this attitude is now condemned as a distortion, false coin to be withdrawn from circulation in common with the edition of the encyclopedia which gave it currency. These movements are now represented as reactionary risings of the feudal classes, dissatisfied by the diminution of the

[a] [I.e., of 1898 and 1916; see cat, 116, pp 88-90 — Analyst]

power of the Khans and clergy. Because it is true that the 829
Dükchi Ishan movement in particular was to some extent a 669
reaction inspired by the Turkic and Islamic traditions of the Farghana Valley, Soviet critics single it out for special castigation on the ground that its leaders aimed at the severance of the peoples of Central Asia from Russia and the Great Russian people — an aim which official teaching now proclaims to have been without validity even in Tsarist times. We shall observe later the development in Soviet hands of a first principle of historical dialectics,[1] designed and applied to establish that Tsarist conquests and suppressions of local nationalism were but the first and right stage in a process leading inevitably to the present Soviet national policy.

As the year 1917 went by, the rebellion was succeeded by 175
widespread famine. The economy of Turkistan, exporting cotton for grain, was brittle in the extreme. World war and local revolt had together produced a situation in which most of the surplus grain was wanted to feed the armies on the Western front and even that which was left over could not be carried to Turkistan along railways that were cut and disorganized. It was not surprising that the brighter spirits among the more educated Turks in Central Asia denounced this revolt as wasted effort and after the October Revolution looked for kindred spirits among the Bolsheviks who would advance the cause of the freedom of the peoples of Turkistan.

And so, heralded by massacre and famine, looms up the 000
Soviet era in this homeland of the Turks. The Tsars in their time had done little to lift the curtain from a country that a long isolation had made mysterious. It was as if, inheriting the jealous exclusiveness of the Emirs before them, they had something serious to conceal. But in 1917 it seemed that the barriers were at last about to fall.

---

[1] Known as the Conception of the Lesser Evil. See pp. 231-2.

[pages 92, 93, 94 = blank]

000

PART II

THE TRANSITION

[p.93]

VI

THE 1917 REVOLUTIONS

000

The sands of an expiring epoch are fast running out ; and the hour-glass of destiny is once again turned on its base.

CURZON

WE now approach the six years of confusion which intervened between the downfall of the Tsars and the consolidation of Soviet power in Central Asia up to, and indeed in a sense beyond, the farthest limits reached by pre-revolutionary Russia. For, when the dust settled, the local autonomy of the old Uzbek States of Khiva and Bukhara had disappeared and all Turkistan was found to be subjected to the ecumenical régime of the new Soviet imperium. This period of turmoil is one in which the writer of *Turkistan today* took a leading part, first under his Russian cognomen of Velidov, when, in attempted understanding with the Soviets, he worked for the realization of an autonomous and a national Bashkiria,[1] and later when as Ahmed Zeki Bey, in conflict with the Soviets and in sympathy with Enver Pasha, he and others strove from a base in Bukhara to bring together the various elements of Eastern Turkish nationalism in a united effort for the independence of Turkistan. Chaotic conditions always follow a sudden change of government over various and loosely knit populations. The gloom which descended on Central Asia during these years is particularly hard to pierce ; a landmark appears for a moment only to be shrouded in swirling mists, and the lanterns which Soviet propaganda provided shed only a dazzling light which is thrown back and makes no sense. But there were a few men, a very few

---

[1] Togan refers to his people by the Turkish name of Bashkurd, in Russian Bashkir. I have compromised, using Bashkiria for the country and Bashkurd for the people.

000 men, among the Eastern Turks of a perception fine enough to be able to look through that fog and knowing the landmarks to perceive a way that might have led them to safety. At that time the vision failed, but they have been able to give an account of wrong turnings taken which may avail their successors in some future time. In their company we begin to get a glimmering of what happened and to understand some of the reasons for the ultimate triumph of the Bolsheviks in Central Asia.

It is important to grasp the essentials of the very inauspicious circumstances existing in Turkistan when Tsardom was overthrown. The very fact that these conditions were so difficult renders the Soviet success the more remarkable, and one cannot deny a tribute to that astonishing combination of diplomatic ability and ruthlessness in action which in the end ensured their victory. Here was a land which had only been finally conquered by the Tsars a little more than thirty years before; conquest over tribal populations had been achieved at the cost of bitter and bloody clashes. The urban centres were traditionally the home of an ancient fanaticism of the more extreme kind. Much of the terrain was either desert or mountain and therefore hard for organized armed forces to 175 control. Only a year before the country had been swept by the storm of a bloody revolt[1], mercilessly crushed. Scarcely was the flame of revolt extinguished when railway communications, in themselves scant enough, broke down, and a severe famine swept a land whose most fertile areas had been given over to the production of a cash-crop, cotton. The situation was the more complex in that the Tsar's government had used Turkistan as the place of internment for thousands of prisoners of war, mainly Austrians, taken on the Western front and released shortly after the revolution in November 1917. During one of the most critical periods of the War (late 1917 and early 1918) and just when Russia was tottering out of it, these released prisoners provided a focus of intrigue for the agents of the Central Powers, Germany and Turkey, in their strenuous endeavours to create diversions on a territory

[1] [1916 -- Analyst]

leading to the Indian frontier. British anxiety on that score 175 led to what Russians have called the 'Intervention Period'. Lastly, Turkistan was to a great extent isolated from the effective deployment of Bolshevik force by the armies of White Russians and Cossacks operating under Denikin and Wrangel from north of the Black Sea and under Kolchak from Siberia. All these factors were unfavourable to the consolidation of Soviet power in Central Asia, and some of them might have been expected to encourage separatism.

There were, however, other factors. These are little 000 known and in the end they told decisively in favour of the determination of the Kremlin, as we now know, to retain for the Revolution in spite of all professions every vestige of the imperial power to which they had succeeded. In the sphere of power, as in that of prophecy, the Soviets were to play the part of a more specious Elisha to the ruder Tsarist Elijah who had vanished from the earth.

In the Bolsheviks' favour was, first, the fact that Tsarist 175 education had produced few among the Turkish or Tajik population who were able to give effect to any modern conception of the organization of a State. There were plenty of pious doctors in the Muslim law, learned in the old ways, but there was no local or even municipal autonomy, no press and, among the Turks, very little higher education on Western lines. The number of 'intellectuals' among the indigenous people could be numbered on the fingers, while that other more ancient cement, the system of tribal authority, was disintegrating under the impact of the Russian wars and governments. In any case the tribal Khan did not count for much in the urban centres. There was consequently a real absence of experience in all that pertains to political architecture in a modern world. In the words of Mustafa Chokai, the leader of the Kokand government, the efforts of the men capable of thought or action at this level had to be directed entirely to the hurried creation of some sort of centre, to bringing together a group capable of uniting people unaccustomed to a political idea. At the moment when these leaders ought to have been

175 engaged on construction, they were not only without architects, they had to wear themselves out in hunting for masons and building materials.[1]

Secondly, although the military tradition of the Eastern Turks was a celebrated one, they had been excluded from Russian military service and they therefore had no cadres with modern military knowledge. Nor had they any share even in the subordinate grades in the working of the communications services, whether railway, telegraph or telephone: all these were by deliberate policy in Russian hands. Nor had they even been admitted to such few industrial organizations as existed, except as labourers under rigid subordination to Russian foremen. The Russian finger was on every control, whether civil, military, municipal or the communications machine.

Thirdly, there existed, outside the towns and away from the railways, a condition which was perhaps even more radical and decisive in the struggle which lay ahead. This sprang from the widespread colonization of the land by Russians under the Stolypin reforms of 1906 and previous agrarian settlements. It is true that Russians were thicker and longer established on the land upon the northern steppe and in the Ili Valley than in Transoxiana or Farghana, but even there in the oases, and in the glens around Farghana, the Russian population by the time of the Revolution was rapidly increasing. Although it suffered severe casualties in the 1916 rising, it had been compelled by those very dangers and difficulties to organize in opposition to the indigenous peoples. There was thus a fundamental difference of interest between the indigenous and the Russian populations in any colonized area. The Russians, moreover, had settled down as peasants, while the people of the soil tended more and more to be nomadic, some of them expropriated, others maintaining a traditional contempt for agriculture.

The result was that in the period of chaos following the Revolution the Russians in Turkistan looked for support to any authority offering them protection against the indigenous 175 population. Some of them joined the Mensheviks and there was intensive murder and counter-murder between Menshevik and Bolshevik on this as on other stages. But, perhaps because of the greater Bolshevik aptitude in the making of fair promises (however belied in ruthless action), it was he who in the end prevailed with the Russians in Central Asia. Thus the nationalists among the Eastern Turks found their separatist aspirations in basic conflict with those of the provincial Bolsheviks.

---

[1] Bib. II, 7, Tchokaieff.

The actual events which took place in Central Asia 000 between the February[1] (Kerensky) Revolution of 1917 and the death of Enver Pasha in August 1922 are so confused that a clear disentanglement is hard to make. The cross-currents were many, one of the most troublesome being the spate of political manifestos issued by the many mushroom organizations, both Russian and Turkish, during this period. Moreover, the continuous rewriting of history within the Soviet Union to fit each new adjustment of the Party line means that the Russian historians are more or less valueless whether as guides to fact or as delineators of perspective. Togan does 114 at least give us a narrative of a succession of personal experiences over a very wide field, for he travelled during those years over the whole country between the Urals and the Afghan frontier, he enjoyed intimate talks with Lenin and Stalin, he was a confidant of Enver Pasha, and finally he was closely concerned with the Basmachi movement. Perhaps most interesting of all, he was the mainspring of the Bashkurd government, which almost alone among the short-lived growths of those times took practical steps towards the creation of a military force, so compelling even Lenin and Stalin to take account of and temporize with its leaders.

It is only possible to find a way through this maze if it is 175 understood that the main forces operating among the Eastern 669

---

[1] According to the Julian calendar, then in force in Russia, this event took place in the last days of February. The Soviets, having brought the calendar into line, often refer to it as the March Revolution.

2; Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 Turks were four, that these forces usually pulled in diverse
657 directions, and that there was no sufficient overriding power to bring them together. The first force was that of the Turkish nobility and gentry, headed by Abdul Said Mir Alim Khan, the last of the Mangit line of the Emirs of Bukhara. The *ulema* or Muslim *religieux*, and the well-to-do merchants, were in general accord with this group, as were also the *kadis* and *begs* (the judges and magistrates in matters of Muslim personal law) and a number of Russian-educated Turks and Tajiks, many of them in subordinate Russian employ. With the exception of some of the more fanatical priests (who turned to the Basmachis), many of these looked to Russia for livelihood and security, and for that reason shunned national enterprise. At a critical moment the Emir refused to commit himself against the Tashkent Bolsheviks who held the key to the failure or success of the Red Revolution in Turkistan, his reason being that the established policy of Bukhara required him to recognize any force representing Moscow or Petersburg as the Russian government. 'He was afraid', says Togan, 'of the shadow of a dead Russian.'[1]

The second force was that of the northern nomads, mainly Kazak and Bashkurd, expropriated from their lands by Russian colonists, bound with loose tribal bonds, and bitter at heart. The Kazaks were ill-organized and had few leaders of more than tribal stature. The Bashkurds, as we shall see, did better. But the Ural steppe and hills did not provide them with sustenance or refuge sufficient to sustain any protracted campaign, the more so since the years of crisis were years of fearful famine brought on by the failure of the grain supply and general disorder.

The third force was that of the Basmachis.[2] Their stamping-ground was in the mountains and glens around the Farghana Valley, breeding a type of tribesman very like the Afridis and Wazirs of the North-West Frontier. These threw up obstinate leaders of great bravery, endurance and resource, able even in times of shortage to retreat to lairs in the hill 175 country less affected by famine than the steppe. Such were 669 Ibrahim Beg, the Uzbek Lakai chief, cunning and bitter, and the gallant Devletmand who fell with Enver at Beljuvan. The Basmachi tribal cohesion was sufficient to enable them to continue as a menace to the Soviets long after the death of Enver Pasha in 1922. Officially, Russia claimed to have extinguished them by 1924, but the spark was constantly lit again, and Ibrahim Beg did not succumb until 1931. There was talk on the Peshawar border of the continuance of the Basmachi movement as late as the time of Hitler's invasion of Russia in 1941, and even today the fire may not be wholly quenched. But the tribal virtues which sustain and prolong such resistance are not those which can supply the sinews of a modern or national State, and Togan's pages are full of the lament that the Basmachi force could only be mobilized in support of a lost cause like that of the Bukhara Emir, breaking in the hands of those whom he calls the intellectuals. That was the tragedy of Enver Pasha.

---

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 373.

[2] The word is usually derived from the Turkish verb *basmak*, to press, tread underfoot, attack, raid. A raider or highwayman.

The fourth force should have been these very intellectuals (*münevverler*), not those who were in Russian service and sold to Russia, but those who sprang from the oppressed people themselves and might have crystallized their love of liberty into something modern and practical. Ali Khan Bukaikhan among the Kazaks, Chokai in Kokand, Obedullah Khoja in Tashkent, Osman Khoja in Bukhara, Khan Junaid in Khiva, Togan in the Bashkurd country — these were a few who essayed the task. The scales were weighted against them and in the end they failed.

The February Revolution in Russia was hailed with acclaim by these very men. Some of them had had experience in the short-lived Dumas of the Tsars in the first decade of the XXth century, and they were encouraged by the fact that Kerensky himself had grown up in Turkistan, his father being an inspector of Russian schools in that Tsarist province. Various congresses were held, and there was much manœuvring among the native nationals to play off one Russian party

175 against another. The Muslims of European Russia did not
669 back up their brethren in Asia. From their headquarters in Kazan they worked for a unitary government of Russia, within which they saw themselves, as close to the centre, occupying positions of great influence; they opposed the majority of the Eastern Turks, who came out with a programme of local autonomy within a federal framework. The real reason for the autonomy movement in Asiatic Russia was the native impulse to obtain power to retrieve the lands forfeited to Russian colonists, and there is a strong impression that Russians of all parties, white, pink or red, realizing this to be the living issue, were only playing for time and determined to prevent the local nationalists from getting effective control of land policy. The autonomists won the day in the Muslim congress at Moscow held in May 1917, but they were beating the air. The months went by in wordy preparations for a Constituent Assembly. Even the Kazaks took to the new ways, holding congresses as in the times of the steppe cavaliers on horseback in the open air, with a fat mare as a rostrum. Meanwhile in Khiva and Bukhara the efforts of the men of new idea were constantly frustrated by the conservative elements behind the Emir and the *ulema* in the south. And all the time famine conditions were growing worse, communications more difficult. In Tashkent, the Bolsheviks — the only purposeful group — played up to Uzbeks and Kazaks alike by professing their horror of Russian land encroachments, and of the failure to bring corn to the stricken land. There was also considerable Bolshevik success in appealing to the intellectuals with natural leanings to the left. It seemed better to work for Russian revolutionaries than for Mullahs and Begs who prayed for the Tsar.

When the October Revolution came, it was the Bolsheviks who succeeded to power in Tashkent in much the same fashion, and adopting much the same tactics, as in Russia itself. Their capture of Tashkent was to prove decisive. They succeeded in holding on to it throughout the troubles, even in the face of a revolt in January 1919 by their own War

Commissar, a youth of 23 named Ossipov who had been a Tsarist officer and cast in his lot with the Bolsheviks. Deciding the Bolsheviks were too doctrinaire for him, Ossipov turned against them, treacherously summoned their leaders to help him (as he said) suppress a meeting in the barracks, shot the lot, then, after one crowded hour of glorious life in command of the situation, gave away his advantage by getting superbly drunk and decamping with the money in the direction of Ashkabad. All this time the Bolshevik position in Tashkent was extremely precarious. Their communications were broken on both railways, White Russian, Cossack or native autonomies intervened between them and Moscow, the tribes in the hills were in revolt and food was scarce. It is not surprising that they shot all Ossipov's supporters without mercy. What is remarkable is that they successfully held on to their position and, when the tide turned in Russia itself, were thus enabled from Tashkent to reimpose throughout Turkistan the authority which they alone of the revolutionary groups had shown themselves capable of inheriting from imperial Russia. It is interesting that the actual force which pulled them through their crisis was made up largely of Hungarian and Austrian prisoners of war, who gave them loyal service in return for release and food in time of famine. 175 669

At Tashkent the Ossipov incident was the turning-point, and after it the Soviets in Turkistan, though they had anxious times to face against the Basmachis, had overcome the enemy within the gate and gradually strengthened their position. But, to go back, during the whole of 1918 which preceded it the Turkish leaders outside Tashkent had been striving with greater or less success to give effect to the local autonomies which were their dream, and (in addition to Bukhara and Khiva which still existed) had for a short time been able to set up at least the outward forms of three such States, the first at Kokand in Farghana, the second known as Alash Orda in the northern Kazak territory with its focus in Yedisu

175 (Semirechye), and the third in the Bashkurd country. During 669 the first few months after the October Revolution, the Cossacks controlled Orenburg (Chkalov), cutting Red communications with Moscow; and after some vicissitudes the Mensheviks held on to the Turkmen country, cutting the railway to Krasnovodsk. The intellectuals therefore had their brief chance. 'Alash Orda' was proclaimed under Ali Khan Bukey Khan on 17th November 1917, the Bashkurd Republic with Togan as its chief inspirer four days later, and the Kokand Republic on 28th November under Mustafa Chokai.

The new State of Kokand lasted only two months, and lacking an army fell in February 1918 to a determined assault by the Bolsheviks under Ossipov — the same man who later raised the storm at Tashkent — launched from the neighbouring town, which at that time, not inappropriately, was named after Skobelev.[1] The Kokand government had been unable even to overwhelm the forty-five Bolshevik soldiers in the Kokand citadel, which held out until relieved by Ossipov. The chief actors fled in all directions. But it was largely the resurrection of a Kokand State for these few weeks that gave shape and inspiration to the Basmachi rebellion which rallied round one Irgesh, the police chief of the short-lived State.

The Alash Orda or Kazak State was never much more than a committee which held congresses and issued manifestos. Its capital was intended to be in the east at Semipalatinsk, but in fact its activities took place at Orenburg (Chkalov), where was also the seat of the Bashkurd government. Alash Orda was unable to organize any real executive power, or to obtain any working agreement with the many thousands of Russian colonists, who were determined not to yield control of Russian immigration or colonies to any Turkish authority.

The Bashkurd State was more of a reality. Its proclamation coincided almost exactly with the well-known Declara-

---

[198]

[1] This town at various times has been known as Yeni (New) Margilan, Skobelev, and Farghana, the present name. The name Farghana confuses it with the whole valley. With the neighbouring town of Margilan it is now the main seat of the Soviet silk industry in Uzbekistan.

tion of 15th November 1917, signed by Lenin and (even so early) by Stalin also. 175 669

> The Council of Peoples Commissars [ran the Declaration] has decided to base its work in relation to the nationalities on the following principles:
>
> (1) Equality and sovereignty of the nations of Russia.
> (2) The right of the nations of Russia to free self-determination, *including the right to secede and form independent states*. . . .

This Declaration was followed by a manifesto specially addressed to 'All toiling Muhammadans in Russia and in the East', words that would read oddly in *Pravda* today:

> Muhammadans of Russia, Tatars of the Volga and the Crimea, Kirghiz[1] and Sarts of Turkistan, Turks and Tatars of Transcaucasia, all those whose mosques and prayer-houses were destroyed and whose religion and customs were trampled upon by the Russian Tsars and tyrants! Henceforth your faith and customs, your national and cultural institutions, are proclaimed free and inviolable. Build up your national life freely and unhindered. This is your right.

It was not surprising that the autonomists believed the golden age for them had dawned. They were soon undeceived. In February 1918, two months after this Declaration of Liberty, the Red Army defeated the Cossack general Dutov and occupied Orenburg. Declaring the Bashkurd government reactionary and nationalistic, the Bolsheviks arrested its members, including 'Velidov', and established a Revolutionary Soviet of Bashkiria, made up of Bashkurds subordinate to the Russian Soviet in the city. The plan was to win over to the Soviet cause the masses of the Ural country. But this Bashkurd Soviet in its turn began to display what would now be called a Tito mentality: for all parties the real political aim in the background was the control of the lands, whether by Bashkurds for their own people, or by Russians for the Russian

---

[1] Kazaks are probably meant. The Russians used to confuse Kirghiz with Kazaks. At that time there were at least four times as many Kazaks as Kirghiz in Russian Central Asia.

175 colonists. Once again there was an interruption. The Russian
669 Whites returned and (in April 1918), driving out the Bolsheviks from Orenburg, freed Togan and the original leaders of the national movement. Before long Togan had organized a number of efficient Bashkurd regiments (the Bashkurds had long enjoyed a special position in the Tsarist army, in which almost alone of Turkish peoples they had always served with distinction), and in this way he displayed a greater awareness than the other autonomists of his time of the essential measures needed to establish a State. These troops proceeded at first to fight for the Whites under Dutov and Kolchak, but soon found that the Right Wing of Russia, though possibly more honest in its statement of policies, was no more ready than the Left to sacrifice the interests of the large Russian colonial populations in the Urals and on the steppe beyond. The Bashkurd leaders were not capable of splitting ideological hairs with Russians; they were nationalists first and every time, and they had a precise aim, namely the control of their ancestral lands and the expulsion of the encroaching Russian colonists. They were in fact ready to mount any bandwagon that promised well, and they turned once more to the Reds when towards the end of 1918 the effort of Kolchak began to flag.

In these negotiations their hands were strengthened by their possession of a military force. Wielding this weapon, they succeeded in extracting from the Soviet leaders in February 1919 an agreement whereby the Bashkurd troops were merged in the Red Army but under their own command, and in return the Soviets recognized the autonomy of Bashkiria which would be governed by a native committee known as the Bashrevcom.

Thus it seemed that, in Bashkiria at least, after an initial setback a great end had been achieved. The agreement had conceded to the Bashkurd autonomists the control of everything within their territory except railroads, factories and mines, which were to remain under the All-Russian Commissariat. This was a far-reaching concession on the Soviet

side, and one that seemed to give way on the point of supreme 175
importance to the Bashkurds, that of the disposal of their lands. 669
But once more the native leaders had grasped the shadow only to lose the substance, and the Soviets knew what they were about. It is surprising that Togan, himself the main organizer of the Bashkurd Army, should have handed the only effective force in Turkish hands on a plate to a set of Bolshevik revolutionaries fighting desperately for their own survival. Again and again he says he could not trust them, yet here he gave away the only real card he ever had. It is a proof, if proof were needed, how bemused were the rising intellectuals among the Turks by the catchwords and slogans of the revolutionaries of the time.

Togan himself went with his troops to the Red Army. In Orenburg the Bashkurd leaders, once in the saddle, embarked on an attempt to realize their programme for the compulsory expropriation of all the Russian colonists in Bashkiria. They strove at the same time to aid in the formation of a real Alash Orda state in Kazakistan, but the number of Russian colonists on the steppe was far too large to allow of the establishment by the Kazak leaders of any real authority in that country. In fact, as we have seen, the separatists' ambitions were in fundamental conflict with the interests of the large Russian population in these territories. This population included not only the Russian peasants but all the workers on railways and other communications, and also in the mines and factories.

The following passage,[1] written with special reference to 175
the then situation in Bashkiria, is of wider application. It 669
demonstrates what were the real motives impelling the Soviets 563
to act in a manner precisely contrary to the professions of their 1917 Declaration to the Muslim peoples of Russia.[1]

> Most Soviet organs in the Urals were predominantly Great Russian in their ethnic make-up because their personnel consisted largely of industrial workers, soldiers of the garrisons, and peasants, none of which existed among the Moslems in any sizeable numbers.

[1] [cat. 116 p105 -- Analyst] Bib. II, 8, R. E. Pipes.

> 175 The Bashkirs . . . had no proletariat . . . only a small part of
> 669 them engaged in settled agricultural pursuits. Hence it is not
> surprising that the various Soviets were predominantly Russian
> 563 and came to fight for specifically Russian interests. That meant
> that local Soviet institutions took the side of Russian colonists in
> their struggle for land with the Bashkir peasantry. Bashkirs were
> in many cases prevented from joining local Soviets.

The writer goes on to quote the central Soviet delegate to Bashkiria as having admitted, perhaps ironically, that, despite their best intentions, the Bolsheviks at that time simply spearheaded the onslaught of the Russian Kulaks on Bashkurd lands. They incited the colonists against the indigenous peoples, armed them, and saw to it that only they should benefit from food distribution measures taken to combat the famine.

This state of affairs enabled the Kremlin to put any convenient gloss it wished on its announcements in favour of local autonomy, self-determination or even secession. Thus Stalin could later claim that the nationality policy was to be national in its outward form but proletarian in its inner substance,[1] and justify the exclusion of an indigenous population lacking a proletariat not only from participation in the organs of supreme revolutionary power but even from the management of its own local affairs. And this, in fact, is what he said and subsequently did. Adjustments were made from time to time to appease national leaders who seemed in the Kremlin to dispose of a temporary power deserving of some respect; but when all was prepared and the base secure, both the will and the force were made available to overthrow them. That is roughly what happened, first in Kokand, later in Bashkiria, and finally, when the time was ripe, in Khiva and Bukhara too. It is what happened in the Caucasus. Further, not only was Moscow, in common with the Whites, determined to uphold Russian colonial interests in Asia; both blocked and frustrated every effort by the Bashkurds, Kazaks and leaders of southern Turkistan to get together with a view

---

[1] Bib. I, 90, p. 210.

to forming a unified State. Both Reds and Whites regarded 175
every such step as in the nature of a pan-Islamic or pan-Turkic 669
alliance to which they were extremely hostile. In the end the 563
autonomous local government of Bashkiria was destroyed by the infiltration of agents of the central Party who organized cells among the Russian population. The method adopted was to place in the hands of the local Party bosses the sole authority for the alleviation of the terrible starvation and disease which had followed the famine and was decimating the peoples of the area. The authority of the Bashrevcom was undermined until, with their army absent fighting the Whites and the Poles in the West, they began to lose even the semblance of a government.

In May 1920 Moscow published a new decree to regulate the autonomy of Bashkiria. This withdrew most of the powers delegated a year before, subordinating all subjects of importance, political, financial and economic, to the Centre. The Bashkurd leaders decided on one final effort, and adopted a strongly worded protest of which the main interest is that it is the earliest realization by the victims that the Soviets were determined, in their own way and time, to work for a Russian hegemony over other peoples. At that time (1920) this reality had not appeared from behind the mask of fair-seeming Soviet platitude lauding such aims as 'Asia for the Asians' or 'Freedom for the Peoples of Islam' — aims which today would be dismissed as mere bourgeois-nationalism. But the Bashkurd leaders, even then, had seen behind the façade. They charged the Party in general, and Stalin in particular, with having embarked upon a course of out-and-out Great Russian chauvinism.

Togan went to Moscow in May 1920 to see what he could do. Stalin and Kamenev sent him a message to come and spend some time with the Bashkurd troops fighting the Poles on the Ukraine front, Stalin hinting that the difficulties were all due to Trotsky into whose mouth he put the opinion that the rise of Togan's influence on the Asiatic front was dangerous to Soviet Russia. Togan was loth to go, remarking that Stalin

175 was only putting his own opinion into the mouth of Trotsky,
669 whom he disliked. Lenin, however, ordered him to comply,
563 and a few days later he met Stalin in the south. What follows is best told in Togan's own words:[1]

> I met Stalin near the Crimea at Kremenchuk, where towards evening our carriages were hooked onto his private train. We had long conversations together both on a motor drive at Kremenchuk and in the train. He was very friendly, and it seemed as if his heart burned for the Eastern Turks, for us small nations. He threw all the blame on Trotsky, whom he described as one who cared nothing for nationalists. He himself, he said, was the son of a Georgian nationalist; that was why he understood us so well. He abused the Russians for their chauvinism, but told me — as had Lenin a few days before — I ought to do my duty in the spirit of Great Russia and not worry so much about governing a small tribe. I was obliged to remind myself that this man, with whom I had talked for so long at table in the Tsar's ornate railway carriage, was in no wise to be trusted, and that, despite all his fair and partly reasonable words, no good was to be expected from him or from the Russian Communist Party which he even then controlled.

Togan was admitted also to more than one personal conversation with Lenin himself. A debate was proceeding in Moscow at the time regarding what was then still called the colonial question, and Lenin sent him the draft of a thesis on 'Nationalities and Colonial Problems', asking him to put down observations in writing on twelve theses which he — Lenin — had set forth. On one of these points Togan advised the despatch of a High Commission to Turkistan to be composed of three Russians and three Muslims — a conservative proportion, given the tone of the November Declaration. Lenin accepted this and made the Muslim appointments, only a little later to withdraw the names and substitute Russians, of whom Kuibishev was one. There could hardly have been a clearer departure from the spirit of the Declaration. Again, as so often with Communist papers, Lenin's draft proceeded on certain *ex cathedra* assumptions which set 'the proletariat' at the head of the pluses, and the 'small bourgeoisie' at the

---

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 400.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia R14

bottom of the minuses as a class which had nothing to expect. 175
Togan demanded a clear definition of both phrases, enquiring 669
pertinently how far each term, as used, cut across nationalities. 563
Lenin found the question an awkward one, but advanced the thesis that 'the colonies' only trusted representatives of the Russian proletariat and this would be the case in future. National leaders in those regions would command trust only in so far as they remained faithful and obedient to the proletariat of the ruling nation. Lenin even advanced the personal opinion that, after the victory of the Social Revolution throughout the world, the Colonial nations in the East must be guided by the workers of the ruling nations of Europe, by which he meant Russia, France and England. During the process of socialization the workers of the native populations must be regarded as *in statu pupillari* only.

There remains one final account of a conversation between Lenin and Togan, which must be related in the latter's own words:[1]

> I have just [he writes] tuned in to Moscow radio, and the first sentence I heard was to the effect that loyalty in our time is a stupid quality. Twenty-one years ago, when a dispute between ourselves and Moscow was being discussed I wanted to gather information regarding a clause in the treaty between the two States. I had approached Lenin, who, without mincing words, said that a treaty was simply a piece of paper. When I said that in our country we were used to keeping promises according to the tradition of our ancestors, he replied, 'Then your ancestors must have been stupid. I took you for a revolutionary. Look at the real facts, not at a piece of paper.'

Even then the period had passed when Liberalism served as a vehicle for Communist propaganda, and a screen for Communist intentions. Lenin's words, spoken in 1917, are the more haunting:

> We want a voluntary union of nations — a union which would permit of no oppression of one nation by another — such a union as would be based on the most complete confidence,

---

[1] From Togan's fascicule written in 1940.

175 on a clear understanding of fraternal unity, on entirely voluntary
669 consent.

563 The Bashkurd leaders realized what had happened and dispersed to organize resistance elsewhere. In Bashkiria the rest of 1920 was passed in Civil War. Under cover of suppression of a counter-revolutionary rising there began a reign of terror, forcing the Bashkurds into the mountains, where they were killed off by Red troops raised from Russian colonists, or succumbed to the rigours of a severe winter. Removed from those events we can now see that what really happened was the stimulation by revolutionary passions of the national emotions of Russian and Turk alike, with the result that revolutionary action took the form of a national and not a class struggle. The contest between nomad and colonist was inevitably expressed as a clash between Turk and Russian. In this struggle the Turks were doomed to failure, not only because Russia as Russia was strong, but because these Turks were nomads and their social and economic structure gave them no part in Communist cells, composed of soldiers, peasants and industrial labourers.

Togan disappeared. One morning in July 1920, in the disguise of Red Army uniform and on pretext of going to Astrakhan on leave, he disappeared and made his way to Baku. From Baku he crossed the Caspian to the Turkmen country and succeeded in winning through to Bukhara. But before he reached safety he addressed a letter as a parting shot to Lenin, Stalin and Trotsky.[1]

> We see [he wrote] you accept the ideas of genuine national Russian chauvinism as the basis of your policy. Everything has turned out as the true Russians wished it. Frunze [the Red General, whose name was later given to Pishpek, the capital of Kirghizia] and Kuibishev, who head the Turkistan Commission, have said openly that at all its meetings a hypocritical policy has been pursued against the native Turkish Communists, and that cooperation with us has been a pure pretence. . . . Another member of this Commission said that class must be deliberately set against class among

---

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 403.

> the native population, by representing the nationalists to be the enemies of the working-class and due for extirpation. But you should realize we mean to give you no opportunity to make us out to be class enemies of the proletariat. You will find plenty to sacrifice, but we are not the men to offer ourselves blindly to sacrifice. The Comintern leaders, Zinoviev and Radek, have treated the representatives of the eastern nations like anti-revolutionary peasants . . . you choose to assume that the most essential problem in the east is the land question, and that the class war in the east rests on that question. You are about to revive the class-war by terrorist means. But we have clearly explained in our reply to the thesis written by Comrade Lenin on colonial problems that the land question in the east has in principle produced no class distinction [between us]. For in the east it is the European Russians, whether capitalists or workers, who are the top class, while the people of the soil [*yerli*], rich or poor, are their slaves. Why should there be any distinction of class between those who have the land cultivated and those who do the work? You will go on finding class enemies of the workers, and rooting them out until every educated man among the native population [*yerli*] has been removed and there are only left the peasants who know only about asses, oxen and spades.

175
669
563

In other words, as he might have added, do you, Comrades Lenin and Stalin, till the land?

To grasp that these words were written to the Soviet leaders as early as 1920 is to realize that the Turks of Central Asia could throw up men of no usual penetration. And they were now to receive a new inspiration, combining the old and the new pattern of Turkish native endeavour.

VII

ENVER AND THE BASMACHIS

O, young Lochinvar is come out of the west . . .

000 IT is now time to turn from events in the north, which had worked themselves to a standstill in so far as the redemption of Central Asian freedom was concerned, and to examine what had been happening along the courses of the rivers and in the ancient States of Bukhara and Khiva. I have shown that very soon after the Revolution the Bolsheviks had captured and held the key to Turkistan at Tashkent, and from that centre had succeeded in crushing the short-lived Kokand government early in 1918. From that point we have followed a circle against the clock, starting from Kokand, proceeding over the Kazak steppe to its fringe in Bashkiria in the Urals, and thence by way of Moscow and the Crimea
175 to Baku. By the end of 1920, disillusioned but not despondent, Togan has left Baku and, travelling incognito to escape the attention of the Soviets whom he had defied, crossed the Caspian back into Turkistan to arrive in Bukhara in January 1921. Here he soon found himself dealing with the very tribal forces whose movement, touched off by the train lit at Kokand three years earlier, was due for a big explosion in a few months' time.

The difficulties of the Bolsheviks in the south of Turkistan had been greater than any they were called on to meet on the northern steppe, where they were contending only with disorganized Cossacks or the Whites under Kolchak. In the south these difficulties sprang partly from the internal political situation bequeathed to them by the continued existence of quasi-independent 'Native States', much of whose territory was either in the mountains or behind the desert (for Khiva had no railway). Partly they arose from the fact that Bukhara at least was a frontier territory bordering on Afghanistan, a country which their predecessors had acknowledged was beyond the sphere of Russian influence. The southern frontier with Afghanistan stood on that general line against which the Russian tide had washed and found itself unable to advance farther against British resistance organized in the defence of India. Both politically and geographically it had seemed that on this line a stable international balance had at last been attained. But the stability of a frontier depends on the continued existence of steady conditions on each side of it; disturbance on either side is likely to upset the balance.

The six months or so following the October Revolution in Russia were coincident in time with a most critical period of World War I. The weight of America had not had time to affect the issue, Russia had fallen in the race, and the possibility of a German victory could not yet be ruled out. Turkey, though hard hit in Irak and Syria, was still formidable. In 1918 the Turks under Nuri Pasha, half-brother of Enver, began a thrust forward to the Caucasus and succeeded in capturing Baku. A German mission under von Hentig and von Niedermeyer had been in Kabul in an endeavour to persuade the Afghan Emir Habibullah to denounce his undertakings to the British in India and in the name of Islam to raise the North-West Frontier in revolt.[1] Meanwhile in Turkistan all was turmoil and it remained uncertain in 1918 which side would prevail in the civil war then raging. Thousands of Austrian and Hungarian prisoners of war, interned in and around Tashkent and elsewhere, had been released and were at large. It is not surprising that Britain thought it necessary to look to the defences of India.

This it was always the British way to achieve by the use of the smallest possible force at the farthest accessible point on the glacis of the Indian fort, not waiting for the turmoil outside to spread to the buffer States along the marches and expose India's own frontiers to direct attack. And this, in accordance with a well-tried principle, is what was done in the present case, and carried through successfully.

---

[1] This German effort failed to affect the outcome of the war, but it left its seed. In 1919 Habibullah was murdered, and there followed Amanullah's assault on India and the Afghan war — events as it happened beyond the present story. Had this pistol gone off a year earlier, events would have merged.

The object of the government in India at that time was to prevent a German-Turkish thrust being launched from the Caucasus by way of northern Persia or Turkistan into Afghanistan and so against India. A serious invasion of this kind in 1918 would have tied down many troops in India and borne hardly on the conduct of the war in Europe and the Middle East. Consequently, a small force of less than brigade strength, under General Dunsterville and known later as Dunsterforce, was sent to Baku; and another even smaller force under General Malleson, known as the North Persian cordon, stood on guard at Meshed and pushed forward outposts in the direction of Merv in Turkistan. At about the same time a diplomatic mission was sent to Tashkent from India via Kashghar, where the government of India maintained a Consulate on behalf of His Majesty's government. This mission was under the direction of Colonel Bailey, of the Indian Political Department,[1] who was ordered to open negotiations with whatever authority should be found to be in power in Turkistan. The situation was kaleidoscopic and the future unguessed, but the main object was to induce any authority capable of implementing an agreement to neutralize the dangers which were expected to arise from the release of the Austro-Hungarian prisoners, and their possible junction with any Turkish or German force which might advance from the west.

Dunsterville succeeded in occupying Baku for a few days, but was driven out. His advance did, however, result in securing for the Royal Navy the vital command over the waters of the Caspian Sea which was needed to anticipate any attempt to extend the Turco-German thrust in the direction of India. And Malleson was in position in reserve on the

---

[1] This service was not concerned with politics but was in effect the government's diplomatic corps. For an account see Bib. I, 18.

Meshed–Merv line as an outpost in the second line to deal /75 with any advance attempted by the land-route through Persia or Turkistan. On reaching Merv he was attacked by Bolshevik forces, which he drove off. He then opened negotiations with a group of Mensheviks, who had succeeded in obtaining temporary control of Ashkabad and agreed that they would aid him in opposing any enemy advance from the west. (It has to be remembered that the Mensheviks were for continued prosecution of the war against Germany and Turkey, while the Bolsheviks had made peace.) This group, supported by Malleson, was for some time in control of the Trans-Caspian Railway, so blocking communications by that route to the Bolsheviks in Tashkent. It was during this time that these Mensheviks caught and murdered twenty-six Red Commissars trying to make their way through from Baku (which had again changed hands) to Tashkent — an incident which Soviet propaganda still bitterly attributes to British influence, unknowing that it is not our way to murder captives in cold blood, or if we can prevent it, permit others to do so.[1] Meanwhile Bailey, arriving with difficulty at Tashkent and having presented his credentials, was threatened with arrest and even with execution, and had to go to ground. After more than a year of hide-and-seek he managed to elude capture by the delightful ruse of going to the Bolsheviks in disguise and offering to pursue and catch himself. His offer was accepted and he chased himself with alacrity into Persia early in 1920 under a hail of bullets to the last. It is pleasant to believe that even the Soviets enjoyed the jest, for to save face they announced sadly a little later that Bailey had died, they were sorry, for they had never borne him any malice and had given him a military funeral. He lives to tell the tale.[2]

By this time World War I was safely over and British forces could be withdrawn from the glacis of India. But it has been necessary to digress in order to explain how it came about that British intervention in the south of Turkistan,

---

[1] For details of this incident see Bib. I, 51, pp. 144-6, and II, 7, Malleson.

[2] Bib. I, 5.

175 essential as it was to meet a Turco-German threat to India while the issue of the War was as yet uncertain, placed the Tashkent Soviets in peril and might have lost them Turkistan. The British action was never intended to do more than achieve the limited object of preventing the use of Turkistan with its communications as a springboard for attack on India, but in carrying this out it inevitably made more difficult the execution of Soviet general policy in the same quarter. On a narrower stage also it probably delayed the assumption by the Soviets of effective control over the Khiva and Bukhara States.

668 It was not until September 1920 that the last Mangit Emir, Abdul Said Mir Alim, found himself unable to maintain his position in Bukhara and gave way to a national reformist group which, after the manner of the Young Turks of Istanbul, called itself a Young Bukhara Party. The chairman of the Party was a young Bukharan named Osman Khoja, who later distinguished himself with Enver's successor, Haji Sami, and helped to maintain relations between the Basmachis and their sympathizers in Afghanistan. The *coup d'état* was achieved with the aid of Soviet troops which plundered the ancient city, destroying many of the *medreses* and setting fire to the famous library containing at that time possibly the most valuable collection of Muslim manuscripts in the world. The Emir fled to the mountains in the eastern part of his State (now Tajikistan), where he established a base at Dushembe (now Stalinabad). He maintained himself there among the Basmachis until March 1921, when he withdrew to Afghanistan. The same period saw the end of an independent Khiva, where a Young Khiva Party seized the person of the Khan, handed him over to the Russians and began to rule themselves.

Although these parties of young revolutionaries were at the outset far to the Left in their political views and were under the closest Soviet control, Bukhara and Khiva were not at first required to call themselves Socialist Soviet republics. The Kremlin was content to know them as Peoples' Soviet republics and to leave them to be governed nominally by the 'young' parties who had seized power, with a Russian political repre-

668

sentative in each capital. In the case of Bukhara there was a Russian resident at Kaghan (the new city on the main line eight miles from old Bukhara), working through a Russian commission of two which closely controlled the Bukhara ministers. The reality is sufficiently demonstrated by the fact that the Bukhara government had no army and only a rudimentary police force. It suited Russia to proceed gradually in the absorption of two States which stood for a centuries-old tradition of Muslim independence under Uzbek rulers.

Behind this façade there was much activity. Among the local nationals there were really three Parties,[1] the Conservatives, the Innovators (who were not Socialists) and the Socialists. The Conservatives the younger Parties despised — they included the *ulema* and many of the adherents of the ex-Amir whom the new idea disliked — but in the event, as all accounts of the Basmachi struggle show, it was they who had most influence with the tribes and their strength was underrated. The most distinguished of the Innovators was Mustafa Chokai, who had headed the ill-starred Kokand government[1] and was chosen later as the man best suited to represent the new idea of Young Turkistan before the Peace Conference in Paris. Later he settled in France and we shall hear of him again. The Socialists were much farther to the Left but they were sincere Turkish patriots. Togan[2] himself a man of the Left, showed breadth of mind in devoting time and thought to clandestine negotiations for the establishment of what would now be called a Popular Front with a common programme on which the two progressive groups, Socialist and non-Socialist, could unite. These Parties succeeded in the end in forming a coalition to which was given the name of National Union. Originally, on the wave of new-found 'democratic' enthusiasm which followed the Emir's fall, the Young Bukharans had felt themselves to be in tune with their Soviet Russian mentors. But with the arrival of Togan and his friends hot with news of the Baku Congress and Soviet perfidy in Bashkiria and elsewhere[3] their enthusiasm for things

---

[1] [See cat. 116 pp 103-104 — Analyst] Togan, op. cit. p. 407.

[2] [See cat. 116, pp. 7-8 -- Analyst]

[3] [See cat. 116, pp. 104-112 — Analyst]

668 Russian waned, and they planned an active deviation. It is a good early instance of a tendency which has since become well known, what the Soviets call the deviation of the bourgeois-nationalist. They soon turned their thoughts to setting up a common front with the Basmachi rebels in the mountains against their Russian masters.

As might have been expected, these young intellectuals did not understand the tribes, who for their part ridiculed and distrusted the new-fangled antics and professions of city politicians. There were many comings and goings, but little real comprehension was achieved between elements so diverse. Togan understood the point of view of both sides and has much to say of the details of the negotiations. He puts the following words [1] in the mouth of a courier sent to Jemal Pasha, but it is just this sort of thing that the tribes heard and disliked:

> Our aim is to find means to force the Russians to accept our proposals, to strengthen the National Union, inspire a modern, national, political spirit into the organizations that are prepared to fight, to get rid of the shameful and disturbing activities of the Emir's adherents, to clear out fanatics and replace them by people faithful and useful to the League, and to convert the whole revolt into a military organization of young and educated revolutionaries which can become a partisan movement.

000 It is easy to imagine the reaction of Muslim tribal leaders to a manifesto of this sort issued by youths who themselves often sickened at the mere sight of blood (there were instances of craven conduct by young revolutionaries). They would look the schoolmen askance from under beetling brows, resent their disloyalty to the Emir and mock their orations to scorn as silly romance. There was a revealing and barbaric example. A young delegate was trying to win over to the cause a fierce old chieftain of the Basmachis, Toghay Sari of the Lakai tribe of Uzbeks. Toghay, a formidable grey-beard of 75 years, heard the envoy out, then turned on him and wrenched out from beneath his coat a bunch of human ears. With a sardonic

---

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 430.

grin he announced they were cut from the heads of Reformers 000 who listened to falsehoods about the Emir. Toghay and Ibrâhim Lakai are charged with having been cunning, cruel and fanatical, as indeed they were. It was even said that Ibrahim and his like worked not so much against the Russians as against the young native revolutionaries. But there were of course failures on the side of the intellectuals also in dealing with the tribes. I am reminded of the scene on the North-West Frontier in 1946 when Mr. Nehru tried, and failed utterly, to impress his personality on the rough men of the Khyber and Waziristan. Nehru had courage and to spare, but the tribesmen laughed rudely at his ways and made him lose his temper and his dignity. So it was with the young Bukharans and the Basmachis. But, when all is said, it was Ibrahim, the Basmachi, who saw the light when later he came face to face with a man he called a man. It was he and no other who maintained resistance in the mountains against all the forces the Soviets could bring to bear for years after the politicians had fallen or fled the land. It was the tragedy of the time that among the people of Turkistan no figure arose like Babur,[1] big enough to be scholar, poet, founder of states and man-at-arms, all rolled into one.

This then was a movement with a double inspiration. It was on the one hand a revulsion on the part of the supporters of the old governments of Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand, and on the other a more idealistic struggle for national freedom, giving expression to the aspirations of the educated and ignited by conditions of famine and horror which threatened to deprive all of everything they knew, material and spiritual. The first stream won the support of independent-minded hillmen not unlike the North-West Frontier Pathans; these, moreover, were all too ready to turn to opportunities for loot. The second was the current which carried the social democrats along. The Eastern Turks themselves never succeeded in finding a leader who could mingle these two tributaries in a flood strong enough to sweep all before it. Mutual jealousies

---

[1] In thinking of Babur, it is hard not to be reminded of Wavell.

000 and multiplicity of aims and counsels forbade cohesion. But there was a man from outside who went near to command success when native talent failed.

669 An interesting and obscure part of the history of the Turkistan interregnum between the fall of Tsardom and the establishment of Soviet power is to be found in the dramatic intervention of the Western Turkish Pashas, Jemal and Enver. These were two of the Istanbul triumvirate which brought Turkey into her declaration of war on Germany's side in 1914 and thereafter led her through the bad years to the final defeat of 1918. Enver's exploits in the field had been gallant though of a somewhat Pyrrhic nature. On the Caucasus front, and particularly at Sarikamish, he won personal renown but lost an army. Jemal is well known for his ruthless direction of the war against the Arabs on the southern front. With Turkey's defeat at the end of 1918 neither man felt he had much to look for in his own country, and both gravitated towards the Bolsheviks who, as we know, were playing up a sympathy with 'down-trodden Muslim peoples'. And both Jemal and Enver probably felt that an alliance of this sort offered them the best hope of revenge on a Britain whose conquering arms had finally succeeded in breaking Turkey after so long a fight.

Jemal reached Tashkent from Moscow in August 1920, a few months before Togan's arrival. Both he and his successor Enver were sponsored by the Bolsheviks, who wished to use the war-born resentment of these Turkish leaders against the British conqueror of Turkey to stir up further trouble for Britain in Afghanistan and so keep her anxious for her own possessions in India. It was the policy of Tsarist Russia, noted by Curzon, to keep England engaged in Asia with a view to offsetting any movement by her against Russia in Europe. There may also have been some hope of diverting Eastern Turkish nationalism away from grievances against Russia, and starting it on the barren road of Islamic enthusiasm against the

British in India across the mountains. But, as the event 669 showed, the last thing Lenin wanted was a focus of nationalism in Turkistan itself.

Jemal, committed and with passion to this objective, went on to the Afghan capital, Kabul, to start what he called an Islamic Revolutionary League, whose object was to be the freeing of India from British domination. He talked at first of organizing armies in Afghanistan to seize the Panjab. (The short-lived Anglo-Afghan war of 1919 was just over, and difficult negotiations were in train for a peace settlement.) Later the Kremlin, who had agreed to his opening negotiations with the Basmachis, suspected him of a too effective organization of the rebels as a fighting force with the help of Turkish officers. What they wanted was to get the Basmachis into their bag. Jemal also negotiated ineffectively with the Bukhara National Union, but the negotiations broke on the latter's demand that he renounce all idea of using Turkistan as a base for freeing India, and concentrate on strengthening their organizations to enable them to bargain effectively with the Russians for their freedom. Jemal would not go so far, but Lenin suspected him of playing a double game and recalled him in October 1921. He was a bitter, cruel man who had failed in all he sought to do, and what he did he did without a generous gesture. He was murdered at Tiflis on 21st July 1922, probably at Bolshevik instigation.

Enver arrived at Bukhara on Jemal's heels in the same month of October. He too came under Russian auspices. His aim, as announced, was the same as that which Jemal had failed to reach — alliance with Bolshevism in the fight for Islamic ideals against the so-called Imperialism. But his own real object, confided to the National Union shortly after his arrival, was to mobilize Eastern Turkish resistance, and particularly the Basmachis, against the Soviets, and so set up an independent State in Central Asia. At first the National Union leaders strenuously endeavoured to dissuade him, pointing to the famine conditions still ruling, but at heart swayed by their belief that the time was inopportune for

669 anything but conspiratorial measures.

After some hesitation, Enver decided that his Turkish patriotism demanded of him a bold move in an endeavour to do just what the Bukhara leaders could not do — unite the Union Party, the intelligentsia, with the partisans, the Basmachis. Togan gives a moving description of Enver's last night in Bukhara, sitting cross-legged on the floor in his uncomfortable Turkish uniform, and making his decision as a *mŭjahit*,[1] with tears in his eyes, feeling he was in the cradle of the Turkish race. Next morning Enver rode off with twenty-four companions, saying:

> I have decided I must go to eastern Bukhara. If we succeed we shall be *ghazis* [victors for the faith]; otherwise we fall *shehits* [martyrs] on the battle-field. We must fight for Turkistan. Did we fear death ordained by fate, and choose the life of a dog, we should merit the curse of our ancestors and our descendants. But if we can bear to die for freedom, we shall have ensured the freedom and happiness of those who follow us.[2]

He rode first to Ibrahim Beg Lakai, of the Emir's party of Basmachis. Ibrahim, loyal to his Emir, held Enver captive as the man who had broken the power of the Ottoman Sultan and started the Young Turk movement. After many vicissitudes Enver succeeded in capturing the tribal imagination and, having secured his freedom, united a large number of tribesmen around him, under the leadership of Devletmand, the most chivalrous of the hill chiefs. He had also some notable Afghan adherents and a devoted Russian Cossack aide named Rayev. His forces, and he himself, gave an excellent account of themselves for some months, and caused the Soviet commanders much disquiet. He had achieved for the moment the impossible, infusing the new ideas and the old with a common enthusiasm. But it was not to last. After some successes, in August 1922 he was forced to retire on Beljuvan in the Tajik hills supported only by the faithful Devletmand and his partisans.

On 8th August Enver died gloriously. Early in the morning he had heard that a detachment of 300 Russians was 6069 approaching a hill above Beljuvan. Without waiting for the rest of his soldiers to collect, he rode against the enemy with 25 men, reaching the top of the hill at the same moment as the Russians mounted it on the other side. Taking advantage of surprise, he succeeded in disarming a body 75 strong, and again advanced with drawn sword against the remainder, thrown into confusion by his onslaught. With him were 5 men only, the Turk Cherkes Hussein, the Kazanli Kerim, Enver's Afghan groom, the Cossack Rayev and the Kazak Ishmurad. The other soldiers under Devletmand were now coming on the scene, but fortune was against a reckless man, as it had been earlier on the Caucasian front by Sarikamish. A Russian machine-gun opened up from a flank and shot the Pasha through the heart. The gallant Devletmand, coming up in support, was killed a minute later. The Russians retired not realizing their triumph.[1]

---

[1] Islamic equivalent of a Crusader.

[2] Togan, *op. cit.* pp. 437 *et seqq.*

Twenty thousand of the tribesmen around gathered weeping to Enver's funeral; many kissed the dead man's hands and feet, and took hairs from his beard in memory. A lament ran through the land, and his death was celebrated in a famous poem of the Uzbeks. In calmer moments Togan says that he was not Enver's man, and their views on political means and ends were widely different. He condemns Enver too for posing as a redeemer with a mission beyond his strength to unite the resistance movement. But the contemplation of a warrior who of his own will has made the final sacrifice moves the historian beyond measure, and he ends by acclaiming him as the hero of an epic which will resound so long as Turks are Turks. He calls him a great idealist, who ignored daily life and facts.

> He had little knowledge of the geography or the statistics of Turkistan. In Bismarck's words, politics is the art of the possible. Yet by his death Enver redeemed all; he has become a legend and

---

[1] The account of Enver's death largely follows *Bugünkü Türkili*, pp. 451–60. It is drawn partly from the memoirs of one Mustafa Shahkul, one of Enver's advisers in Bukhara.

669 a memory, even among the very men who would have fought against him in his time. All who knew him acclaim him a great man, a pure man, a man beyond the common measure.

He appears indeed in the story as a sort of Young Pretender, a hero for Turkistan to acclaim as was Shamil for the Caucasus, the embodied pattern in these latter days of Turkish heroism and ideals.

Among the tribes support for Enver came from the recognition that he stood for that ancient ideal of Turkish chivalry, and the intellectuals believed in him because, with all this, he had proved himself an innovator.[1]

The chronicle proceeds:

> Enver was before his time, yet his death sowed a seed. I said to him at Bukhara 'we are not ready for it yet'. Enver replied: 'And it will be some time before you are ready for it'. And he was right. Many years have now gone by since we first laid the charge that is to explode when Russia's internal and external situation becomes difficult, and we see it is not yet ready to go off. If Enver Pasha had taken no part in developments in Turkistan, the rising would have faded without memory; he gave it a new form, a new significance.
>
> Nor did he really dream of pan-Islamism or even of pan-Turanism. He considered indeed that the interests of the Turks in western and central Asia were identical, and that it was the duty of clear-thinking men to make known in Turkistan the reality of such interests. But he said to me at Bukhara: 'Osmanli will never become the common language of Turkistan: a native Chaghatai must be invented. This has become obvious to me since, having been in Russia, I have come to Turkistan.' He himself never expected his movement at that time to succeed, so he adopted the watchword — Victory or death in the field. By his death on Turkistan soil he offered the supreme sacrifice for that country and for the history of the Turks.

000 In Britain, the exploits of Enver Pasha have won no renown: he was our bitter enemy in World War I, and he met his death far away, in a period of confusion which we have never tried to understand. So far as there existed knowledge at that time, his exploits beyond the Oxus caused anxiety in India, and there was a tendency to echo the Soviets and cry

1/[See pp. 101, 119 cf. 116 -- Analyst]

000 him down as a mere adventurer. But it is not the habit of Englishmen to withhold honour from a gallant foe. Enver was a good loser. And to many Turks, it seems, he remains a national hero, who brought about the revolution in Turkey and played a noble part in Central Asia. A Turkish historian of today has compared him with the Seljuk Kilich Arslan, who smote the Crusaders. To such men Enver ranks among the Deli Dumrul — the epic heroes — of the Turks.

669 The Basmachi rebellion was officially stated to have ended in 1924, but it did not die with Enver. In fact his death supplied just the impulse needed to bring the varied elements of the resistance together. The embers of the revolt smouldered on, supported from across the border in Afghan Turkistan, until the Afghan revolution in 1928[1] gave the Soviets a chance of intervention across the border during the interregnum. It was not until 1931 that Ibrahim Beg was finally captured, and there was evidence which filtered through of rebel movements in Soviet Turkistan much later than this.

The spirit which animated this struggle comes out in the story of Khan Junaid of Khiva, a gallant old man, who had fought the Russians steadily since 1873, when they captured that city. Ever since then he had refused to take Russian citizenship, and had been the Khan's chief minister more than once. In 1920, disgusted with the failure of the Bolsheviks to live up to their professions, he took up arms again, and continued to raid lines of communication until 1927, when he concluded peace on the terms that he would be left alone to farm his land near Urgench. Finding the Soviets were still after him, he withdrew once more into outlawry and fought on until 1929, when he was forced across the frontier into Afghanistan. It is now high treason for any admirer even to refer to Khan Junaid. Or there is Haji Sami, the Turk on whom Enver's mantle fell, a hard determined man who, unlike

---

[1] The abdication of Amanullah and accession of Nadir Shah after a short usurpation by Bacha Sakao.

669 Enver, hanged traitors. He took Ibrahim Beg prisoner and compelled him to serve the cause, and found a way to make the intellectuals and the tribal fighters join together in the campaign. For many months he carried on with the utmost resolution in Karategin and around Farghana. When at last he was driven across the frontier into Afghanistan, Togan reproached him, saying he had been too confident when Enver was still alive, and had now lost heart. The answer was full of dignity: 'My heart is with me, but I am wounded and cannot ride'.

000 Togan has much to say of the crowded and confused events in Central Asia that followed the Russian revolution, but the proudest and the newest message he has to offer is to be found in his assessment of the historic significance of the Basmachi movement. In his account of it he rises from the ranks of the chroniclers to become the writer of a drama, almost a prophet; the style of his narration changes like that of Thucydides when he puts speeches into the mouths of his statesmen and generals, and he seems inspired. If this Basmachi struggle was indeed a real epic, it will still stir the hearts of the descendants of those who took part in it just as it moves him. It is represented as a great national impulse, which for years
669 absorbed all the forces capable of playing an active part. It was joined not only by men who had taken part in the Merdikar rising of 1916, but by those who had been with Dūkchi Ishan in 1898 and old men who had fought against the Chinese in Kashghar. It mobilized the tribes, Uzbek, Kirghiz and Kazak, the young intellectuals of the cities, West Turk officers, many Afghans and Enver Pasha. Since the days of Shaibani Khan in the XVIth century there had been no national movement in Turkistan to compare with it. The movement had of course its negative side, for the need to meet the rebels on their own ground had forced the Russians to penetrate far into the mountains of eastern Bukhara and along the Chinese and Afghan frontiers, but this would have followed in time without any struggle. The Russian press professed to lament the losses caused to the rebels in battle, which they said had led

to a large diminution in the population. But such losses were 669 as nothing to the systematic mass-murder which inevitably followed if a revolting population was forced to throw itself on Soviet mercy. Only a few thousands fell in battle in Farghana, and only a few hundred in Bashkiria, but when the Bashkurds submitted in 1921 they were subjected to artificial famine and disease, their lands were handed to Russians and they themselves were forced into the mountains or the steppe after seizure of their flocks, with the result that they died in hundreds upon hundreds of thousands. The Soviets in fact adopted the Roman process; it was their peace which made a solitude and was more deadly than their war.

Of his own part, and the emotions to which the struggle 000 gave rise, he speaks feelingly. In 1923 the hope of organized resistance was over and with a few friends he was crossing the Hindu Kush on his way to Kabul. As the little party mounted the foothills of the great rampart, they looked back sadly to the vast plains of the Turanian land stretched out beneath them and thought of the last six years since the Kerensky revolution, of all the effort which had been expended, and of the lives lost and the dreariness of the opening prospect. For six years they had ridden up and down that great land and calculated they had put perhaps 7000 miles behind them. But was all that endeavour in vain? Let him speak for himself.[1]

> It is my delight that I was privileged to share in the severest struggles of my people in real earnest and not as a looker-on, even if that part had no historic significance. Everywhere we went we had seen the untold misery, the great-hearted uprightness, the saintliness of soul of our people. With our own eyes we beheld the things that travellers write about, and we exposed the lies told of the morale and character of the Turks. We observed the characteristics described as pacifist and cowardly, and knew these to be really the expression of the cool blood of a thoughtful, enduring and incredibly patient people, and also of a kind of wonder when face to face with the strange civilization the Russians had brought with them. Among the nomad and tribal Uzbeks and Kirghiz the old spirit of leadership, the master-soul, the true

---

[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 472-4.

heroism, is alive today. They sang us old songs which they preserved in their memories, and recited old stories and ballads. We observed moreover that the stories about the religious fanaticism of the Uzbek peasantry were mere idle tales. There is perhaps among them more tolerance than in any eastern territory. We were never asked by any Uzbek — why don't you pray? Why don't you keep the fasts? It was enough for them that we really loved the people and were trying to help them by our wisdom and knowledge.

The events of 1918–1924 were greater than anything I hoped for. The educated, intellectuals and others, along with the peasantry and tribesmen, showed such a spirit of self-sacrifice as to throw themselves into a forlorn hope in the firing-line and die a hero's death. The Basmachis who hitherto, if they fought at all, would only fight for their own district, and knew no fatherland beyond the limits of their own homes, were led to fight for all Turkistan. New popular ballads arose.

The Basmachi movement showed that the Turks of Central Asia were not a dead corrupt nation as had been written; it was the best training-ground for them, the start of a new period in the life of Turkistan; a period in which they began to fight for their existence, weapons in hand. Finally the dispersal which followed it caused the Turkistan people abroad, as in every modern land which fights for freedom, to combine in groups of political emigrants and to gain contact with other nations. In future Turkistan will never again be a mere looker-on at world events; it will play the part proper to it.

PART III

ooo

SOVIET PRESSURES

[page 132 = blank]

VIII

NEW APPROACH

The time was now rapidly approaching for the mighty experiment.

DE QUINCEY, Revolt of the Tartars

THE story has now reached the point in 1922 or so, when, with the weakening of nationalist resistance, it became possible for the Kremlin to take stock of the position in Central Asia and to decide how far, if at all, they would implement their own high-sounding Declaration of Rights of Independence of November 1917, or alternatively go forward to the creation of a centralized Russia. Before proceeding to examine these questions, it may be of some assistance to stand back and indulge in some more general reflections on the new forces about to be applied, and on the best approaches open to us for an understanding of the clash and merging of two ways of life which could scarcely have been more opposed.

The first of these reflections may well be the undoubted fact that from the very beginning the chief figures in the Kremlin have placed the affairs of Central Asia very high in their list of priority. Lenin himself, though in remote control, saw to it that a most challenging announcement to the borderlands should be one of the first actions of the Bolsheviks when they come to power. His personal interventions, so clear from Togan's story, rather suggest that at the beginning he may have thought more of this approach as a vital contribution to world revolution in all dependent territories than as a means of stabilizing the Revolution in Russia itself. One gets sometimes a sense that Lenin in some queer way really believed in autonomy for Asiatic nations. But at the time we have reached he had only two more years to live. Then there was Stalin. It was on this horse that he rode to the head of the race. What people like Togan felt about the honesty of his thought as far back as 1920 must be clear from what has already been related. But the fact remains that Stalin gave every aspect of this great problem continuous and unremitting attention, holding it in a grip that he never relaxed. There was also Kuibishev, the leading figure on the Commission sent to Turkistan, and Lazar Kaganovich, the Jew, related to Stalin by marriage and still at the present time (1953) a member of the Kremlin hierarchy. It was largely on his advice that Soviet policy in Central Asia was later steered. There was also Frunze, the Red general, who finally overcame the Basmachi rebels and gave his name to Pishpek, the capital of Kirghizia. A fine bevy of Soviet heroes who staked reputations on the policies they had devised for the Soviet borderlands and, in the case of Stalin and Kaganovich at least, must have derived a grim satisfaction from the way in which those policies have worked out.

I have had reason to point more than once to a sort of fate that seems to hang over Turkistan. Ever since the maritime age opened, this has not only been the continental territory most distant from the oceans, but the most secluded by the deliberate policy of man. This seclusion, well known in Uzbek times and continued by the Tsars, is still the destiny of Central Asia in the Soviet era, in so many ways a mere extension of the Tsarist decades which had gone before. Soviet publicity tends often towards hyperbole in expression, with one object presumably of suggesting that under the Soviet régime Turkistan has arrived at the millennium. If this were so, it would suit those who make the claim to admit visitors without distinction of sympathy to see and approve the new age. But Soviet Central Asia is guarded by an angel with a flaming sword — a paradise only to be entered by the very privileged along the narrowest of paths. In recent years, for instance, British visitors have been confined to a small

000

Parliamentary delegation shepherded along main lines, a few Embassy officials (notably Fitzroy Maclean) overlooked by secret police in their every movement, a rare single traveller of enterprise, and finally one couple for whom special air transport was provided.[1] Others are told there is no hotel, or no train, or, if there is a train, that their papers are deficient, or, should their papers pass muster, that they are booked for the wrong day, or anything to prevent them travelling. Even those who have reached the goal have seldom been able to get beyond Tashkent, and Farghana retains its mystery. It can only be that there is much that the authorities have to conceal, for the curtain is drawn even closer here than elsewhere in the Union.

It follows therefore that any conclusions on the feelings and thoughts of the people in Central Asia subject to the Soviet régime have to be intuitive to a very large extent. There is a good deal of rather dry research, so-called, and a series of unrelated statistics backed by much panegyric in Soviet publications and press, but little other foundation on which to build a real understanding of the souls of the people today. This process of intuition is aided if the case can be approached by or through those who have some knowledge of the kind of people with whom the Russians are dealing and the probable reactions of such people to the pressures applied upon them. Writers like Togan — one of the last in time to see and feel with their hearts the glory and the tragedy of what was going on, and still able to communicate with us — have a message worth hearing. They are able to reveal with a flash something of the inner thoughts that move a people, and details can then be filled in by studying even the negations of Soviet attitudes. One such negative attitude is the notable jealousy displayed in the matter of visitors. Another is the stream of vituperation which never ceases, addressed from the Soviet press and platform to the national or religious 'deviationists' who, remaining true to their prejudices, have not even yet bowed the knee to Baal. The mere reading of it induces in the most rational mind a sense of spiritual starvation.

---

[1] Bib. I, 23, Coates.

Mention of statistics leads to another thought. It may not be impertinent to suggest that much of the current study devoted to what goes on within the USSR is rendered almost unreadable by the mere fact that it rests so largely on bluebooks and statistics, sometimes unrelated and more often than not over-burdened to support some economic theory or practice. There is indeed an obsession with economics, and it is hard to see beyond the figures to the men and women for whose benefit presumably the figures are marshalled. In any case Soviet statistics are apt to be in percentages without a starting-point: a common shape for instance, is the triumphant announcement that coal, oil, cotton or silk production, say, in 1937 was several hundreds per cent higher than it was in 1913. If after a search more painstaking than usual we succeed in extracting the absolute 1913 figure, it is generally a very small one — a few tons or metres was all the poor Tsars could manage — and the astronomical percentage then ceases to impress. We shall do better to turn to human beings, for it is probably true that the most valuable statistics for the study of man are those which are embodied in census results and reports. Births and deaths, increases and decreases in population, or in classes of population, approach near to the life of man himself. For what does it profit, in the scale of ultimate values, if cotton production rise fourfold but the weaker workers perish in the factory; or if a canal embankment rivalling the Pyramids be built, but the forced labour that builds it die of pestilence or famine in the wilderness? Here then, in so far as we deal in figures at all, I propose to look mainly to the trends of populations and to treat even that question within the limits of one chapter. Other figures there may be, but they will be few.

It is not only statistical trends that empty so much writing on Soviet Russia of life; there is also the blast and counterblast of jargon, that highly specialized vocabulary of factitive or causative abstractions all strung together, which the Soviets seem to have taken over as part of their Germanic inheritance from the original prophets of Communism.[1] Responses to 000 Soviet challenges of this nature are sometimes as involved as the sentences and sentiments which provoke them. With both sides, as it were, throwing words into a machine, it seems all too likely that it is not in human nature to listen, and that the propagandists are wasting their time. Unless one can shut down, even for a moment, all the surface clatter of these well-worn abstractions, it is impossible to hear the rhythm of the life behind. Yet, though for a time it may seem to be drowned in the noise of the machines, that music can still echo faintly for him who has ears to hear.

A final thought of a general kind is this. So far, I have tried to depict the influences which shaped the lives of the people of Central Asia in the sequence of some sort of chronological order. This way of looking at things has even served to some extent when we came to examine the confused conflicts between Communism and Turkish nationalism during the interregnum period. There is of course also a chronology 178 in the thirty years of the Soviet era which followed the first consolidation of Soviet power in Central Asia in 1922. As, for instance, the period from 1922 to 1928 was occupied mainly with the territorial establishment of new republics, the 'rooting' of the Party, and the nationalization of land and water; the periods 1928–32 and 1933–7 were those of the first and second Five-Year Plans, with collectivization of agriculture and suppression of nomadism in the countryside and the rapid creation of an urban proletariat by means of redeployment of population to serve industry; the periods 1938–41 and 1941–5 represented the third Five-Year Plan (broken off by the War) and the War period, and saw a large increase in production of coal, oil and heavy industry generally under the spur of war needs and evacuation of industry from Europe; lastly, the period 1946–50 is that of the fourth Five-Year Plan, which set targets for the over-all increase of industrial output in Central Asia by 80 per cent.[1]

---

[1] A good example: 'It is the establishment, by means of the collectivization of the rural proletariat, of the forms of practical application of a complete and good measure directly answering the requirements of today which is at stake'.

000 Asia by 80 per cent.[1] But to examine the workings of the administrative machine in this fashion would not get us much farther than the blueprints; what is needed is an attempt to isolate the pressures and tendencies and see how each bore upon the population. Only so shall we be able to divine how far the eleven million[2] or so people of indigenous stock that have survived are in a position to remain the masters of their fate or to work out a new soul which they can call their own.

From this point on, then, I shall try to see each picture whole in such compartments of Central Asian life as have been chiefly affected by the newer dispensations of the Russian imperial rule.

---

[1] A fifth Five-Year Plan (1951–5) has recently (1952) been announced. It sets ambitious over-all targets, but is notable for lack of detail in the breakdown of figures.

[2] Of the total population of nearly seventeen million in 1939 only some eleven million were of Asiatic stock. See footnote to page 2.

IX

NATIONALISM AND THE SOVIET COLONIAL EMPIRE

000

His dark intellectual qualities of machiavelian dissimulation, profound hypocrisy, and perfidy which knew no touch of remorse, were admirably calculated to sustain any ground which he might win from the simple-hearted people with whom he had to deal.

De Quincey, Revolt of the Tartars

THE Declaration[1] of 15th November 1917, and the manifesto[1] which followed it, sounded like a clarion call to the peoples of Central Asia. If any words could pronounce a complete right to independence, these surely did so. At that time there was even an emotional appeal to them as Muslims. 'Henceforth your faith and customs, your national and cultural institutions, are free and inviolable. Build up your national life: this is your right.' The national leaders themselves soon developed their own views as to what value to attach to these early professions; they were convinced they had seen through them and they denounced them as a cynical appeal to nationalist feeling, never meant as more than a temporizing device to gain time for the deployment of other forces. But the world outside knew little about the sealed-off countries from which they came, and the Turkish leaders were voices crying in the wilderness. The same doctrine of liberty, with right of secession, is proclaimed as the Soviet gospel today, and is still broadcast to other peoples *outside the Soviet world* as the fundamental doctrine upon which the multiple Soviet society has been successfully reared. Let the nations but rise and embrace liberty and they will soon enter the haven in which the Soviet ships of many

---

[1] See Chapter VI, p. 105.

000 nationalities are already safely moored. So runs the argument,[1] still in 1953 unshaken by exposures such as the words written in 1920 to Stalin.

In spite of all that has happened in the colonial areas *within the USSR*, in spite of rebellions, suppressions, mass movement of populations, decimation of peoples, purges, the phrase 'freedom for colonial peoples' remains on Communist lips as the open sesame giving access to that new Soviet world where the lion and the lamb lie down together.

COLONIZATION

How has this come about? The answer begins to appear when we turn to examine certain particulars distinguishing Soviet Central Asia entirely from other parts of the world which from time to time have been regarded as dependencies.

The first distinction is that the people of what may be
162 called the metropolitan race in the USSR — the Great Russians — have an absolute majority over all other races in the Union, and constitute over 58 per cent of the total population.[2] The Great Russians and Ukrainians together make up exactly three-quarters of the total. There is thus a very large preponderance of Europeans over Asian races in the Union as a whole, while the two most important Asian races, the Uzbeks and Kazaks, together make up less than 5 per cent of the population. It follows that in areas suitable for European colonization there
00b are no such problems as beset the Commonwealth in countries

---

[1] The following are typical passages. 'The Bolsheviks had one exceptionally effective reply — *i.e.* the Soviet decrees on the right to secede if the native peoples so desired.' Coates, *op. cit.* (1951). 'The kernel of the answer is contained in the Party's proclaimed policy . . . every national has the right to self-determination, including the right to secession . . .' *Soviet Studies* (Jan. 1952), M. Holdsworth. For the exposure see pp. 112-13 *supra*.

[2] 1939 census. After the Great Russians come Ukrainians, 16·5 per cent; White Russians, 3·1 per cent; Uzbeks, 2·8 per cent; Tatars (*i.e.* Volga and Idel-Ural Turks), 2·5 per cent; Kazaks, 1·8 per cent; Jews, 1·8 per cent; Azeris, 1·3 per cent. Georgians, 1·3 per cent; Armenians, 1·3 per cent. Since that census the addition to the Russian Empire after the war of the Baltic States, and large parts of Poland and Rumania, may have increased the non-Russian population of the USSR by some 20 million, reducing the percentage of Great Russians to about 50 per cent, or even less, of the total population. But even this does not substantially affect the argument.

like South Africa, Rhodesia or Kenya, and France in Algeria, Morocco or Tunis. And, although the native population is thick on the ground in certain limited parts of Transoxiana where there is intensive cultivation on irrigated land, it cannot be said that there is any part of Soviet Asia where a few Russian administrators lead isolated lives amid teeming masses of indigenous people, as was formerly the case with the British in India and is still their lot in Malaya. Where there is no question of Russians being left as a small minority, it is easy for the Kremlin to assert that all men have equal rights in every respect.

There is another distinction to be drawn. This is that Central Asia is a part of the same continent with European Russia; one passes into the other with easy gradations of climate, soil and population. Indeed the Russians are only doing today in Central Asia what they did from the XVth to the XVIIth centuries on the Volga steppe and in the Urals; just as then they flooded over and mingled with the Tatar population in Europe, so now they gradually pervade and submerge the Turkish population of the Kazak steppe and Transoxiana. The process is the same, the interaction farther to the east — that is all. The process is rendered easier, in that, broadly speaking, the whole of the inhabited portion of Central Asia outside the deserts is a possible terrain for European colonization. There are portions such as the Turkmen steppe with its extremes of heat and cold that may be uncomfortable for Russians,[1] but none of it is impossible. Indeed much of Turkistan, and particularly Tashkent, Alma Ata and the Farghana Valley, have a more clement climate than any part of Russia proper, the Crimea perhaps excepted. There is thus no question, in any part of Turkistan, of the Russian being a sojourner only, as is the British administrator in Nigeria or the Sudan. He is included in the settled population and, as we shall shortly see, on the Kazak steppe at least he makes up much more than a fraction of the population.

---

[1] Russian colonization in Turkmenistan accounts only for about 200,000 out of a total population of about 1,250,000. In Kazakistan Russians make up about half the population of over 6,000,000. For details see Chapter X.

The third distinction to remember is that at the time of the Revolution and for some time later, there was in Central Asia no organized indigenous urban proletariat. There was of course a large city population of merchants, traders, craftsmen and *religieux*, but it was the usual medley, without order or arrangement, at best following the medieval guild system to be found in the bazaar quarters of all eastern towns. Such factories as existed — mostly for cotton-ginning and carding — were staffed by Russians, and Russians alone were to be found on the railways and telegraphs. Industry and communications were in Russian hands, and, to cite Stalin himself, the only proletariat of consequence was Russian.

[563]

> The fact of the matter is that a number of peoples, mainly Turkic peoples — about thirty million in all — have not had time to pass through the period of industrial capitalism and consequently have no industrial proletariat[1].

He followed this up two years later with a conclusion which it might have been inopportune to state on the first occasion.

> The conditions now exist enabling these republics which . . . possess no proletariat to establish *with the aid of the Russian proletariat* their own centres of industry in order to create in these centres groups of local proletarians who will serve as a bridge between the Russian proletarians and the toilers of these republics. In this sphere serious work is required; and talk of schools and language alone is not enough.[1]

This interpenetration of the Central Asian peoples by a Russian peasantry in the countryside, and by a Russian proletariat in the towns and along the lines of communications, supplies perhaps the most important clue to an understanding of the colonial policy of Soviet Russia. It is seldom mentioned; indeed Stalin's reference to the bridge-like task of the Russian proletariat is perhaps the nearest we have to an admission of the facts. But from the beginning its existence made 000 nonsense of the high-sounding phrases of the 1917 Declaration, and ensured for Russians a dominating position in Turkistan not as sojourners like the English in India, but as permanent settlers with the main stakes in their hand. In parts of Turkistan we shall even see that with the years the Russians ousted the native population and attained an actual numerical preponderance.

---

[1] Stalin speaking on 10th Mar. 1921 and 23rd Apr. 1923 to the Tenth and Twelfth Congress of the Communist Party. Bib. I, 90, pp. 104 and 156.

THE FIVE REPUBLICS

With this clue in hand it is time to take up the tale from the point when the Soviets, having destroyed the national governments of Kokand, Alash Orda and Bashkiria, and having come to grips with the Basmachis, were free to devote serious attention to the execution of a firm colonial policy. The picture will be clearer if we pass in quick review the measures which resulted in the eventual setting up of the five Soviet republics in the Central Asia of today.

The Kremlin inherited from Tsardom in Central Asia 642 four units—(i) the Stepnoi Krai or Steppe Territory, roughly 631 coincident with the northern steppe (northern Kazakistan of today); (ii) the Turkistan province with the Farghana Valley, Tashkent and Samarkand, covering most of Transoxiana and the Turkmen steppe; (iii) and (iv) the quasi-independent States of Bukhara and Khiva. (i) and (ii) had been directly administered under the Tsars, (iii) and (iv), as we know, were left in internal matters to their own Khans and during the interregnum had been the chief seat of the Basmachi troubles. As soon as the able Red General, Frunze, was in a position to report that conquest was secure and resistance only sporadic, Stalin announced[1] a territorial division which did not at first break entirely new ground.

The directly administered Tsarist provinces of the Steppe Territory and Turkistan had already been included in the

---

[1] Stalin, speaking on 26th Dec. 1922 to All-Russian Congress of Soviets. See *op. cit.* pp. [illegible]

642 RSFSR[1] as Autonomous Republics (ASSRs); thus they had 631 not attained a nominally equal status with the RSFSR, under whose wing they remained. Khiva and Bukhara were now declared to be *Peoples* Soviet Republics, the word 'Socialist' being omitted for the reason given by Stalin himself that they were not socialist.

> But [he added] I do not doubt, comrades, and I hope you do not doubt also, that these republics, as they internally develop towards Socialism, will also form part of the confederate State which is now being constituted.

The grim irony behind the words is clear enough.

By 1924 the way had been prepared for a further rationalization of the constitution of the Central Asian provinces. In September of that year, Bukhara and Khiva took Stalin's hint and declared their adherence to Soviet Socialism, and steps were taken to redistribute the territories on what was described as the national principle. By May 1925 these two, together with most of the old Turkistan province, had become the two full constituent SSRs of Uzbekistan and Turkmenia (Tajikistan was at that time given the rank of an ASSR within Uzbekistan). Thus the ancient States of Bukhara and Khiva ceased to exist. There was at least one Russian to regret it.

> Le Kherezm fut complètement éliminé comme état. . . . Jusqu'à quel point une telle mesure, qui s'inspirait du principe des nationalités, était-elle souhaitable ? On peut en discuter . . . en ce qui concerne ses traditions historiques il restait un organisme visible et original, et l'anéantissement de cet organisme . . . n'aura peut-être pas été effectué sans conséquences.[2]

There remained a fringe of the old Turkistan province. By 1926 this had been united with the old Steppe Territory

---

[1] In what follows:

USSR = Union of Soviet Socialist Republics — the whole Russian Empire.

RSFSR = Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic — *i.e.* Russia proper, much the largest of the 16 constituent SSRs which make up the USSR.

SSR = Soviet Socialist Republic — *i.e.* one of the other 15 of the 16 constituent Republics, *e.g.* Ukraine, Uzbekistan.

ASSR = Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic — *i.e.* a territory with limited 'autonomy' within an SSR, *e.g.* Karakalpak ASSR within Uzbekistan.

[2] Barthold, *op. cit.* p. 192.

as Kazakistan, but still as an ASSR within the RSFSR. 642
Similarly, Kirghizia in its mountains became a second ASSR 631
within the RSFSR. Thus by 1926 the name of Turkistan had ceased to exist, and the shape of the new map had begun to emerge. There were already the five republics of today, but two of them only, Uzbekistan and Turkmenia, had full constituent status. Of the other three, Kazakistan and Kirghizia remained ASSRs as part of the RSFSR, while Tajikistan had a similar standing as part of Uzbekistan. Of these three, Tajikistan alone rose to full constituent status as an SSR a few years later, in 1929.

Since then there has only been one significant constitutional development, and several adjustments of boundaries. The point of significance is that it took the eleven years until 1936 for Kazakistan and Kirghizia to qualify for full constituent status. The story of the disasters which accompanied this process belongs rather to the period of collectivization, to which we must turn later. Here it is enough to say that, apart from the fact that about one-third of the peasantry, in Kazakistan at least, was already Russian and therefore preferred to be included in the Russian State, the Soviets experienced the greatest difficulty in subjecting the nomads of the steppe and the mountains to any system which bore the stamp of Communist principle or practice. Dictatorial régimes have a traditional dislike of nomadism, which is hard to organize and eludes the tax-gatherer. Eleven years had to pass with devastating loss of human and animal life before the authorities could proceed to complete the pattern and bring Kazakistan and Kirghizia into line with the older republics as constituent SSRs.

FRONTIERS

A few minor boundary adjustments were made. What is 131
now the Karakalpak ASSR with capital at Nukus was a slice 631
of territory along the lower Amu Darya once part of Kazakistan and later transferred to Uzbekistan. It is possible that the setting up of this autonomous area was a belated Soviet

131 631 admission of the justice of Barthold's criticism of the annihilation of Khorezm. (Khorezm was really the settled area, while the Karakalpaks are in the main a steppe tribe, but the areas overlap.) And in 1929 there were adjustments between the Uzbek and the Tajik country, in particular the transfer of the lower part of the Farghana Valley — that part around Khojent (now Leninabad) inhabited mainly by Tajiks — from Uzbekistan to Tajikistan. The upper part of the valley, east of Andijan, is in Kirghizia, and a glance at the map[2] reveals a strange interlacing of the inter-republican boundaries in this part of Central Asia.

131 312 Let us pursue this geography a little further, for on these administrative divisions the Kremlin relied to a large extent in support of its claim to be a respecter of nations. The official thesis was that the boundaries were drawn in accord with national principle, but not in such a way as to clash with economic divisions. It was stated, for instance, that each irrigation system was included as a rule in one republic.[1] There is Stalin's own verdict as guide.

> I think the recent delimitation of national frontiers in Turkistan may be regarded as an excellent example of how the Soviets can be brought into closer touch with the masses. . . . In a pre-revolutionary era these countries were torn into fragments and were a convenient field for the exploitatory machinations of the powers that be. The time is now come when these scattered fragments can be reunited into independent states, so that the toiling masses can be welded with the organs of government.[2]

[162] The map itself belies him, for the boundaries are confused and the territories twirled and twisted round each other like the spokes of a catherine wheel. It is not even true that the boundaries divide the language-stocks, the 1926 census showing considerable minorities of Uzbeks in Tajikistan and Kirghizia, of Kirghiz in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and of Tajiks in Uzbekistan and Kirghizia. Indeed, as history shows, Uzbeks and Tajiks in particular are inextricably mingled in all these parts of Turkistan. Turning to irrigation, we note that the

---

[1] Mikhailov, Bib. I, 72.

[2] Bib. I, 90, p. 209.

[2] [See cat. 116, map facing p. 272 -- Analyst]

Turning to irrigation, we note that
Sir Darya starts in Kirghizia, passes into Uzbekistan, thence 131
into Tajikistan, thence again into another part of Uzbekistan, 312
and finally runs out into Kazakistan. The Amu Darya too 133
starts in Tajikistan, passes along the short southern side of
Uzbekistan, thence flowing into Turkmenia, pursues a course
close to the Uzbek boundary until it re-enters Uzbekistan in
the Khiva region, only to touch Turkmenia once more at
Takhya Tash opposite Nukus, and finally to flow back into
Uzbekistan again. In both cases the irrigation canals often
have to cross what on the original Soviet showing were
nothing short of national frontiers between independent units
of a federal State, and it is not easy to uphold the claim that
the irrigation systems have been kept within single adminis-
trative units. The difficulty of organizing irrigation across 000
a real administrative frontier is obvious to anybody who
possesses experience, for there is no administrative question
which leads to so much disagreement and disharmony as the
disposal of competing claims to irrigation waters from the
same canal or from different canals on the same river. Assum-
ing for the sake of argument the official Soviet theory that
these republics are real sovereign autonomous units in a
federal structure, it would be impossible for them, situated as
they are up and down the same rivers, to reach the necessary
agreements for the season-to-season, week-to-week, and even
day-to-day distribution of water, without which an irrigation
system does not work. The conclusion is irresistible that one
reason for so drawing these boundaries was to compel a degree
of central direction which makes nonsense of a real autonomy.
Or we may say if we like that it did not matter how the
boundaries were drawn, for the administration of all essential
matters would be in central hands. In either case their only
meaning would be to divide artificially stretches of territory like
the Farghana or Khorezm oases, each of which has a natural
geographical and agricultural unity. The best that can be said
for them is that the convolutions look pretty on the map.

There is another curious feature of political geography in 131
Soviet Central Asia. The five capitals are — of the Kazaks 361

131 Alma Ata, of the Kirghiz Frunze (Pishpek), of the Uzbeks
361 Tashkent, of the Tajiks Stalinabad (Dushambe), of the Turkmens Ashkabad. All these five are on the extreme edge of each territory, the first four of them remarkably close to one another in relation to the great area of the country as a whole. Road communications, though not rail, from Tashkent to Alma Ata go through Frunze. The position of Alma Ata on the edge of the huge Kazak republic is particularly strange, and not altogether explicable by the fact that here are grown the largest apples in the world. It is hard to interpret this tendency, unless the location of the capitals has been fixed with a view to grouping all of them close to Tashkent as the local focus of the central authority. The fifth, Ashkabad, presides over a republic in its origins and history even in recent times turning more towards Azerbaijan and the Caucasus than to Central Asia, and it may be that it looks to Baku as its Capua rather than toward Tashkent.

000 I do not suggest that there are no grounds for drawing
[101] linguistic boundaries in Turkistan; indeed its whole history shows at least four main historical groupings, the Kazaks of the steppe, the Turkmens along the Persian frontier, the Uzbeks of Transoxiana, Farghana and Khorezm, and the Tajik remnant of the original Iranian population. Moreover, as Barthold observes, both Bukhara and Khorezm had a history of a long viability, while the Kirghiz are in many ways distinct from both the Kazak and the Uzbek tradition. But, in spite of the differences, there was also some real underlying pattern — a unity of spirit and tradition — or it would have been impossible for men like Togan, or Khan Junaid of Khiva, to have ridden the whole land from end to end and won support. Togan makes the point that the Russian object was first, under a cloak of separate race-consciousness, to break down and weaken the natural ties joining the limbs of Turkistan, and then to bring each severed part not into relation with the other parts but into subjection to the outside force, Russia. To serve that end division and subdivision was carried to absurdities. A minority nationalism becomes ridiculous if it

has lost its focus. The Russian policy is in fact describable as cantonization, conceived with the object of working against any conception of the unity of the Eastern Turks and bringing the *disjecta membra* under the influence of overwhelming forces of assimilation from without.

DOCTRINE OF THE PROLETARIAT

So much for the outward forms of the five republics. There were other weapons in the Soviet armoury more powerful than these, and we have to see how the directors of policy even in their own minds were able to reconcile their 1917 professions of 'freedom for all' with the developments that actually took place. For the result has been not a loosely knit federation of self-governing units on national lines, but the most centralized human organism in the modern world. In examining this question we shall have to look first for some statement of the principles that were supposed to regulate policy and then for the agency responsible for execution of the policy itself. As the examination proceeds, the case will be clearer if we bear in mind Stalin's own statement that the indigenous peoples of Central Asia possessed no proletariat.

The right of a constituent republic to secede is not only contained in the 1917 Declaration, but appears in every pronouncement since then and is enshrined in Article 17 of the latest 1936 constitution. Let it pass for a pious aspiration. The right has never been exercised, and attempts to foster local nationalisms have been crushed by force more decisive than that used to defeat the attempt of America's southern States to secede in the middle of last century. It has never been suggested that any SSR in the Union really possesses the sovereign power which would entitle it even to be neutral in a war, as was Ireland in World War II. There are the facts, but again the question must be asked how the fact can be reconciled with the platitude of the theory.

The most satisfactory method of arriving at the answer must be to go to the Russian sources. In *Marxism and the*

National and Colonial Question[1] there exists a collection of Stalin's speeches and essays dating from a time before the Revolution to 1934. In these he sets forth a tortuous argument, reasoning from first principles and without concrete references and seeking to justify Soviet practice by reference to the prophets of Communism. In his thought national movements are identified with the bourgeoisie, and are outmoded when the bourgeoisie gives way to Communism. Thus a basis of autonomy, and the right to secede, can only be a temporary concession to the transient ambitions of an immature class, and although for the sake of argument it may be granted that a nation has a right to return to this out[illegible]n idea, it is the duty of the Communist Party to work against it. Nationalism is only really useful as a slogan for getting rid of external imperialism; once that is done, it is the task of Communism to get rid of the nationalist leaders. And this is best done by the Party, which will drive a wedge between the indigenous workers, namely the proletariat and peasants, on the one hand, and their own nationalist leaders on the other. These are represented as feudal, religious or bourgeois, but in every case a privileged minority unrepresentative of the toiling masses.

In case this account should appear partial, here is a selection of sayings. The first is from Lenin's writings quoted by Stalin, the others are all from Stalin's essays and speeches.

Lenin. Marx had no doubt as to the subordinate position of the national question as compared with the labour question.[2]

Stalin. There are instances when the right of self-determination comes into conflict with the other, the higher right — the right of the working-class. . . . In such cases, this must be said bluntly, the right to self-determination cannot and must not serve as an obstacle to the exercise by the working-class of its right to dictatorship. The former must give way to the latter.[3]

Nations have the right to preserve any of their national institutions, whether beneficial or pernicious . . . but that does not

---

[1] Bib. I, 90. I am indebted to the analysis in Mrs. Stahl's book, Bib. 1, 89.

[2] From Lenin's *Right of Nations to Self-determination*, see Stalin, *op. cit.* p. 168.

[3] Stalin, *op. cit.* pp. 168–9.

mean that Social Democrats (*i.e.* the Party) will not combat and 000
agitate against the pernicious institutions of nations, and against the inexpedient demands of nations. On the contrary it is the duty of the Party to conduct such agitation and to endeavour to influence the will of nations so that they may arrange their affairs in the way which will best suit the interests of the proletariat.[1]

It is not the national but the agrarian question that will decide the fate of progress in Russia. The national question is a subordinate question.[2]

Proletarian in content and national in form — such is the universal human culture towards which socialism is marching.[3]

I am referring to the deviation towards local native nationalism which is at times to be observed in the ranks of native Communists and which in the East expresses itself in Pan-Islamism and Pan Turkism.[4]

Here then is the Doctrine of the Proletariat, overriding the right of self-determination, and applied to 'native nationalists', who *ex hypothesi* have no proletariat of their own, by a Russian proletariat working through the Party. Leaving aside the instruments of enforcement lurking at every corner, it is hard to think of a series of pronouncements which could be more discouraging to a Central Asian patriot, or less in tune with the proud declaration of the liberty of the colonial peoples to decide on their own future.

THE PARTY

The period from 1918 to 1929 was spent in the integration 665
of these colonial areas with Great Russia, using as instrument 471
the Party. Collectivization had not yet been launched; up to 1929 the aim was to cut off the smaller landholders from their national leaders. Here again it is to be remembered that the Russian peasantry in the countryside and the Russian proletariat on the communications and in the towns were ready to hand to implement a policy. Whatever the theory, 000
the Party has always been in fact a single unified structure bound by the tightest possible discipline. To parody Stalin,

---

[1] Stalin, *op. cit.* p. 53.
[2] Stalin, *op. cit.* p. 25.
[3] Stalin, *op. cit.* p. 110.
[4] Stalin, report to Communist Party, 10th Mar. 1921, *op. cit.* p. 104.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

000 it is unitary in content, federal only in form, a solid structure working like an army from the central command. Affairs throughout the Union are controlled from one apex at Moscow. The Party has often been called a monolith; it is perhaps more like a banyan tree, whose branches spread from the central trunk and return to earth sending up fresh trunks all of the same species as the central tree, still nourished from the centre and killing all other growths in the surrounding lands. Party missionaries from this central stem went out to spread the gospel and fight nationalism as Stalin had instructed. The central tree killed any local shrub that tried to root itself on ground which the banyan could reach. In such a conflict the local nationalists had little chance. The wonder is that their resistance was so prolonged.

471 In the cities the authority of the clergy was shaken by the confiscation of religious endowments (*evkaf*). In the settled countryside the land was nationalized, all holdings over a certain area being seized and redistributed, including cattle and agricultural implements considered surplus to the maximum allotment. At the outset a show was made of racial impartiality by confiscating Cossack lands, the Cossacks in the main having been the only Russians who resisted the new régime and the largest Russian landholders on the steppe. (Incidentally, they were the Russians on the best terms with the indigenous population.)

000 It remained to secure control of the water which is the life-blood of all intensive cultivation in sub-tropical continental tracts. It is broadly true to say that the people of the soil in all lands enjoying an indigenous irrigation system in the Muslim East had worked out over the centuries elaborate systems apportioning responsibilities (for channel maintenance) and rights (to turns of water), usually based on ancient tribal records of the account of profit and loss within a tribe. When older tribal theories of common lands had given way to individual user, the water continued to be regarded as a common possession to be distributed in accordance with a well-known roster, disputes being settled by the chief. For

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

many years the Tsars had been toying with the idea of sweeping all this aside, but so strong was local sentiment that they had failed to act. But by a decree of May 1924 the Soviets vested all control of distribution of water in the State. And they applied it ruthlessly. The result was to remove settlement of disputes from the tribal authority near at hand, substituting an impersonal officialdom, and at the same time to enable authority at the desired moment to decree without gainsaying the kind of crop which should be sown and the arbitrary price for which it would be taken up. The reform also served the purpose of shifting the weight of economic and political power from the people to the Party. It was easier to carry out in the areas of intensive cultivation where farmers were tied to the land and must have water or starve, and where a redistribution by means of robbing Peter to pay Paul had at least some chance of pleasing Paul. But even here there was a fierce struggle between the Party and the traditional leaders who were often loved and trusted by the people and understood their minds. These leaders were at first able to prevail over the Party men in local elections, and the latter had to resort to confiscation of crops, hay and cattle, and even to expulsion of big landowners, before they could prevail. 000 [312] 665 661

On the steppe it was much more difficult to carry through the process, for the nomads were seldom tied to definite holdings, and the tribal allegiance to the chieftain was in the patriarchal tradition. John Littlepage,[1] the American mining engineer, who spent the ten years from 1928 in the midst of this country, has described with obvious sincerity exactly what he saw of conditions before the Second Russian Revolution of 1929 (as he calls it) and after it. In 1928, before collectivization, tribal life on the steppe was scarcely touched. Meat and food were plentiful and the tribes came and went with their herds as they had been used to do. But the Kremlin had already announced that the nomad's life was demoralizing and must be broken up. And that meant the destruction of the old tribal organization, and the conversion of the tribes, 177

---

[1] Bib. I, 62.

177 by force if necessary, into settled stockmen under State control or wage-earners in factory or mine. That process was to come.

THE CONSTITUTION

642 631 The Party is not the only Soviet organ that has a centralizing effect. There is also the Constitution and the effect of an official economy admittedly centralized. The Supreme Soviet and its Praesidium (which sits between sessions and, subject to Party manipulations, has the real power) legislates over the field of the entire Union and controls a 'federal' budget about five times the size of the local budgets of all the sixteen constituent republics put together. The Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet therefore levies taxes in the colonial empire just as in any other part of the Union. Theoretically, the interests of the colonial areas can be put forward in the Second House of the Supreme Soviet (the Soviet of Nationalities) which, like the American Senate, represents each constituent state equally. But the five Central Asian republics together have a relatively small representation in this House, and in any case it is unknown for an issue of policy to be raised or voted on. The system of one-party rule forbids that. Each republic, like the Union, has its own Supreme Soviet (but in this case of one House) and its Praesidium, but, as the finance figures show, it exercises authority in a narrow field, and its ministers are subordinate not only to the local Soviet but also to the corresponding federal minister in Moscow. Further, there is a practice whereby, when a minister is of Turkish or Tajik stock, his deputy is almost always Russian, and there have been many instances of penalties exacted from leaders of local origin who have sought to stress a traditional nationalism. Here again we see an economy and administration rooted from the Centre.

EDUCATION

000 It might seem that this central emphasis conflicts with a policy of cantonization. But one form of effective central

dominion is proverbially associated with the encouragement 000 of artificial local divisions. We have already noted the cleavage of class which it was the Party's task to bring about between the local peoples and their natural leaders, and the queer boundaries which at best can only have been laid down with tongue in cheek. But a policy first of division, and later of absorption, can be promoted as well by a system of education as by the drawing of frontiers. And, as Macaulay knew, the language in which education is to be conducted is a most vital factor for consideration in a dependent territory. In their turn applied linguistics begin with alphabets.

Different methods of transcribing Turkic languages may 212 appear at first sight to be a subject of academic interest only, but between 1920 and 1940 the controversy in various aspects was a major issue in Turkey herself and among the Turkish peoples both in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The case is known as the alphabet controversy, and relates to the adoption first of a Roman script in place of the Arabic traditional to all Muslims, and later (in the areas of Russian dominion) of a Cyrillic in place of the Roman script. The first steps to the adoption of the Roman script were taken in 1921–2 in the Turkic-speaking parts of the Caucasus (Azerbaijan and parts of the North Caucasus). On 1st May 1925 this change was consolidated by decree of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet and Party, ratifying a Roman alphabet as the official script. On that day all papers appeared in the new garb, to the dismay of Arabic literates who could not follow a word of it. During the following three years rather different Roman scripts, varying *inter se*, were introduced into Central Asia also.

One effect was to insulate the peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus from the cultural influences of Turkey herself, who was then still using the Arabic script. Soviet preference at that time for a Roman rather than a Cyrillic script is partly attributable to the fact that in Azerbaijan there was already a native movement in favour of Roman, and partly no doubt to a sound calculation that immediate insistence on the Cyrill would give too much away. Any script other than Arabic would isolate the Turkic-speaking peoples in the USSR from the natural cultural influences brought to bear from outside, and that for the moment was sufficient.

Meanwhile a number of prominent Azeri exiles in Turkey, of whom Ahmet Aghaiev and Yusuf Akchura were the best known, were actively pursuing with the Kemalist government a project for the introduction of a Roman script into Turkey also. In 1928, as is well known, this movement was successful. It was then necessary for the Soviets to think again, for Turkey's action had re-established a basis for the cultural unity of all Turkic-speaking peoples. But time was needed to prepare the ground, and ten years went by before the plunge was taken, and Cyrillic alphabets, again varying somewhat, were introduced one by one into all the Soviet republics inhabited by peoples of Turkish and Iranian stock.[1]

This second change was uneconomic, for millions of text-books had been issued for the schools in Roman, all the new teachers knew the Roman alphabet, and before they could teach they had to learn again. It was as if everybody in Britain had been ordered overnight to read and write in Greek letters. There has been much speculation as to the causes for the change, but, given the Soviet mentality, one answer is clear enough. Ankara had compelled the ship to go about on a new tack, a tack which incidentally should lead more directly to the home harbour. If linguistic unity were the aim, it had better be not a unity of the Turkic languages themselves but a shaping at least of their alphabets into a Russian mould.[2] Apart from that was the reasonable point that the adoption of the Cyrillic script for the local tongues would make it easier to

---

[1] Georgia and Armenia were exempted from this *ukase*; it is not difficult to see why.

[2] *E.g.* the Soviet press, speaking of a linguistics conference assembled at Baku in Jan. 1951, wrote: 'The duty of linguists is to write really scientific works on the origin and history of the [Azeri] language, in doing which they must fully show the favourable influence of the Russian language on it, and establish the identical elements in the two languages. The [Azeri] language must be enriched with words employed in the Russian language which are the possession of all the peoples of the USSR.'

It is hardly necessary to add that Azeri, a form of Western Turkish, has no identical elements with Russian.

212

teach Russian as a second language. But there was surely a motive of a more subtle kind — the realization that change upon change in the medium of education would tend to sever the generations one from another and help to usher in the new age. It is indeed through the new education that the Soviets strive unceasingly to draw a line between the historical past and the world into which, as they see it, man is inevitably moving. This is a fundamental of their thought.

There remains one theme, connected with languages. Of late much has been made of Stalin's 1950 pronouncements on what has come to be known as the 'Marr controversy'. This hinges on the interpretation of a philological doctrine, taught by Professor N. Ya. Marr (d. 1934), that language is a superstructural phenomenon which changes as the basis of society changes. In his day Marr was reputed a great and scholarly philologist and not only in the Soviet Union, but the inclination now is to condemn him for having later prostituted his science to meet the demands of Marxist theory. The best illustration of the later jargon of the Marr school is perhaps the saying that personal pronouns were invented when private property was first instituted. It needs a philologist to unravel the technical complexities of this controversy; but as Stalin (who opened the ball by exclaiming 'I am no philologist') attempted it, it may not be impertinent to join in. References to such abstractions as globogenic process, Japhetic theory or morphological structure at the best probably meant no more to Stalin than to the general reader; at the worst as ground for a political argument they read like charlatanism. What is interesting is that on so strange a peg Stalin himself should have chosen to hang a long series of articles in *Pravda* and *Bolshevik*, reaching the conclusion that every dogma in Marxism, and no doubt in Marrism too, is to be understood relatively to the conditions in which it is sought to apply it. That this is sophistry as a contribution to scholarship is clear from the accompaniment of a mocking challenge to the scholars and the inclusion of more than one platitude. For not only was Stalin 'no philologist', he proceeded to instruct us

000

in the commonplace with comments such as 'language is a social phenomenon', and 'language is an instrument by which one person communicates with another'. Meanwhile heads were rolling, and the academic slaughter of the Marrists had begun.

On the way to his conclusion about the relativity of dogma Stalin incidentally refuted the doctrine of Marr and his disciples that language is a superstructure. He accused Marr of extreme and narrow errors; and, although *more Sovietico* he left his formulas open to adaptation whatever may happen, he pronounced that there is a constant element in language which possesses a vitality of its own.

What was the significance of this intervention in an abstruse question of scholastics by Stalin himself, and how, if at all, does it bear on the 'colonial' languages? It does at least demonstrate a conviction in Stalin's mind that language policy, and its manipulation, goes to the root of social and political questions, and for this reason has a practical bearing on larger policy. But, reading between the lines, the immediate object may have been to discredit, and even liquidate, a band of language scientists whom the Kremlin thought had gathered overmuch power and prestige and who needed to be disillusioned and dispersed. A longer-term end in Stalin's mind may have been to shake himself free of the trammels of all and every dogma, even the commandments of the prophets; and clear the way for the simple opportunism of the master mind. His last word is 'Marxism is the enemy of all dogmatism'. It may be this is the gospel that, so near the end of his life, he wished to leave behind — his final testament and contribution to the history of Marxist thought. But, even so, the elaborate façade of a free discussion in the columns of the Soviet press reads like mockery, the more so because Stalin was so jocular at the outset and in the end so dogmatic in his conclusions against dogma. One final suggestion may be hazarded. Marr's Japhetic theory, proceeding as it did from Caucasian and Georgian archetypes, had postulated a multi-national basis for world culture, a postulate which in the strictly limited cultural field was acceptable to Soviet historians and 000 scientists down to 1937. But the Great Russian revival set on foot at the time of the 1937 purges, and developed during and after the War, destroyed such multi-national concepts, and led to the abandonment of theories like that of Marr which drew inspiration from a colonial source. Great Russian chauvinism had won the day.

MISCEGENATION

There is another influence which goes deep. Unlike the 563 English, says Togan,[1] the Russian pursues tactics — to him second nature — of pretending to be the friend of the people among whom he comes. He presents himself as their brother, tries to combine his blood with theirs in marriage, and creeps into intimacy with them. He knows how to suit his language, literature, music and architecture to the native taste. Himself half-Asian, he seeks to deal with the people of Asia as Asians, and in his letters and even in the appearance of his envoys, adopts the mannerisms of Asia. This elastic character and tact is the most menacing side of Russia's domination of Turkistan. He goes on:

> As regards family life the men who mix with Russians often marry Russian women. It is true that mixed marriages between nationals of different countries with common civilization strengthen their cultural inter-connection. But this is a menace to the Turkish idea in Turkistan. If one partner comes from the ruling nation and the other from one inferior politically and economically, it hastens the process of assimilation. Russian women like most Russians are fanatical, nationalistic and despotic. Not only by their caresses, but by their continual nagging at the quality of self-respect which they despise, they reduce their husbands to submission.

A recent account[2] tends to confirm this picture. As sympathizers these visitors took a different view when they met Satpaiev, the Kazak President of the Alma Ata Academy of Sciences, with his Russian wife. Nominally at least this

---

[1] Togan, *op. cit.* pp. 536 and 586. The author at the moment is speaking of Tsarist times. But a Commissar is as good as a Count.

[2] Coates, *op. cit.* p. 141.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

563 lady was working under her husband in one of his laboratories. But 'My husband is a Kazak,' she said, 'allow me to introduce him'. Behind the comfortable assertions of harmony there lurks the impression that she patronized her husband and treated him as a sort of interesting exhibit. This very Satpaiev is one of those pilloried in the 1951 press for seeking to defend colleagues accused of nationalist deviations. Even the possession of a Russian wife has not availed to protect him, or else the Kazak in him has not been wholly tamed. Many, like Satpaiev, have fallen in the race after they had served their turn.

661 186 More recently there has been no pretence of the respectability of nationalism. The press teems with abuse and diatribes to the address of any public man with a Muslim name who may be held suspect for a display of nationalistic tendencies. Many have been purged. Early examples were Faizullah Khojaev,[1] chairman of the Uzbek Council of Ministers, and Ikramov, secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party. Others have had short shrift. The usual gazette formula applied to men of high place, up to the rank of Premier of a republic, is to say they are 'removed to attend a special study course' or 'for duties elsewhere'. A recent case is that of Abdul jabbar Abdurrahmanov, another chairman of the Council of Ministers in Uzbekistan, a man widely publicized for orthodox views up to 1950 and decorated with the Order of Lenin. He disappeared in April of that year, charged with violation of the constitution and turning the Uzbek Communist Party into an asylum for reactionary elements. At the same time his Deputies, Ghulamov and Kichamov, were mentioned as 'no longer there' when a new government was formed.

As things are, the very word of nationalism is one of the unholy things, and it is a far journey back to the Declaration of 1917. Every force that can be thought of has been applied

---

[1] For an interesting description of this man in his Soviet hey-day see Bib. I, 66, p. 172.

1[See cat. 116 pp. 104-05--Analyst]

to overcome any centrifugal impulse in the colonial territories 661
of the Soviet Empire. First in order was the power 186
derived from the presence of a Russian population, infusing into a plural society an outside element as strong as are the Chinese in Malaya. The monolithic Constitution, the rooting of the Party sprung from its parent stem, the artificial division of natural local unities, applied education and linguistics — all these pressures have been steadily brought to bear against the realization of national or industrial particularism over a period of some thirty years. And in the background, always present, is the secret police and military force at the disposal of the Union.

The flood is the same flood as that which swept over 000
Turkistan in Tsarist days. Like the waters of the Oxus after storms in the mountains, it may be turgid, but it is the same river, unpredictable in the direction of its attack, but submerging the landmarks till all is flat and even and the last resistance is overcome.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia

Kazakhstan R92

X

RUSSIANIZATION

000 *For now began to unroll the most awful series of calamities, and the most extensive, which is anywhere recorded to have visited the sons and daughters of men.*

De Quincey, Revolt of the Tartars

THIS chapter is statistical but the statistics are revealing and not so cold as might be thought. They are all drawn from official Russian sources, both Tsarist and Soviet, and it would be difficult for a Russian to deny them or gainsay the deductions which are to be drawn from a study of them. The particular story which they tell concerns Kazakistan, much the largest and the most northerly of the five Central Asian republics with an indigenous Turkish or Iranian stock and that into which Russian immigration has been the heaviest. Similar, though less drastic, processes have been going on in the other four republics.

101 Present-day Kazakistan is made up of the old Steppe Territory (Stepnoi Krai), which forms its northern half, and a part of the old Turkistan, which forms its southern half. As originally constituted in 1926, Kazakistan was an Associated SSR, and one corner of it included most of the old Khiva State (the Karakalpak country). When after eleven years it was raised to the status of a full SSR — one of the sixteen republics which make up the USSR — the Karakalpak oblast was taken away from it and joined to Uzbekistan. The changes of area make statistical comparisons difficult, but with some application and common sense they are not impossible.
162 The figures which follow illustrate in statistical form what has to be said about the Russian pressures on the land and indigenous population. This pressure in the early stages took the form of Russian peasant colonization, and later of a large-scale urbanization, which followed in the train of the

drive for industrialization. This urbanization was carried out partly by means of further Russian immigration, and partly by the forcible shifting of country Kazaks into the towns to form an indigenous proletariat by the side of the Russian proletariat. Finally, the figures show how the so-called collectivization of agriculture and stock-breeding has gone far to exterminate the indigenous population. 162

For simplicity's sake no attempt is here made to distinguish Great Russian from Ukrainian and White Russian immigrants. The expression 'Russians' therefore covers all three. Actually the Great Russians exceed the others, *e.g.* in 1926 1·28 million or 19·8 per cent of the Kazakistan population were Russians and 0·86 million or 13·2 per cent were Ukrainians.

The figures given[1] treat of four periods: 101

(i) 1897–1911, being the period of immigration from the Tsarist census nearly down to the opening of World War I. 162

(ii) 1911–26, being the period of World War I, the Revolution and the opening of the Soviet era down to the first Soviet census.

(iii) 1926–39, being the period from the first Soviet census to the second Soviet census, including the first two Five-Year Plans.

(iv) 1939–50, being the period from the second Soviet census to the end of the fourth Five-Year Plan, and including World War II.

(i) 1897–1911

162

1897 is the year of the only complete census under the Tsars, but migration figures were carefully recorded. The Russianization of the population of the old Steppe Territory during this period is shown by the following table (numbers in thousands):

	1897	1911	Increase
Total population	2465	3835	1370
Russians	493	1544	1051
Russian percentage	20	40	77

[1] [see cat. 16, pp. 163-172 -- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia
Kazakhstan RA1

162 Hence the Russian numbers between these years increased by more than one million and were more than trebled, the Russian percentage of the total population being doubled.

The distribution of Russians in towns and country was as follows:

	Towns		Country		Total	
	(1000s)	%	(1000s)	%	(1000s)	%
1897	144	29	349	71	493	100
1911	282	18	1262	82	1544	100
Increase	138	13	913	87	1051	—

From the above it is clear that the Russian population of the countryside increased much more rapidly than that of the towns. The Russianization of the Steppe Territory before the Revolution was mainly in the form of agricultural settlement under the Stolypin reforms of 1906. On the other hand, by 1911 the greater part of the town people had become Russian, the proportion of Russians in the total urban population being 76 per cent (15 per cent in 1897).

During the same period, the Kazak population developed as follows:

	(1000s)	%
1897	1973	80 of the whole
1911	2291	60 „

Thus, although the absolute number of the indigenous population rose by 14 per cent, the percentage which this number bore to the whole fell by 20 per cent. The increase of 14 per cent equals about 1 per cent per annum, to be compared with the Russian increase of 213 per cent or 14 per cent per annum.

The Russian population consisted of peasants, Cossacks, merchants, officials and soldiers, with peasants in the majority. Industrial workers constituted only 0·2 per cent of the Russian population. The Kazaks were hostile to the immigrants. Often they were expropriated, often they left the districts colonized.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia
Kazakhstan RQ1

(ii) 1911–26

162 1926 is the year of the first Soviet census. Russian colonization continued until 1914, when it was halted by World War I, followed by the Merdikar revolt of 1916, the Revolution and famine of 1917–18, the civil war of 1918–20, renewed famine, epidemics and rebellion in 1921–4.[1]

[131] The area of the Steppe Territory was 1·85 m. sq. km., whereas that of the new Kazak ASSR was 2·74 m. sq. km. Exact comparisons between the two are therefore impossible. But, taking that part of the Kazak territory which had previously been the Steppe, the Russian increase between 1911 and 1926 was only 255,000 or some 17 per cent – about 1 per cent per annum. This is less than the annual increase of the *resident* Russian population in the same area just before 1911. It is therefore reasonable to deduce that less concerted Russian immigration took place during this period than before the Revolution into this area.

The population of the Kazak ASSR (less the Karakalpak oblast) in 1926 was 6,198,000, of whom 2,164,000 or 35 per cent were Russian. The absolute number of Russians was thus greater than in 1911, but the ratio is 5 per cent less than that of 40 per cent in the old Steppe. This is explained by the fact that the new republic included much territory to the south where the ratio of Russians to the total was lower than in the north.

Of the 2,164,000 Russians, 1,845,000 or 85 per cent lived in the country and 319,000 or 15 per cent in towns, not a great shift from the 87 per cent and 13 per cent of 1911. This shows that up to 1926 no great structural alteration in the population had appeared. But despite the low absolute and proportional figures of Russians in the towns as compared with Russians in the country, Russians formed 61 per cent, or nearly two-thirds, of the total urban population. This establishes that the indigenous population up to that date continued to be tied to the countryside. The Russians on the other hand, being the urban majority, were in a position to dominate

[1] [see cat. 116, p. 89 ff.-- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia
Kazakhstan R91

162 Kazakistan. In the rural districts at that date they constituted 32·5 per cent of the population. Figures of urban population show the interesting fact that the only Kazak town with an overwhelming indigenous population was Turkistan (Yese), the seat of the shrine of the mystic Ahmed Yesevi of the XIIth century. Here the percentages were: Kazaks 79·8 per cent, Russians 20·2 per cent. Where saints are remembered, the Russian of today does not go.

The following table gives a summary of the 1926 census figures for the whole republic by nationality.

		%
Russians	2,164,582	34·9
Kazaks	3,627,612	58·5
Uzbeks	129,429	2·0
Miscellaneous	274,733	4·6
	6,196,356	100·0

The number of non-Russians in the new republic was 1,455,000 greater, and their proportion of the total population 2 per cent more, than in the former Steppe Territory. This increase is attributable to the incorporation of new territories.

In sum, no important quantitative or qualitative changes occurred in Russianization during this period.

(iii) 1926–39

1939 is the year of the second Soviet census. This took place after the purges and after the official policy had turned away from the ostensible encouragement of local nationalism. This census, therefore, as might be expected, gives no figures breaking down the peoples of the various republics by nationalities, but only the total population of each republic, with its distribution between town and country. It does, however, give the total number of each 'race' in the USSR as a whole.

The following comparison between the two censuses is of interest:

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia
Kazakhstan RA1

	1926 (1000s)	1939 (1000s)
Kazakistan		
Total population	6198	6146
Urban	522	1706
Rural	5676	4440
Whole USSR		
Total Kazaks	3968*	3099 = − 21·9% (decrease)

* Note that this figure is higher than that for Kazaks in Kazakistan in 1926 628,000) since some Kazaks lived in other republics.

These figures show that in this thirteen-year period decisive changes had occurred. These are:

(*a*) a small decrease in the total population of Kazakistan;
(*b*) a large decrease in the rural population;
(*c*) a very large increase in the urban population, which was more than trebled;
(*d*) a very large decrease in the total number of Kazaks.

These changes were the result of collectivization and industrialization during the first two Five-Year Plans.

The degree of Russianization of the population during this period can be deduced as follows.

The percentage decrease of Kazaks in the whole USSR is 21·9. Apply this to the 3,628,000 1926 figure of Kazaks in Kazakistan and we get a 1939 figure of 2,833,000 for the Kazaks in Kazakistan. By a similar method, but in this case applying a percentage increase, the number of other non-Russians in Kazakistan can be estimated at 436,000 in 1939 compared with 406,000 in 1926. Kazaks and other non-Russians together thus total 3,269,000. Subtract this total from 6,146,000 and the result is 2,877,000 Russians.

This is an increase of more than 700,000 Russians over this period, giving a 1939 percentage of 47 per cent as against 35 per cent of the total population in 1926.

The rate of increase in the number of Russians in Kazakistan over this period is much greater than that of the total

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia
Kazakhstan RQ1

162 USSR population (33 per cent against 15·9 per cent). This difference of 17 per cent between the two percentages is therefore reasonably attributable to new immigration, *i.e.*, say, 370,000 out of 700,000.

The urban population increased by about 1,200,000. Allowing, say, 100,000 (20 per cent of the 1926 urban figure of 520,000) for the natural increase, this implies new arrivals in the towns of 1,100,000. Of these, not more than 370,000 (see last paragraph) could have come from outside Kazakistan. It follows that some 730,000 must have moved from the country into the town.

From this point it is not difficult, by a series of deductions and applications of all-over percentages (of which it would be tedious to give the somewhat Euclidean details), to arrive at the conclusion that in 1939 the distribution of the Russian urban and rural population was:

Urban	Rural
970,000 or 35%	1,900,000 or 65%
(against 15% in 1926)	(against 85% in 1926)

While, therefore, there still remained two country Russians for each townee, the population as between the two had moved heavily in favour of the towns.

During the same period, the non-Russian population decreased as follows:

	Kazaks	Others	Total
1926	3628	406	4034
1939	2833	436	3269
Decrease or increase	−795	+30	−765 net

Or 765,000, a decrease of nearly 20 per cent. On all-Russia figures an increase of 15·9 per cent would have been expected, giving a much larger real decrease against normal expectations.

In sum, in this period:

(*a*) the Russian immigration proceeded at a considerable rate;

(*b*) there was the normal Russian increase in the resident 162 population;

(*c*) the number of country Russians remained steady, while the number of Russian townees was trebled;

(*d*) there was a very large decrease in the non-Russian population, which could only have been brought about by war, famine, pestilence, mass emigration or disaster brought about by deliberate policy. The period was one of peace. There was no general famine or pestilence, as the increase in the Russian figures shows. There was no mass emigration. The period was that of the forcible introduction of collective farming and suppression of nomadism. The result must be attributed therefore to the methods of collectivization adopted;

(*e*) the decrease in the non-Russian population put Russians first among the peoples of Kazakistan with 47 per cent of the total population, Kazaks holding second place, with a small percentage of others.

(iv) 1939–50

There have been no further censuses since 1939. There were, however, general elections in 1946 and 1950, at which all over 19 years old were entitled to vote. Numbers entitled in 1946 were 3,302,000 and in 1950 3,860,000. The percentage of persons under 19 years on census averages may be taken as 44 per cent, making the above figures 56 per cent of the total population. It follows that an approximate population figure is:

1946	5,900,000
1950	6,900,000

The 1946 figure shows an actual decrease of about 250,000 on the 1939 figure. On census averages of increase for the whole USSR there should have been an increase to some 6,700,000 showing a real decrease of some 800,000. The figure is even higher, for, from statistics for transfer of industrial undertakings to Asia, it is known that a further 200,000 immigrants entered the country, making the real decrease up to 1,000,000.

162 The deficit must be attributed to World War II and its effects, whether by way of actual call-up or high mortality owing to shortages and distress.

The 1950 figure shows a large restoration of the balance, with an all-over increase of 1,000,000 from 1946, and a net increase of 750,000 from 1939. There is indeed here a surplus over natural increase among residents, which must be attributed to return of troops demobilized and probably to increased Russian immigration to provide the sinews of the fourth Five-Year Plan (1946–50).

Applying general trends, the composition of Kazakistan in 1950 may be estimated as follows:

Total	6,900,000
Russians	3,400,000
Non-Russians	3,500,000
(Kazaks	3,000,000)

The Russians therefore are the most numerous single people in Kazakistan, and have nearly achieved an all-over majority.

The elections provide no data for a reliable estimate of distribution between urban and rural populations, but on previous estimates it would be conservative to assume that, as in 1939, at least 35 per cent Russians or 1,200,000 live in towns, and a maximum of 65 per cent or 2,200,000 in the country. Similar deductions can be made for non-Russians.

SUMMARY

The following table shows the progress of Russianization since 1897 (populations in thousands):

	Steppe				Kazakistan					
	1897	%	1911	%	1926	%	1939	%	1950	%
Russians	493	20	1544	40	2164	35	2877	47	3400	49
Non-Russians	1972	80	2291	60	4034	65	3269	53	3500	51
Total	2465	100	3835	100	6198	100	6146	100	6900	100

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia
Kazakhstan R01

Up to the Revolution Russian and Ukrainian peasants 162 passed into Kazakistan, dispossessing the indigenous population both of pasture and arable land. Towns were created of which the population was predominantly Russian.

Thereafter there was a pause, until the Five-Year Plans. Russian immigration was then resumed, not mainly to the countryside but to industrial centres. The very large increase in the Russian population was accompanied by an even larger decrease in the Kazaks. These were 21·9 per cent in deficiency, when on normal expectations for the USSR on a whole they should have been 15·9 per cent in excess. In short, one Kazak out of three perished during this period. Reduced by hunger and terrorism, large numbers of the indigenous population remaining were forced into towns, where they became a new proletariat. In the Soviet jargon this was a period of proletarianization. The degree of Russian infiltration already achieved should suffice to paralyse any Kazak nationalist or separatist movement originating in Kazakistan. On the other hand, Kazaks still form about half the population, and could make themselves felt under any system of democratic government in the Western sense.

There is one further comparison worth making. The figures of the 1939 census, as compared with the 1926 census, show that in the other four Central Asian republics, viz., Uzbekistan, Kirghizia, Turkmenia and Tajikistan, there was a considerable increase in the absolute figures of population over this period, in contrast to the decrease in Kazakistan. It may then be argued that the heavy decrease of the Kazak population in Kazakistan was due to emigration of Kazaks into the other four republics in pursuit of the industrialization there being pursued. But the argument holds no water. For the statistics of *all* the Kazaks in the USSR in 1939 show a figure of 3,099,000 only, which (to say nothing of the comparison with the analogous figure for 1926) is much less than the 1926 figure for the Kazaks in Kazakistan only, viz. 3,628,000.

I affirm, then, that the dry facts of Soviet statistics display

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia
Kazakhstan RQ1

162 a picture of something which can only be described by the new term, genocide. In Turkistan it is known as *Katl-i-aam*, meaning a general massacre.

Sources: Tsarist census, 1897; Soviet census, 1926 and 1939; Lorimer, F., *The Population of the Soviet Union*, League of Nations, 1946, pp. 120-21, 133-40, 161-3.

XI

COLLECTIVIZATION AND THE SUPPRESSION OF NOMADISM

000

> *They were told of the oppressions of Russia, of her pride and haughty disdain evidenced towards them by a thousand acts; of her contempt for their religion; of her determination to reduce them to absolute slavery; of the preliminary measures she had already taken by erecting forts upon many of the great rivers in their neighbourhood; of the ulterior intentions she thus announced to circumscribe their pastoral lands, until they would all be obliged to renounce their flocks and to collect in towns like Sarepta, there to pursue mechanical and servile trades of shoemaker, tailor, and weaver, such as the free-born Tartar had always disdained.*
>
> DE QUINCEY, Revolt of the Tartars

VERY unlike De Quincey, but typical of the research discussions conducted nowadays on Soviet policies towards the 'Tartars' is the following apologia:[1]

The collectivization of agriculture was primarily due to the need to industrialize Soviet Russia: this entailed the transfer of a part of the peasantry to industry, and the production by the rest of a surplus sufficient to feed the increased industrial population. If it is assumed . . . that large-scale enterprise in agriculture cannot be technically superior to the small or medium one (or not sufficiently superior to compensate for the possible shortcomings of bureaucratic organization), it necessarily follows that the Russian peasants who remained on the land had to work harder or eat less, or both. In this case some amount of compulsion was needed not only in order to establish the *Kolkhozy*[2] (in general revolutions do not happen to be the heydays of argument by mere persuasion), but it is also continuously needed in order to keep the *Kolkhozy* in being against the obvious economic interests of their members.

---

[1] Bib. II, 9. Schlesinger.

[2] KOLKHOZ. Abbreviative for the collective farm. Dealers in these phrases like to use a Russian plural (*Kolkhozy*).

> 000 If, on the other hand, it is admitted that large-scale enterprise in agriculture as well as in industry may carry technical and organizational benefits inaccessible to small or even medium enterprise (a problem on which the record of the Soviet *Kolkhoz* experiment is making a fundamental contribution), it is possible that a reduced number of agricultural producers are supplying an increased surplus to the towns and at the same time improving their own standards of life. In this case, the economic success may comprehensibly command the agreement of those concerned even after the initial motives (a mixture of enthusiasm and coercion for different groups of the population) have become less important.

Making allowances for the involutions of the brackets, this passage conveys an impression that the writer is not really dealing with human beings at all but indulging in a logistical speculation as to the most effective means of fighting a war on the interrelated agricultural and industrial fronts. Whatever your opinion (he says in effect) on the point whether a collective agriculture is or is not more efficient than individual enterprise — and I myself think there is a good case for holding it is more efficient —, naturally some degree of compulsion was needed to put it in force. At least some part of the population had of course to be coerced.

In the last chapter we have seen the bare bones of a skeleton, as yet unclothed with the sentient flesh — a set of figures fairly deducible from Russian publications, which lead to a terrible conclusion. Those figures deal with human developments in Kazakistan, mainly a country of herdsmen. It is indeed on the nomads that the pressure of the collective system has weighed most heavily, and it is from among them that most of the human fodder was extracted to feed the new factories and work the mines. Nevertheless, the peasant on his homestead was shaken by the same relentless blast of new doctrine as was the herdsman on his pasture.

Both were torn violently from their accustomed moorings to be driven hither and thither, storm-tossed, on a cruel sea. The herdsmen, more inured to hardship, resisted more strongly and suffered more. A pale shadow of the pain and injury inflicted appears in the fact that it took the Soviets themselves nearly a decade from the time of introduction of their collective drive in 1929 to wear down the free Kazaks and Kirghiz, the nomads of the steppe and the mountain, to the point at which in 1936 they thought it safe to treat them on an equal footing with the settled Uzbeks in the south. Yet academic argument continues on questions such as that posed above, research bodies quote blueprints, and argue like Stalin from first principles. The more involved and philosophic the discussion, the less account it seems to take of the concrete case, the actual cost in human suffering. And even those who enter the lists against the Soviet apologist are apt to speak in terms of thousands or millions of human lives from the standpoint of recorders of casualties in some phantom war. The spirit and the dignity of man is given no place in all these bickerings.

Let us try to see what really befell the men and women of 471
Kazakistan of 1929. By that year a centralized control had been imposed in the areas of settled cultivation in Soviet Central Asia; hereditary leaders of the people had been pulled down by confiscations from their position in city and field and, less certainly, from their paramountcy on the steppe also; land and water had been nationalized and, after taking a large share for the *Sovkhozes* or state farms, redistributed in an arbitrary fashion. But here more than elsewhere in the USSR up to 1928 Lenin's New Economic Policy had given some freedom at least to the small man; small-holders still worked on lands they counted their own, yoking their own oxen to the plough, milking their own cattle, riding their own horses; herdsmen roamed the steppe or hillside tending their own flocks and herds of camels, cattle, horses, sheep and goats; both brought their produce to market in cart or on hoof — grain, vegetables, fruit, eggs and chickens, milk, cheese and meat — and sold it in shops at reasonable prices. Except that the chiefs and big men had been removed, the social and economic system of agricultural production and distribution remained much as it had been before the Revolution. On the steppe and in the mountains there even remained vestiges of

471 an aristocracy. All this was to be violently changed by centralized decree from the Kremlin, a second Russian Revolution.

The outward shape of what was then conceived and carried through has often been described. The whole conception was indeed two-headed — to collectivize and mechanize agriculture, and use the displaced peasants and nomads as unskilled labour for the new industries which were being set up. The American mining engineer Littlepage,[1] who saw it all from the inside, describes well both the central conception and the manner of its execution.

> A conversation something like the following must have taken place at headquarters in Moscow. One of the big Communists said 'Well, what will we do about it? We can't put through our plans for industry unless we have a few million workers who will stay put. There will be too much of a howl if we simply make the free workers stay where they are. What can we do?' And someone would answer, 'Why not liquidate the Kulaks? We can kill two birds with one stone, get these obstinate small farmers away from the villages where they obstruct our scheme for collectivization and at the same time get plenty of industrial labor which will stay put because it is under police guard.'

THE PEASANTRY

474 661 He goes on to tell what he saw of the peasants being dragooned round the country under police escort and set down as forced labour to work in mines and factories. Men, women and children were driven out of their houses, and their furniture, domestic animals and all but a few clothes were taken from them, the confiscated houses being taken into use as clubs and offices. Some were herded along the camel-trails, others, packed like animals in cattle trucks, in stifling heat or bitterness of winter, were despatched by rail to centres where their labour was needed. Many died of hunger, cold or disease on the way. All seemed completely bewildered; they had lost their homes, had been forcibly removed from

---

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 78.

lands their families had occupied for generations, and put at 474
unfamiliar work in unfamiliar surroundings. Fewer still made 661
any effort to escape, their experiences seemed to have broken up any spirit of defiance they may have had before. He explains how the numbers of peasants available made the federal police the largest single employers in Russia, and gave them a reputation for getting things done. They could always count on a steady supply of labour, that great forced-labour army which started from the days of the so-called liquidation of the Kulaks. In this way the double end was served, opposition to collective farming stifled and the sinews of industry provided.

The policy of collectivization was directed both at the settled farmers and at the nomads, but with the former was easier to achieve. In Central Asia the peasants do not usually live in scattered farms on their lands but congregate in villages huddled together for protection and defence and enjoying from ancient times some degree of communal life based on their tribal past. Each cultivator goes out daily, and sometimes nightly, from the village to his fields which are often in several parts of the village lands. One man, for instance, will cultivate his ancestral share of the best irrigated land, a similar share of land not so good, perhaps dependent on rainfall, and a share in the village common or waste where the herds pasture. The water-rights will be held in theory in common, and approportioned by ancestral shares according to traditional needs. This system was not without a collective tribal background and with sympathy and vision it might not have been impossible to have introduced reforms gradually leading to a commonalty which, taking account of tradition, should have combined the incentive of individual user with the needs of the whole village community. That, however, is what Communists would nowadays call a feudal survivalist deviation, and it is not what happened. As we have seen, the Communists aimed not at a form of collectivism which should be the most efficient consistent with its acceptability by the people, but at very greatly reducing the number of workers in the fields in order to supply industry. Redeployment in industry was

474 perhaps the most important part of the plan — proletarianization as they called it.[1] They did not therefore try for a revivified tribal system, but aimed at a complete reorganization of village life, by means of a consolidation of small-holdings into large fields to be worked by a mechanized agriculture. In practice, this meant not only the dispossession of the more efficient and more prosperous farmers, but such an amalgamation of lands as to produce complete confusion of the identities of possession and user.

661

Essential grazing-lands came under the plough. All incentive was at least temporarily removed, and the Party slave-driver could not be everywhere at once. Thousands of cattle died of starvation or were deliberately slaughtered by the peasants in protest. The initial disasters caused even the Soviet planners to modify original plans and eventually to allow homestead holdings of a limited acreage for the individual peasant to cultivate outside the commonalty. Togan describes the position in Farghana, the richest part of Turkistan. The people were starving, and half the people landless. Draught oxen had perished in thousands. The people were exposed to every form of official tyranny and persecution — imprisonment, plunder, deportation, execution for those that stood out. Draught cattle that remained were seized and tractors brought in and shown to the farmers on condition that they should be used for cotton cultivation only and by those only who would join the *Kolkhoz*. The peasants, robbed of their horses and oxen, found their fate depending on machinery from Russia, using oil which then had also to be imported, and mechanics then also Russian. They were helpless.

Another American, John Scott,[2] has a vivid description of the methods adopted for the 'dekulakization' of a village.

> 'How did they decide who was to be dekulakized?' 'Ah, that's a hell of a question to ask a guy that's trying to expiate his crimes in

---

[1] During the second Five-Year Plan directions were issued to release 1,500,000 workers *annually* from agriculture to industry. This was for the whole Union.

[2] Bib. I, 85. A sincere admirer of the indomitable determination shown by Stalin and others in pushing through industrialization beyond the Urals, Scott also underlines the cost in blood and tears. He worked for five years at Magnitogorsk.

honest labor. Just between the three of us, though, the poor 474 peasants of the village get together in a meeting and decide: 661 "So-and-so has six horses; we couldn't very well get along without those in the collective farm; besides he hired a man last year to help on the harvest." They notify the GPU and there you are. So-and-so gets five years. They confiscate his property and give it to the new collective farm. Sometimes they ship the whole family out. When they came to ship us out, my brother got a rifle and fired several shots at the GPU officers. They fired back. My brother was killed. All of which, naturally, didn't make it any better for us. We all got five years, and in different places. I heard my father died in December, but I'm not sure.'

All this[1] happened more than twenty years ago. Since 433 then Communist ranks have swollen and absorbed hundreds [474] of the people of the soil, official statistics show the usual propaganda figure of 98 or 99 per cent of the peasants in the *Kolkhoz*, and the Kazaks and Uzbeks have begun to qualify as mechanics. The new economy is settling down and the Soviets would have the world believe that, in spite of backslidings, the peasants are docile and apt to the mechanical age which has overtaken them. The cotton expansion policy has ridden on shortage and misery to triumph; industry and mineral wealth have been developed (the former largely by the establishment of textile mills for cotton and silk in Turkistan itself) and the connection with Siberia by the Turk-Sib Railway, opened in 1930, is a permanent symbol of a new economic era. Perhaps most significant of all, the [562] Soviets have insisted on the emancipation of women, making the discarding of the veil the touchstone of loyalty to the new idea. In this, let it be remarked, they run counter only to the orthodox tradition of Bukhara and the south, and not to that of the nomad, whose women, riding freely on the steppe, were never veiled. On a short or a long view the removal of the *paranja* must be regarded as a beneficent reform, against which no Central Asian nationalist would find it easy to exclaim. Lastly, in the oases at least, there are signs of plenty, and even of the emergence of a new Party aristocracy. The fatted calf can still be killed, and favoured visitors lick their lips as they

[1] [collectivization; see cat. 116, pp. 175-179 -- Analyst]

433 are introduced to banquets spread out in garden pavilions, where *Kolkhoz* officials uneasily may take their ease.[1]

000 The cultivated lands of the southern oases are in a favoured part of the earth's surface. They are indeed restricted, but acre for acre, they are probably among the most productive in Asia. Throughout history the population was thick on the land and, once subdued, could be subjected to police control village by village without being able to put up much of a resistance. State management of the essential water-supply gave to authority the final weapon that could scarcely be gainsaid. Even the second Revolution could not destroy the natural prosperity of such favoured lands as these. But on the steppe and in the mountains it was different.

THE NOMADS

233 In order to understand the situation facing the Soviet planners of the collective farm in the wide unirrigated territory north of the Sir Darya, and in the more remote mountain glens, it is necessary to have some insight into the meaning of Central Asian nomadism. There are two forms of nomadism: that of the spreading open steppe, and that of the nomads who move with the season to the mountains. The first form, that of the steppe, is not unlike the nomadism of the Beduin in the Arabian deserts, for much of the steppe melts into a desert colder and less hospitable than Arabia. It has indeed a considerable snow precipitation, and therefore usually affords excellent pasture when the snows melt in the spring. But

---

[179]
[242]
[1] Cf. Coates, *op. cit.* pp. 232-4. This contains an amusing account of a princely entertainment offered in 1947 in the garden surrounding his private house near Tashkent by the Uzbek chairman of a *Kolkhoz*. The meal was spread in a pavilion — one among many — looking down a garden avenue, flanked with vines laden with grapes. The first course consisted of pies, sausages, bread and cakes, fried pelmeni, fruit, almonds, sweets, wine and cognac, with soup, tea and yoghurt as aids to digestion. There followed the *pièce de résistance*, a pilav, an hour's gorged rest and to finish up a rich dessert of melons, grapes and other fruit. 'What', asked the visitors, 'has become of the former owners of the land?' 'Some', replied the chairman, 'were killed during the fighting, others had fled the USSR, but some of the younger people have settled down to honest labour. The son of my former master, for instance, is now a member of this *Kolkhoz*.'

233

subsequent rainfall may be precarious and the owners of flocks and herds often have to move many miles in pursuit of grass. Except about latitude 50 degrees, where the steppe reaches the zone where crops can be grown without irrigation, much of it is bare but for seasonal grazing. Before the Soviet cataclysm the various tribes had recognized ranges which in bad seasons would overlap and lead them into tribal warfare. Or a stronger tribal combination might oust a weaker. The form of life was not unlike that of the sailor in a primitive age, when each ship had to fend for itself and be on watch for enemies or pirates. Endurance, courage, a free and adventurous spirit, counted high in the scale of human values, but, as at sea, there had to be leadership, for without discipline all might perish. It was the same tradition that produced the Khans of the Golden Horde, and later, when the Russians came, gave birth to men such as Abilay and his grandson Kine Sari Khan. The tradition of reverence for the Khan died hard. It is not dead yet.

The tribal background was the same for the mountains as for the steppe, but the hill Uzbeks and Kirghiz, the peoples of mountain Turkdom, had to face climatic conditions of a different order to those upon the steppe. As we know, a large part of Turkistan consists of very high mountains standing over deep valleys, and it is possible for a man to change his climate in a few hours, or at most in a day or two. In Farghana and the Tajik valleys, for instance, the heat in summer is fierce and the lower-lying land, unless irrigated (and that is needed for cropping), burnt brown. But a short journey leads the shepherd to flowery Alpine meadows (*Yaylaks*), where his flocks can pasture at their ease. In the same country in winter the *yaylaks* will be deep under snow, but at that season the skirts of the hills afford a comparatively clement refuge and a good pasture. So the shepherd would move up and down with the seasons. And because the land is so free and large, and not over-crowded, he would have little need to store up winter food; some part of his accustomed range would suffice for his animals right through the year.

000 In this way the tribes of the steppe and the tribes of the mountains had roamed for centuries free-born and untrammelled, meeting only with rivalry from their own kind if they should overstep their limits. Their flocks were part of their family and they lived by and on them. For houses they had only tents (*yurts*) and wooden or adobe huts. For their Khans they had a real veneration recorded in epic poetry handed down by minstrels by word of mouth. The way of their life implied that they would be here today and gone tomorrow, and it had always been difficult for authority to control or tax them. If the seasons were kind, a tribe was self-contained and asked little of any man. In bad seasons there might be
177,47 raiding and local forays. By 1929 the Soviets had not fully
474 succeeded in driving a satisfactory wedge between the Khans and the other tribesmen on the steppe. In the settled areas it had been possible to appeal to the cupidity of the lesser men by redistributing the land of the richer; but on the steppe the redistribution of pasture lands was a most difficult operation, and that of flocks and herds almost impossible. In either case the bond between Khan and free tribesman was too close and intimate to brook official interference of that kind. It was for this reason, that, when Littlepage arrived on the steppe in 1928, he was able to record that the old life and manners of the tribes up to that time remained unchanged. Some of the old loyalties to the chief and elder, the old observances of tribal formula or prohibition, the old laws of hospitality, were still in force. At that time the tribal herds were increasing every year and the tribes supplied meat and dairy products ample for themselves and for the dwellers in cities alike. It was this system that the Soviets had to break up, if they needed these men for industry. It was a tough job.

In a pregnant passage Littlepage[1] states both points of view:

> The nomads were among the principal sufferers when the Second
> 000 Communist Revolution started in 1929. But the nomads were dirty and superstitious, and I could understand how the Communist

---

[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 185-6.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

reformers believed that they were doing them a favor by breaking 000 up their old forms of life and persuading them, even by the use of force, to adopt a manner of life considered more civilized and sensible. On this trip, however (undertaken in 1934), as we pushed along day after day through these pastured plateaus, my sympathies went out to those nomads who had forcibly resisted their conversion into proletarians. . . . I could see how the life might appeal to them. . . . I even began to understand how they might be willing to fight for this mode of existence if someone threatened to take them away from it.

The job[1] was done not by redistribution, but by the 474 indiscriminate rounding-up of the nomads with their animals. 661 Nearly half those who did not die, men and women, went off to slavery. Three-quarters of the flocks and herds were slaughtered or perished uncared-for in the wilderness. When all was over, nothing remained to be seen on the steppe but once in a while a small village of Russian settlers whose ancestors had pushed into the Kazak country half a century earlier and, very occasionally, a small group of felt huts occupied by miserable-looking down-at-heel Kazaks who had been induced to settle down in cattle-breeding farms.

Lest it be thought that this picture is too highly coloured, let us turn to Soviet sources. The *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, a cautiously written compilation, relates[1] that, in spite of preventive measures taken by the Central Committee, most serious deviations from the Party line took place in Kazakistan, making it easier for the beys, the Kulaks and the Alash-Orda elements to carry out anti-Soviet and anti-revolutionary activity. 'But', it concludes, 'with the help of the Central Committee of the Communist Party these mistakes in the set-up of the *Kolkhoz* system were put right.' We need only turn to the census returns to see how matters were put right, by measures leading to the death of one in three of the Kazak population, whether by mass starvation or by violence. That is the true picture of Soviet colonial imperialism. To allow of due completion of this process it was necessary for the

---

[1] *G. S. Encycl.* vol. 30, p. 598. Bib. III, 10.

[1] [i.e. collectivization -- Analyst]

N

2a Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

474 Soviets to retain Kazakistan as a part of the RSFSR (the Great
661 Russian republic) up to 1936. It was only then, as it was openly stated, that it became possible and safe to confer on 'the Kazaks' even the circumscribed and illusory autonomy enjoyed by a non-Russian constituent republic. The delay is the more remarkable given the very large proportion of Russians in Kazakistan.

THE STOCK

233
LV71 The story is not yet complete. Herdsmen cannot be killed off without loss of the animals which serve them and which they serve. In Kazakistan in 1935 there was only 1·7 head of cattle for each household grouped in a collective farm, and 6500 collective farms were altogether without a herd. The livestock losses over the whole republic in the six years 1928–1934 were estimated at 73 per cent of the cattle, 87 per cent of the sheep, and 83 per cent of the horses.[1] The real wealth of the country in men and livestock had been sacrificed on the altar of the collective deity, and there is reason to think that the losses then suffered have not been restored even today.

A study of the current Soviet press on the subject of stock-raising and stock-farming throughout Soviet Central Asia reveals an attitude and atmosphere of inspissated gloom. In Uzbekistan, for instance, it is admitted that progress has been thoroughly unsatisfactory; the required increase in the number of publicly-owned sheep and cattle has in no case been achieved, the organization of winter feeding has broken down, and what is called mass-political work among the *Kolkhoz* and *Sovkoz* workers on the collective farms has been ineffective. The same tale comes from Kirghizia and Kazakistan, and also from the Tajik Republic. To go even farther afield, it is repeated in strident tones from the Caucasus, where special complaint is made of delays in the mechanization and electrification of processes in the care of stock. Plans have not been fulfilled; veterinary services, irrigation, scientific research work — all are lagging. In Turkmenia nearly half the *Kolkhozes* at the beginning of 1951 had not the minimum number of sheep, and things were even worse for horned cattle. A search for scapegoats has begun. Bagirov, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Party in Azerbaijan and heresy-hunter of the deviationists who praised the North Caucasian XIXth-century patriot Shamil, entered the lists with an attack on the Minister of Agriculture, Abdullaev. Abdullaev and his deputies Nagyzade and Barbaev — all, by the way, of Azerbaijani stock — are accused by him of nepotism and corrupt practices. The widespread nature of the complaints, extending as they do from the Tienshan to the Black Sea, suggests that the malady is attributable to deeper causes. What can those causes be?

---

[1] Soviet sources quoted by M. Holdsworth, Bib. II, 9.

The first and obvious reason is that the policy of destruction of nomadism was unsuited to the climatic conditions of Central Asia and to the aptitudes of the people. In the semi-desert of the steppe, or in the sharp contrasts of mountainside and glen, with all the variations brought about by season and altitude, there exists a stage on which it is difficult, if not impossible, for men or animals to survive unless they adapt themselves to a migratory life. The Soviet agronomists talk of winter storage. But the production of fodder-crops or winter-feed cannot easily replace these rotational pastures. Mountain and steppe pastures do not produce long grass very suitable for hay or silage, even if it could be transported with the seasons, and the irrigated fields, on which it could be produced, are all required for cash or grain crops. In other words, the right economic system for stock-raising, imposed by this climate and its contrasts, is a form of nomadism and nothing else.

All dictators, of course, dislike nomads, so hard to reach and tax, or in any way to discipline or organize. It was so with Reza Shah of Persia, also a dictator, whose main and unfulfilled ambition was to settle all the nomadic tribes of Persia. And inevitably it has been so with the Soviets. It is because autocracy has given way to this irrational dislike and

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

000 tried to substitute a social and economic organization which defies nature and defeats the tried and tested initiative of the local stock-breeders, that this experiment has been such a ghastly failure. There is need of another Lenin, courageous enough to admit defeat and inaugurate a New Economic Policy for the animals.

233 Of all this there is no mention in the stream of invective that pours from Soviet publicists on this subject. The Party line is quite otherwise. Defects are due, they cry, to insufficient Party-political and educational work among the stock-breeders. Leading workers do not concern themselves with the matter, but leave it to subordinates. The managers of stock *Kolkhozes* do not understand the importance of mechanization. Fodder supplies are not made available — here there is a shadow of the truth; irrigation works have not been reorganized. Winter pasturing is insufficient and badly arranged; the local Soviets in many districts fail to assume responsibility. And hear Bagirov. Great harm had been done, he said, by over-concentration on cotton-growing, and neglect of stock. The total of stock was still below the figure of 1940, and there was negligence in the provision of fodder. Blame was due not only to the Minister and his deputies but to all Party officials. They had themselves neglected the interests of stock-breeders, and had allowed embezzlement. People of doubtful honesty were kept as officials. The Ministry did not check them but actually defended them. The *Sovkhozes* — State farms — were almost as bad as the *Kolkhozes*. And so on — without a hint of the essentials of the art of animal management.

000 In all this there is yet another and more subtle failure. It has been remarked that the beginnings of Soviet stock-rearing in Asiatic Russia were not encouraging, for an iron system failed to allow for that elasticity of adjustment which alone can secure a satisfactory return to the stock-farm. But it is impossible to read these diatribes without concluding that the failure goes deeper even than that. The bond between herdsman and herd, between man and the animal which serves him and which he serves, is in essence a close and individual

bond. To get the best out of a dairy the feed for each individual cow must be apportioned and changed in accordance with many varying factors of pasture, season, milk-yield and individual habit. However scientific may be the system of mechanized milking, each animal requires its own treatment at milking time. It is the same with sheep and goats — and even more with horses. No cast-iron rigid rules apply: all animals have their idiosyncrasies. And whatever Marxism-Leninism may decree in the matter of environment as the determinant in human affairs, the world of animals cannot be regulated out of a reliance on heredity. And, we may ask, how can collectivism understand that close bond which unites the Arab with his mare, the Englishman with his dog, the Irishman with his blood-stock, the mahout with his elephant, the Brahmin with the quiet and bountiful cattle which his faith has taught him to adore? How can a mechanized system, which condemns a poet for portraying ideals and even for writing verses containing 'individualistic descriptions of the beauties of nature',[1] grasp the thought of that shepherd who leaves the ninety-and-nine sheep in the wilderness to search for the one sheep that is lost, and, when he has found it, brings it home on his shoulders, rejoicing? The animal is an individualist and gives of its best in response to gentleness and care. 000

It has been truly said that in the Soviet Union all verbs are conjugated in the future and the millennium is always round the corner; meanwhile for those not of the Party there is toil and trouble, and even for the Party an anxious unrest and never a fulfilment. But, if the human machine at least creaks and groans along somehow, it is because breakdown, complete and utter, is prevented by kindness. Even in a materialistic world, and not least in Russia, there is that undercurrent of kindness between man and man, between woman and child, which smoothes the harsh edges of regulation. In the sphere of animal management, however, there seems no question even of future tenses; the Soviets themselves admit an utter failure. The animal, mistreated, will not toe the line: it just dies off. And the margin of human kindness that can survive regulation does not suffice to save the animals. It is exhausted on human beings already.

---

[1] The Tajik poet, Dekhoti, condemned by the Tajik Union of Soviet writers, in their congress in July 1951.

It is hardly fanciful to picture the ideological herdsman in his collective dairy, faced with a cow whose milk-yield is falling off. 'The idiosyncratic beast,' he might say, 'shirking the output which our great Stalin once decreed. Kick her in the udder, or, better still, as punishment reverse the journeys she went on her nomadic days. Let her die of cold on the uplands in winter, or of thirst in the Karakum in the summer heats. That will teach the other cattle, and be a good lesson for the nomads too!'

XII

INDUSTRIALIZATION AND PUBLIC WORKS

816

> *I shall follow the arduous trail blazed by the surveyors, who are charting the course of irrigation systems, by the botanists and forestry experts, who are determining the future flora of the desert, and by the zoologists and ornithologists, who are to populate the new forests and gardens with beasts and birds. I shall meet the soil scientists and agronomists engaged in selecting the crops to be grown on the fields and plantations that will alter the face of the desert. My path will be the path of the archaeologists, who are doing their share to help the canal builders by unearthing the secrets of ancient cultures buried for centuries in the sands. . . .*
>
> Boris Krinitsky, on Turkmenian Canal[1]

THE main objective of the two first Five-Year Plans 000 was to create a centre of heavy and light industry in the Urals[2] and beyond, which should be out of reach of any invader, whether Germans coming from the west or Japanese from the east. At an immense cost in human lives and suffering, through scenes of welter and confusion, often sadly lagging but always driven on by a grim determination from above, the great programme staggered through fantastic difficulties during construction until it reached the serious production stage, round about 1935. It was an immense mechanical achievement, and there can be no doubt that it is mainly to Stalin's foresight in building this stronghold that Russia in 1941–2 owed her capacity to stand fast against the German onslaught long enough to receive that unacknowledged margin of assistance from the West which enabled her to survive.

---

[1] Bib. II, 5. Anthropologists escape notice.

[2] The Urals themselves are just outside Kazakistan, and coincident in the main [00] with Bashkiria, in which is situated Ishimbay. Magnitogorsk is in a narrow strip of RSFSR territory between Kazakistan and Bashkiria. In the industrial picture all this region must be viewed as part of the Central Asian complex.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

464 The sites of heavy industry are, however, in the Urals and in the Kuznetz basin in Central Siberia, both outside the five republics of Turkistan. This great combine, with its iron-ore at Magnitogorsk, and very rich coal deposits in the Kuznetz, supplied the metallurgical foundation of the heavy industry base which was to supplement, and if necessary replace, the old industrial areas of the Ukraine. At Magnitogorsk, next door to the iron-ore mines, were sited the steel-foundries. Also in Bashkiria, not far away, is Ishimbay, the [315] focal point of the region now known as the Second Baku,[1] the wells of which may now be yielding as much as 19 million tons of oil a year. All these, although beyond the northern limit of Kazakistan, are situated in what was once a country of Turkish nomads, and their development was made possible largely by the use of Kazak unskilled labour. As John Scott wrote:[2]

> His ancestors for centuries had raised stock on the flat plains of Kazakistan. They had been dimly conscious of the Czarist government; they had had to pay taxes. Reports of the Kirghiz insurrection in 1916 had reached them.[a] They had heard stories of the October Revolution; they even saw the Red Army come and drive out a few rich landlords. They had attended meetings of the Soviet without understanding very clearly what it was all about. Now he was building a blast furnace bigger than any in Europe. He had learned to speak Russian, he read newspapers. His life had changed more in a year than that of his antecedents since the time of Tamerlane.
>
> Some fifty thousand Magnitogorsk workers were directly under GPU supervision. About eighteen thousand de-Kulakized well-to-do farmers, and from twenty to thirty-five thousand criminals — thieves, prostitutes, embezzlers who performed unskilled labour usually under guard — these formed the reservoir of labour power needed to dig foundations — and do other heavy work.

---

[1] 'The Second Baku' is the propaganda name attached to a vast region stretching from the Volga to the Urals, producing over 11 m. tons of oil in 1950 and expected to reach an output of some 19 m. tons in 1952. Ishimbay is the centre of the most productive wells. Others are at Tuimazi, also in Bashkiria, at Syzran and Buguruslan, near Kuibishev, on the Volga bend, and at Krasnokamsk on the Kama farther north. Most of this was once Golden Horde territory.

[2] *Op. cit.* pp. 16 and 70.

[a] [see cat. 11c, pp. 89-90 -- Analyst]

Scott, who shared these labours and saw the heroism and misery of the workers, speaks with understanding of the passionate idealism that sustained the Russians who made the sacrifice. He and they thought of it all as a war, in which the soldiers must be prepared to die. It was, he felt, a society for which it was worth while to shed blood and tears. The expropriated peasants, the political exiles, were a lost tribe, sacrificed on the altar of progress. They would die off, but by their death Socialism would win through to a time when it could function without scrapping blocks of its population every decade. A cruel concept, but there it was. 000

There was most certainly a great Russian idealism, even a grandeur in this plan and its achievement. But, like the valour of Sparta, it was a heroism that depended for survival on the labour of countless slaves and helots, pitilessly ground down and made to work at menial tasks without thought of human dignity. The helots of Turkish stock had not been born into the ranks of citizens, but they were set in the forefront of the battle to fight a cause that was not theirs. Most of them were inarticulate at the time, but later events were to demonstrate clearly enough that the iron had entered into their souls. Unlike the Russians, these did not believe the papers which told them daily they were the luckiest people in the world. The vast metallurgical combine of the Urals, the centre of the heavy industry of Soviet Asia, was set up just beyond and on the fringe of the most northerly of the five Central Asian republics. Their part in it was only to sweat and groan and die in mine or mill, to be frozen stiff on a scaffold at construction work or burned at a furnace mouth. In their own homeland they did not fare much better.

Beyond the Urals and within the political boundaries of the five republics the industrial lay-out was not quite so intensive and was certainly more varied. There are indeed non-ferrous metals in Turkistan of great importance. North of Balkhash at Kunrad, and in the Jezkazgan area of the northern steppe, 433 328

433 are situated the largest copper-workings and smelting plants
328 in the Union, and there is another at Almalik close to Tashkent and therefore better placed for transport than the larger mines farther north. At Chimkent is the largest lead centre in the Union, working ore from many quarters, including the Tajik hills. And there are important minerals, said to include mercury, radium and uranium, in the mountains surrounding
433 the Farghana Valley. But, apart from the man-power they can supply to feed the industrial Moloch, the main importance of the five republics in this field is to be found in the production of the raw material for textiles — cotton and silk — and the availability of supplementary sources of power, which include oil, coal and water-generated electricity. The production of the last, hydro-electric power, is tied up in the minds of Soviet engineers with large-scale irrigation, and this in turn with transport, both by waterway and railway. In all these spheres there has been ambitious planning, and forecasts are often extravagant and even grandiose. In almost all cases it is hard to disentangle prospective targets from actual results, publicity media being regularly used to give an impression that projects which have not in fact left the draughtsman's table are on the point of realization in the field. Indeed it can fairly be said that almost any account of planned development in Soviet Russia, industrial or agricultural, calls for question on this ground. Usually the more poetic the vision of the publicist, the less advanced will be found to be the execution of the work. Another tendency is to claim as the triumph of the Soviet genius works which were in fact conceived and carried to an advanced stage by Tsarist engineers. This is particularly apparent in the field of railway works.

185 It is convenient to view industrial development in this region under four main heads:

(*a*) power, including oil, coal and hydro-electric;
(*b*) light industry, mainly cotton and silk textiles;
(*c*) irrigation;
(*d*) transport, railway and waterway.

496

SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

Railway Network 1952
Broad Gauge 5′ 0″

From Soviet sources
(very contradictory)

—— Working line with centre or junction

++++ In final stages of construction

—·—· International frontier

········ Boundaries of Republics

N.B. Trans-Siberian, Central Asian, Trans-Aral, and most of Farghana network, constructed by Tsars; and Turk-Siberian, planned and surveyed by Tsars.



OLAF CAROE: SOVIET EMPIRE (MAC

- 192(A) -

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

496


54°
66°
To Sverdlovsk
TRANS –
Chelyabinsk
Kurgan
Ufa
Troitsk
Magnitogorsk
Chkalov (Orenburg)
Uralsk
Orsk
Aktiubinsk
TRANS –
ARAL
RAILWAY
Novokazalinsk
Kizil Orda
ARAL SEA
Kungrad
Nukus
Takhta Tash
Urgench
Khiva
CASPI
Krasnovodsk
Nebit Dagh
CENTRAL
ASIAN
RAILWAY
Ashkabad
Dushak
Merv
Charjui
Bukhara
Kagan
Karshi
Kerki
Kushk
PERSIA
AFGH
54°
66°

T EMPIRE (MACMILLAN & CO. LTD.)

– 192(B) –

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1


76°
78°
To Kuznetz & Far East
NS – SIBERIAN RAILWAY
Tomsk
Omsk
Petropavlovsk
Barnaul
Kulunda
Pavlodar
52°
Akmolinsk
Semipalatinsk
Karaganda
Ayaguz (Bound for Sinkiang)
Jezdi
Jezkazgan
Mointy
Kounrad
Balkhash
L. BALKHASH
Tekeli
44°
SIBERIAN RAILWAY
Chu
Alma Ata
Turkistan
TURKSIB
Chimkent
Lugovaya
Frunze
Rybachie
Aris
Chirchik
Namangan
Tashkumyr
Andijan
Kokyangak
Tashkent
Jalalabad
Kara Su
Osh
Fergana
Ursatievskaya
Samarkand
Shahr-i-Sabz
Stalinabad
Kelif
Termez
CHINA (SINKIANG)
36°
GHANISTAN
PAKISTAN
KASHMIR
66° East of Greenwich

EMERY WALKER LTD. SC.

185 These four overlap, as for instance in the case of irrigation and hydro-electric works, or irrigation and navigation canals, both of which Russian engineers like to set side by side. They do not by any means give an exhaustive analysis — the copper and lead mines and works above mentioned are instances of this — and at many points they have to be considered in relation to agricultural development also. But they do provide some general idea of the all-over Soviet plan for the development of Turkistan. In broad terms this may be said to be to continue the Tsarist policy of using Central Asian products to make Russia self-sufficient in the raw materials of the finer textiles (cotton and silk); to improve on that by bringing the mills to the fields in order to manufacture on the spot; largely to increase the area under cash-crops by irrigation; to use the irrigation canals to aid in the supply of power; to increase also to the limit the fuel sources of power available within these territories; and finally to provide the rail transportation necessary for bringing the whole agricultural and industrial complex within the all-Union economic system.[1]

496 I mention transportation by rail last because the Soviet record in the matter of railway construction has been remarkably unimpressive, and one has the impression that the provision of enough and efficient transportation links does not precede or synchronize with, but follows, developments in other fields, seriously handicapping the prospect of a balanced economy. Only one really important trunk railway is known to have been fully completed in Turkistan during the thirty-five years of the Soviet era, and that is the Turk-Sib. Even that was planned and surveyed under the Tsars, and but for the Revolution would almost certainly have been put through much earlier than 1930, which was the year in which the Soviets with a great fanfare announced its eventual completion. The Tsarist engineers completed the Trans-Caspian (or Central Asian) Railway in the eighties of last century and the

---

[1] A table of a few targets set under the fourth Five-Year Plan which ended in 1950 follows this chapter. The targets for the most part are said to have been reached, and the Soviets have now moved on to a fifth Plan. For rail-network see map opposite.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia R L1

496 Trans-Aral line up the Sir Darya by the end of 1905. They also laid down and completed the main network of the very important branches to Khojent, Kokand and Andijan in the Farghana Valley, and the line to the Afghan frontier at Kushk. Soviet propagandists, conscious of this damaging comparison, seek to disarm criticism by saying that only Soviet energy could fulfil the Tsarist plans; but in making this claim they overlook the fine pioneer work done by their predecessors. In a larger field it is remarkable that it was the Tsars, not the Soviets, who built railways to the Pacific. The Soviets frequently announce the construction of a second 'Relief' Siberian line farther to the south, but so far only bits of this exist on the ground. It is indeed remarkable how Soviet enterprise has been found wanting in this sphere.

There are two good examples of the other tendency to confuse prospect with performance. In April 1940[1] it was stated in the Soviet press that a new Oxus Valley line — this too, be it noted, a Tsarist scheme — was to have been completed northward from Charjui as far as Urgench in Khorezm some time in that year. But later notices establish that this important trunk (designed, it seems, eventually to link up with the main European system north of the Caspian) was only begun, much less completed, as lately as October 1947. In the words of the panegyrist:[2]

> One of the great railway-building feats of all time is being carried out in Soviet Asia. A few months ago the restless wind was the only intruder in this wilderness of shifting sands. Then one October day, an army of 70,000 people crossed the horizon, making for the Amu Darya River. They had come to carry out a task laid down in the Five-Year Plan — to build a railway from the Transcaspian Line to the Aral Sea, from Chardzhou to Kungrad. The idea of building a railway across the desert is not new. Attempts were made before the Revolution in 1899 and again in 1913 — to survey a route; but, like other great projects, the Karakum scheme was destined to be realized only in Soviet times. Soviet life in all its cheerful busy variety has invaded the desert. In the evening when the moon rises and the sandhills turn blue, cinema operators

---

[1] *Pravda* (3rd Apr. 1940).

[2] Bib. II, 10.

set up their portable projectors, professors give science lectures, 496 hundreds of newspaper editors get busy in their offices among the dunes, and brilliant companies of musicians and singers entertain the multitude. . . . By 1950 the Amu Darya Valley will be transformed.

It is clear that an important railway of which the completion was forecast in 1940 was not even started until seven years later, and was due for completion on a rough estimate as much as ten years later. This line may not be finished even now (1953). A recent manual on Uzbekistan[1] includes it on sketch-maps as having been constructed as far as Kungrad in the Amu Darya delta, but a less convincing text suggests that the work is far from complete. This line will be of the greatest importance, if the Soviets mean to realize their vast project for a Turkmenian Canal with a headworks at Takhya Tash in the delta.

Another case in which promise and performance are not equated is that of the Mointy–Chu line. The most important new railways actually constructed by the Soviets in Turkistan during the Five-Year plans are those leading to Karaganda, their coal centre, with branches to their two main copper regions north of Balkhash and round Jezkazgan. These had to be constructed if the coal and copper were to be worked at all. (They include an important branch, destined in due course to become a link in a Relief Siberian Line, from Akmolinsk to Kartali, near Magnitogorsk.) In July 1946 Kovalev, the Central Minister of Railways, announced that the Balkhash line was being extended from Mointy to join up with the Turk-Sib line at Chu, so providing a fourth through-trunk connecting Tashkent with the outside world. But it was not until 1952 that news came through of a single special train passing over this line to mark the occasion of the Kazakistan Congress. The line has now gone back to the list of construction works for further attention to the permanent way. In the case of the Oxus Valley line the reasons for delay may be sought in the impact of the war, although this did

---

[1] Bib. III, 26. Vitkovich.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

496 not prevent large-scale construction in Turkistan in certain spheres. Delays over the Mointy–Chu line must be attributed to other causes. Whatever the actual cause in any given case, it is possible to affirm with certainty first that it has become a habit for engineers and announcers alike to make a point of confusing blueprints with actual construction, and secondly that Soviet railway construction in Turkistan up to the present time has not added very materially to the network which existed twenty years ago.

Shortcomings and delays of this kind are worth mentioning, for the picture must be seen in light and shade. But the general impression would be as true, namely, that the five republics have now become, for their population if not for their size, a highly industrialized area. Statistics, if nothing else, show something like one in three of the population as
316 living in towns and centres. Karaganda, the centre of the coal-
135 field in Kazakistan, has grown from nothing to 200,000. Like Magnitogorsk in earlier days, it is in fact a concentration camp of helot labour, producing over sixteen million tons of coal a year and qualifying as the third most productive coal-field in the Union, the next after the Don and Kuznetz basins. There are large coal deposits in the Angren Valley close to Tashkent, well sited to serve the industries of the capital and near the nodal point of the railway network. There is also
315 coal in the Tajik foothills. Ishimbay, the heart of the Second Baku in the Urals, already mentioned, is not far outside the five republics and within Bashkiria, while in the republics are three most important groups of oil-wells. The first is in the Emba area (in Kazakistan north-east of the Caspian), with the fields round Guryev and pipe-line to Orsk, the third most productive field in the Union. Next is the Nebit Dagh field close to Krasnovodsk, followed by various smaller wells in the Farghana Valley at Kim-Shorsu, at Yarkurgan and Chimion and also near Andijan. Others find mention in enthusiastic articles in press and encyclopedia alike. Some 1950 targets of production — all realized — are given in the selective table appended to this chapter. [a]

[a] [See cash 116, p213 -- Analyst]

As might be expected, cotton and silk production is the 231
peculiar pride of Turkistan. The Farghana Valley, we know, 248
has the ideal climate and the water both for cotton cultivation,
and for the growth of mulberry-trees[1] for the silk-worm.
The same is true of the other southern oases, watered by the
Chirchik (Tashkent), Zarafshan and Kashka Darya, and also
of the Vakhsh river irrigation in Tajikistan. In the early years
cotton cultivation was in danger of becoming a monoculture,
and more than once brought the country into terrible famine
conditions. The figures of the fourth Five-Year Plan, if
reliable, suggest that, even in Uzbekistan, there has now been
a considerable reversion from commercial cropping to grain,
and, if so, the rural economy is not so brittle as many have
supposed. The great Soviet achievement has been to bring
the mills into Turkistan and process the crops locally. The 288
largest cotton-processing establishment is the Stalin Textile
Combine and Institute at Tashkent, while for silk there is a
combine at Margilan, said to be the largest in the world, and
integrating all processes from the unwinding of the cocoon to
the weaving of the final material. Woven silk is in great
demand for parachutes.

IRRIGATION

The aim to free Russia from all dependence on foreign 000
cotton and then to build heavy stock-piles is bound up with
the Soviet policy of irrigation. Irrigation in its turn is linked
both with waterways and (more important) with the production of hydro-electric power. In some respects, on the face
of them, the Soviet plans for development under these heads
are more imaginative even than the metallurgical projects
realized in the Urals before the War. For the claim is that
they will turn a great desert into a smiling countryside, and
even divert waters destined by nature for the Arctic into the
Turanian basin. But the science of the irrigation engineer

---

[1] *Morus alba*, known locally by the Persian word *tut*.

000 is far from being a technical one to be applied successfully from a central draughtsman's office: it is a form of public works which to command success requires of its professor a sort of sixth sense, a feeling after the countryside, the climate, the lie of the land, the local native knowledge acquired by experience, the queer things water does both above and under the ground. The successful irrigator must be more than an expert scientist; his science has become an art. To see how and where he can give life to desert lands he needs some of those intuitive qualities of genius that distinguish the architect from the builder, the landscape-gardener from the tractor-driver. There have been men like this in the Panjab, Egypt, the Tennessee Valley; they have gained great experience which with wisdom could be turned to account by the Russians in Asia also. Such men treat water like a precious fluid that must be humoured. They know, for instance, that to preserve its power to grant fertility water must have its outlets as well as its infall.

312 The beginnings of Russian irrigation in Turkistan were not particularly auspicious. In all the piedmontane tracts there existed before the Russians came an indigenous system of irrigated channels, constructed with primitive tools and maintained by the joint labours of the village communities. The skill going to the construction and maintenance of such systems is well described in such books as Holdich's *Indian Borderland* and *Gates of India*; it was considerable. In all these countries water is more important than land, and whoever controls the water has power over the land. The method by which this power was acquired by the Russians has been described, and it constitutes one of the most definite steps taken to give effect to the new economic policy. In a land dependent on artificial watering the State thus secures a more absolute control over the peasant than can be the case where fertility depends on rainfall.

241 In such lands intensive cultivation of small-holdings is the
312 rule. (Incidentally, intensive cultivation is akin to gardening, and of all types of agriculture the least suited to collective

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

mechanization.) The Russians, coming fresh to the science 241 of tropical agriculture, believed that the native use of wooden 312 ploughs and shares instead of the iron plough implied a primitive condition. They could not estimate the value of the intensive cultivation that had gone on for thousands of years in the country. Togan tells us[1] how they tried to teach the unirrigated system of agriculture, as if the Turkistan people in their ignorance were incapable of understanding what it meant. They aimed not at getting a good crop out of a small-holding, but at cultivating large areas in order to get a large crop. Even Nalivkin, a former Governor of Farghana, had to admit that the Russian conquest had brought with it the cessation of intensive cultivation.

There was a time when even the Orsk and Emba areas north of the Caspian used to be cultivated by irrigation. There is evidence that in 1920 irrigation in that area was still being maintained to some extent, though the tradition was even then disappearing as the nomad Kazak inhabitants were driven south and agriculture in the Sir Darya basin decayed. Two Russians, Asmolovsky and Yusuf Karamshev, observed that, although the Sir Darya Kazaks used old primitive ploughs, it was for that reason that the land ploughed up with them retained its moisture and was more productive than that worked with the Russian plough. But there was one useful [177] thing the people of Turkistan did learn from the Russians — how to mow with the scythe. Men like Barthold at that time issued warnings about the new methods and from the start were pessimistic about the attempt to cultivate the Mirza Chōl[2] (the desert near Jizak west of the point where the Sir Darya issues from the basin of Farghana). Never in history had these parts been farmed, although they were close to the river, and this was a case for learning from the experience of the native population, who must have had good reason for leaving these lands alone. Why not revive with the quickening

---

[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 291-3. [see ext, 116, pp 7-8 -- Analyst]

[2] The *Mirza Chōl* is a name also applied to the Betpak Dala, north of the Chu-Talash area.

o

241 water the lands where there existed traces of former irrigation,
312 as, for instance, the disused canal system of Gavkhore on the
right bank of the Amu Darya opposite Khorezm? But no: Barthold was a mere professor, who had made for himself a picture of the country from 'Sart' sources. The Russian engineers were convinced of their wisdom, and money was devoted to schemes which, far from turning the land into a garden, in a few years led to water-logging, no measures having been taken to prevent the land turning into a morass, a home of reeds and waterfowl and a source of malaria.

> In September 1922 [says Togan], I passed by the lower side of the canals in Mirza Chöl, and a Kazak showed me how the poplars planted by the Russians were drying up, and the surface of the land, cultivated a few years before with care and trouble, was now covered with saltpetre.[1]

653 The Tsarist irrigation engineers seem to have had little
312 conception of the dangers of water-logging and saltpetre
which arise in a flat riverain country under a tropical sun, when water is brought to it and the fall is insufficient for natural drainage. The remedy lies in the provision of artificial drainage by digging channels to lower the watertable, but this is not always easy and it is very expensive. Even in their weirs and dams the Russian engineers set their bricks much too loosely, as compared with the old brick walls of indigenous canals, which had held for centuries. An effort by the Grand Duke Nicholas at the end of the XIXth century to construct a perennial irrigation system on the Amu Darya in Khorezm resulted only in cutting across and destroying the old indigenous inundation channels. The project was conceived as one in line with British irrigation works in the Panjab and in Egypt, but it is evident that the Russian engineers of that time had much to learn both as regards original canal construction and the remodelling of old works.

The Soviets have given great attention to irrigation works in Central Asia, and have certainly profited from the mistakes of their predecessors. Although in this case also it is hard to

---

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 295.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

disentangle achievement from expansive visions existing only 653
in the planner's mind, there is no doubt that in Farghana, in 312
the Chu–Talash area, and also on the Zarafshan and the Vakhsh, much good work has been brought to a conclusion. The best-known completed works are:

- (*a*) The Stalin Great Farghana Canal, 270 km. long.
- (*b*) The Mikoyan, or Northern Farghana, Canal, 165 km. long.
- (*c*) The Andreev, or Southern Farghana, Canal, 108 km. long.
- (*d*) The Katta Kurgan and Verkhno-Bukhara Reservoirs on the Zarafshan.
- (*e*) The Great Chu Canal, 270 km. long.
- (*f*) The Vakhsh Canal.

The construction of the first was widely advertised, with due 653
praise allotted to the 160,000 *Kolkhoz* members who dug it 312
out, and completed it in forty-five days. The availability of 464
corvée labour of this kind, which can be used in the off-season for irrigation work, must greatly aid the authorities in their task, not only on construction but on maintenance and silt-clearance. The official case is that a considerable percentage of all *Kolkhoz* workers in canal areas is used for such duties, and the labourers while absent from their homes receive their fair share of *Kolkhoz* produce. That may work in the rich and smiling Farghana Valley. But how is the case with those transported to dig in the wastes of the deserts? The logistical effort alone needed to feed armies of workers in the Karakum must be colossal.

It has been suggested that construction of the Stalin-Farghana Canal called out nearly one million labourers and that there was suffering on a large scale. Yet, in the face of all criticism, there remains an impression that this in itself was a great work, which has added much to the fertility of an already productive region. Systems of government change, but an irrigation work remains.

Since the war there has been planning on a far grander 653 312

Since the war there has been planning on a far grander
653 scale. The first two schemes which follow may be called
312 'local' in the sense that, in appearance at least, they are not
185 part of a continental linked project dealing in the waters of
more than one river. These two projects are:

(i) *The Karakum Canal*

The project was an old one, but it was revived in 1945, and ratified in 1947. The main channel is to be some 350 miles long and to irrigate nearly half a million acres. The headworks were to be somewhere near Kerki on the Oxus left bank, and the main objective is to increase the cultivated area watered by the Murghab and Tejen rivers in the Merv and Serakhs oases. Work was stated to have been started in 1949.

A work of this kind, skirting the Kopet Dagh line of mountains which forms the Persian frontier, must cross the natural drainage lines of the country, and involve heavy bridging or siphoning and much danger of being breached by floods, to say nothing of being choked by sand-drifts. Without any local knowledge it is possible to affirm that this canal must take time to construct and will be expensive to maintain. Confidence in the Soviet engineers is not increased by loose talk that the canal will be used for shipping. Navigation and irrigation are ill partners.

(ii) *The Uzbek, or Upper Oxus, Canal*

This project was planned by the Uzbek Academy of Sciences in May 1947. It is a very large scheme for a canal 500 miles long to supplement the irrigation at the tail of the Kashka Darya and the Zarafshan systems — among the best cotton-lands in Central Asia — by water from the Oxus. The project was described at some length by a spokesman of the Central USSR Ministry of Agriculture. The plan envisages the construction of a headworks at Kelif on the Oxus right bank, where the river finally emerges from the hills into the plain. At this point the right bank rests on a spur of the Hissar Range, a rocky eminence which canalizes the channel and prevents it from shifting as it is always doing in its course 653 through the plains lower down. On the face of it then the 185 site is well chosen for the headworks of a perennial canal. 312 At this point a dam described as 6 km. long and 20 metres high was to be constructed. For the next 100 km. the main canal would run along the skirt of the Hissar Range, passing on its way a point named Akyar where it would drop 34 metres, the fall being used to establish a hydro-electric power station. The canal would then swing northward to cross the Kaskha and Zarafshan rivers and augment the water-supply in both. The forecast spoke of opening up new irrigation to the extent of 1·2 million hectares, or nearly 3 million acres, and the estimated cost was 7000 million roubles. No date of completion was named.

This project, like the last, involves cutting across the natural drainage lines of the country, and the upper part of the main channel, skirting the great chain of the Hissar mountains (rising at one point to over 15,000 feet) will necessarily have to withstand occasional floods of extreme violence. Further, the crossing of the Kashka and Zarafshan basins at a point presumably not far distant from the debouchment of those rivers into the plains will demand engineering and constructional skill of no mean order.

The plan calls for the establishment on the falls of hydro-electric generating stations of an aggregate capacity of 1 million kilowatts, equal to about ten times that of the Ardnacrusha Station on the Shannon.

The spokesman said that these two canals together were expected to take nearly 2000 cubic metres per second[1] from the Amu Darya. On the assumption that each is designed to take 1000 cubic metres, each of these canals would be about twice as large as any of the great works constructed in the Panjab. This 2000 cubic metres volume is quoted as taking about half the total discharge of the river even in July and

---

[1] To convert cubic metres into the normal British engineer's standard of water-volume, viz., cubic feet per second, an adequate rule of thumb is to multiply by thirty. 1000 c.m.s. would therefore be equivalent to about 30,000 'cusecs'.

653 August, the flood months owing to summer melting of snow
185 in Oxus' 'high mountain cradle in Pamere'. A draught on
312 the river of this order must of course put in jeopardy the irrigation down-stream in the Khorezm area, but the spokesman met this by explaining that three reservoirs were to be constructed to store 6000 million cubic metres in the seasons of low demand.

These two projects for irrigation from the Oxus, great as they are, pale into insignificance when set against an immense integrated plan, described as 300 times the size of the T.V.A.[1], for the application of the latest sciences to the Dnieper, Don, Volga and Amu Darya basins in the connected fields of irrigation, navigation, hydro-electric power and afforestation. Here we are concerned with the Amu Darya only, but the plans announced cover much the same ground on the European rivers. Over the whole field the planners speak in terms of transforming an area of two million square miles, two-thirds the size of the United States. The rivers are to be dammed at a number of points, the dams forming reservoirs many miles across; power stations of great capacity are to be established at these barrages with irrigation canals taking off at the same points; ocean-going steamers are seen as penetrating to the lakes through locks; and finally belts of forest, three miles wide (quite modest this), are to be planted in the valleys 'to keep them damp and on the watersheds to let the run-off from melting snows down gently'. In the Karakum, an awkward place for labour, the forests are to be sown with seed broadcast from aircraft. Finally, the suggestion is that, to avoid a fall in the Caspian Sea following the diversion of rivers to irrigation, waters flowing to the Arctic are to be impounded to compensate the southern rivers. A presumably serious commentator[1a] has written that it is possible that ultimately no water from Siberia will go to the Arctic, and it has even been suggested that the consequent greater salinity of the Arctic Ocean may reduce the size of the Polar ice-cap.

---

[1] Tennessee Valley Authority.

Turning more particularly to that part of the scheme to be 653
derived from the waters of the Amu Darya, to be called the 185
Turkmenian Canal, the same commentator [1A] stated: 312

> The scientists told me a great deal about how they had planned the scheme for the Karakum desert. . . . They are chosen to cover the whole range of interests . . . there are hydrologists, navigation experts, electrical experts, every kind of engineer, soil scientists, zoologists, botanists, geologists, there are also geo-physicists and seismologists . . . besides all these there are the archaeologists, who are considered a very important part of the scheme.

In the presence of this battalion of experts from Academies of Sciences, with some conflict of interest (one would think) even in Russia, the genie of the scheme will surely sigh for one good practical engineer.

The Turkmenian Canal itself was announced in September 1950 in a decree of the Central Council of Ministers of the USSR. It is nothing short of an attempt to realize the old dream for the redirection of the Oxus back into its ancient course to the Caspian Sea by means of a canal 700 miles long starting from Takhya Tash on the left bank close to Nukus, skirting the Sarikamish depression (which, being even deeper than the Caspian, would take too long to fill up), and thence along the old bed of the Özboy across the middle Karakum and through the Balkhan gap into the sea near Krasnovodsk.[1] It is not unamusing to reflect that this also was an idea in the minds of Tsarist engineers more than fifty years ago. Curzon, writing in 1889, mentions that as a navigation project it had even occurred to the fertile mind of Peter the Great, and quotes the scornful saying of the German engineer Kiefert referring to the project, when at the height of its favour in the seventies of last century, as the great Central Asian sea-serpent. But it seems clear that a decision has now been taken for a canal to irrigate 1,300,000 hectares or about 3,000,000 acres, and to carry three hydro-electric generating stations, each with a capacity of 100,000 kilowatts (each about equivalent to the Shannon Station in Ireland). Work was to begin in

---

[1A] Professor J. Bernal, F.R.S., Bib. II, 1.

[1] [See cat. 116, pp. 23-26 -- Analyst]

653 1951 and is scheduled for completion in 1957. The official
185 spokesman [1] stated:

312

> The idea of bringing life to the desert by turning the course of the Amu Darya towards the Caspian Sea originated long ago. Yet Tsarist Russia was incapable of carrying it out. It was on the initiative of Stalin that the Government decision was taken to revive the desert and fulfil the age-old dreams of the people of Central Asia. The special characteristic of the present scheme is that the waters will be used in their entirety for irrigation and will not be discharged into the Caspian Sea as proposed in all preceding projects. All remaining canals of the world, including those of America, Egypt and India, are considerably shorter. . . . Krasnovodsk will receive an abundant supply of water [is this inconsistent with the special characteristic ?]. The new irrigation construction is an important link in the great Stalin plan for the transformation of nature. The Caspian desert plain will soon be converted into a marvellous flourishing land.

The project is linked with the railway constructional plan already mentioned for a line northward from Charjui to Kungrad along the Oxus left bank, that described as one of the great railway building feats of all time.[2]

000 In face of the admissions of short supply in the river which will follow the completion of the first two Amu Darya projects above mentioned, it is not easy to see how the Takhya Tash headworks — down-stream of Kelif and Kerki — would find sufficient volume to irrigate the whole of the Karakum from Khorezm to the Caspian. Can it be that this grandiose project for restoring the prosperity of the days before 1573, the year when the Oxus turned to the Aral Sea, is alternative and not supplementary to the Karakum project? It is possible that the surveys may have convinced the Soviet engineers of the difficulties of constructing a canal along the skirts of the Kopet Dagh, with all the dangers of breaching by flood, and induced them to have second thoughts. It is not inconceivable that they, or their political superiors, may have been influenced by the romance which appeals so greatly to the local bourgeois patriots, that of turning the Oxus back

---

[1] Deputy Minister, Cotton Cultivation USSR.

[2] Bib. II, 10.

to the course it followed four centuries ago (or, as the Soviets 000 have it, in the Tertiary Period). By so reversing history they might in a new age regain for this land its old prosperity.

There is the further possibility that the Soviet engineers really plan to compensate the Oxus by diversion of one or more of the Arctic rivers. Some years ago, publicity was given to a project[1] sponsored by the engineer J. Davidov, for no less than the re-routing to the Aral and the Caspian Seas of a great part of the waters now flowing to the Arctic in the Ob and Yenisei. The Tobol, Ishim and Irtish are confluents of the Ob, the first two having their source in northern Kazakistan and the last just across the frontier in Jungaria. Part I of Davidov's scheme was for the building of an immense barrage to dam these rivers close to their point of confluence with the Ob; and so impound them in a vast marshy lake, which would be drained by a canal passing through the Turgay gap into the Aral basin. As with the projected Turkmenian Canal, the water would be conveyed thence by the Ŏzboy to the Caspian. Part II of Davidov's plan would consist in the extension of the barrage to impound the upper waters of the Yenisei also. The scale of this planning, and indeed its reality also, can be estimated from the fact that the author speaks, in terms of a barrage 80 metres high to impound a lake 250,000 sq. kilometres in area, to be drained by a canal which would pour 250 cubic *kilometres* of water annually from the Arctic rivers into the Oxus (the annual volume of the Oxus he estimates at 56 cubic *kilometres*). The commanded area for irrigation is given as an aggregate of 240,000 sq. kilometres, and the hydro-electric capacity as 24·5 milliards kilowatts. There is a further suggestion to use these canals for navigation. If the Turkmenian Canal is ever constructed, it must certainly be correlated with upstream demands on the Oxus, and it is probable that some compensatory project will have to be worked out. How far this would be possible by the diversion of waters from an Arctic destination is an interesting point, but scarcely likely to be resolved by planning or commentary such as that of

---

[1] Bib. I, 59, Leprince-Ringuet, pp. 117-20.

Davidov. Criticism may fairly be directed not only to the grandiose conception itself but to the point that an effort is being made to do too many things at once. Is the object navigation, or is it power, or is it irrigation? Practical engineers know that irrigation and navigation do not go easily as partners. Again, the plain of Turkistan has a declination as gradual as that of any plain in the world. Rivers are nature's drainage-lines, and their damming in flat country is apt to lead to serious water-logging, the more so perhaps when they drain to inland seas. The danger of saltpetre is great under a tropical sun. A great accession of water into the Turanian basin might make of the desert a saline marsh less favourable to agriculture and health than the present sands of the Karakum. It is not unfair to suggest that he would be an optimistic conservator of forests who relied on the establishment of *Saksaul*[1] plantations in the desert by means of seed scattered from the air. Again, what of the towns, villages and lands to be submerged under these man-made seas? And lastly, good sites for the production of hydro-electric power are hard to find in a vast plain, where volume may not altogether compensate for lack of fall.

Later evidence of progress must be awaited. Meanwhile, although fears may well be liars, the enthusiasm of Soviet spokesmen when looking to their targets provokes a questioning voice, and it is well to reflect that efficient canal construction calls for the balanced mind which will weigh profit with loss, advantage with danger. One of the perils has been indicated — that of water-logging. Another is inadequate provision for balancing the conflicting demands of the up-stream and the down-stream irrigator on one river-system.

In a thirsty land which is watered by artificial means the day-to-day anxiety of the peasant is bound up with the turn of the water which means life. With a system of individual holdings water disputes arouse passions leading inevitably to violence and bloodshed, and on the administration of the water-turns, efficient or otherwise, depends the farmers' whole life, whether for good or ill. The collectivization of farming into *Kolkhozes* in hundreds may enlarge this anxiety by creating a new sort of tribalism to take the place of the older one, but it cannot remove it. And what has been described here as the cantonization of Turkistan has introduced a kind of administrative tribalism at an even higher level. As we have seen, the source of the Farghana irrigation, the Sir Darya, starts in Kirghizia, passes into Uzbekistan, thence into Tajikistan, thence again once more into another part of Uzbekistan, and finally out into Kazakistan.

---

[1] *Haloxylon ammodendron*, the most widely distributed of the Sand-flora of these deserts.

000

On any canal the balancing against supply of the demand of the up-stream and the down-stream irrigator calls for careful and continuous adjustment. When the demands are voiced not by individuals or even by communities, but by separate, nominally sovereign, constituent republics in a federation, harmony could never be secured merely by consultation between equals. An over-riding authority would be essential. And, even then, decisions would have to be made on paper and on much too high a level to allow of the day-to-day adjustments needed to direct the living water — always a variant factor — to flow, where needed, on the thirsty crop — itself also a variant with the season and the type of land. It is not enough to say, as the Soviets do, that the republics operate their irrigation canals jointly, and the flow of the rivers is controlled mechanically on a proportional basis. It is the dead mechanism of a system claiming even to control the living waters in the streams which oppresses the spirit beyond endurance.

WATER-POWER

We have seen how all these irrigation plans go hand in hand with hydro-electric projects designed to supply an alternative source of power so that the fuel resources of Central Asia may be used elsewhere. The geographical formation of the country, with vast mountain systems set

000 against a low-lying plain, is favourable to the harnessing of a great reserve of water-power, draining from the everlasting snows and glaciers of the Tienshan and convertible into electricity.

Propagandists are apt to confuse figures of capacity of power stations (in kilowatts) with those of output (in kilowatt hours *per annum*), and there is a notable inclination to brandish the latter with the object presumably of impressing the reader with astronomical cyphers. It is easier to stick to capacity figures.

A useful yardstick in estimating hydro-electric development in Turkistan is available in the Ardnacrusha Station on the Shannon in Ireland. The capacity of this station, working with one turbine in reserve, is a little under 100,000 kilowatts on a fall of 28½ metres with a maximum volume discharge of 250 cubic metres a second. Although of course the Shannon is a very small stream in comparison with the great rivers of Turkistan, the Shannon hydro-electric station has several points of interest to the student of Central Asia. Central Ireland is a flat country, and it is not easy to secure sufficient fall for the efficient generation of hydro-electric power. The lack of fall must be made up by a greater volume, and that is not available on the small rivers of these islands. The result has been that the Shannon Station has by no means fulfilled the hopes of its German designers. It does not supply all Ireland with electric power, and it has been necessary to develop an additional station in Dublin, deriving power from steam, not water, with a capacity of 118,000 kilowatts to carry the present loads. In other words water-power in Ireland does not carry even half the load.

377 If we neglect Davidov's figures[1] and turn to a recent forecast of capacity to be reached by the stations in Soviet Central Asia at the end of the fourth Five-Year Plan, we find an aggregate figure of 1,000,000 kilowatts or about ten times the capacity of the Irish station. The largest stations now working are at Farkhad at the approaches to the Hungry Steppe (Mirza Chōl) on the Sir Darya, where a 1148 foot-long dam

[1] [See art. 116, p. 207--Analyst]

has been erected and the longest derivation canal in the Union 377 has been excavated. Work was begun in 1943, and the station is supposed to have started to operate in 1948. The capacity is stated to be 200,000 kilowatts. The next largest is on the Chirchik and Boz-Sir, near Tashkent, where there is a series of linked stations, six of them finished in 1945 and four more in 1947. Others are planned. The capacity stated is 150,000 kilowatts. There is also planning for the construction of a [185] series of generating stations on canal falls on the Upper Oxus–Zarafshan project, to reach an aggregate capacity of 1,000,000 kilowatts, and for three similar stations of an aggregate capacity of 100,000 kilowatts, also on canal falls on the great project for a Turkmenian Canal along the old Amu-Darya bed of the Ōzboy. There are, moreover, numerous small power stations, listed in hundreds, on mountain torrents and streams, and also on canal falls in Farghana and elsewhere in the piedmontane area. The largest recently mentioned seem to be in Tajikistan on the Varzob and Vakhsh rivers, 13,000 and 10,000 kilowatts respectively.

The impression derived is that the Soviet engineers have two techniques: the first for the establishment of large stations at canal headworks or on canal falls, and the second for the dispersal of large numbers of small local plants on mountain torrents.

Now, on a general view, the terrain of Turkistan should be 000 admirably suited for the harnessing of water-power in the east where the mountains merge into the plains. But it is unlikely to be so favourable well out in the plains, where the declivity is very small in the direction of the Caspian and Aral Seas. Canal falls do not normally provide good sites for large stations, the fall being insufficient except in favourable circumstances. The plains of Turkistan are flatter than central Ireland. It may be that the great volume of the Turkistan rivers will make up for any insufficient fall. The discharge of the Oxus in flood may be anything up to 10,000 cubic metres a second, but water for a generating plant must be canalized in a derivation channel. Some scepticism is

000 justifiable. Nor is it ordinarily economic to transmit power over very long distances by cable.

SUMMARY

311 The industrial picture of Turkistan emerging from all this has certain very distinguishable features and falls into clear geographical compartments.

(*a*) There is one area which industry, agriculture and population all mark out as the strategic heart of Turkistan. This is the relatively small ellipse centred on the Farghana basin, including its outlying glacis with Tashkent to the north-west, Samarkand to the west and the Vakhsh valley with Stalinabad to the south. This is the heart of the oasis country where the large towns are grouped, whence comes most of the cotton and the silk, and where also are found valuable deposits of oil and coal, many non-ferrous metals and rare minerals.

(*b*) The area in the middle of Kazakistan holds the third greatest coal-fields in the Union as well as the largest copper deposits and smelting works — Karaganda, Kunrad, Jezkazgan.

(*c*) The Emba area, north-east of the Caspian, with fields at Guryev and pipe-line to Orsk, is the third most important oil producer in the Union. First of course is Baku, and second the Ural fields round Ishimbay, both in territory once inhabited by Turkish peoples, but outside the five Central Asian republics.

(*d*) The port at Krasnovodsk with the oilfields at Nebit Dagh.

(*e*) The string of extensive piedmontane oases north of the Tienshan, viz. Alma Ata, Frunze (Pishpek), Jambul (Aulie Ata) and Chimkent.

All these are situated on an exposed flank, in peripheral territories annexed to the Empire and relatively close to an international frontier. The impression is one of a country as large as the main block of Europe but with industry and agriculture concentrated into quite a few well-marked areas, defined either by the rivers or by discoveries of minerals.

1950 TARGETS[*]

	Population 1939		Heavy Industry (Millions of Tons)			Textiles (Millions of Metres)			Crops (Millions of Hectares *)	
	Total	'Native'	Coal	Oil	Steel	Cotton	Silk	Woollen	Cash	Grain
Kazakistan	6,146,000	3·09	16·4 (Karaganda)	1·2 † (Emba)	0·07	19·0	Nil	2·9	0·34	5·34
Kirghizia	1,459,000	0·88	1·6	0·08	Nil	0·7	0·92	0·5	0·11	0·7
Tajikistan	1,485,000	1·22	0·44	0·06	Nil	18·0	5·1	Nil	0·18	0·63
Turkmenia	1,254,000	0·83	0·06	1·1 (Nebit Dagh)	Nil	22·0	0·83	0·82	0·16	0·16
Uzbekistan	6,282,000	4·98	1·1 (Angren)	1·1	0·1	161·0	14·0 (Samarkand and Margilan)	Nil	1·13	1·38
Total	16,626,000	11·00	19·6	3·54	0·17	220·7	20·85	4·22	1·92	8·21
			= 7·8% of USSR total of 250 m. tons	= 9·9% of USSR total of 35·4 m. tons	USSR total given as 25 m. tons	= 4·7% of USSR total of 4·686 m. metres	USSR total not ascertained	USSR total not ascertained	of which 1·35 m. is under cotton = 80·4% of USSR total	= 7·7% of USSR total of 105·8 m. hectares

* 1 hectare = 2·5 acres approx.

† Does not include Ural oilfields at Ishimbay, producing in 1950 at the rate of, say, 7 million tons a year.

*[i.e. of Fourth Five Year Plan -- Analyst]

21 Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RLI Soviet Central Asia/RL2

[P. 213]

185
433

OOO These processes have altered the complexion of all social questions, and gone far to bring the Uzbeks and Kazaks and the remaining peoples along the road laid down by Stalin in the early days. No Central Asian patriot can leave them out of his account.

There is now an urban proletariat, not organized on the ancient guild systems of Bukhara, but on a strict Soviet model. The change is in fact no less than that brought about in the fields by mechanical agriculture and the *Kolkhoz*.

XIII

HERITAGE OF CHAGHATAI

Now these, her princes, are come home again . . .

THERE is yet another unrelenting pressure to which, ○○○ in Stalin's time, the peoples of Soviet Central Asia came to be increasingly exposed — that pressure on the spirit felt by those subjected to the assaults of the war on the ideological front. This is a pressure applied in greater or less degree wherever Soviet writ runs, but it naturally bears more heavily on the Muslim inheritors of a corpus of idea remote from the concepts of any European philosophy and alien even to the older traditions of Russia. For Marxism-Leninism, as it was worked out, was in no sense the child of a Russian and Turkish liaison conceived during the long period of contact on the Ural–Volga front: if there was any offspring of that meeting, it was to be found rather in the institution of the Cossacks, who adopted, with their own variations, something of the spirit and impulses that moved the Tatar tribesmen of the steppe. Marxism was the result of the impact of systematized western social philosophies, in the hands of very able and embittered men, on a double-storeyed ill-cemented Russian society whose Byzantine framework was outworn and outmoded, and whose trappings had begun to appear as tinsel to men who had lost their direction. The formulas of Marxism, deriving from the West and not from the East, were at all points at variance with an age-old tradition, a tradition resting in part on the faith of Islam, and in part and equally significantly on that sort of positive insouciance the hall-mark of the free-born horsemen of the steppe. However exoteric the faith of the nomad, it was a strong expression of a way of life instinct with self-respect and honouring that rigorous code which binds

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL2

000 men who live the open life of the wanderer in the desert. It is perhaps the very simplicity of this nomadic attitude which makes the nomad impervious to an indoctrination with ideas which easily permeate more recondite minds. Thus in part we can explain the original resistance of the Turk to the winds of new doctrine. On this showing there is little need for surprise that those two parts of Asia, China and Turkistan, should have reacted differently to the Marxist-Leninist appeal.

But before it is possible to arrive at any demonstrable conclusion on the strength of traditional belief and observance in the face of Communist indoctrination, it is necessary to see whether there exists in the minds and thoughts of the people of Soviet Central Asia any monument, *aere perennius*, strong enough to stand up to the corrosive influences of time and adverse weather. This monument must be looked for in the existence of a continuing literature, without which any civilization, however grand its arts or its architecture in the past, will be hard put to it to live on into the present. It must not only be built of durable material but must be developed and restored to meet the changes and chances of the age, and so buttressed as to resist successfully even the shock of an earthquake. Can such a literature be found in Turkistan? And, if so, in what does its strength consist, how far is it up to date and what is the quality of the forces which seek to overthrow it?

538 Leaving aside for the moment the sacred books of Islam — and let no man underrate the effect of these in bestowing on man a certain firmness of spirit possibly stronger than with other faiths — there is the limited but undoubtedly great literature of the Timurid age written in the Chaghatai language. Its great representatives are the Emperor Babur in prose, and Mir Ali Shir Nevayi in poetry. Babur is the prince of autobiographers. Boon companion, warrior in single combat and in command of armies, man of letters, lover of nature and all beautiful things, a sinner grand enough to confess and make good his repentance, free of all cant, bearing no malice, frank, honourable, born a prince and in the end

the founder of an empire, he sets to the Eastern Turks, from whose ranks he came, a pattern of manhood and simplicity such as no one Elizabethan can show to us. Whether he deals in battle or statecraft, in the love of nature or the kindness of friends, in the good-fellowship of a carouse or in resolutions (which he kept) to break his goblets and abstain from wine, in wise and humorous counsel to a son or the mature appraisement of good verse, in the littleness of man or the supreme efficacy of prayer, in all things, Babur has a quite inimitable charm. Combining as he does in one person so great a versatility, and passing, as only he knows how, from the extremes of ill-fortune to the summit of glory, he keeps to the end and unspoiled his grand simplicity. He was a very king of men. 538

Among many treasures in the *Baburnama*[1] is one, seldom quoted, but in many ways revealing of the man he was. It is a letter to his son Humayun, written after long separation:

> To Humayun, whom I remember with much longing to see again, health.
>
> Thanks be to God, who has given you a child, a child to you and to me a comfort and an object to love. . . . You have called him Al Aman [mercy, peace]; may the Almighty prosper him.
>
> This is the season for you to expose yourself to danger and hardship, to exert your prowess. Fail not to meet strenuously every situation as it arises; for indolence and ease go ill with kingship. . . . Remember too always to act handsomely by your brother. The great should exercise self-command; and I do hope that you will always keep good understanding with him. He on his part is a correct and worthy youth, and will be careful to maintain the fidelity due to you.
>
> In many of your letters you complain of separation from your friends. It is wrong for a prince to indulge in such a complaint, for as Saadi says:
>
> *If thy foot be fettered, choose to ride resigned,*
> *If thou ride alone, take the course of thine own fancy.*
>
> There is no greater bondage than that in which a king is placed,

---

[1] Babur's memoirs have been translated into English twice — (*a*) by Erskine and Leyden in 1826, (*b*) by Mrs. Beveridge in 1922 (Bib. I, 12 and 61).

538 and it becomes him not to complain of partings.

As I bade, you have indeed written to me, but certainly never read your letters over before despatch. Had you done so, you would have put them by. I did indeed manage, though with much difficulty, to decipher the meaning of your last letter, but the style is crabbed and even the spelling is not right. . . . Letter-writing is not your strong point, and this because you are too anxious to show off your acquirements. Pray write unaffectedly, with clearness, using plain words, such as cost less trouble both to writer and reader.

Waste no time in private parties, but, if you desire my approbation, indulge in liberal talk and frank intercourse with all about you. Attempt always the utmost courtesy of manners. . . . Forget not to pay attention to the state and discipline of the army.

Once more I salute you and long to see you.

Of Babur's literary style Mrs. Beveridge, one of his translators, writes that it is terse, word-thrifty, restrained and lucid, and that it comes over neatly into English, perhaps through primal affinities. 'It is neither regal nor self-magnifying but co-operative, as beseems the chief whose volunteer and nomad following makes or unmakes his power, and who can lead and command only by remittent consent accorded to him.' And Erskine, his earlier translator, said of Babur that, if we change but the circumstances, we might imagine we were among the Knights of Froissart. This, and the simplicity of his language, he owed to his being a Turk. That style which wraps up worthless meaning in a mist of words, and the etiquette which annihilates the courtier in the presence of his prince, were still, fortunately for Babur, foreign to the Turkish race. He was a great exemplar, to be remembered by those who are today subjected to the turns and twists of the new jargon.

Babur died at Agra in 1530, aged only forty-eight. A generation older, Mir Ali Shir Nevayi, the master of Chaghatai verse as Babur was of narrative prose, was born in Herat in 1441 and died there in 1501. He was the most esteemed subject of Babur's Timurid cousin, Hussain Baikara, at whose court he is represented as not only a Maecenas of letters and the arts, but a great poet in his own name both in his native Chaghatai and in Persian. Sometimes charged with being only a neat translator of Persian into Chaghatai, Nevayi has won the approbation of many recent critics as the creator of an original school of Eastern Turkish poetry instinct with its own peculiar inspirations and responsive to the tastes of the time.[1] Fuad Köprülü, now Foreign Minister of Turkey, has claimed greatness for Nevayi on the ground that his poetry was inspired not only by a real and tolerant faith but by an embracing patriotism. He was also the first among the Eastern Turks to crystallize a Turkic language and *esprit* in words which were not slavish copies of the Persian. But better than all of these is the testimony of Babur himself, Nevayi's junior by some forty years.

> Ali Shir Beg [he writes] was celebrated for the elegance of his manners, and this elegance and polish were ascribed to the conscious pride of high fortune; but this was not the case — they were natural to him, and he had precisely the same manner when he was in misfortune in Samarkand. Indeed Ali Shir Beg was an incomparable person. From the time that poetry was first written in the Turkish[2] language, no man has written so much and so well. Some of his Persian verses are not bad, but the greater part are heavy and poor. He has also left excellent pieces of music, excellent both as to the airs themselves and as to the preludes. There is not upon record in history any man who was a greater patron and protector of men of talent than Ali Shir Beg. He had no son, nor daughter, nor wife, nor family. He passed through the world single and unencumbered, and in the end, victim of a sudden stroke, he departed to the Mercy of God.

Ali Shir adapted the *mesnevi* (rhymed couplet) to Turkic verse and, apart from his own poetry, he introduced to the Turks the *Tezkere*, or biography, in the form of a *Lives of the Poets* (*Mejalis-un-nefais*).[3] But, unlike Dr. Johnson, he was

---

[1] Cf. Haidar Bammate (Bib. I, 6), pp. 424-30. This writer also cites MM. Berthels and Barthold, Russian savants, in support of his views. Incidentally, at this moment Nevayi is enjoying a Soviet vogue, but Soviet approbation is fickle.

[2] *Turki* (ترکی) in the original, as then generally used for the language and other Turkish or Turkic attributes, without the circumscription of modern thought.

[3] The Arabic words literally convey the idea of a symposium of elegant people.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

538 at the centre of things and had no cause to be troubled or cast down. To him and to Jami, the illustrious Persian and Nevayi's colleague at the Herat court, Gibb[1] gives honour as the twin suns in the east, by whose warmth West-Turkish Ottoman poetry was kindled into light.

> By the middle of the XVth century [writes Gibb] there was nothing wanting but the man of destiny, the man who by stammering, if not by singing, was to inaugurate the literature of the Osmanic Empire and become the van-courier of Ottoman poets. The voice of the age cried aloud for a leader, and in response arose Ahmed Pasha. Vaguely conscious of an ideal which he could not clearly conceive, Ahmed was stumbling along his way when, lo, out of the East came light, the light for which he and all his fellows were straining with eager gaze. When the *ghazels* sent by Nevayi to Constantinople came into the hands of Ahmed, his eyes were opened; he saw before him embodied in a form, fairer than which he could not picture, these very moods and fantasies which he and his companions had been vainly striving to express.

Ali Shir Nevayi, like Babur, was an Eastern Turk of Turkistan, and Herat under the Timurids was a Turkish city where the Turkic and Persian cults met. It was Nevayi's poetry, which for a century and more after Ahmed, was the main source of inspiration of all the Ottoman lyric writers. In this way the Eastern Turks not only gave the ancestors of the men who carved out the Western Turkish empires, but added those currents of song and poesy which can be traced in Turkish poetry even today.

198 It was a bequest of which the Eastern Turks may well be
538 proud. But Chaghatai as a medium had its limitations. It was in essence a literary language of the court and, although many have claimed for it that at one time it had in the East the same currency as literary Osmanli had in the West, it was deeply impregnated with Arabic and Persian extravagances and therefore not well adapted to become the medium of business and cultural relations. Moreover, so strong was Persian influence in Transoxiana that it became the habit of the Khivan and Bukharan courts in the Uzbek period to use Persian as the official language for administration and the laws.

---

[1] Bib. I, 38.

Persian as the official language for administration and the law.[1] 000 Literary Chaghatai, written in the Persian *shikasta* form of 194 Arabic letters, has another and important liability, if regarded as a mode of transcription of a Turkic language. This is the relative weakness of the Arabic alphabet in vowel signs, and its consequent inability to express the very varied vowels of Turkic languages, and particularly the vowel qualities and harmonies. It is true that the form of Uzbek itself, as spoken at least in Tashkent, Bukhara and Samarkand, has become Persianized to the extent of losing its vowel quality and most of its vowel harmony. But, even so, Chaghatai Arabic expresses the vowel sounds inadequately, the more so because in the Farghana and Yese (Turkistan) forms of Uzbek the harmonies are still to be found. *A fortiori* Chaghatai, based 197 (as Babur tells us) on the purest Uzbek, spoken then as today in the Andijan district of Farghana, was not a medium easily adaptable to the languages spoken in Kirghizia or in the countries now known as the Kazak and Turkmen steppe. There is an elaborate system of comparative morphology to be acquired before it becomes possible for a student, even on paper, to relate the various Eastern Turkic languages, *e.g.* Uzbek, Kazak and Turkmen, one to the other. In speech the difference is great enough to cause difficulty of understanding between even native speakers. The path of the reformer 000 seeking to establish one language as current coin for all Turkistan is therefore not so easy as has often been suggested.[2] As a long-term project, if circumstances were favourable, it should not be impossible. But, as we know, the Soviets are doing all they can to promote linguistic and other distinctions between the five republics, and it follows that any move towards assimilation runs counter to tendencies within modern Turkistan itself. None the less, as a social and political

---

[1] Exactly the same process can be seen at work today in Afghanistan. The Barakzai Sardars who rule the country, themselves of Afghan blood, often can not even talk Pashtu, the Afghan tongue. Persian is the official language.

[2] A group of émigrés in Germany, mainly Uzbek, issue a journal, *Millij Türkistan*, in a language which they call *ortatili*, or the middle tongue. It is really Uzbek, with a few extraneous words, written in an alphabet adapted from the Turkish Roman. It is an interesting experiment.

000 objective designed to promote a union of thought over a wider than parochial field, any effort of this kind deserves respect. If it is to have any prospect of success, it must be based on a living literature, good enough and strong enough to drive inferior coin out of currency. It may be that Babur and Nevayi supply the prose and verse foundations on which such literature can successfully be built up. Both stand for a period of splendour in the history of the Eastern Turks, both are widely read in all Turkish lands, and the renown of one, Babur, has spread far beyond the limits of Turkdom.

538 It is unfortunate that Chaghatai literature is of relatively narrow scope. One reason may well be sought in the lamentable destruction of the famous library burned by the Soviet armies at the taking of Bukhara in 1920. Apart from the contents of that library, now lost to us as irretrievably as Alexandria, there are probably many manuscripts collected in the libraries of Russian Academies of Sciences in the five republics, but, even if so, they are not much use to Western scholars. Moreover, although at one time the study of the literatures of the Eastern Turks was most diligently pursued under Soviet auspices, the tendency is now all the other way. It is even difficult now to obtain outside Russia the works of Eastern Turk poets in the original, and translations into Russian are the vogue. Almost one might be persuaded that these are Russian poets!

The Chaghatai literature was the sophisticated product of the settled oases of the south. Not unexpectedly we find the familiar distinction between the sedentary population of the cities and the men of the steppe carried through into their several literatures. The Kazak, Turkmen and Kirghiz traditions — the spirit of Abilay and Kine Sari Khan — were expressed in a fine literature of ballads (*dastan*) and epic minstrel poetry, handed down originally by word of mouth and later, often at the suggestion of earlier Russian admirers, reduced to writing. Such were the *Köroghlu*, the *Dede Korkut* (or *Korkut Ata*) of the Turkmens and Azeris, the *Edige batir* and the *Kublandi-batir* (*batir* means hero)[1] of the Kazaks, the *Alpamish* of the Uzbeks, the *Manas* epics of the Kirghiz.

But here again, with the exception of the Kirghiz Manas transcribed by Radloff,[2] these poems are for the most part inaccessible in the original tongue. Many examples of Central Asian verse will be found cited in a recent English book on the epos, but the distinguished author[3] has to confess having had to work entirely on Russian translations without access to any original texts. In fact, outside Soviet Academies, these texts are just not to be obtained, if only for the reason that the minstrels sang of heroes of the resistance, and their original work is therefore banned as tainted with 'survivalism'. On the other hand, versions of this literature, carefully edited and expurgated, are to be had in Russian translation, and must be read, even in Central Asia, in Russian.

The Russians perhaps forget that poetry of this kind is in the oral tradition, learned at the mother's knee or in the congregations of the young men. It does not depend on texts for its survival. One of the merits of Togan's writing is that he is able to hand on passages in the Turkic from some of these poems. The examples I quote are taken from his book, inadequately rendered into English.

In all these stories the hero stands four-square in the line of Eastern chivalry. He glories in his countryside and his tribe,[4] he venerates old age, he is a paragon of manly beauty and bravery, he is loyal in his love, above all his military honour is beyond reproach. The wife or beloved of the hero is endowed with equal womanly virtues: as courageous as her lover, she may surpass him in wit and intuition, and she is his equal. During the XVIIIth and XIXth centuries a more lyrical line of minstrelsy, originally handed down from bard to bard, was reduced to writing by such poets as Yirav, Nisembay Akin, Abay[5] and Maghjan Jumabay, and was expressed in a series

---

[1] Bib. II, 7, Dr. Wiener.

[2] Bib. I, 78.

[3] Bib. I, 14, Sir M. Bowra.

[4] Cf. the Pathan proverb: *Har cha tah khpal mulk Kashmir dai* — 'Unto every man his own land is Kashmir'.

[5] Bib. III, 1.

538 of national poems directed against the Russian expansion. This expression of a renewed nationalism grew directly out of the epic tradition, with its stress on the valour of the warriors who defended their people at all costs. In these epics and lyrics the horse and the herds form a part of the family life of the hero; indeed the horse himself, the hero's nearest companion, is as splendid as the horses in the Psalms. We are reminded of the horse Rakhsh, nuzzling the dying Sohrab in Matthew Arnold's classic poem.

The name of Kine Sari has been celebrated in Kazak poetry ever since he fell in fratricidal battle with the Kirghiz chiefs near Issik Köl. He became the symbol of Kazak national pride, and even the Kirghiz, who slew him, regard him as the hero of all Turkistan. His death is the subject of a poem by Nisembay:

He was a man, strong in heart and body,
As though he had been born in armour,
Fate, that favoured him,
Girt him about the loins with a sword;
When he saw the foe in battle, he shouted 'Abilay'
And chased them from the field;
He chose his horse from the wild horses,
And fed him, as he rode, from the bag,
Or gave him honey for fodder
And the milk of a barren mare. . . .

Togan has a moving account of some of the poetry and prose writers of the Eastern Turks since the Russian occupation. While he emphasizes the conflict of soul which gave them unrest, he is generous enough to recognize the debt they owed to the inspirations of Russian liberalism under the Tsars, and brings this out prominently in his accounts of Abay and Ismail Gaspirali. The following selections give an idea of the tradition of the more prominent writers since the Russian conquest.

Abay (1845–1906), Kazak poet

He was born in the Chingiz Tav in Yedisu. About 1880 he came into contact with Russian literature through a

Russian revolutionary named Mikhailis, who introduced him to the works of Pushkin, Tolstoy, and more particularly Lermontov 'with his model Byron'. He combined with this the Persian strain of the centenarian Saadi and the Turkic strain of Nevayi.

He was a poet of the steppe, describing nomadic life in a series of beautiful lyrics, written in such simple language that even the herdsmen could take in his philosophic ideas. Or so they thought: Abay himself in one of his best-known poems, grieved that the Kazaks could not follow him.

> *The footman is left behind, the horsemen ride on,*
> *Who of them will turn aside to listen to my plaint?*

Abay created a society for himself, described as an Islamic milieu, loving Russian literature, and knowing the intellectual life of Russia. His poems are current in the Russia of today, but in Russian translation, not in the original Kazak.

Chokan Velikhan

Chokan was born about 1837 and died of consumption in 1865.

He too was a Kazak and a descendant of Chingiz in the Kazak nomadic tradition. His career is described as a national tragedy in that he was a great admirer of Russian liberalism and Western inspirations, but in the end suffered grievous disillusionment. He started by trying to cleanse the Turkish tradition from its accretions, brought by the priesthood and feudalism, and to attune it to a new synthesis with what he saw to admire in Russia. He graduated at the Russian War Academy and was a friend of Dostoievsky. But he was betrayed and his ideals broken in pieces. Throughout his life he followed his star; as long as he believed in Russia, he spoke out in friendship. Later he expressed his hatred, having seen a Russian bayonet a Kazak woman on the march. Exclaiming 'This land is the land of my fathers: I cannot bear it', he threw off his uniform, and withdrew to the steppe, where he died.

For him the Turkish epics were a source of inspiration. He was the first to study the Kirghiz Manas epic, and to transcribe parts of it into literary Turkish. He believed that the nomad Turks, even if they sat lightly to Islam, had in them a civilization strong enough to prevent them being sacrificed to any foreign machinations whatever. Though he admired the new Russian XIXth-century humanism, he had no opinion of the political aims behind the Orthodox Church. His great contribution was to make known the ballads of the famous singers, as a possession for ever for those who loved the old Turkish nomadic tradition of the mountain and the steppe.

Ismail Gaspirali (1851–1914)

Gaspirali was a Crimean, and only a few years younger than Chokan. He was taken up as a promising young Turk, and went through the Russian War Academy, where he was influenced by the liberalism of the middle XIXth century. His life's work was to appeal to the Russians in a spirit of brotherly loving-kindness to forsake policies of assimilation, while attracting the Turks to what was good in Russian civilization. He also planned the creation of a literary language which should be common to all Turks. In him perhaps are to be found the first stirrings of the spirit which spread abroad, and became known to all the world, in the speeches and actions of Mustafa Kemal. Gaspirali's idea was that of the renewal and purification of the Ottoman language by means of currents from farther east. It is curious to note the emphasis which all these Turks, and Russians too, place on language as a social, cultural, economic and political counter, and to reflect how far removed is this attitude from that of the protagonists of a united Europe. Using language as a symbol, Gaspirali dreamed of a cultural Turkish unity which should transcend all differences and even lead to a larger association of idea.

The conflicts of soul that tore at patriots such as Gaspirali is described in a moving passage by Togan. He writes:

I came across Gaspirali's book in the home of Ebubekir Agha, in Russian service. I remember saying to him that Ismail Bey (Gaspirali) had been too servile: the Russians had abolished slavery, but introduced a new slavery in its place. It was dangerous for us to encourage the Russians to approach us in the guise of a big brother, creep into our hearts, give us decorations and uniforms, make love to us in order to betray us. It was better for the future of the colonial peoples to refrain from close mingling, as the English did. Ebubekir replied — 'The ideas of that period were rather different; moreover, had Ismail Bey said that, his book would never have passed the censorship. In the bad times he brought us at least some comfort,' and, smiling sweetly, he played on his harmonium some old Bashkurd melodies, more beautifully than I could have imagined. His own eyes, and the eyes of his wife, filled with tears.[1]

Maghjan Jumabay

He was a Kazak national poet, born in 1894 in Yedisu, east of Balkhash. His collected poems were published in Tashkent in 1923, but the collection is incomplete, for many were too patriotic to pass the censors. Here are some quotations; even a distillation through more than one language does not entirely destroy the inspiration of the original, and they have the stir of genuine poetry.

The Sacred Issik Kōl, on which the first Turk,
Born of the grey wolf, saw the light of the world;
The two rivers Jaihun and Saihun,
And between them the holy graves of thine ancestors;
The great mountains of Turan, Khan Tenri reaching to heaven —
Look now to the mountains and think how the Turks suffer in
bondage!

And again:

Aksak [lame] Timur, who set the world afire,
Sent forth a beam like a lightning-flash.
Tanri, the God in heaven, has no descent,
But Timur's descendants, the Gods on earth,
Are the Turks, and their sign is fire.

---

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 556.

538 And in a poem addressed to Turkey at the end of World War I:

My brother, far away, so greatly suffering,
My brother, like a tulip broken,
Is not Altai our common mother?
Have we not played on her slopes,
Did not the cool mountain springs
Splash for us, run for us through the rocks,
Were not our horses the wild steeds,
Running like the whirlwind?
In the golden days thou didst part from me
And go to the Middle and Black Seas.
But I remained like a bird,
Spreading not my wings,
And none was left to show me the way.
The enemy's bullet struck my heart and I sank down:
I was thrust into a dark prison and shut in.
And thou, O Master?
Have we Turks lost the heart of the lion,
Become cowards and weary of war?
Is the fire in our hearts put out?
And our fathers' blood dried up?
Oh brother, thou there, and I here,
Both in dire distress.
Come, let us go again to the Altai,
And mount the golden throne of our fathers.

And addressing God:

Thou gavest to every land, to the poor Arabia,
Nurse of camels,
A Prophet to show the way
And a holy Book,
But to us Turks this grace thou hast not vouchsafed.
We have followed prophets from divers lands,
And set our faith in holy words,
But the way has not been shown us.
Send us a prophet to show us that way.

The renascence of Turkey under Atatürk — has it been the answer to this prayer?

Cholpan

He was an Uzbek, whose real name was Abdul Hamid Suleiman. He was born in 1897 in Andijan, where (as the Emperor Babur said more than 400 years ago) the literary language of Alishir Nevayi is at its best. He graduated in an Islamic school, learned Russian, and studied in Moscow. Until 1926 he wrote in the national spirit, choosing as his patterns the older poets, particularly Alishir Nevayi. He also translated from the Russian, and from the Indian poet Tagore. After 1926 he and Maghjan were exposed to much persecution and forced to write to order. They evolved a kind of poetic cypher system, Maghjan using the words *Kun men tun* (day and night) when referring to Turks and Russians, and Cholpan *east and west*, referring to the oppressed and the tyrants. Many of his earlier poems are now very difficult to come by, but the following are quotations: 538

He is the enemy who knows not
The limit of his going,
Who hides what lies
To his right and to his left.
It may be that all must bow before the tyrant,
But if the tyrant oversteps the mark,
It may be that the heavens will come down to earth.

Such poems as these are described by Russian commentators as works of the period when the poet was caught up in the stream of nationalism, and they have disappeared from print. But they are preserved like the ballads of old in the souls of Turks who were persecuted or forced to leave Russia.

The languages in which these poems are written, Uzbek and Kazak, are for all practical purposes a closed book to Western students, and, until such time as it becomes possible to read them in the original, it is not easy to appraise their value. But for us the question is this. How enduring is this literature, starting with Ali Shir Nevayi and ending with Cholpan? What does it represent? We shall be in a better position to answer after seeing what the Soviets think in the matter.

XIV

DEVIATIONISM

If I climb up into heaven, thou art there;
If I go down to hell, thou art there also.
If I say, Peradventure the darkness shall cover me,
Then shall my night be turned to day.

000 IN Stalinist jargon every word I have quoted here would be termed ideological distortion, deviationism, apoliticality, gross manifestation of bourgeois-nationalism calling for immediate correction by means of a radical ideological-creative reorientation. Babur would not have liked it, but that is how they talk; indeed, each phrase comes straight from the current press. We have seen how in the earlier days the Soviets resolved the contradiction between their national professions and their real objectives by evoking the rights of the proletariat as a higher force which must overcome the right of national self-determination. In effect, although they did not then so formulate it, their case at that time was that the loss of a nation's right to independence is no doubt an evil, but it is a lesser evil than the sacrifice of the rights of the workers. (Note that the fact that in Central Asia all the 'workers' were then Russian is immaterial to the doctrine as a first principle.) Since, as they say, continued independence would have involved the latter, the loss of 626 independence, regrettable in theory, must follow. But in the 517 first years, as the Kremlin saw it, it was expedient to accord 186 lip-service to an abstract nationalism so far as to encourage a local literature and a press which should play up Central Asian resistance to the Tsarist conquest. At the time this could do no harm; it diverted national patriotisms to a past age, and it drew a possibly useful distinction between the Bolsheviks and the outmoded Russian Empire to which they had suc-

ceeded. National tradition therefore was lauded, national 626
epics were unearthed and reduced to writing, and there was a 517
period of studious academic research into the national achieve- 186
ments of the various parts of Turkistan. These early years were indeed in many respects favourable to the work of profound Russian scholars such as Barthold and Samoylovich. The temporary relaxation also served to encourage the emergence of a native intelligentsia ambitious to combine pride in their national past with the outlook of a Communist on the contemporary world. It was a fool's paradise.

In those early years this encouragement of what may be called a cultural nationalism was expressed by the now outdated 'School of Pokrovsky'. Pokrovsky was a well-known Russian historian who lived from 1868 to 1932, so flourishing in both the Tsarist and the Soviet periods. Once esteemed by the Soviets as an evangelist, he is now discredited, and with him the edition of the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*[1] which borrowed his learning and announced his gospel. His historical theory was the simple one of regarding the annexation of any non-Russian territory by Tsarist Russia as an absolute evil, resistance to which on the part of a national-liberation movement was a progressive and even a revolutionary act. Pokrovsky in fact was the mouthpiece of the apparent liberalism which prompted the Declaration of November 1917 on the right of all nations to independence, and incidentally was useful for export. It was not long before this school of thought was found too productive of national pride. After some preliminary outpost actions of a probing nature, the Pokrovsky theory met with definite official attack in a Decree dated 27th August 1937, issued by the jury of the Government Commission for the Best Textbook on the History of the USSR.[2] This Decree assailed Pokrovsky as the slave of a defective anti-Marxist convention, the author of a heresy which has become anathema. In the place of his theory it propounded a new first principle known as the Conception of the Lesser Evil, now an immaculate doctrine in the Soviet Creed.

---

[1] Bib. III, 10. See Vol. 45, Column 856.

[2] Bib. II, 11.

186
626
The dogma of the Lesser Evil is briefly this. Oppressive though the Tsarist régime may have been, it was less evil and oppressive than the alternative then open to non-Russian nationalities, namely, annexation by Turkey. (At this time the case of Armenia was chiefly in point.) And oppressive and evil though the Tsarist capitalism may have been, it led the annexed peoples away from Feudalism through Capitalism along the only road to Socialism, and was therefore a lesser evil than a continued independence. Thus this dogma was an extension backwards into Tsarist history of the sort of reasoning from first principles which enabled the Soviets by means of the Doctrine of the Proletariat to justify to their own minds the crushing in their time of the new nationalism that arose in the interregnum period. Both dogmas were shafts aimed at one target, the native nationalists who, if they believed in the dialectic of historical materialism, wished that it should develop within the framework of a national and not a Great Russian consciousness. The difference was that under the newest dogma — that of the Lesser Evil — it was no longer even respectable for a 'Colonial' nationalist to take pride in the prowess of his people even against the Tsarist conqueror. Great Russia in both her incarnations was henceforward to be regarded as unassailable, above criticism, the instrument by which the ultimate reality was inevitably to prevail.

The ground was prepared for the propagation of this doctrine in 1937, before World War II, at about the period of the greatest intensity of the purges. But other preoccupations, with the War itself, prevented active steps being taken for its enforcement until the post-War period. From 1945 onwards enforcement has taken the form of an all-out campaign against nationalism in any form. Such tendencies are compendiously described as bourgeois-nationalism, feudal survivalism or pan-Islamic pan-Turkic capitalist distortions or deviations, and are detected in every field of thought or cultural endeavour, social, literary and aesthetic. In their most secret thoughts all men, women and children must turn

to Moscow as their Mecca; language, literature and the arts 186
must follow suit; the praise of past achievement is ruled out; 626
and even an appreciation of the beauties of nature is a sign of unhealth and decadence. Stalin is quoted as having said[1] that the remnants of capitalism in people's consciousness are far more alive over the question of nationality than in any other sphere, since they are able to mask themselves in national costume; hence the need to be ever vigilant against the smallest manifestations of nationalist remnants, in whatever guise they may appear.

The campaign got into full swing with an article in *Pravda*, published on 26th December 1950, and subsequently echoed, in season and out, in all the local press of the five republics. What follows is taken direct from press and platform diatribes against 'bourgeois-nationalism' and is no exaggeration. Sometimes there is a trace of unintended humour, but in general the theme is so reiterative that it produces a conscious reaction of boredom and even, let it be said, a sense of spiritual hunger.

The first move is a direction to historians to hold correct 186
views on the history of their republic in relation to its associa- 814
tion with Great Russia. In considering the formation of the 626
Uzbek nation, for instance, the favourable influence of this association, even with Tsarist Russia, must be the main theme. For union under the Tsars brought feudal Central Asia into the system of world capitalism and saved it from the wretched fate of slavery to British imperialism. The Stalinist view is that this union slowly developed a bourgeois nation, out of which was born a socialist nation under the impact of the Communist Party and with the brotherly assistance of the Russian people. But emphasis is needed on the prime condition that the Uzbek, or other, nation must desire to associate its national interests with the vital interests of the USSR as a whole. Above all, it is to be realized that all progressive thought, social and economic, was formed under the beneficent influence of Russian culture, and owes nothing to Western Europe. The only impact of the latter was the

---

[1] [See cat. 116, pp 230-33 Bib. II, 2. -- Analyst]

186 Anglo-American 'intervention' in the 1919–20 period. Even
814 the American intervention, claiming to be economic, could
626 not be dissociated from the political plans of the militarists
and revealed the bestial character of the American imperialists, no disinterested benefactors as was Great Russia. Thus historians, philosophers, economists and literary scholars, all alike, must in their works display the influence of the Great Russian people in the formation of social thought in Asia. Their works must be permeated with the Bolshevik Party spirit and give a Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the past. At the base of every thought must be the treatises of Stalin on questions such as linguistics. These will give them a correct understanding of the historical process.

538 It follows that resistance to the Russian conquest is no
186 longer to be seen as a splendid, though unsuccessful, enter-
626 prise. Henceforth poetry or prose works extolling as national
heroes the men of Turkish stock who had struggled against the establishment of the Russian imperium, must no longer be included in histories or anthologies, or be quoted with approval. Such actions are futile resistance by a lesser breed to an inevitable absorption in a larger whole by dialectical historical process working through the Russian people; that absorption, even if it pre-dated the Revolution, was, as it were, the shadow of what was to come. Those who presume to praise the 'heroes' of the resistance are guilty of ideological distortion, bourgeois-nationalism, patriarchal feudal survivalism, and so on.

This condemnation extends to specific works. The *Kublandi-batir*, for instance, is no longer a paean of national virtue and valour, but low patter, extolling violence and brigandage. It is steeped in the poison of hatred for other peoples, in reactionary Muslim ideology and ideas of pan-Islam. A local savant is taken to task for presuming to assert that this poem is in content near to our own times, having as its basic idea patriotism and the love of the people. Only a bourgeois-nationalist could thus appraise a poem extolling cruelty and brigandage. All views of this kind must be

expunged from syllabuses and text-books. The various 186
versions of the Uzbek *Alpamish* epic are as bad, and have not 538
been saved by their translation into Russian. They are not 626
people's epics but Khan's epics. When an Uzbek panegyrist praises them as symbols of all that is heroic and noble in the conceptions of the Uzbeks, he slanders the Uzbek working people by ascribing to them the desires and ideals of the Khans. As a folk-lore expert he should correct his views by reference to the teachings of the classics of Marxism/Leninism. Other objectionable poems are the so-called *Korkut Ata* or *Dede Korkut* epics. Certain Turkmen savants have been shameless enough to plagiarize what is in origin an epic of Azerbaijan. But that is not all. The epic itself is an idealization of the feudal system, conceals the class-struggle, and reveals a non-Marxist attitude to the heritage of the past. It is symbolic of the tendency of nationalism to retire within the confines of a national frontier, refusing to see that which binds the workers of all nationalities of the Soviet Union. The task is to strengthen the struggle against the smallest manifestations of bourgeois-nationalism, against glorification of an outdated culture, against every capitalist survival to be met with in the Asiatic parts of the Union. Yet Uzbeks, Kazaks and Turkmens persist in abstract praises of their 'motherlands'. One Turkmen even had the insolence to write a poem 'My Turkmenistan', and another a lyric entitled 'Thou Turkmen'. Both poems merely isolate the Turkmen artificially, representing only themselves as excelling in valour. It is their contribution to the great assemblage of Soviet peoples that must be stressed. No more bards with a religious-nationalistic ideology, praising Khans and priests, can be allowed.

In their place there has grown up an obsequious literature, best represented by the Kazak laureate Jambul (1846–1945). Like Saadi in one respect alone — he was almost a centenarian —, he has given his name, if only for a season, to the old town of Aulie Ata, near Chimkent. He is the author of poems extolling the Soviet high-priests and the banners of the Red

186 Army, which he sees as pointing the way into a world where
538 man can at last realize his destiny. Not for him the old,
626 unhappy, far-off things.

In Jambul's company this ideological war is then carried on to the ground of individual figures in history, and Kine Sari Khan the son of Kasim, the Kazak leader, comes in for special castigation. Historians are taken to task for publicizing in their works the reactionary-monarchist movement of 'K. Kasymov, the robber Khan'. Kine Sari was a reactionary and no defender of the people. Such defects can only be due to neglect of Bolshevik criticism in the literary circles of Kazakistan. Historians and students alike must turn over a new leaf and cease to idealize brigands such as Kine Sari, Abilay and Nauruzbai. Artists and writers do not seem to realize the immense political changes which have taken place as a result of the carrying-out of the Lenin/Stalin national policy, and frequently take delight in an old and outworn past. They must not describe backward individuals as typical representatives of contemporary Soviet life. They must forswear literature of a formalist and cosmopolitan colour; that way lies pan-Turkism, pan-Iranism and pan-Islamism.

186 Music and the arts do not escape. In Kazakistan musical
533 science is backward and on the wrong lines. The national
626 handbook of music is full of gross errors and idealizes a feudal
past, regretting lost freedom. This is bourgeois-nationalism at its worst. Kazak musicians even dare to refer all musical achievement in the republic to the pre-revolutionary period, and to express such views publicly. In Uzbekistan the development of musical culture is far behind the economic, political and cultural growth of the republic — note the order — and does not meet the demands prescribed by the Party to the musical art, as a powerful means of Communist educa-
186 tion of the workers. The minds of sculptors are low; they
532 do not deal with the heroic labour of the people in the pro-
626 duction of oil and cotton. One artist presumed to say his
pictures would be appreciated in ten years' time: an anticipation of the future is as bad as a delight in the past, for it

is the duty of Soviet man to glory in the achievements of contemporary life. 186 532 626

There is some unconscious humour. There is the outrageous instance of a worker who, though a member of an anti-God league, was found with his Comsomol ticket in one pocket and his religious charm in the other. Too few, we are told, are worried by the fact that there are not enough girls in Comsomols ; a massed attack must be made on the girls in the collective farms and an ideological-creative spirit must be displayed by the youth. The Deputy Chairman has even been seen going to the cinema, while his wife, suppressed by his bourgeois-nationalist outlook, remains at home to mind the children. Stalin wants no more decadent verses with descrip- [538] tions of heroes and their horses and cattle, no more delight in the beauties of nature, no more sob-stuff about roses, nightingales and lovely maidens — and certainly not erotic poetry —, no more pictures of aged greybeards who close their eyes to pray and waste time on the job. All these are foreign to the aesthetic tastes of the Soviet people. The heroic labour of miners, metal-workers, cotton-growers and engineers — these are the true themes for contemporary literature and the arts. And, chiefly, let all remember their big Russian brother, without thought to spare for a separate world and a tradition dead and gone.

This picture is not overpainted ; it can be seen in its full 000 colours by any casual visitor to the Stalinist public gallery. It is not imaginary to suppose that this unrelenting effort is prompted by a certain unease. Here in Central Asia is an exposed flank, the source of raw materials vital to the survival of the Empire, the home of peoples whose memories of their own civilization make them probably the least assimilable of all elements in the Union. At any cost then, in this quarter above all, it is necessary to suppress every tendency towards a separate national consciousness. The question to be asked is this — how far has this unceasing stream of exhortation and vituperation destroyed the old faith, the traditional way of life, in peoples who, for many hundreds of years, had their own pride, their own distinctive civilization, and their own foundations of belief ?

The very tone of the Soviet propagandists is evidence of their anxious fear that all is not going as they wish in the garden of zoological nationalism [1] which the Kremlin is so sedulously cultivating in Central Asia. Names are given of men who stubbornly proclaim a faith that they are creative, free, artists who will not conform to the Party line, and of others who defend their own notion of the realities of their beliefs and history. The virulence of the inspired press demonstrates that there still exists in Turkistan a national pride in the identity and achievements of the Eastern Turks. There is thus evidence even in Soviet sources of a tradition linked to the heroes of national story, which refuses to be submerged. The old lore lingers on in the hearts of a people who have learned to transmit inspiration by means of minstrelsy and so by word of mouth. It has been said [2] that the Turk in history is like a piece of rubber, resilient when pressed down, but escaping from the hand that tries to hold it. But in the last resort resilience in the human spirit is to be expected only where there exists an inner spring of thought and belief strong enough to resist material pressures during the period of their application and ready to leap into action when the pressure is relaxed.

We have observed in Soviet propaganda a half-uneasy consciousness that the mainspring of what they call bourgeois-nationalism is an inward faith which they identify sometimes with their idea of pan-Turkism but more often with Islam. And during the course of this book we have been able, without the need for digression, to notice a number of indications of the reality of belief which inspired, and may still inspire, the Eastern Turks. What then are these fundamental inspirations, and what is their force ?

---

[1] For this phrase acknowledgment is due to *The Caucasus* (Munich, Jan. 1952), p. 16.

[2] Togan, *op. cit.* p. 608.

In so far as they are political and worldly we have already 000
tried to study them, but in their deeper aspect they can only be spiritual. The leaders of the Eastern Turk nationalists were not priests' men, and were never tired of referring to the venality of the Bukharan clergy on the one hand and on the other to their fanatical devotion to an effete clericalism. A barren and rigid clericalism is indeed a phenomenon all too apparent on stages not far removed from Turkistan. Lahore, Peshawar, Kabul and Teheran can each supply recent examples. There too the fanatic has his day. But there too it is not he who best interprets the Kingdom of God on earth as seen in the light of the inspirations of Islam.

There are two strains in the spiritual inheritance of 771
Turkistan, the first the *Yasa* or *Yasak*, the Turkish tribal tradition, and the second the *Sheriat*, the sacred law of Islam. The derivation of the first is traced in part to Shamanism and Manicheism, creeds which saw religion and the State as separate worlds, and this broadly is the nomad's faith. The second, the sacred law, inspired the ancient culture of Khorasan which overflowed into Transoxiana. It does not distinguish religion from politics and in practice, in its Sunni form, it exalts the priesthood. In the *medreses* of Samarkand, Bukhara and Balkh it prevailed, taking advantage of Turkish *laisser-faire*. But the torch of the older custom remained alight among the nomads.

While the modern nationalists[1] cannot sufficiently condemn the clerics — the picture is familiar — they are constrained to admit, with a deep sense of emotion, that Islam lives on in the hearts of the people, far beyond the precincts of the mosque. As a Kazak said in Mecca: 'Since we have no mosques, no official clergy, and no institution that the Communists can abuse, this means that they can do nothing with us'. It may be that the whole of Turkistan will come to Islam in this sense. Again, early in August 1922, the Bolsheviks commissioned a party of influential clergy to demand

---

[1] For Togan's exposition see *op. cit.* pp. 530-35, of which these paragraphs are in some sense a distillation.

771 | of the Basmachis that they submit to the Soviets. The Basmachi Achil Beg, addressing them, said: 'Let us leave the Bolsheviks on one side for the moment, and also those who speak for them. Come, tell me, on your conscience, whether God will be pleased by your attitude or no?' Said the priests, 'Sir, you know that better than we do.' Whereupon Achil Beg cried with a loud voice, 'You fools! If it is I that know God's will, why preach you in the name of God? Have you no shame to come to us today preaching for the Russians? I would kill you all, but that you are old and foolish and soon will die. Go, and God's curse be with you!' And the Basmachis applauded.

The conclusion is that, under Bolshevist pressure, religious institutions have for ever lost their old meaning and force in Turkistan, partly because the priesthood failed to stand to their brief, but more because religious endowments had been seized and the clergy's authority undermined. 'Yet Islam, cleansed of its theocratic accretions, lives as a spiritual possession in the hearts of the people. Unlike the Orthodox Church of Russia, it does not meet the Godlessness of Communism in an opportune spirit, but is becoming more and more unified with the traditions in our inmost hearts. It is the time of the peoples' clergy.' In fact, Islam has become the spiritual core of the nationalist political creed.

771 Current evidence from Russian sources goes to support
.626 the conclusion. The contemporary press harps on the defects of Islam, the prejudices of the clergy and the identification of Muslim ideas with a feudal patriarchal framework. Other themes constantly expressed are indignation over loss of time due to religious observances or prayer; persistence of religious influences even among Party members, preference for the Koran over medical attention or drugs; even the stupid story of the Comsomol member with his charm.

The spear-head of the Soviet drive against the faith of Muhammad is supposed to be the Comsomol organizations. The secretary of the Central Committee of the Kazak Com-

munist Party, Shayakhmetov,[1] went on the air just before 771
Christmas 1951, with a direction to the Comsomols in 626
Kazakistan to take an active part in the struggle against religious behaviour or feudal survivals, and to unmask the *advances* made by people of that way of thought. Whenever work on these lines slackened, he said, there emerged insubordination among individual Comsomols, bourgeois-nationalistic tendencies, and, worst of all, religion among the youth. Not for the first time those who worship Divus Augustus have found that there is no challenge to a living faith which goes without its response. Deviationism will remain for the Soviets an ever-present problem.

For the spiritual inheritance of a people, or group of peoples, 000
is not identifiable only with the direct inspirations of a revealed religion. There is a certain afflatus of the Turkish spirit which seems to make the Turk, Western or Eastern, conscious of impulses which in his own estimation move him apart from other men. These have enabled him in the course of time to impress his personality, and even his language, on many who were not Turks, while he preserved his identity proudly for himself. That pride has lasted to this day, and the Turk, whose spirit has breathed over Persian and Mongol, Anatolian and Byzantine, Bashkurd and Kirghiz, remains simply and invincibly himself, curiously unsullied by the more complex influences around him. Many have been turcized; the Turk remains — a prince of deviationists.

It is even a question how far the much-lauded emancipa- [522]
tion of women has really weakened the more vital of the Turkish traditions, though it may have transformed them. On the steppe women were never secluded. A vivid nationalism is not seldom nurtured by women, both within and without the home, more feelingly than by fathers or by schoolmen. A greater permeation of society by women may produce a higher feminine velocity, as it were, and in the end recoil on the

---

[1] It is not easy to recognise in Russian garb the Muslim name Shah Ahmed. Moreover, the habit of using the patronymic results in the world never knowing a man's own name. Although this is in tune with the use of the Turkish termination *-oghlu*, it is a break away from Muslim custom.

000 Russians who forced it on urban Muslim populations. Something in this matter may be learned from the political and educative part played by women who have become public figures in Kemalist Turkey.

Thus the impression we receive of the spiritual impact of Islam on the Turks of Central Asia owes nothing to the rigidity of doctrine. Clericalism those in the true line abhor. Yet here is an intimate sense of a real inspiration, owing much to the life of the tent and something to the pantheistic worship of Shamanist ancestors on the beautiful uplands of Central Asia, but infused with the mysticism of such men as the saint Ahmed of the XIIth century, whose tomb at Yese on the lower Sir Darya was once a great centre of pilgrimage. Ahmed himself stands in the line of Turkish mystics leading to Yunus Emre of Anatolia two centuries later. No amount of indoctrination in materialism will exorcise from the hearts of men and women a spirit which far transcends any doctrine.

There is a Western Turkish poet who has expressed in a few simple words that clear and shining faith in God which is here claimed as the peculiar inheritance of the sons of the steppe. Such men may see a holy book or a great mosque at journey's end, but their daily worship is attuned to the roving life, to infinite horizons beneath the sun, and at night to a multitude of stars :

539

Ye read a book
And ask for the writer,
A glorious building have ye seen ?
Ye seek for the builder.
Have the earth and skies then no master ?
O man, think and understand !
Unto us all things prove
There is one God, the Great, the Almighty.[1]

Okursunuz bir Kitabi
Sahibini sorarsiniz
Gördünüz mü bir hosh yapi
Ustasini ararsiniz.

Sahipsiz mi yerler, gökler ?
Düşününce insan anlar !
Herşey bize ispat eder
Büyük, Kadir bir Allah var.

İbrahim Alaeddin

XV

WORLD WAR II

How shall we sing the Lord's song in a strange land?

ONE result of the accumulation of all these pressures* 668 was to impel such of the intellectuals of Turkistan 167 as could escape and evade the frontier guards to seek sanctuary beyond the reach of the long arm of the Kremlin. After 1923 escape became difficult, and refugees were reduced to a mere trickle. But most of the refugees of the older emigration were men like Mustafa Chokai,[1] Osman Khoja or Togan, who had played a leading part during the interregnum and succeeded in crossing the frontiers before the Soviets had had time effectively to bar the gate. Many of them reached Afghanistan by crossing the Oxus in its higher reaches. Some went to pre-partition India, and settled down in a colony in Peshawar. Osman Khoja is still in Pakistan. Others drifted through the Arab world, and one group established itself in Cairo. Togan found his way ultimately to Turkey, the bourne of many thousands of Crimean and other refugees from Turkic lands farther to the west, some of them, such as Jafar Krimer of the Crimea, men of considerable renown. Mustafa Chokai went to Paris, where he lived as an exile from 1921 onwards and became well known in all circles interested in Central Asian affairs. One, Kayum Khan, a younger man of a well-known Uzbek family, has made a home in Germany. On him fell Chokai's mantle. Later events have shown him to be endowed with gifts of leadership, and not without that singleness of purpose which enabled Jinnah to found a State in Asia not many years ago.

---

[1] Sometimes known as Chokaiev or Tchokaieff in Russian or French fashion, or as Chokayoghlu in Turkish fashion. The various transliterations of Turkish names, taken through Russian and French, are tiresome.

*[see pp. 230-242 — Analyst]

Mustafa Chokai was among the most eminent of the older emigration. A good French scholar, he was able to give voice to the aspirations of his countrymen in words which could reach the ears of Western Europe and America, and in turn to interpret Europe to his own people. 'We have to be', he said, 'at one and the same time the architects and masons of a healthy national structure in which we would wish to see harmonised our national liberation and our love and admiration for European culture.' [1] He started an organization named *Millij Türkistan Birligi* (Unity of National Turkistan), and was indefatigable in preaching the possibility of a smaller unity within Turkistan itself, which should embrace the different races without distinction of Uzbek, Kazak, Turkmen or Kirghiz, and including the Tajiks on the ground that they are intermingled with the Uzbeks and often bilingual, speaking both their own dialect of Persian and Uzbek. These ideas, taken over by Kayum, were a good deal less ambitious than a plan formulated independently in Istanbul for the creation of a Greater Turkistan which should include with Turkistan proper the Turco-Tatar peoples of the Volga and the Bashkurds of the Urals. This plan has received the name of Türkili, possibly inspired by Togan's book. Its sponsors seek to justify it on the ground that neither Turkistan proper, which has an open frontier in the north and a settlement area crowded with Russians, nor the Volga–Ural region, surrounded as it is by Russians on all sides, could by themselves be regarded as viable units for a State. If then they are to aspire to independence, they must unite. As is usual among émigrés, there are also other splinter groups.

All groups are agreed that they are set on an autonomous Turkistan, and they do not seek political association with Turkey. But while Chokai's successors aim at independence, others have in view some sort of union or federation with a new United States of Russia. There has been a difference in emphasis on the point whether Eastern Turk patriots would do well to stand in with Russian émigré organizations in seeking the overthrow of Bolshevism — a debate hotly contested. 668

---

[1] Speech to Royal Central Asian Society, 29th March 1933.

There is support in America and elsewhere for this line of thought, so apparently consonant with democratic theory. The argument runs that all non-Slavs of the emigration, old and new, would do well to concentrate their hopes on the collapse of the Stalinist system, trusting that, when tyranny breaks, it will give way to a multi-national régime on a Western democratic model, to be set up in the whole of the Russian Empire. In this new house, it is suggested, all the 'minorities' would find it easy to meet and merge, just as the various stocks have been able to do in the United States.

The answer to this pleading is clear enough. In the first place, the term 'minority' is resented as a misconception, for each non-Slav people in its own land is the very people of that country, brought into subjection by conquest from without. Secondly, this attractive vision of a United States of Russia is seen by men who surely forget that immigrants entered America from the countries of Europe because they desired, often passionately, to lose their individual traditions and memories in the larger hospitality of the New World. In the Russian Empire, whether under Tsars or Soviets, the non-Slav peoples took no such initiative. They were twice conquered by Great Russians, whom they regard as their historical oppressors. Consequently, any Central Asian Turk of the emigration who may be persuaded to stand in with anti-Soviet Russians on a common platform against Stalinism tends to be spurned by the less equivocal group under Kayum Khan, which will have no dealings with any Russian who is not prepared to concede in advance the right of Turkistan to an existence as a free State bound in no way to any future Russia. This more rigorous view is founded on the belief that no Russian party with a programme confined to the overthrow of the existing régime can be trusted to give freedom to the national components of the present Russia. In such a succession State, they hold, the non-Slav peoples would only exchange one master for another, and in support of this view

668 they refer to the attitude of the Russian Whites in the 1918–20 period. But, given agreement that, by whatever means, all are working towards eventual independence and not for an imaginary United States of Russia, there is something to be said at this stage for treating this controversy as more concerned with tactics than with the substance of policy.

Whatever the emphasis, these ideas may seem to be the vague dreams of an embittered emigration, to be dismissed as without substance, impossible of conversion into reality in a practical world. Even in their dreams, it will be said, these men, already old and out of touch with the actual in their own country, contend violently one with another and fail even to subordinate their personal ambition to the common good.
668 This might have been the verdict before 1941.[a] But with the
727 War hard facts broke in, in the shape of many thousands of
167 Central Asian, Caucasian and other 'minority' deserters and
prisoners from the Soviet armies, who fell into German hands in the first months after the German attack on Russia. At one time there were well over one million of these people in German prison camps. Many died, but many lived on to serve as legionaries against Russia. They came from all the five republics of Central Asia, from Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia and the North Caucasus, from the Volga and the Urals and from the Crimea. During nearly four years of service, they gave proof of their own capacity as soldiers and of the real attitude of the younger generation to the Russia from which they had come. It was a young emigration in mass formation. It was their tragedy that, like the Kalmucks in the XVIIIth century, they were used as pawns in the struggle of two contending empires on the chess-board of power-politics. In such a contest their own aims, however noble, could not be realized.

From Turkistan alone later interrogations established that well over half a million men either deserted to the Germans or were taken prisoner in the first year following June 1941. These were first placed in prison camps in Poland under appalling conditions, and treated as brutally as the Nazi

[a] [For background, see cat. #6, pp. 243-246 --Analyst]

régime treated all prisoners from Russia. Starvation diet was 668
the rule, and there was no medical care. A raging typhus 727
epidemic attacked the camps, and more than half the prisoners 167
died of hunger, fever and general hardship. Towards the end of 1941 Mustafa Chokai and Kayum Khan, both of whom had been at first arrested by the Germans as former Soviet citizens, were released from Paris and Berlin respectively and met in Paris. They obtained the consent of the German Government to tour the prisoner-of-war camps, where they found their compatriots in the frightful conditions described and persuaded the German Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories under Rosenberg (the Ostministerium) to organize a Commission for the classification and possible enlistment of the prisoners as volunteer legionaries in the German forces. During their tour of the camps, Chokai contracted typhus and was removed to Berlin, where he died in December 1941. The task then fell to Kayum Khan, on whom Chokai's mantle fell as Commissioner for Turkistan. Other Commissioners were appointed by the Ostministerium to deal with men from Azerbaijan, the Volga–Ural, the Caucasus and the Crimea.

Kayum's organization was on a large scale, and succeeded by the end of the war in putting as many as 180,000 men from various parts of Turkistan into one or other formation of the Wehrmacht or the Waffen-SS. It is true that the larger part of these — rather over 100,000 — were placed in labour, guard, ordnance and supply formations, but there were also at least 40,000 combatant troops, who gave on the whole a good account of themselves. The larger part of the 162nd German Infantry Division was made up of men from Turkistan, and in addition there were nineteen independent battalions and twenty-four infantry companies of which the rank and file consisted wholly of Turks and Tajiks from the east of the Caspian. These were all volunteers in the Wehrmacht. There was also a Waffen-SS formation known as the *Osttürkisches Waffenverband* (East Turkish Armed Formation) made up of four regiments of two battalions each. Of these four regiments, one was composed of men from Turkistan ; the

668 other three being from Azerbaijan, Volga–Ural and the
727 Crimea respectively. Like so many SS units, this force (not
167 formed until 1944) was not a combatant unit, but was designed as a collective political entity largely for purposes of propaganda. To the very end of the war the German High Command halted between two political opinions as to their treatment of the 'minority' peoples from Russia who had fallen into their hands. As regards those of Turkish race, should they organize on pan-Turkic lines, or should they make a distinction by areas? In either case, should they declare themselves behind liberation movements and in favour of the establishment of independent States, or should they aim, on conquest, at taking these people over as a new German colonial empire? Himmler inclined towards pan-Turkism and at least a declaration of German support for independence; Rosenberg was for a realistic distinction of races, and supported the recognition of independence by several areas; Hitler, with his arrogant contempt for Asiatic peoples, cared for nothing but willing service without conditions and looked to a time when the German yoke would merely replace the Soviet. The Waffen-SS formation, with its grouping of all Russian Turks in one division but with separate regiments, was a compromise between these opinions. In the end Rosenberg was authorized to declare for the recognition of the independence of Turkistan, but not until March 1945, when it was much too late to influence the behaviour of the mercenaries or to affect the issue in any way.

In the beginning things went well. Those in the prison camps had it put to them, 'Either stay where you are, or come and fight against Communism'; and all but some 20,000 of them gladly obeyed the call and volunteered for service. There was a natural desire for freedom from captivity, and it was not until the volunteers realized that the Germans had made no precise declaration of their war aims that doubts began to arise. With the encouragement of the Ostministerium, a national committee (the National Turkistan Unity Committee) was formed under Kayum and charged with the political and

national leadership of the volunteers. It was expected to act 668
as the honest broker between the men and the German Army 727
and Party authorities. From the beginning this committee 167
worked for German recognition of the principle of national independence for Turkistan, and on this ground was continually at variance with the German authorities and even with the German commanders of the legions. But, as the War went on, Kayum seems to have been tacitly allowed to spread the gospel of independence among the volunteers themselves both in speech and writing. It was found that without such propaganda the morale of the troops could not be sustained, and the Ostministerium, itself sympathetic, gave the committee a free hand, provided that the propaganda was limited to the volunteers themselves. This did not prevent the SS at one stage from demanding that the whole organization of Eastern Turks should submit to work under Vlassov's leadership 'for the liberation of all the peoples of Russia from the Soviet yoke'. This the committee categorically refused. But to the end, that is up to March 1945, there remained a conflict of idea: the Germans enlisted these men for the struggle against Communism, the volunteers were only willing to fight for the restoration of their independence.

This uncertainty of political aim seriously affected the volunteers' morale. The most distinguished officer of commissioned rank among them, Ghulam Alim, a former sergeant in the Red Army who had deserted, felt himself so frustrated that he fled with 200 men into the Slovakian mountains, where he was shot by partisans. This man had won every possible German decoration for bravery, including the Iron Cross, and had been promoted to command of a regiment, but he was distracted by the conflicting political influences and could not stand the course. A further reason for discontent was a narrow and mistrustful German policy in the matter of appointment and promotion of Eastern Turk officers. Almost all the officer cadres were German, more than one unit having a German element up to 15 per cent of its strength. Among 180,000 volunteers there were only eighty-seven Turkish

668 officers, out of whom thirteen held only nominal com-
727 missioned rank in the National Committee. The remaining
167 seventy-four were distributed fifty-one to the Wehrmacht and twenty-three to the SS formations. The Germans had not even the sense to draw a distinction between deserters and prisoners-of-war, and German commanders angrily attributed discontent on this score to the factious interference of the committee. The men for their part could not but regard the presence of so many Germans, even down to NCO rank, as a sign of obvious mistrust. Language difficulties were great and prevented understanding; the words of command were given in German, and Germans with the units made little or no attempt to learn the Asian languages. An extreme folly was the allotment of a differential scale of rations to Germans and Turks, even to those employed on similar duties within the same unit. The armament handed out consisted mainly of captured Russian weapons notoriously inferior to the German — a policy which had a severe effect on morale since the superiority of German weapons in 1941 was known to have undermined the confidence of the Red Army. It was not surprising that some 3000 desertions took place, but of these only 800 were on the Eastern Front and most of those not to the Red Army but to anti-Soviet partisans.

The Germans did undertake one interesting experiment. In response to requests for religious instruction arrangements were made to attach an *imam* to every unit. Some of these were found from among the personnel in the units themselves, while others were trained in two schools which the German government opened in Dresden and in Göttingen. The Dresden school was intended mainly to train priests for the Waffen-SS formation and, as might be expected from its aims and from the association with it of that old fox El Hajj Amin Hussaini, ex-Mufti of Jerusalem (then in Germany), it tended to subordinate spiritual to political aims and to preach a refined form of pan-Turkic pan-Islamism. The Göttingen theological school was a more genuine attempt to provide for spiritual needs, and one less corrupted by purely political ends

and catchwords. Some idea of the difference of approach 668
between the two schools, and incidentally of the crudity of 727
German ideas on subjects such as these, can be gathered from 167
the reports. There was hot argument on the point whether it is necessary to draw distinctions between a training in Sunniism and one in Shiism. The Dresden school, influenced apparently by its orthodox Sunni advisers, seems to have flatly announced that Shiism does not really exist, while that at Göttingen was constrained to observe that the people of Turkistan are no doubt all Sunnis, but the majority of the Azeris, like the Persians, are Shiahs, and history demonstrates the lack of understanding between the two.

Religious services and teaching were in great demand in the units and the imams did much to strengthen morale. Experience showed that their ministrations were desired by all of every age-group, including the youngest men. The scheme had of course in it a strong element of exploitation of spiritual needs to serve a worldly end; its welcome suggests a condition of spiritual hunger among the volunteers such as only Soviet propaganda can induce.

In spite of all the German mistakes of principle and practice, in spite of the frequent crudity of method and the general inability of the German officer to give that emotional touch to his relations with men of another race which can alone command the devotion of Asian troops, it can be said that on the whole these Eastern Turkish and Caucasian mercenaries served their new masters not so unfaithfully to the end. Three battalions from Turkistan fought to the last man in front of Stalingrad, others were destroyed in fierce fighting in the Caucasus, six battalions held up the Russian advance for a time in front of Berlin. Altogether they suffered losses in killed of some 50,000 men, and 12,000 war disablements — figures against which the numbers of desertions sink into insignificance. They proved good soldiers with a child-like trust in their officers if these tried to understand them and treat them well. Where there is record of close personal relations being established between officers and men, these Turks were capable

727 of extreme devotion, as when a battalion which had broken out
668 of a pocket near Kharkov re-entered it in order to rescue the
167 body of a German commander who had won the affection and respect of his men. Most of them showed astonishing powers of endurance and a flair for guerrilla fighting. It was noticed that, Communist or not in upbringing, the youth of Turkistan was always influenced by a national tradition inculcated in family life. This tradition, which often had a religious background and remained a living one within the family, had made the youth sceptical of Communist teaching and ready to welcome those who could speak to them of what they could better understand. There was evidence too that in the Red Army the Muslim peoples had had a raw deal; they disliked the Russian mentality and felt aggrieved. Those who were better educated had in mind the purges and the waves of arrests and banishments which followed any demonstration of national pride; the rank and file recalled bitterly the deprivation of lands and flocks which had gone with collectivization. Those Russian cruelties they would never forget; the bloody eyes[1] of Skobelev, Kuropatkin and the Commissars were for them the eye of a single ogre, who would not leave them in peace. It was fortunate for the Allied cause that the Germans proved so heavy-handed. The inevitable impression is that the Germans did not deserve to have such men to lead. They used them only to serve a German purpose; when totalitarian Germany fell, she dragged down her mercenaries with her. The path was uncharted and there was no clear direction for men who sought anxiously for a goal. In the end most of the volunteers who did not perish were by Allied agreement handed back to their old masters, and disappeared. Cast to and fro between two tyrannical forces, lacking a home and refused understanding, often tortured when not killed, for them the end was bitterness.

Some have remained in the West after all was over. These include Kayum Khan, the leading spirit and the firmest of the national committee, and some of his helpers, as well as a number

---

[1] An allusion to Skobelev's cognomen, *göz kanli* — bloody-eyes.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

of members of the national committees who dealt with volun- 727
teers from other minorities within Soviet Russia, in particular 668
those from the North Caucasus and Azerbaijan. These con- 167
tinue to be the most prominent representatives of the new
Muslim emigration from the USSR. They are in a strong 000
position as against the older emigration, in that they have now an intimate sense of the hopes and fears, the elations and disappointments, of a great mass of their countrymen who had risked and often given their lives for what they thought their aim and duty — the liberation of their country from the Russian yoke. In their persons they have renewed the experience which inspired men like Togan and Chokai in the old days of the interregnum period of 1918 to 1924. Once more they have failed to realize their dreams ; Hitler's Germany, though they had no chance to look elsewhere, was not the helper that they needed. Yet what happened shows at least that a strong spirit of independence had survived a quarter-century of Soviet rule and still lived in the hearts of thousands of the youth brought up in Communist schools.

It is not surprising that Soviet Russia after the war should bend so much energy to the suppression of all signs of nationalism among the kinsmen of these men in Turkistan.

There is one aspect of these events of some further significance. We know how the Soviets had divided the Eastern Turkish peoples into separate units on an ostensibly racial and
linguistic basis — the policy of cantonization. The name of [illegible]
Turkistan disappeared from the Russian map in 1924. Later measures in the linguistic field, and the introduction of separate Roman and later Cyrillic scripts for each republic, intensified local idiosyncrasies and hampered mutual understandings. The ban on religion in education weakened such unifying effect as might have accrued from common religious thought. We have seen, too, how the Germans tended to the other extreme, and, while halting between two opinions, were inclined to flirt with ideas of pan-Turkism. The national

The national

668 committee under Kayum Khan's direction followed a middle course. They stood for a single united Turkistan, including the Persian-speaking Tajiks, roughly coincident with the limits of the five Soviet Central Asian republics, and they strove to inculcate the political idea of a common Turkistani nationality and allegiance. Unwilling to recognize that the several languages spoken in Turkistan are in fact languages and not mere dialects of one language, they tried to serve their end by inventing a middle-language — *ortatili* — which should become a lingua franca for all the country. They also did their best to encourage the German commanders to mix up the rank and file without regard to racial or linguistic affinities, making no distinction between an Uzbek or a Kazak, a Kirghiz or a Tajik. Their aim was a deliberate one, to counter the Russian policy of breaking down into small units and to re-create a common tradition for Turkistan. On the other hand they would have nothing to do with suggestions for a wider Turkish organism which should be shared with Azerbaijanis, Volga Tatars or Bashkurds. They stood for a smaller unity, confined to Turkistan alone.

000 [321] It is not easy to pronounce with confidence how far this policy is consonant with realities. On the one hand it was noted that the Azeris, the only substantial people of Turkish stock in the Caucasus area, proved to be better combatant troops than any of the volunteers from Turkistan. This result may be partly attributable to the fact that, being alone, the Azeris were not mixed with other stocks and knew how they stood. The mingling of the five main stocks of Turkistan without any regard for origin or language must have produced a result not unlike what would follow if Pathans, Baluches, Panjabis and Awans were thrown together haphazard in the army of what is now Pakistan. It was a bold experiment and it can hardly have promoted efficiency, at least at the outset. On the other hand there is evidence that Uzbeks and Tajiks at any rate get on well together. (The Soviet attempt to play up the Persian character of the Tajik tradition is probably misconceived: Tajiks are often bilingual in any case.) As

was to be expected, there is testimony to a certain tension 000 having existed between Uzbek and Kazak, heirs as they are to such very different traditions, but even here the forcing of the Kazaks into settled agriculture and the mines and factories may tend gradually towards assimilation.

Perhaps a fair conclusion would be this: there are, and 563 always have been, very real distinctions of habit, language and bearing between the sedentary population of the towns and oases, who are now mainly Uzbeks and Tajiks, and the men who come from the steppe and mountains, mainly Kazaks, Kirghiz and Turkmens. These differences have been accentuated by Russian policy. But it was proved in 1918–24, and has been proved again in 1941–5, that all these peoples are close enough to work together effectively in a close organism such as an army.[a] On this premise there is ground for sup- 000 posing that, in spite of differences, trusted leaders may be able to exploit a common tradition to the degree of achieving political unity in action at least when the cry is liberation from a foreign yoke. It is even possible that Russianization may in the end assist this process, as did the introduction of the English language and administration into India. For it by no means follows that the higher Russian education, which provides a new level on which the more intellectual can communicate without regard of race, will cause Kazaks or Uzbeks to think or act as Russians. Judging from the history of World War II, they are more likely to act as Uzbeks and Kazaks, and to believe that freedom is just round the corner.

Finally there is this to be said. There are few emigration groups who have had so great a chance as this national committee to influence directly the hopes and thoughts of so many thousands of their fellow-countrymen over a period of three or four years. Conditions were difficult, the Germans lacked understanding, and after the first two years it was clear that the Eastern Turks had not backed a winning horse. If in spite of this they carried on, and the rank and file fought and died as they did, it proves at least they thought they had a cause to die for. In spiritual terms that cause was the redemption of

[a] [e.g. under the Nazi's; see cat. 116, p. 246 ff. -- Analyst]

their way of life before God and man; in terms of politics it was the deliverance of a united Turkistan. In face of this it is hard for us, who look on, to conclude that a United Turkistan is an unrealizable dream not worth fighting for.

On a different stage, and under new leaders, they have enacted a new scene in the tragedy which began with the Merdikar and Basmachi movements more than thirty years ago. But the West lacks knowledge of their past achievements and their present predicament, and to put their case as it deserves they need a purpose to inform their eloquence. If their voice is to carry, the old idea and the new must forget differences of age and tactic, and combine in allegiance to a cause which, presented with one mind, should command the attention of the outer world.

XVI

CONCLUSION

We rejoice in our sufferings, knowing that suffering produces endurance, and endurance produces character, and character produces hope, and hope does not disappoint us.[1]

000

IT is twelve hundred and fifty years since the armies of the Umayyids under Kotaiba ibn Muslim won Transoxiana for Islam. It is a bare two hundred years since the pressure of Russia was first felt on the northern steppe, less than a century since Russia conquered Transoxiana, and only a generation since the Soviet Empire was firmly clamped down on the whole land, rivers and steppe alike. The local nationalist sources, the events of World War II, the current Soviet press, all show plainly enough that the equation between Islam and Communism is not yet worked out. On the resolution of this question it may be that much more than the future of the Muslim world depends. For this land of Turkistan, once a planet of a Muslim Eastern constellation and now wrenched from its natural orbit to revolve uncertainly in another, has shown that past loyalties have not yet wholly failed. The older attractions still exert an influence not to be despised. Yet the assimilative forces of the new system, as exercised in this modern world, are so overpowering that it remains an open question how far the older tradition can hope to survive as anything more than a nostalgic memory destined to fade sorrowfully into history.

Here is Velidov, they might say, a man over 60 years old who thirty and more years ago led a tribal rebellion against his big Russian brother. Here is a man of the past who since that time has been living in foreign lands on scholarship,

---

[1] Romans, 5, 3. New American version.

000 nourished only by old memories, driven from the country of his birth, unable to see with his own eyes the effects of the new Socialism, the new economy, on the risen generation of his countrymen. How can such a man estimate the forces and the currents of thought which have renovated an ancient land, introduced millions of Russians to cultivate where his ancestors roamed, built new towns on the steppe, changed the shape of old cities, now become hives of industry, once stagnant and answering only to the drone of the *Muezzin*? Even among the emigrant irreconcilables, to whom alone his message can go, there are divisions of thought, jealousies and lack of leadership. And from his countrymen in Farghana, Tashkent, Samarkand, Ishimbay, his message is shut out. Even if they could hear it, would they not laugh him to scorn as one who celebrates old victories and praises the past, one utterly severed from present realities? In any case, in his enthusiasm he forgets the power of an efficient State machinery, unbound by scruple and determined to mould men from childhood to one pattern. So they would argue, contemptuously.

The Soviet will and the power are there, and, if these tremendous forces do not even yet seem real, this book of mine has failed of its purpose. A universal Communist ideology, a regimented education, collectivization, centralized industrialization, ruthless suppression of deviations, mass movement and slaughter of populations, the mechanization of the inner springs of life, all these forces are to hand, and they are used. Apart from the break-up of tyranny itself, the only factor, surely, which can upset material calculations of this order is the existence, in the face of all power-influences and indoctrination, of an inner spirit which refuses the idea of the mechanization of man. More than one people in history have managed to keep a flame burning against mass slaughter, against oppression of body, mind and spirit, and even against generous treatment at the hands of those to whom they have been subject. The burning of a light at the heart of a people depends on qualities of spirit, either revealed or bequeathed to

them through heredity and upbringing, and a torch of that 000
kind will be extinguished if there are not those who come to trim it or to supply fresh fuel to keep it alight. We have to determine from their history how far the inspirations of the Eastern Turks are strong enough to survive the immense pressures set in force to muffle them.

In the course of this survey we have noticed more than once the strength and weakness of the spiritual possessions of the various societies which have gone to make up the amalgam of peoples in Turkistan. We found two main strands of thought, that of the cities, and that of the steppe. After the impulses of expansion were spent with the end of the caravan age, the cities of Central Asia, cut off from any fertilizing stream, relapsed into a jealous medievalism, a bigotry proverbial even in an age and region where tolerance was not in fashion. Fertile enough to maintain themselves in self-sufficiency, with a respectable margin for these same leaders of bigotry, they refused or denied all outside influences which might have checked the negations of their narrow clericalism. The peculiar brand of scholastic religion associated with the [171]
Central Asian *medreses* may have been as persistent as other Islamic manifestations, but it had become derelict and ossified. It was a strange mingling of the barren controversies of the schoolman with the emotional hysteria of the dervish, and it is not irreverent to find in the fanatical rigidity of the *emirs* and *ulema* of Bukhara and Khiva the very prototype of that Communist faith which in its turn was to admit no deviation and preach its own anathema. Even the religious mania of the dervish and the assassin has in it some quality which by a strange paradox is akin to the missionary endeavours of the high priests of Communism. Intolerance, bigotry, blood-purges, are common to all forms of fanaticism; they are the outward showing of the spiritual condition which prompts the fanatic — hatred and fear. All religions, Islam not excepted, have been guilty of aberrations such as these. It was this attitude more than anything else which, for the three centuries between the fall of the Timurids and the coming of

OOO

the Russians, cut off Turkish Central Asia from the remainder of the civilized world. A renascence was long overdue.

The age of the Timurids, as we know, had produced remarkable men as well in the field of action as in that of letters. Nor had this spirit perished. When the Russians came, there were still to be found men of this type, half contemptuous of the townsmen and cultivators, still roaming upon the steppe or pasturing their flocks in the mountains, men of the same way of life and thought as had furnished the armies of Timur and Babur, but organized on a tribal model and lacking the focus of city, court or market-place, which a tribe needs if it is to grow into a nation. Their religious inspirations owed something to the Shamanism[1] of remote ancestors, and all accounts agree that their conversion to Islam left them free from bigotry. Their way of life as nomads inclined them to that sort of pantheism expressed in the Benedicite; they saw God rather under the canopy of heaven than within the mosque.

The pride of the height,
The clear firmament,
The beauty of heaven, with his glorious show;
The sun, when it appeareth,
Declaring at his rising a marvellous instrument,
The work of the most High. . . .
He made the moon also to serve in her season
For a declaration of times, and a sign of the World,
Increasing wonderfully in her changing,
Shining in the firmament of heaven;
The beauty of heaven, the glory of the stars,
An ornament giving light in the highest places of the Lord. . . .
Look upon the rainbow, and praise him that made it,
Very beautiful it is in the brightness thereof.
It compasseth the heaven about with a glorious circle,
And the hands of the most High have bended it.[2]

This vision of the splendour of nature and God's part in it had informed men like Babur, who succeeded in achieving in their persons a marriage of the spiritual inheritance of the pastoralist with the revelation of Islam, and so released a new creative energy in the human soul. But the vision faded. The essential Islamic element, the necessary accretion, had been corrupted in the mosques and *medreses* of the Central Asian cities ; the Turks of Central Asia existed in isolation even from the rest of the Muslim world, and could hear no challenge from Christendom which might have awakened a response. It was as if the effort spent in furnishing the sinews of war which in former times carried the ancestors of these men to the banks of the Danube and the Ganges had emptied their successors of that *élan* which alone, united with the spiritual culture of the cities, might have enabled them to put up an effective resistance to the advancing Russians. Their civilization began to crumble, and they are now undergoing the painful process of forceful enrolment in the Russian proletariat.

---

[1] For an interesting dissertation on Shamanist beliefs see Czaplicka, Bib. I, 28.

[2] Ecclesiasticus 43.

In an interesting essay[1] Arnold Toynbee has discussed various encounters in history between Western society and Islam. After describing the successful Ottoman reaction to the first attempt by the West to exterminate Islam by means of the Crusades, he goes on to explain the renewal of the Western offensive on Islam as a concentric attack which control of the maritime routes and other methods of transportation enabled the West to launch during the last one hundred and fifty years. This he sees in terms of a Western movement to incorporate all mankind in a single cosmopolitan society, at a time when the modern West is superior to the Islamic world not only in arms but in the technique of economic life on which civilization increasingly depends. He goes on to illuminate his discourse by giving his account of two alternative methods of response by which one society attacked by another, whether in cold or hot war, may respond to the challenge. As protagonists among those challenged

---

[1] Bib. I, 93, Islam, the West and the future.

000 there will arise a set of men whom he calls 'Zealots' and another set called 'Herodians'.

The Zealot is the man who in contest with an overbearing foreign enemy falls back on his traditional battle-cries. He is the puritan, the soldier for the faith, the *ghazi*. He stands on his archaic past. Examples are the Wahabis, the Afridis, the Basmachis. The Herodian is the man, like Mehmet Ali of Egypt or the founders of modern Japan, who, confronted with a better-armed and unfamiliar opponent, responds by discarding his traditional methods and learning to fight his enemy with the enemy's own tactics. The fastnesses of Zealotism are inaccessible like the desert of Nejd or the North-West Frontier; the centres of Herodianism are in places such as Cairo and Constantinople, the cross-ways of the high-roads of the nations. The Zealot acts by instinct, the Herodian by reason. The former, though he stands in the true line, takes no account of change and will fail in the end; the latter, though his resistance is cleverer and therefore more effective, is essentially an imitator and unable to create. If the former is a fossil, the latter, if he escapes submergence, is in danger of becoming a mimic only of the living civilization to which he is trying to conform. In taking on the forms he misses the spirit that lies behind.

How does this digression bear on the Eastern Turks? Although Communism is, as it were, a Western heresy, when turned against the West it is apt to be regarded as a sort of semi-oriental counter-attack against Western Christendom itself. But, turned against the Islamic world, I suggest it is to be seen as the sharp edge of a latter-day Western assault on the outposts of Asia. The response evolved by this challenge in the resistance of the Basmachis was undoubtedly of the Zealot variety; that of the young Bukharans was of the Herodian kind. Both failed. But it is worth noting that the most pronounced form of Zealotism in Turkistan was to be found not among the nomad tribesmen but among the *ulema* and the town populations — a curious reversal of the usual tendency. The nomads themselves were neither Herodians nor Zealots; they represented rather a positive and primitive way of life, which in a previous age had led them along paths of conquest but now awaited some fresh impact or infusion before it could release the energy that undoubtedly was theirs.

The conclusion is that neither Zealot nor Herodian will influence the outcome of the encounters between present-day Islam and the West, the former because he is a relic and therefore extinct as a living force, the latter because as an imitator he cannot himself create. The great majority of the Islamic society in contact with the West is made up not of protagonists, such as *ghazis* on the battlefields or mimetic statesmen, but of a mass of townsmen and peasants whose destiny in the USSR it is to be enrolled in a cosmopolitan proletariat. Of these what can be expected in the way of a creative contribution to the civilization of the future? Zealot and Herodian answer disdainfully — nothing! But Toynbee replies with another question, put in the mouth of a Roman of the Tiberian age: 'Can any good come out of Nazareth?' Should we then be foolish if we believe now that in Central Asia, under the impact of Russia, the underworld is once more stirring, and even that (as Toynbee says) 'we can discern certain spiritual movements which might conceivably become the embryo of new higher religions'?

At this point the contemporary student of Soviet thought and action in the colonial sphere will exclaim with impatient denial or with a shrug of despair, according to the promptings of his personal ideology. He may affirm that he can see no present sign of a positive and independent movement of the mind or soul of any Muslim people beneath the Stalinist sway. The waters under which they are submerged are too turgid, or the swirl of the current of conformity is too powerful, for anything to come to the surface and swim against it.

But there are two considerations which suggest that this judgment may be at fault. The first is that the very pressures of Soviet force and propaganda are apt, are indeed intended, to make us of the West blind and deaf to any spiritual visions or

OOO undertones among the non-Russian peoples of the USSR. We need to correct such defects of sight and hearing by acquiring a deeper knowledge of these peoples' real attitudes and history. I suggest that it is not necessary to go very far beneath the surface to become conscious of a stirring of the spirit that survives.

The second point is less obvious. If something new is indeed to emerge from the clash between Russian and Turk of Central Asia, it will not be just a resurrection of the unchanging and traditional bigotries of Bukhara, or even of the simple tribalism of the steppe. For much that is constructive and life-giving — for instance, a greater enlightenment among women — will have come in under cover of the new forces. Dead wood has been cut and new growth achieved. Persecution purifies. There will be memories of past inspirations, but the spark that is blown by that breath to flame will not illuminate the faces of a latter-day body of *ulema*, but of men and women who have been through Soviet schools. We need not expect the products of Soviet education superimposed on the Central Asian tradition to be of the stuff of a Gandhi or a Jinnah, for, paradoxically, such men are bred only in an English forcing-house. But they may be persons in their own way no less surprising. While tyranny is in full blast, they will bide their time; when it breaks, as break it must under stress of inner conflict, their opportunity will have come. When that time arrives, they will be well placed from their peripheral situation to make contact with the outer world.

In the more particular field of revealed religion we should not expect this encounter to give birth to some watered-down eclectic theosophy which seeks to assimilate the less challenging beliefs of Islam with those of other faiths. It is not for a Christian to foretell the emergence of a revivalist sect preaching some negative and syncretic philosophy, taken from the niches of an undefined and sentimental pantheon. We shall travel an austerer path. Christian and Muslim alike subscribe to the *Tauhid*[1] — I believe in one God; to apprehend him both trust to the abandonment of prayer. Just 600 as the encounter between East and West brought forth these revelations of the past, we may look for a strong and positive response from this new collision. And just because this collision of idea is so unequal and contrasted at the point where the proletarian system of Russia has met the old world of Islam, it is not impossible that men's minds will be opened to a new message vouchsafed from just this quarter, a revelation based on the older inspirations but under an original interpretation. Much as the Arabs in the VIIth century, following the lead of the Prophet of Islam, liberated the Middle East from the Graeco-Roman and Sassanian yokes, so may their Turkish successors free themselves from the Russian proletarian chains, marching under a new banner. And in these days it may even come to pass that this will be decided on what is now known as the cold war front. Looking forward into history, our successors could then say that the inert mass of stratified ritual and bigotry, which represented Islam as practised in Transoxiana before the Russians came, needed the violent impact of the encounter with Communism to reanimate it and rouse it to a new height of spiritual reaction. The resurrection could be won only at the cost of a descent into hell.

---

[1] In Turkish *Tevhit*.

There is another point worth making. I have shown how Russian violence reached its peak in forcing the nomadic population off the steppe to be merged with the static sedentary population of the cities and oases. The consequences of such a displacement are not likely to evaporate in mere resentment: a new urban proletariat descended from the virile free-born pastoralists has been created, and the fresh mixture may supply the very element required to leaven the lump, the spark to set the whole fabric alight. Thus Russian violence would have been turned backward on itself, and a new revelation come to birth among the Eastern Turks.

Such a spiritual renascence might spring from within the body of the faith, as it has done before. One of the greatest and most original thinkers and theologians that Islam

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

has produced was Al-Ghazali,[1] like Firdausi a century earlier born at Tus just outside Meshed in the 450th Muhammadan year (A.D. 1058) and, after a life spent mostly in Baghdad or in retreat, dying at Tus where he was born in 505 (A.D. 1111). Al-Ghazali started as a highly orthodox theologian and exponent of the canon law. He then believed that the State should rigidly uphold the strictly orthodox faith and punish deviations. His subsequent reading of philosophy turned him to an absolute scepticism, and he became a declared unbeliever not only as to religion itself but as to the possibility of any certain knowledge. He laboured ineffectually to recover an intellectual and theological balance, and, in despair, turned finally to a Sufi mysticism. The exercise of the intellect had failed — what of direct revelation? After some years of discipline in mystic practice he returned to belief in God — or, as he put it, God restored to him his beliefs, but under the overwhelming influence of terror. His conversion was not unlike St. Paul's, but there is more emphasis on the anger of God which strikes down the obstinate and the unbeliever. In the throes of this conversion Al-Ghazali broke down both physically and mentally, and went into retreat.

When he emerged, he taught that a purely philosophical structure had no base. Philosophy was no more than mere 'thinking'; the philosophers could be understood by any intelligent man. There could be no metaphysics on a basis of pure thought. Even ultimate truths could not be founded on intellectual certainty, but only proved by the direct knowledge with which God floods the heart of the believer. The intellect could be used only to destroy trust in itself, and the only trustworthy knowledge was that gained through experience (*marifa*). By that experience the fact of prophetic revelation is established, and the truth of the theological structure assured. Only a great emotional experience could break the fetters of tradition and give the force needed to turn the current of the age.

---

[1] Abu Hamid Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Ghazali al-Tusi. This account of his life is taken from the *Encyclopedia of Islam*. See also Bib. I, 6.

Al-Ghazali's nervous prostration is believed to have been hastened by distress over tyranny, purges and assassinations at the Seljuk Court. As the years went on, he saw the fears which had caused his conversion as the reverse side only of the love of Allah, which he came to regard as the basis of the emotional life of the saints. His influence was exercised always for tolerance and charity, and he denounced all casuistry and every attempt to make the faith of the masses a structure of logically demonstrated articles (*akaid*). All who believed in the broad principles of Islam, he said, should be treated as believers. Many hold that indirectly Al-Ghazali's thought had an influence on the West, and flowed through Thomas Aquinas to affect Pascal.

For freedom of expression and a new interpretation, Al-Ghazali is remarkable among Muslim thinkers. He broke clean away from rigid formalism, he denounced tyranny, he preached charity and tolerance. Above all, he hated jargon. He brought the philosophers into the open and dissipated the glamour which then surrounded them, preaching that by philosophy the ultimate truth could not be reached. He showed that the basis of all religious certainty was ecstatic experience. His home was only a few miles from that frontier which divides Iran from Turan. After his death he was accepted as the great restorer of the faith. There were saints in Islam in those days. In this age of spiritual hunger, it may be that in the line of Al-Ghazali another inspired *mujaddid* (renewer) will arise, and point the way to all believers. Then will the meaning be clear of the shrine which Timur built over the grave of Ahmed Yesevi beneath the Kara Tav — the sacred place where Abilay also was laid to rest.

The great movements of history, which are in essence movements of the spirit, tend to have origin in regions where ideas and civilizations overlap. It was so with Judaism, and again with Christianity and Islam; Central Asia, like India, is a region of this kind, from which we may expect new forces to be set in motion in this age. There is good reason of recent showing for the belief that the older inspirations of the Central

000 Asian peoples have not yet failed; there are also grounds for supposing that the impact of the new has not been wholly destructive, but by a process of catalysis may even bring about some renewal of life. A re-birth of this sort is more likely in a society which has released women from subjection and cast off the outworn bigotry of mosque and school. From this meeting of old and new some offspring will surely be born. It is for the free world to forecast the delivery and nurse it when it comes.

181 The message sent out by those who would speak for the Eastern Turks is this:[1] In order to bring about the disappearance of the nations of Central Asia by complete assimilation, Russia will have to torture and oppress these millions for centuries. For even if the Russian domination were assured, the people of Turkistan will not forget their freedom so far as to renounce their languages and their faith. The dangers caused by the Soviet domination are indeed a reality on a scale never imagined, yet just as quickly and on just such a scale the day of the crack is approaching. The tide will turn and bring with it either liberation — or disappearance from the pages of history. Never has anyone been able to force a religion or course of action on the Turks. A nation has its own idealism — its own romance. Life moves forward and nothing can prevent a nation from developing.

Remembering how the Mongols came and conquered and passed away, Turkistan will struggle on, like the Oxus —

A foiled circuitous wanderer, till at last
The longed-for dash of waves is heard, and wide
His luminous home of waters opens, bright
And tranquil, from whose floor the new-bathed stars
Emerge, and shine upon the Aral Sea.

---

[1] End of Togan, *op. cit.*

APPENDIX

TRANSLITERATION

A SYSTEM of transliteration of names should be consistent and broadly scholarly without being pedantic. It is particularly hard to observe this mean in the presentation of a Turkic nomenclature for English readers, and harder still when the theme is not Turkey but the Eastern Turks under Russian rule. The difficulty is still further increased by the fact that the Soviets have forced the Turkic and Iranian languages of Russian Central Asia into two distinct transcriptions, first a set of Roman letters, and then a set of Cyrillic letters. There have also been variants in the Roman and in the Cyrillic alphabets used to transcribe the various languages, *e.g.* a slightly different alphabet has been applied to Uzbek and Kazak. A final complication is introduced by my use of Togan's book in modern Western Turkish as one of the media through which these Trans-Caspian names are here presented for study. (It is consoling to observe that even Togan does not use an alphabet always consistent with that used in Turkey today, *e.g.* he introduces a '*q*' for Arabic ق, and a '*kh*' for Arabic خ, both unknown to the modern Turkish alphabet.) ۱۹۷

2. Turkic nomenclature has often, by no means always, a Muslim background, but even then the value of the Arabic or Persian words is altered both in pronunciation and spelling, *e.g.* in the simplest case Mehmet for Muhammad. There are also the modifications (umlaut) on vowel sounds, and the vowel harmonies. In modern Turkish there is no '*kh*' (Russian *x*) for Arabic خ, its place being taken by a simple '*k*', but خ does exist in Eastern Turkic tongues. Finally, superimposed on the Persian and Arabic, one finds many names of pure Turkic origin.

3. For these reasons the accepted Western system of transliteration adopted by Arabists does not fit any Turkic tongue. For instance, 'Abdu'l Raḥman or Ḥafidh, apart from their pedantic look, do not represent the words as they are apprehended by a Turk's eye or ear, west or east of the Caspian. There is rather more to be said for the simpler Hunterian system as used for Muhammadan nomenclature in India, but that too misses the distinctive elaboration of vowel sounds to be found in Turkic languages. It has, however, the advantage of familiarity to an English eye, and some adaptation of it may be a possible solution.

4. Next to be considered is a system taken through the Russian. This has the advantage that it represents the written word within modern Turkistan, and is therefore familiar to the educated in the five Central Asian republics. It is, however, anathema to every Eastern Turk outside the USSR and, opposed as it deliberately is to the memories and traditions of a Muslim past, is probably to the distaste of many of the indigenous populations within the country. It is, moreover, clumsy, *e.g.* the use of *dzh* for Arabic ج (jim) and the Russian patronymic *-ov* so strange to a Muslim ear. Why write *Tadzhik* in English for *Tajik*, or *Shayakhmetov* for the son of *Shah Ahmed*?

5. There remains the modern Western Turkish Roman alphabet. In many ways this might be suitable, but it involves the use of the following:

c for English *j* (French *dj*, Russian *dzh* дж)
ç for English *ch* (French *tch*)
ş for English *sh* (French *ch*)
h for Arabic and Persian خ (German or Scottish *ch*, Russian *x*).

N.B.—In English systems this is usually given as *kh*. In modern Western Turkish it has lost its original sound and is pronounced as an aspirated *h* only. But the original sound remains east of the Caspian. In any case, words such as

Khiva, *Bukhara*, *Khan* look absurd in the dress *Hiva*, *Buhara*, *Han*.

ğ for Arabic and Persian غ (not unlike French *r*)

N.B.—In English systems usually given as *gh*.

k for Arabic ق (not unlike *ck* in cock)

N.B.—In English systems usually given as *q*.

ö as in German
ü as in German
ĭ (undotted) for Russian ы, something like English *u* in *hut* or *but*, or *y* in the adverbial termination *-ly*.

The use of all these in an English text would make it tiresome and unfamiliar to the general reader, and might introduce difficulty for the printer. All should be ruled out except *ö* and *ü* and possibly *k*.

6. It is easy to proceed so far negatively. As a positive contribution I suggest the following, which rejects the Russian and the scholarly Arabic, and represents a compromise between the modern Turkish and the Hunterian.

(*a*) *Vowels*. Adopt Western Turkish vowel signs except *ĭ* (undotted). (I have considered possibility of using *y* for *ĭ*, but this would be unsightly and unfamiliar, *e.g.* *Osmanly* for *Osmanlĭ*. On the whole it is probably better that *ĭ* (undotted) should appear without distinction from *i*.)

N.B.—I should modify this general principle in the case of names whose spelling has become standardized according to Hunterian values, *e.g.* write Samarkand, Farghana, Timur, Turk, not Semerkend, Ferghana, Temür, Türk.

(*b*) *Consonants*. Adopt Western Turkish consonants with following important exceptions:

(i) Turkish *c* to become *j*, *e.g.* Tajik, not Tacik, Tadzhik or Tadjik;

(ii) Turkish *ç* to become *ch*, *e.g.* Chaghatai, not Çaghatai or Tchaghatai;

194 (iii) Turkish *ş* to become *sh*, *e.g.* Shah, Sherif, not Şah, Şerif, Chah, Cherif;

(iv) Turkish *h*, when used for Persian or Arabic خ, to become *kh* (not *x*), *e.g.* Khan, Khiva, Sheikh, not Han, Hiva, Şeih;

(v) Turkish *ğ* to become *gh*, *e.g.* oghlu, not oğlu; Chağhatai, not Chagatai.

N.B.—I have considered what to do with Turkish *k* when used for ق. Scientific systems use *q*, but this would involve writing *e.g.* Qazaq, Qirghiz and Samarqand, all somewhat pedantic. Kazak and Kirghiz are probably better (Kazakh often used, following the Russian, is wrong in any case, the Arabic form being قزاق not قزاخ).

7. It is suggested that the text need not be complicated by using commas for *ain* and *hamza*. They are apt to give an air of dust, and are not very important for Turkic languages, for which is needed a system generally phonetic in intention and effect, yet conforming broadly with an educated approach to orientalia.

104 8. One name calls for comment. It may be said that Jengis, Jenghis, and Cheng(h)iz Khan are recognizable, but Chingiz is unfamiliar. On the system suggested Chingiz is a correct transliteration of the spelling adopted by Babur and others in Chaghatai. A correct transliteration from the original Mongolian would be Chingis, since there is no *z* in the old Mongol writing.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953

RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

197

162

REFERENCE

Kazak .... ▨

Kirghiz .... ▧

Turkmen .... ▥

Uzbek .... ▤

Taranchi, Turki .... ≋

Karakalpak .... ▩

Tajik .... ▦

Broken lines:- Scattered and scarce population

No marks within U.S.S.R.:- Practically uninhabited, (deserts, high mountains, etc.)

To avoid complexity, areas of Russian and Ukrainian settlement in the south have not all been marked

International frontier .... —·—·—

Boundaries of Republics .... – – – –

PRINCIPAL SOURCES

1. Völker- und Sprachenkarte des vorderen Orients, Reichsamt für Landesaufnahme, 1943.
2. Dominant Linguistic Groups along the Southern USSR Boundary, CIA, 11830.
3. Географический Атлас СССР, для средней школы, Москва 1950.
4. Maps and descriptions of the distribution of languages in Western and Soviet publications on the languages involved: e.g. A. von Gabain, K. Menges, J. Benzing, G. Jarring, E. D. Polivanov, and many others.
5. Results of systematic questioning of former inhabitants of the various republics, and particularly of linguistically overlapping areas.



OLAF CAROE: SOVIET EMPIRE (MACMILL

[facing page 272 - A]


GUISTIC MAP OF
ET CENTRAL ASIA
D BORDERLANDS
54°
66°
RUSS.
UKR.
RUSS.
UKRAINIANS
RUSSIAN
RUSSIANS
UKR.
RUSS.
Aktyubinsk
Kandagach
K A Z A K I
Guryev
Karsakpay
ARAL SEA
Kazalinsk
Jusaly
Kizil Orda
KARAKALPAKISTAN
U Z B E K I
Nukus
KHOREZM
Urgench
Khiva
Turtkul
Krasnovodsk
T U R K M E N I A
Dayakhatin
Bukhara
S T
Samarkand
Karshi
Tashkent
Kara Bu
Aris
Tur
Charjui
Ashkabad
Merv
Termez
Bandar Shah
Shahrud
Meshed
Shibarghan
Mazar-i-Sharif
Kushk
Herat
R S I A
A F G H A N I S
66° East of Gree

IRE (MACMILLAN & CO. LTD.)

[facing page 272. - B]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

197
162



78°
Miles
0 50 100 200 300
UKR
Kokchetav
UKRAINIANS
Pavlodar
SIANS
Atbasar
UKRAINIANS
Akmolinsk
UKRAINIANS
RUSSIANS
RUSSIANS
UKRAINIANS
Karaganda
Karkaralinsk
Uspenskiy
S T A N
Ayaguz
L. BALKHASH
Taldi-Kurgan
RUSSIANS
Kulja
Alma Ata
Turkistan
Ikan
Jambul
RUSSIANS
Frunze
Przhevalsk
Talass
Chimkent
KIRGHIZIA
Naryn
Aksu
Jalalabad
Andijan
Osh
Ferghana
Leninabad
Kashghar
TAJIKISTAN
Stalinabad
Yarkand
Kulyab
Faizabad
Khotan
CHINA
PAKISTAN
KASHMIR
40°
Greenwich
78°

[facing page 272: C]

BIBLIOGRAPHY

113

This is a selective list, in three parts, for a supplementary range of reading on the problems of Russian Central Asia dealt with in this book. Except in the case of official publications, and journals, references are to authors' names.

I

Books and Compilations (English, French, German)

1. Abulghazi. *Shejre-i-Türk* (Genealogy of the Turks). Translated from Chaghatai into French by Desmaisons under the title *Histoire des Mongols et des Tatares*, St. Petersburg, 1871.
2. Al-Ghazali. *See* Bammate and Encyclopedia of Islam.
3. Alishir Nevayi. *See* Gibb, E. J. W.
4. Babur, Emperor. *See* Leyden and Erskine, and Beveridge.
5. Bailey, F. M. Mission to Tashkent. London, J. Cape, 1946. A dramatic account of the 'Intervention Period'.
6. Bammate, Haidar. *Visages de l'Islam.* Lausanne, Payot, 1946. A North Caucasian now in Afghan diplomatic employ. Not a translation, and contains interesting views on the mystic Al-Ghazali and on Eastern Turkish literature and art.
7. Barthold, V. V. (i) *Histoire des Turcs d'Asie Centrale.* Paris, Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1945, *adaptation française.* A remarkable collection of lectures delivered by the great Russian historian at Istanbul in 1926. *See also* Encyclopedia of Islam.
8. Barthold, W. (same man). (ii) Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion. Translated from original by Prof. H. A. R. Gibb. London, 1928.
9. Barthold, W. (iii) *See also* I, 32, and III.
10. Bates, E. S. Soviet Asia. London, J. Cape, 1942.
11. Bernal, Prof. J. *See* II, 1.
12. Beveridge, Mrs. *Baburnama.* In English. London, Luzac, 1922. A translation straight from the Haidarabad Codex in Chaghatai. The Codex itself has been published in facsimile in Vol. I of the Gibb Memorial Series. London, Quaritch, 1905.
13. Birge, J. K. Guide to Turkish Area Study. Washington, D.C. American Council of learned societies, 1949. Deals mainly with Turkey, but extends into Central Asian field and comprises useful bibliographical material.

14. Bowra, Sir M. Heroic Poetry. London, Macmillan, 1952. Contains many examples of Central Asian Turkish epics, but all taken through the Russian.

15. Burnes, Sir A. Travels into Bokhara. London, John Murray, 1835.

16. Cahun, L. *L'Histoire de l'Asie, Turcs et Mongols.* Paris, 1896.

17. Carew Hunt, R. N. Theory and Practice of Communism. London, Clay, 1950.

18. Caroe, Sir O. Wells of Power. London, Macmillan, 1951.

19. Castagné, J., Prof. (i) *Les Basmatchis (1917–24).* Paris, 1928 ?

20. Castagné, J., Prof. (ii) *Presse russe.* Official collection in French of extracts from Russian Press from 1916 to 1939 for Quai d'Orsay.

21. Chokaï, Mustafa. *See* Tchokaieff, and III.

22. Clavijo, González de. Embassy to Tamerlane (1403–6). Translation from Spanish by Guy le Strange, London, Routledge, 1928.

23. Coates, W. P. and Zelda. Soviets in Central Asia. London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1951. An interesting account of a sponsored tour by two Communists in 1947.

24. Communist Party, History of. Official Compilation edited by Central Committee, 1938.

25. Conolly, A. Journey to the North of India. In 2 vols. London, Bentley, 1834.

26. Crankshaw, E. Russia by Daylight. London, Joseph, 1951.

27. Curzon, Lord. Russia in Central Asia. London, Longmans, 1889. A background book as great in its way as the author's classic on Persia.

28. Czaplicka, Miss. The Turks of Central Asia. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1918. An essay in ethnology by an anthropologist. Contains also valuable bibliography, in which *see* items listed under Radloff, Samoylovich, Vambéry.

29. De Quincey. Essays, Revolt of the Tartars (a classic).

30. Desmaisons. *See* Abulghazi.

31. Elias and Ross. *Tarikh-i-Rashidi.* The life of Mirza Haidar. London, Sampson Low, 1895. The introduction has a clear exposition of Turk-Mongol question, and particularly of the Chaghatai successors of Chingiz Khan. *See also* No. 44, Howorth.

32. Encyclopedia of Islam. 1913 edition. *See* articles on Turks, Amu Darya, Al-Ghazali, etc., by Barthold and others.

33. Encyclopedia, Great Soviet. *See* III, 10.

34. Erskine, W. *See* Leyden. Erskine, however, bore the chief rôle in this partnership.

35. Fitzroy Maclean. *See* Maclean.

36. Fraser-Tytler, Sir W. K. Afghanistan. London, 1950. An informed study of the balance of power in Asia down to 1947.

37. Gabain, A. von. *Ōzbekische Grammatik.* Leipzig and Vienna, 1945. Fräulein Gabain is an outstanding Turcologist in the linguistic field.

38. Gibb, E. J. W. History of Ottoman Poetry. In 6 vols. London, Luzac, 1900. Overlaps into Central Asia. *See* Index, Vol. V, under *Newai* for Alishir Nevayi. *See also* Beveridge.

39. Gibb, Prof. H. A. R. *See* Barthold, W.

40. Goldman, Bosworth. Red Road through Asia. London, Methuen, 1934. Chapters xi to xv deal with Central Asia.

41. Holdich, Sir T. (i) The Indian Borderland. London, Methuen, 1901.

42. Holdich, Sir T. (ii) The Gates of India. London, Macmillan, 1910.

43. Holdsworth, Mrs. M. *See* II, 9.

44. Howorth, Sir H. H. History of the Mongols. In 5 vols. London, Longmans, 1876. Classic, but somewhat outdated, authority on Mongols. Unfortunately, never completed to include house of Chaghatai, as to which *see* Elias and Ross, No. 31.

45. Hudson, A. E. Kazak Social Structure. Yale Univ. Pub. in Anthropology, XX, 1938.

46. Ilyin, Mikhail. *See* II, 10.

47. Jarring, Gunnar. Uzbek Texts from Afghanistan. Lund-Leipzig, 1938. In English. The language is the Iranized Uzbek of Bukhara and Samarkand. Author in Swedish diplomatic service and a renowned Turcologist.

48. Jorré, Georges. The Soviet Union. London, Longmans, 1950. English translation by E. D. Laborde. Not much concerned with Central Asia, where approach is geographical and even so not always accurate.

49. Kantemir, A. *See* II, 3.

50. Kayum Khan, Veli. *See* II, 4.

51. Kazemzadeh, F. The Struggle for Caucasia. Oxford, Ronald, 1951.

52. Kirk, George. Short History of the Middle East. London, 1948.

53. Kolarz, W. Russia and her Colonies. London, Philip, 1952. Published after my book was finished, this work approaches the subject from a different angle. *See* II, 7A.

54. Krist, Gustav. Alone through the Forbidden Land. Translation by E. O. Lorimer. Faber, 1939. Historically inaccurate but contains striking account of Samarkand in early Soviet days.

55. Lane-Poole, S. Mohammadan Dynasties. London, Constable, 1894. An invaluable background to Muslim comparative history.

56. *L'Asie soviétique.* Official French Studies. Published by Institut National de la Statistique. Paris, 1949.

57. Lattimore, Owen. Inner Asian Frontiers of China, 1940. Republished New York, 1951. Mr. Lattimore's emphasis hitherto

113

has been on the parts of Central Asia farther east than Russian Turkistan. It is to be hoped that he will extend his range.

58. Lenin, V. I. Selected Works. Vol. IV, article 'On the Right of Nations to Self-determination'.
59. Leprince-Ringuet. *L'Avenir de l'Asie Russe.* Paris, 1951.
60. Lestrange. *See* Clavijo.
61. Leyden & Erskine. Memoirs of Zehir-ed-din Muhammed Babur. Translated into English, 1816. First published, 1826, latest edition, London, O.U.P., 1921. Most of the work was done by Erskine. 'It differs from Mrs. Beveridge's translation (*q.v.*) in that, although the Chaghatai Turkish text became available to Erskine before publication, he did not know the language well and started from the Persian text. Easier to handle than its rival.
62. Littlepage. In Search of Soviet Gold. New York, 1937.
63. Lockhart, L. Nadir Shah. London, Luzac, 1938.
64. Lorimer, Frank. Population of the Soviet Union. League of Nations, Geneva, 1946. Contains full analysis and bibliography of the two Soviet censuses in 1926 and 1939.
65. Maclean, Fitzroy. Eastern Approaches. London, J. Cape, 1948. The most stimulating travel-book on Soviet Central Asia from British sources.
66. Maillart, Ella. Turkestan Solo. New York, Putnam's, 1935.
67. Malleson, Gen. Sir W. *See* II, 7.
68. Mandel, W. The Soviet Far East and Central Asia. Published by American Institute of Pacific Relations, 1944. A typical 'research' compilation.
69. Marco Polo, Travels of. Translation into English of the travel story of the great XIIIth-century Venetian, by A. Yule. In 2 vols. London, John Murray, 1875.
70. Menges, K. H., Prof. (i) Qaraqalpaq Grammar. New York, 1947.
71. Menges, K. H., Prof. (ii) *Einige Bermerkungen zur vergleichenden Grammatik des Türkmenischen, Archiv Orientalni.* Vol. XI. Prague, 1939. A distinguished Turcologist now in U.S.A.
72. Mikhailov, NN. Soviet Russia; the Land and its People. New York, Sheridan House, 1948. An economic geography of the USSR.
73. Minorsky, Prof. *See* II, 7.
74. Nevayi, Alishir. *See* Gibb, E. J. W.
75. Padmore, G. How Russia transformed her Colonial Empire. London, Dobson, 1946. 'A challenge to the Imperialist Powers.'
76. Pipes, R. E. *See* II, 8.
77. Quincey. *See* De Quincey.

78. Radloff, W. (i) *Proben der Volksliteratur der türkischen Stämme Südsibiriens, etc.* German version. St. Petersburg, 1866–1907. This great work of 10 vols. contains in its fifth the Manas epic of the Kirghiz, taken down by the author from native minstrels, with translation into German.

79. Radloff, W. (ii) *Versuch eines Wörterbuches der Türk-Dialekte.* In German and Russian. St. Petersburg, 1893–1911.

80. Radloff, W. (iii) *See also* Czaplicka, who gives a representative list of this scholar's works, mainly in the fields of literature and linguistics. He was bilingual in Russian and German, and wrote in both.

81. Räsänen, M. *Materialen zur Lautgeschichte der türkischen Sprachen,* Studia Orientalia, Soc. orient. fennica. Helsinki, 1949. An outstanding Turcologist from Finland.

82. Samoylovich, A. N. *See* III and under Czaplicka.

83. Schlesinger, R. *See* II, 9.

84. Schuyler, E. Turkistan. In 2 vols. London, Sampson Low, 1876. American consul. This is an invaluable background book for study of the Tsarist conquest and the early impact of Russia on the old world of Transoxiana and the Central Asian steppe.

85. Scott, J. Behind the Urals. London, 1942.

86. Shabad, T. Geography of the USSR. O.U.P., 1951.

87. Skrine, Sir C. P. Chinese Central Asia. London, 1922. British Indian envoy. An able study by a man who was British Consul-General in Kashghar during the latter part of Basmachi movement. In present context chiefly notable for its indication of the 'separateness' of the two Turkistans at that time.

88. Skrine and Ross. The Heart of Asia. London, 1899.

89. Stahl, Mrs. K. British and Soviet Colonial Systems. London, Faber, 1951. A valuable study.

90. Stalin, J. Marxism and the National and Colonial Question. English translation. Lawrence & Wishart, 1942 edition, authorized by Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute in Marxist-Leninist Library. An essential and revealing book.

91. Tchokaieff (Chokaiev, Chokai, Mustafa Chokayoghlu). *See* II, and III under Chokai.

92. Toynbee, Prof. Arnold. (i) Study of History. In 6 vols. *See also* abridgment by D. C. Somervell. London, 1946. The best way to use this great book as an aid to specific study is to work through the admirable index, both in the original and in the abridgment. The abridgment is a remarkable *tour de force.*

93. Toynbee, Prof. Arnold. (ii) Civilization on Trial. London, O.U.P., 1948.

94. Vambéry, A. (i) Travels and Adventures in Central Asia. London, 1864.

95. Vambéry, A. (ii) The Story of My Struggles. London, Fisher Unwin, 1904. Vambéry's works, both as traveller and scholar, are inclined to 'date', but he is still worth reading for background and for his penetration and enterprise.

96. Vambéry, A. (iii) *See also* under Czaplicka.

97. Vladmirtsov, B. (i) *Gengis-Khan*. Translated from the Russian into French by Michel Carsow. Paris, Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1948.

98. Vladmirtsov, B. (ii) *Le Régime social des Mongols*. Translated as above. An important Russian scholar in Mongolian field, and thus rather outside the scope of this book.

99. Wiener (Winner), Dr. T. G. A notable American Turcologist. *See* II, 7 and 7A.

100. Wolff, Dr. J. Mission to Bokhara. London, Parker, 1846. The self-imposed journey of a gallant but eccentric clergyman of Jewish extraction to the court of the Bokhara Emir.

101. Wurm, Dr. S. (i) *Der özbekische Dialekt von Andidschan, Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien*. Vienna, 1945.

102. Wurm, Dr. S. (ii) The Uzbek Dialect of Qizil Qujaš. London University, S.O.A.S. Bulletin, Vol. XII, Part I, 1947.

103. Wurm, Dr. S. (iii) The Karakalpak Language. Anthropos. Vol. XLVI. Fribourg, 1951.

104. Wurm, Dr. S. (iv) The Kirghiz Language. London University. S.O.A.S. Bulletin. Vol. XIII, Part I, 1949. An outstanding linguistic scholar in the Turkic and many other fields.

105. Yakunin, A. *See* II, 11.

106. Yan, V. Jenghiz Khan. Translated from the Russian into English by L. E. Britton. London, Hutchinson, no date. Stalin prize novel.

II

JOURNALS (ENGLISH, RUSSIAN, TURKISH)

1. Anglo-Soviet Journal. Autumn 1951. Article by Prof. J. Bernal on irrigation works.

2. *Bolshevik*. Article in December number, 1951, on the Lesser Evil.

3. *Kafkasya* (The Caucasus). Editor A. Kantemir. Journal of Caucasian National Liberation Movement. Published by a group of émigrés of the North Caucasus in Munich in Turkish, Russian and English. Of some value for light from one quarter on current events. Comprises interesting cultural articles.

4. *Millij Türkistan* (National Turkistan). Editor V. Kayum Khan.

Journal of Eastern Turk Liberation Movement (National Turkistanian Unity Committee). Published by a group of the younger emigration in Düsseldorf in a lingua franca based on Uzbek, also in English and Arabic. Propagandist, but comprises interesting cultural articles.

5. Moscow News. 'Public Relations' periodical in English. January 1952. Article by Boris Krinitsky on Soviet public works.
6. Round Table, The. Article in Number 169, December 1952, on Soviet Imperialism.
7. Royal Central Asian Society's Journal. (1) July 1933, article by Tchokaieff, M. (2) July 1933, article by Gen. Malleson. (3) January 1943, article by Prof. Minorsky. (4) October 1951, article by Dr. Wiener. Prof. Minorsky's article contains bibliographical material.

7A. Royal Geographical Society's Journal, March 1953. Review of I, 53, by Dr. Winner.

8. Russian Review. Published by Russian Research Center. Harvard University, USA. October 1950. Article by R. E. Pipes on the Bashkir struggle for liberation.
9. Soviet Studies. Published for Glasgow University. January 1952. Articles by Mrs. M. Holdsworth and R. Schlesinger on stock and collectivization of agriculture.
10. Soviet Weekly. 'Public Relations' periodical. December 1947. Article by Mikhail Ilyin on railway construction.
11. *Voprosi Istorii.* November 1951. Article by A. Yakunin on the Pokrovsky school of history.

III

Russian Sources Consulted

1. Abay, K. Абай Кунанбаев, Избранное, перевод с казахского. Selections from the works of the poet Kunanbayev Abay, translated from the Kazak into Russian verse, by L. Sobolev and Mukhtar Auezov. Ogiz, Moscow, 1943. To be of value this book should have had the original Kazak verse interleaved with the Russian, but the sole concession to Kazak readers is a bilingual title-page in Russian and Kazak.
2. Abdukalukov, B., and Pankratova, A. Абдукалуков, М. и Панкратова, А. История Казахской ССР с древнейших времен до наших дней. A history of the Kazak SSR from early times up to our own days. Kazogiz (official printers of Kazakistan), 1943.

T

3. Abdullayev, Kh. Абдуллаев, Х., Советский Узбекистан. Soviet Uzbekistan. Gosplanizdat, Moscow, 1948.

4. Baronov, B. F., Bukeikhan, A. N., and Rudenko, S. I. Баронов, Б. Ф., Букейхан, А. Н. и Руденко, С. И., Казаки, антропологические очерки. The Kazaks. Anthropological sketches. Leningrad, 1927.

5. Bart(h)old, V. V. (i) Бартольд, В. В., История культурной жизни Туркестана. History of the cultural life of Turkistan. Leningrad, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1927.

6. Bart(h)old, V. V. (ii) Бартольд, В. В., Отчет о поездке в Среднюю Азию с научной целью 1893–94 гг. Report on a journey to Central Asia in the years 1893–4 with a scientific aim. St. Petersburg. Memoirs of the Imp. Acad. of Sc. Dpt. of philology and history. Vol. I, 4, 1897.

7. Bart(h)old, V. V. (iii) *See also* I.

8. Bernshtam, A. Бернштам, А., Историческая правда в легенде об Огуз-Кагане. The historical facts of the Oghuz-Khan legend. Sovyetskaya Etnografiya, No. 6, 1935.

9. Chokai, Mustafa. Чокай, Мустафа, Туркестан под властью советов. Turkistan under Soviet domination, Yash Turkestan. Paris, 1935.

10. Encyclopedia, Great Soviet. Энциклопедия, Большая Советская. First edition of Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 65 vols., now withdrawn as ideologically unsound and embarrassing. In the field of 'sciences' the withdrawal of this compilation is a revealing example of the shifts of Soviet mentality.

11. Eventov, I. Эвентов, И., Казахский героический эпос и песни Джамбула. The Kazak heroic epos and the songs of Jambul. *Sovyetskii Folklor*, No. 6, 1939.

12. Grigoryev, A. A. (editor). Григорьев, А. А. [под ред], Казахстан. Kazakistan. Moscow–Leningrad Acad. of Sc. of the USSR, 1950.

13. Kuftin, B. A. Куфтин, Б. А., Киргиз-Казаки, культура и быт. The Kirghiz-Kazaks, their life and culture. Moscow, edition of the Central Museum of Ethnology, 1926.

14. Markov, K. K., and Burachek, A. R. Марков, К. К. и Бурачек, А. Р., Таджикистан. Tajikistan. Leningrad, Acad. of Sc. of the USSR, 1936.

15. Materials for statistics of the Turkistan Province. Материалы для статистики Туркестанского края. St. Petersburg, edition of Turkestan statistic committee, 1872–3. 2 vols.

16. Materials for the history of the Kazak SSR, Vol. IV. Материалы

L

по истории Казахской ССР, т. 4. Moscow, Acad. of Sc. of the USSR. Institute of history.

17. Mozolkov, Ye., Dzhakishev, U. (editors). Мозолков, Е. и Джакишев, У. [под. ред.], Манас киргизский народный эпос. The Kirghiz national epic, the Manas. Moscow, 1941.

18. Orlov, A. F. Орлов, А. Ф., Казахский героический эпос. The Kazak heroic epos. Moscow–Leningrad Acad. of Sc., 1945.

19. Radloff, W. Радлов, В. *See* I.

20. Ryazantsev, S. N. Рязанцев, С. Н., Киргизия. Kirghizia. Moscow Acad. of Sc. Institute of Geogr., 1951.

21. Samoylovich, A. N. (i) Самойлович, А. Н., Некоторые дополнения к классификации турецких языков. Some supplementary comments on the classification of Turkic tongues. Institute for living oriental languages. Petrograd, 1922.

22. Samoylovich, A. N. (ii) Самойлович, А. Н., Из туркменской старины, сборник Потанина. From Turkmen old days: a collection of Potanin. Imperial Russian Geogr. Society. Petrograd, 1909.

23. Samoylovich, A. N. (iii) *See also* Czaplicka in I. Samoylovich was Elisha to Radloff's Elijah. He is recognized as one of the founders of the modern classification of Turkic languages.

24. Skosirev, P. Скосырев, П., Туркменистан. Turkmenistan. Moscow, 1948.

25. Vyatkin, M. Вяткин, М., Очерки по истории Казахской ССР. Sketches of the history of the Kazak SSR. Acad. of Sc. of USSR, 1941.

26. Vitkovich, V. Виткович, В. Путешествие по Советскому Узбекистану. Wanderings in Soviet Uzbekistan. Moscow, 1951.

27. Zarubin, I. I. (i) Зарубин, И. И., Список народностей Туркестанского края. A list of the nationalities of the Turkistan Province. Leningrad, Russ. Acad. of Sc. 1925.

28. Zarubin, I. I. (ii) Зарубин, И. И., Население Самаркандской области, его численность, этногр. состав и территор. распределение. Population of the Samarkand Oblast, its numbers, ethnological composition and territorial distribution.

[Page 282 = blank]

INDEX

odd

Abay, Ibrahim Kunanbay, Kazak poet (1845–1906), 223, 224–5, Bibliography
Abbasids, Caliphate (750–1258), 49, 51, 58
Abbott, Sir James, British Indian administrator (*fl.* 1846–60), 4
Abdul Ghaffar, Kazak Chief (*fl.* 1916), 90
Abdul Hamid Suleiman. *See* Cholpan
Abdullah, Shaibanid Emir of Bukhara (r. 1556–98), 66
Abdul Malik, Caliph (685–705), 48. *See* Umayyids
Abdul Said Mir Alim Khan. *See* Mir Alim
Abilay, Kazak Chief (d. 1781), 74, 181, 222, 224, 236, 267
Ab-i-Panja, 15. *See also* Amu Darya
Abul Ghazi, ruler of Khorezm (r. 1643–1663), 66, Bibliography
Achil Beg, Basmachi (*fl.* 1920–22), 240
Afghanistan, Afghan(s): neighbour to Russian Central Asia, v–vi, 3, 14, 76, 115; Turkistan, 13, 127; old name for, 14; physique of Town Turks compared to, 40; Powindahs, 42; war, 76, 123; defeat at Penjdeh, 81; Wakhan, 82; as buffer-state, 115–116, 122; support of Basmachis, 118, 124–5, 127, 241; revolution, 127 and n. *See also* Amanullah, Durranis, Ghazni, Habibullah, Kabul, Nadir Shah (ii)
Afridis, Pathan tribe, 100, 262. *See also* Khyber
Afshar, Turkmen tribe, 67. *See* Nadir Shah
Agha Khan, the, 39, 83
Agra, 218
Ahmed (Ahmet): (i) Yesevi, mystic (d. 1166), 13, 46, 55, 62, 166, 242, 267; (ii) Aghaiev, Azeri exile (*fl.* 1920–30), 156; (iii) Pasha, Ottoman poet (*circa* 1500), 220; (iv) *see* Togan
Akbar, Great Mughul (1542–1605), 34 n., 66
Akin (Kazak bard). *See* Nisembay
Ak Mechit. *See* Kizil Orda
Akmolinsk, town and rail junction, north Kazakistan, 195
Aksu, tributary of Amu Darya, 15, 23 n.
Alai, mountain range, 15, 55
Alash Orda, Kazak provisional government, 104, 107, 143, 183
Alexander the Great, 17, 55, 80
Alexandria, 222
Algeria, 141
Al-Ghazali, theologian and mystic (1058–1111), 266–7, Bibliography
Ali Khan Bukai Khan (*fl.* 1916–20), 101, 104
Ali Shir Nevayi, Eastern Turkish poet (1441–1501), 64, 216, 218–20, 225, 229
Allen, W. E. D., vi
Alma Ata, capital of Kazakistan, 57, 141, 148, 159, 212
Almalik: (i) Chaghatai capital, 57; (ii) copper site near Tashkent, 192
Alphabets, 155–7. *See also* Cyrillic, Roman
Alsace, 3
Altai, mountain system, 18, 228
Amanullah, King (r. 1919–28), 127 n.
Amin Hussaini, El-Hajj, ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, 250
Amu Darya (Oxus, Jaihun), river: as Russo-Afghan frontier, vi, 12, 76, 81; defining region inhabited by Eastern Turks, 2, 5, 50; giving name to Transoxiana, 14; and Sir Darya, 14–16, 23–6, 49, 227; and Karakum, 15; and Kizilkum, 15; tributaries of, 15; issues from mountains, 16; as boundary between Turan and Iran, 17, 50, 65–6; and Matthew Arnold, 23, 268; old course of, 23–6; origin of name Oxus, 23 n.; and Turkmens, 51; as navigation channel, 86; and Khiva, 86, 200; in relation to internal boundaries, 145; as source of irrigation, 146–7, 202–9; floods from, 161; railway along, 194–5. *See also* Ab-i-Panja, Irrigation, Matthew Arnold, Sir Darya, Togan, Transoxiana

[Page 284 = blank]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

000

regret over elimination of Khorezm, 144, 145; warnings about waterlogging, 200. *See also* Bibliography
Bashkiria, Bashkir (Bashkurd), 7, 41, 95, 100, 104-9, 119, 143, 190, 244
Basmachi(s): collective name of Central Asian Turkish tribes, mainly Uzbek, resisting Soviet reconquest (1918-31), 13, 21, 34, 42, 100-101; lit fuse laid by Dükchi Ishan, 88-9, 128; connection of Togan with, 99; resemblance to Afridis, etc., 100; derivation of word, 100 n.; leaders, 101, 120, 124, 240; persistence, 101, 127-8; supporters of Bukhara Emir, 118, 121, 124; relations with intellectuals, 120-122; Jemal Pasha and, 123; Enver Pasha and, 123-4; significance of, 127-30; attitude to the clergy, 240; as Zealots, 262. *See also* Castagné, Devletmand, Ibrahim Lakai, Toghay Sari
Batu, Chingizid (XIIIth century), 54, 57, 58, 59. *See* Golden Horde
Bayezid, Ottoman Sultan (r. 1389-1402), 46, 64
Begovat, new Soviet town on Sir Darya, 16
Bekovich, Prince (d. 1717), 77
Beljuvan, town in Tajik country, 101, 124-5
Berke, Chingizid (XIIIth century), 54, 59, 60. *See* Golden Horde
Bernal, Professor J. D., 205 n., Bibliography
Betpak Dala, Steppe of Misfortune, 15, 18, 20, 25. *See also* Mirza Chöl
Beveridge, Mrs., 14 n., 217 n., 218, Bibliography
Beymembet, Kazak envoy, 75
Bilingualism, 32-4
Birge, J. K., American Turcologist, 37 n., Bibliography
Bismarck, 125
Black Sea, 70, 97. *See also* Crimea
Bokhara, 30. *See* Bukhara
Bolshevik(s): distinction between practice and profession, 6, 97, 105-10, 127, 133, 140 n.; temporary alliance with Turkish intellectuals, 91, 95, 98, 102; difficulties in Central Asia, 96; and Mensheviks, 99, 103, 117; at Tashkent, 100, 102-3, 114, 117; at Kokand, 104; in Bashkiria, 105-9; and Malleson, 116; and twenty-six Commissars, 117; sponsorship of Jemal and Enver Pashas by, 122-3; comparison with Tsars in colonial field, 230; negotiations with Basmachis, 240; pressure on clergy, 240. *See also* Cantonization, Collectivization, Colonization, Constitution, Declaration of Rights, Deviationism, Dogmas, Kremlin, Lenin, Party, Secession, Stalin
Borak, Chingizid (XIIIth century), 54, 60
Boulangier, French engineer, 80. *See* Skobelev
Bourgeois nationalism. *See* Nationalism
Bowra, Sir M., 223 n., Bibliography
Buddhist influences, 50, 72
Bughra Khan (XIth century), 50. *See* Karakhanids
Buguruslan, oilfield, 190 n.
Bukhara: Mangit Emirs of, 4, 67-8, 76, 82, 100, 118; centre of Independence Movement, 7, 95, 121; Vambéry's history of, 30; bilingualism in, 32, 34; captured by Karakhanids, 50; captured by Chingiz, 56; destroyed and rebuilt twice, 60; captured by Shah Ismail, 65; seat of Shaibanids and Mangits, 66-7, 148; captured by Nadir Shah, 67; seat of orthodoxy and fanaticism, 69, 70-71, 84, 97, 100, 179, 239; as Russian satellite, 76, 83, 85, 95, 100, 108, 114, 143; as Peoples' Soviet Republic, 118, 144; and young Bukharans, 118-21, 262; Enver Pasha in, 123, 126; absorbed in Uzbekistan, 144; dialect of Uzbek spoken in, 221; library of, 222. *See also* Bokhara
Bulgars, 36
Bum (Buam) gorge on River Chu, 18
Burnes, Sir Alexander, British Indian Envoy and explorer (*fl.* 1830-41), 4, Bibliography
Bursa (Brusa), 46, 51
Byron, 225
Byzantium, Byzantines, 64, 215. *See also* Constantinople, Istanbul

Cairo, 243, 262
Canada, 3, 13
Canals. *See* Irrigation and Waterways
Cantonization, 144-9
Cape of Good Hope, 27
Carroll, Lewis, 40

000

Caspian Sea: as western limit of Central Asia, 3, 13, 46, 68, 112, 247; relationship to Karakum and Ust Yurt, 15-16; situated in depression, 16; remnant of larger sea, 22; one-time destination of Amu Darya, 23-6, 53; refuge of Shah of Khorezm, 56; in relation to irrigation and power projects, 204-7, 212. *See also* Trans-Caspia(n)
Castagné, French Turcologist, 88, Bibliography
Cathay. *See* Kitai
Caucasus, the: distinguished from Transcaspia and Central Asia, 1, 45; geological uplift of, 26; conquered by Chingiz, 56; struggle against Russian conquest, 74, 126, 185; temporarily overrun by Turkey (1918), 115; threat to India from, 116; military defeat of Enver in, 122; movement for revision of script in, 155; as origin of Marr's Japhetic theory, 158; name of modern journal, 238 n., Bibliography; German Turkish legionaries drawn from, 246-7, 251-3. *See also* Armenia, Azerbaijan, Baku, Georgia, Shamil, Transcaucasia
Caucasus, journal, 238 n., Bibliography
Census, Soviet, 2 n., 162-72
Central Asian Railway. *See* Trans-Caspian
Central Asian Turks. *See* Turks, Eastern
Chach (Shash), old name of region around Tashkent, 14
Chaghatai: (i) second son of Chingiz (XIIIth century), 36, 54, 56-8; (ii) dynasty and horde, 27, 54, 60-61, 70; (iii) literary language, 32, 43, 55, 64, 126, 216-22
Chaldees, the, 55
Charjui (Tchardzhou), town on Trans-Caspian line near Amu Darya crossing, 194, 206
Chekishler, town on Caspian near Persian frontier, 78
Cherkes Hussain, companion of Enver, 125
Chernaiev, Governor-General (*fl.* 1865-1884), 77
Chimion, oilfield in Farghana, 196
Chimkent, city in Uzbek part of Kazakistan, 76, 88, 192, 212
China, Chinese: and Communism, 2, 216; conquest by Mongols, 27, 54, 56, 61; conquers conquerors, 36; and Kitai, 52-3; and Cathay, 53; ruled by Yüan dynasty, 54, 57; Silk Road from, 69; as claimant to power in Central Asia, 71; and Kalmucks, 71-2; negotiations of Abilay with, 74. *See also* Chinese Turkistan (Sinkiang), Chingiz, Kublai Khan, Manchus, Marco Polo, Peking
Chinese Turkistan (Sinkiang): contrasted with Russian Turkistan, vi, 1-2, 13, 15, 18; discoveries of Aurel Stein in, 2, 22; position of Khan Tenri in relation to, 15 n., 19; farthest in world from sea, 29; part of Chaghatai inheritance, 57; ruled by Manchus, 82. *See also* Kashghar, Khotan, Kulja, Taklamakan, Tarim, Yakub Beg
Ching. *See* Manchus
Chingiz (Jenghis) Khan (1162-1227): conquers China, Turkistan and Persia, 27; divides empire between four sons, 27, 56-7; and hordes, 27, 58-9, 65; invasion of Transoxiana, 32, 48; enemy to Islam, 35, 59; ancestor of Babur, 36; turcization of followers of, 36-7, 46, 59-60; dynasty of, 48, 54; and the Kitai, 52; and the Khorezm Shahs, 55-6; destroys Bukhara, 60; his empire compared with that of Russia, 61; contrasted with Timur, 63; ancestor of Shaibani Khan, 65; Skobelev spiritual descendant of, 80; and Kazaks, 85; ancestor of Chokan, 225; spelling of name, 272
Chirchik, river of Tashkent, 197, 211
Chitral, 39, 82. *See also* Gilgit, Ismailis
Chkalov. *See* Orenburg
Chokai (Chokaiev), Mustafa (d. 1941), Eastern Turkish leader, 7, 97, 101, 104, 119, 243-4, 247, 253, Bibliography
Chokan, Velikhan, Kazak writer (d. 1865), 225-6
Cholpan (Abdul Hamid Sulaiman), Uzbek poet (b. 1897), 229
Chu, river: once possibly draining Issik Köl, 18, 25-6; Balasagun on, 50, 53; scene of Kirghiz defeat by Russians, 85; railway junction, 195-6; irrigation from, 201
Chuguchak, frontier post with Sinkiang, 18
Chuvash, people and language, 36

000

Clavijo, González de, Spanish Envoy to Timur (1403–6), 4, 59, Bibliography
Clergy, Clericalism, 35, 84, 96, 239–42, 250–51. *See also Ulema*
Coates, W. P. and Zelda, 135 n., 140 n., 180 n., Bibliography
Collectivization, 137, 173–88. *See also* Bolsheviks
Colonization, 84–5, 98, 140–43, 162–72. *See also* Bolsheviks
Conolly, British Envoy (d. 1841), 4, 68, Bibliography
Constantinople, 59 n., 64, 220, 262. *See also* Byzantium, Istanbul
Constitution, Soviet, 149, 154. *See also* Secession
Cordova, 3
Cortez, 68
Cossacks: derivation of word, 38 n.; invasion of Khiva, 77; savagery of, 79; opposed to Bolsheviks, 103–4, 114; companion of Enver, 125; friendly with tribes, 152, 215; confiscation of lands by Bolsheviks, 152
Cotton, 85–6, 96, 142, 179, 192–3, 197, 202, 212
Crimea(n): conquered by Turco-Mongols (XIIIth century), 59; conquered by Ottomans (1475), 59 n.; War (1854–6), 74; Soviet proclamation to, 105; meeting of Togan with Stalin near, 110; climate, 141; birthplace of Gaspirali, 226; refugees, 243. *See also* Jafar Krimer
Crusades, the, 261
Curzon, Lord: author of classic on Persia, 5; author of notable work on Central Asia, 5,13, 95, Bibliography; Gibbon his literary exemplar, 5; description of desert, 22; laudation of Samarkand architecture, 62–3; appraisal of Skobelev, 79–80, 88
Cyrillic script, 155–7, 253. *See also* Alphabets, Roman
Czaplicka, M., 14 n., Bibliography

Dalai Lama, 72
Damascus, 3, 49
Danube, 261
Darius, 67
Dava, Chingizid (XIVth century), 54, 60
Davidov, J., Soviet planner, 207–8
Declaration of Rights: made on 15th Nov. 1917, 105; providing for secession, 105; association of Lenin and Stalin with, 105, 133–4; set aside, 108; emotional appeal of, 139; belied in practice, 143, 149, 151, 160
Delhi, 67
Denikin, General, 97
De Quincey, 28, 70, 71, 133, 139, 162, 173, Bibliography
Deviationism, 74, 230–38, 241. *See also* Bolsheviks
Devletmand, Basmachi leader, 101, 124–125
Dnieper, 204
Dogmas, Soviet. *See* Bolsheviks, Evil, Proletariat
Don, river, 41, 57, 204
Dresden, 250
Dükchi Ishan, village priest and rebel leader (d. 1898), 88–9, 128
Duma, 101
Dunsterville, British general, 116
Durranis, Afghan dynasty (1747 to present day), 51, 65, 71
Dutov, Cossack commander, 105–6

Education, 97, 154–7, 161, 255
Egypt, 200, 206, 262. *See also* Alexandria, Cairo
Elizabeth, Elizabethans, 64, 66, 217
Emancipation. *See* Women
Emba, river and oilfield, 196, 199, 212–213
Enver Pasha (d. 1922): association of Togan with, 7, 95, 99, 125; epic of, 8, 124; Tajiks and, 40; and pan-Islam, 45, 126; and Basmachis, 101, 124–5, 127–8; and brother Nuri, 115; successor, 118; defeat at Sarikamish, 122; sponsorship by Bolsheviks, 123; idealism, 124–5; death of, 124–125; views on language for Central Asian Turks, 126; reputation in Britain, 126; and pan-Turkism, 126–127; and intellectuals, 128. *See also* Basmachis, Haji Sami, Jemal Pasha
Epic. *See* Heroic poetry
Erdebil, town in Persian Azerbaijan, 28
Erskine, British Indian scholar (*fl.* 1816–1826), 217 n., 218, Bibliography
Ethnology, 32–5. *See also* Linguistics
Euphrates, 14
Evil, Conception of the Lesser, Soviet dogma, 91 n., 231–2
Evkaf, religious endowments, 152, 240

000

Faizullah Khojaev, Uzbek Communist, 160

Farghana: Kokand, capital of, 7, 20, 68; the home of Babur, 14; name of upper Sir Darya basin, 14; importance during caravan age, 18, 28; description of, 20-21, 71, 85-6, 178; agricultural and industrial importance of, 21, 85-6, 212; centre of Basmachi movement, 21, 100, 128; compared with Kashmir and Peshawar, 28, 85-6; Kipchaks in, 37; mouth at Khojent, 39, 86; Russian conquest of, 77, 79, 83; the name of new Margilan, 79; rebellions in (1898 and 1916), 88-91; Russian colonization of, 98; part of Tsarist province of Turkistan, 143; division into three parts by Soviets, 146, 147; Uzbeks in, 148; climatic contrasts in, 181; mineral wealth of, 192, 196; cotton and silk cultivation in, 197, 212; irrigation in, 201; hydro-electric works in, 211; the heart of Central Asia, 212; seat of the best Uzbek, 221. *See also* Andijan, Khojent, Kirghiz, Kokand, Tajiks, Uzbeks

Farkhad, hydro-electric station named from legend, 210

Firdausi, Persian poet (Xth and XIth centuries), 17, 50 n., 266

Five-year plans, 88, 137-8, 213

Flecker, J. E., 48

Fraser-Tytler, Sir W. K., 51 n., 76 n., Bibliography

Frontiers, inter-republic, 143-9

Frunze: (i) General, 112, 134, 143; (ii) capital of Kirghizia (Pishpek), 112, 148, 212

Gandhi, Mahatma, 89, 264

Ganges, 261

Gaspirali, Ismail Bey, Crimean writer (1851–1914), 46, 226-7

Georgia, 46, 110, 156 n., 246

German dealings with Central Asian and Caucasian Turks, 246-53. *See also* Dresden, Göttingen, Himmler, Hitler, Rosenberg, Ostministerium

Ghazi, Islamic equivalent of a crusader, 124, 262-3

Ghazni, Ghaznavids (962–1160), 12, 50, 56. *See also* Mahmud (ii)

Ghilzai, Afghan tribe of Turkish origin, 42, 51. *See also* Khalij, Powindah

Ghulam Alim, Volunteer commander, 249

Ghuzz. *See* Oghuz

Gibb, E. J. W., 220, Bibliography

Gibb, Prof. H. A. R., Bibliography

Gibbon, 5, 80

Gilgit, 39, 82

Gobi, 68

Gök Tepe, scene of Turkmen defeat (1881), 67, 79-81

Golden Horde, the: name of followers of western Mongols under Juchi, 27, 41, 54, 57; distinction from Chaghatai horde, 27, 57; temporary control of Khorezm by, 27, 60; on the Volga, 36; *turquisation* of, 41; limits of, 56-57; control of much of Russia by, 57; practical independence of, 58; ancestors of Tatars, 59; descent of Uzbeks from, 65, 70; nomadic tradition of, 181

Goldman, Bosworth, 9 n., Bibliography

Gorchakov, Prince and Chancellor, 75-76

Grigoriev, Tsarist Turcologist, 30

Gur Khan, title of Kara Kitai, 53

Gurkhas, 47

Guryev, Caspian port at mouth of Ural River, 196, 212

Habibullah, Durrani Emir (1901–19), 115. *See also* Afghanistan

Hafiz, Persian poet (1320–89), 40

Haji Sami, Enver's successor, 127-8

Hanafi, most orthodox of the four Sunni schools in Islam, 35, 50 and n.

Hari Rud. *See* Tejen

Harun. *See* Karakhanids

Henry III of Castile (XVth century), 4. *See* Clavijo

Hentig, von, German envoy, 115

Herat: city of, 16; importance under Timurids, 27, 64, 218-20; decay of, 27; monuments of, 46; included in Chaghatai area, 57; seat of literary culture, 64; inclusion in Persia, 65; inclusion in Durrani Kingdom, 65; and Penjdeh, 81; birthplace of Ali Shir Nevayi, 218. *See also* Hussain Baikara

Herodians, 262-3

Heroic poetry, 74, 222-9, 234-5

Himalayas, 2, 15

Himmler, 248

000

Hindu Kush, mountains, 1, 13, 15-17, 50, 68, 71, 81, 82, 129
Hindustan, 14, 31, 64. *See also* India
Hissar (Russ.: Gissar), mountains, 32 n., 202
Hitler, 248
Holdich, Sir T., 198, Bibliography
Holdsworth, Mrs., 140 n., 184 n., Bibliography
Hormuz, old emporium on Persian Gulf, 27
Howorth, Sir H. H., 56 n., Bibliography
Hulagu, Chingizid (r. 1258–65), 27, 54, 58, 60. *See also* Ilkhans
Humayun, Mughul Emperor (1511–56), 36 n., 217
Hungary, Hungarians, 6, 30, 45, 58, 103, 116
Hunter, Sir W. W., Hunterian system, 270
Hussain Baikara, of Herat (1438–1505), 64, 65, 218. *See also* Ali Shir Nevayi
Hydro-electric power, 192-3, 197, 203, 205, 207, 209-12

Ibrahim Lakai, Basmachi chief (d. 1931), 101, 121, 124, 127-8
Ilak Khans. *See* Karakhanids
Ili, river: migration route, 1, 18; once known as Mughulistan, 14; ancient importance of, 24; Almalik situated near, 57; disputed between Chaghatai and Ogodai hordes, 57; arrival of Russians on, 74, 98
Ilkhans, Chingizid dynasty in Persia and Irak (XIIIth and XIVth centuries), 27, 46, 58, 69. *See also* Hulagu
Imams, 250-51. *See also Ulema*
India: compared with Turkistan, 2-3; Mughul dynasty in, 14, 31, 34 n., 37; derivation of word 'Sart' from, 39; army of, 47; refuge of Khorezm Shah, 56; as route to Mecca, 66; designs of Uzbeks on, 66; conquest by Nadir Shah, 67; maritime route to, 69; Hindu Kush and, 71; withdrawal of British from, 76-7; defence by buffer states, 82, 115-16; separated from Russia by Wakhan, 82; threat to, 115-16, 117-18; Jemal Pasha and, 122; Enver Pasha and, 123; British as sojourners, not settlers, in, 141; irrigation in, 200, 206. *See also* Hindustan
Indus, 42, 56. *See also* Attock
Inland waterways, 192-3, 202, 204, 207-8
Intervention, period of, 6, 97, 115-18, 234
Irak, 14, 27, 115. *See also* Baghdad
Iran. *See* Persia
Iranian influences, 32-5, 39-40, 40 n., 47, 49, 65-8. *See also* Linguistics, Nadir Shah, Ṣafavids, Samanids, Tajiks
Irgesh, of Kokand, 104
Irkishtam, frontier post and pass between Farghana and Kashghar, 18
Irrigation, 20, 21, 25-6, 192-3, 197-209. *See also* Hydro-electric, Inland waterways
Irtish river, 20, 37, 207
Isfahan, 28, 66. *See also* Safavids
Ishan. *See* Dükchi Ishan
Ishim, river, 20, 207
Ishimbay, oilfield in Bashkiria, 189 n., 190 and n., 196, 212, 213
Ish Murad, Enver's companion, 125
Iskandar Köl, lake, 17
Ismail: (i) Gaspirali. *See* Gaspirali. (ii) Shah, founder of Safavid house, 35, 65
Ismailis, heretical sect of Shiahs, 39 and n., 83. *See also* Agha Khan
Issik Köl, lake, 15, 18, 19, 25-6, 74
Istanbul, 8, 25, 28, 66, 71, 118. *See also* Byzantium, Constantinople

Jafar Krimer, Crimean émigré leader, 243
Jaihun. *See* Amu Darya
Jalaluddin, last of royal house of Khorezm (r. 1220–31), 56
Jambul, Kazak bard (1846–1945), and city, 212, 235-6
Jami, Persian poet (XVth century), 220
Jamuga, rival of Chingiz Khan, 55
Janids, Bukhara dynasty (1599–1784), 54, 66
Japhetic theory, 157-8. *See also* Marr
Jaxartes. *See* Sir Darya
Jemal Pasha (d. 1922), 120, 122-3
Jenghis Khan. *See* Chingiz
Jezkazgan, copper site, 191, 195, 212
Jinnah, Kaid-i-Azam, 264
Jizak, Uzbek town, 199
Johnson, Dr., 219
Juchi, eldest son of Chingiz (d. 1227), 41, 54, 56-8, 65, 70. *See also* Golden Horde
Junaid Khan, Khivan leader, 127, 148

000

Jungaria (northern Sinkiang), 2, 13, 14, 18, 57, 61, 207
Jüre Beg, Uzbek notable, 43-4

Kabul, Afghan capital, 14, 71, 123, 129
Kafirnihan, Amu Darya tributary, 15
Kaganovich, Lazar, 134
Kaghan, new Bukhara, 119
Kaidu, Chingizid (XIIIth century), 54, 58
Kajars, Persian dynasty (1779–1922), 67
Kalat-us-sin. *See* Rebat Tamgach
Kalmucks, 43 and n., 71-2, 246
Kama, river, 190 n.
Kamenev, 109
Kanat, Kirghiz chief, 85
Kandahar, 14, 50 n.
Karaganda, coal centre in Kazakistan, 195, 196, 212, 213
Karakalpak, tribe, language and ASSR, 32-3, 145-6. *See also* Nukus
Karakhanids (Ilak Khans), Turkish dynasty (*circa* 999–1137), 50, 52-3
Kara Kitai, Chinese dynasty in Turkistan (*circa* 1137–1200), 52-3, 55, 56
Karakoram: (i) mountain system, 1, 15; (ii) Mongol capital, 57
Kara Kulja, tributary of Sir Darya, 15
Karakum, desert: the Black Sands, 15, 16; Sarikamish depression north of, 23-4; irrigation of, 26, 202, 204-8; oases in, 67; railway construction in, 194
Kara Su, tributary of Sir Darya, 15
Karatav, hill range, 18, 62, 74, 267
Karategin, district in Tajik country, 15, 23 n.
Kartali, railway junction on N. Kazak frontier, 195
Kashghar, 1, 18, 50, 52, 57, 116. *See also* Chinese Turkistan
Kashka Darya, river, 17, 62, 197, 202-3
Kashmir, 22 n., 27, 39 n., 223 n.
Kasim, father of Kine Sari, 75, 236
Kaufmann, Governor-General (1867–1882), 77 and n., 78-9
Kayum Khan, Veli: his lingua franca, 43, 221 n., 254; Editor of *Milli Türkistan*, 221 n., Bibliography II, 4; of Uzbek origin, 243; leader of young emigration, 243, 252-6; his quality, 243, 252; on common Turkistani nationality, 244, 253-6; successor to Chokai, 244, 247; his emphasis on independence, 245, 254; dealings with Germans, 247-9; organiser of volunteers, 247-50; founder of NTUC, 248-9; distrust of older emigration, 256
Kazakistan, Kazak(s): defined as Eastern Turks, vi; inclusion in Russian Central Asia, 2; area and population, 2 n., 140 and n., 162-72, 213; climate in north, 20; linguistic distribution of, 32-3; distinction from Uzbeks, 33, 148, 254-5; descent from Kipchaks, 37-8; tribal organization, 37, 43; origin of name, 38 n.; not a tribal name, 42; essentially nomadic, 42-3, 83; attitude to the faith, 43, 239; character, 43; distinctions and affinities, 47, 148, 254-6; and Kalmucks, 71-2; confusion with Kirghiz, 72 n., 84, 105 n.; struggle against Russian conquest, 73-5, 89, 100; forced south, 84; Russian colonization, 84-5, 162-72; share in Merdikar rebellion, 90; expropriation, 100; in 1917, 102; Alash Orda, 103-4, 107; percentage of population in USSR, 140 n.; correspondence with Steppe Territory, 143, 162; in relation to other republics, 144-5; delay in grant of full status as SSR, 145, 162, 175-6; capital at Alma Ata, 147-8; Academy of Sciences, 159; Russianization, 162-72; conversion into proletarians, 163, 183; suppression of nomadism, 169, 175-6, 180-84; genocide, 172; as mechanics, 179; loss of herds, 184; relation to Urals, 190 and n.; industrialization, 190-91, 212-213; Mointy–Chu railroad, 195-6; Karaganda, 196, 212-13; irrigation, 199, 201, 207, 209; source of Siberian rivers, 207; coal and copper, 212; wool production, 213; 1950 targets, 213; epics, 222-4; poets, 224-6, 227-8, 235-6; deviationism among, 234-6; distinctions from other Turkish stocks, 255. *See also* Abay, Abilay, Chokan, Jambul, Kine Sari, Maghjan, Nomadism
Kazan, 102, 125
Kazemzadeh, 117 n., Bibliography
Kelif, town on Oxus, 16, 202, 206
Kemal (Mustafa), Kemalist. *See* Atatürk
Kent-Turks (Town-Turks), 40-41, 47. *See also* Sarts

Kenya, 141

Kerensky, 99, 101

Kerim, Enver's companion, 125

Kerki, town on Oxus, 202, 206

Kesh, birthplace of Timur, 32 and n., 44, 48, 62

Khalij (Khalji), 51. *See also* Ghilzai

Khanikov, explorer, 4

Khan Junaid. *See* Junaid

Khan Tenri, mountain, 15 and n., 19 and n. *See* Tienshan

Khiva: early visits to, 4; slavery in, 4, 77; Russian conquest, 5, 76-9; old name, 51, 53; early impregnability, 53, 77; foundation, 66; Khans of, 66, 121, 222; Turkmen raids, 67; becomes satellite state, 83; disappearance, 95, 146, 162; young Khivans, 101, 118; as Peoples' republic, 118, 144; Junaid of, 127, 148; absorption in Karakalpakistan, 162. *See also* Khorezm

Khojent, city in lower Farghana, 16 and n., 32, 34, 39, 53, 57, 86, 146, 194. *See also* Leninabad

Khorasan, the plateau of West Persia and Afghanistan, 14, 49, 51, 57, 60, 65

Khorezm: geographical description, 14; old capital, Urgench, 14, 53, 66, 194; decline, 23-4; destruction by Mongols 27, 55-6; Shahs of (1097–1220), 53-56; as Muslim outpost, 53; 'the hushed Chorasmian waste', 53-5; frontier town, Otrar, 55-6; disputed between Golden and Chaghatai hordes, 58; disputed with Persia, 66; becomes State of Khiva, 66; final elimination by Soviets, 144; artificial division, 146; as one seat of Uzbeks, 148; irrigation in, 200, 206. *See also* Khiva, Muhammad Shah, Otrar, Urgench

Khotan, city in S. Sinkiang, 2

Khyber, 117

Kiefert, German engineer, 205

Kilich Arslan, Seljuk, 127

Kim, oilfield in Farghana, 196

Kine Sari (*fl.* 1837–46), Kazak chief, 74-5, 90, 181, 224, 236. *See also* Abilay, Deviationism, Kasim

Kipchak, name of tribe, 20, 33, 37-8, 41, 55

Kirghizia, Kirghiz: area and population, 2 n., 171, 213; linguistic location of, 32; distinctions and affinities, 47, 254-256; flight before Mongols, 55; location, 55; confusion with Kazaks, 72 n., 84, 105 n.; kill Kine Sari, 75, 224; share in 1916 rebellion, 85, 190; share in Merdikar rebellion, 89; share in Basmachi movement, 128; delay in attainment of SSR status, 145; overlap into Farghana, 146; capital, Frunze, 146; essentially nomadic, 175, 181; stock-raising, 184; epics, 223, 226. *See also* Frunze, Poetry

Kirk, G., 14 n., Bibliography

Kitab, town near Samarkand, 32 n., 44. *See* Kesh

Kitai, Russian name for China, 52-3. *See* Kara Kitai

Kizilkum (the Red Sands), desert, 15, 55, 78

Kizil Orda, town on Sir Darya, 24

Kohik, river. *See* Zarafshan

Kokand, city: capital of Farghana, 7, 20-21, 68; seat of 'independent' government, 7, 68, 97, 114, 121; conquered by Russia, 77, 79, 83; captured by Bolsheviks, 104, 143; connected by rail, 194

Kolchak, Admiral, 97, 106, 114

Kolkhoz, 173-4, 178-80, 186, 209, 214

Komarov, Tsarist commander, 81

Kopet Dagh, hill range dividing Iran from Turan, 16-17, 65, 83, 202, 206

Kotaiba-ibn-Muslim, Arab conqueror of Transoxiana (VIIth century), 48, 257

Kovalev, Communications Minister, 195

Krasnokamsk, oilfield, 190 n.

Krasnovodsk, Caspian port, 24, 87, 104, 205-6

Kremlin, the: as source, 9; establishes 'ethnic' republics in Central Asia, 13; Skobelev as lodestar of, 81; as Elisha to Tsarist Elijah, 97; partiality for glosses, 108; temporizing policies, 108, 118; and Jemal Pasha, 122; and Declaration of Rights, 133, 141; and administrative divisions of Central Asia, 143, 146; and local nationalists, 238. *See also* Bolsheviks, Kaganovich, Kuibishev, Lenin, Stalin

Krinitsky, Boris, publicist, 189

Krist, Gustav, Bibliography

Kriukov, land administrator, 85

Kublai, Great Khakan and Chingizid (r. 1257–94), 27, 54, 58

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

000

Kuenlun, mountain system dividing Sinkiang from Tibet, 68
Kuibishev, the man, 110, 112, 134; the city, 190 n.
Kulaks, 176-7, 178-9, 183, 190
Kulja, city on Ili in N. Sinkiang, 18, 57
Kungrad, in Khorezm delta, 194-5
Kunrad, copper site near Balkhash, 191, 212
Kuropatkin, Governor-General (1914-1917), 77 n., 90, 252
Kurtish, location in Turkmenia, 24
Kushk, border-post towards Afghanistan, 194
Kutluk Nigar, mother of Babur (XVth century), 36, 54, 60
Kuyuk, Chingizid (d. 1248), 54, 58
Kuznetz, Central Siberia, 190
Kuznetzev, land administrator, 84

Lahore, 239
Languages, 32-4, 40 n., 43, 47, 221 and n., 254
Lattimore, Prof. O., Bibliography
Leao, Chinese dynasty, 52. *See* Kara Kitai
Lenin, V. I.: negotiates with Togan, 7-8, 99, 110-11; signs Declaration of Rights, 105; as realist, 111; views on 'colonial' nations, 111, 123, 133-4, 150; Togan addresses letter to, 112-113. *See also* Bolsheviks
Leninabad, city, 16 n., 146. *See* Khojent
Lermontov, 225
Lesser Evil, Soviet dogma, 91 and n., 231-2
Leyden, British Indian scholar, 217 n., Bibliography
Linguistics, 32-4, 154-7, 254-5. *See also* Iranian influences, Ethnology, *Ortatili*
Literature, Eastern Turkish, 36, 45-6, 55, 74, 216-29. *See also* Ali Shir Nevayi, Babur, Chaghatai (iii), Heroic poetry
Littlepage, American engineer, 20, 176, 182-3, Bibliography
Lomakin, Tsarist general, 79, 87
Lorimer, F., 172 n., Bibliography

MacGahan, American freelance, 79
Maclean, Fitzroy, 9 n., 84, 135, Bibliography
Maghjan Jumabay, Kazak poet (b. 1894), 223, 227-8
Magnitogorsk, 190, 196
Mahmud (i) of Kashghar (XIth century), 19; (ii) of Ghazni (r. 998-1030), 50 and n.; (iii) Yalavash, Vezir to Chingizids (XIIIth century), 60
Maillart, Ella, 160 n., Bibliography
Malaya, 141, 161
Malleson, Sir W., British General, 116, 117, Bibliography
Manas. *See* Heroic poetry
Manchus (Ching), Chinese dynasty (1643-1912), 2, 18, 68, 82
Mangishlak, peninsula on Caspian, 16, 78
Mangit, clan-name and name of last Bukharan dynasty (1785-1921), 41, 66-7, 82
Mangu, Chingizid (XIIIth century), 54, 58
Manicheism, 239
Mao Tse-Tung, Chinese Communist leader, 18 n.
Marathas, Indians of Bombay Deccan, 47
Marco Polo (1254-1324), 19, 58, Bibliography. *See also* Silk Road
Margilan, town in Farghana, 79, 104 n., 197
Marr, N. Ya., Russian linguist (d. 1934), 157-9
Marxism, 215-16, 234-5
Masud Beg, vezir to Chaghatais (XIIIth century), 60
Masum, Mangit Emir, 67
Matthew Arnold, 23, 224, 268
Mavera-un-nahr, 14. *See* Transoxiana
Mecca, 66, 239
Madrases, Muslim schools, 46, 62, 68, 118, 259, 261
Mehmet Ali, Pasha of Egypt (XIXth century), 262
Melasgird, battlefield in Anatolia (1071), 51
Mensheviks, 99, 104, 117
Mardikar, revolt against Tsars (1916), 89, 128
Merkit, Turkish tribe, 55-6
Merv, city in Turkmenia, 4, 6, 17, 65, 67, 76, 81, 116-17
Meshed, capital of Persian Khorasan, 116-17, 266
Millij Türkistan, journal, 221 n., Bibliography
Min, Kokand dynasty (1700-1876), 68, 85
Minorsky, Prof. *See* Bibliography
Mir Alim Khan, Abdul Said, last Mangit Emir (fled to Afghanistan, 1921), 100, 118, 121, 124

Mirza Chöl, steppe desert, 199 and n., 200, 210

Mointy–Chu, railway link, 195-6

Mongol(s), Mongolia: cross boundary between Turan and Iran, 17; inundate Turkistan, 19, 32, 36, 41, 51, 55-6, 59-61, 65, 70; and Turks, 31, 36-7, 38, 41-3, 59-61, 65; and Chinese and Russians, 36; descent of Timur and Babur from, 36, 62; relationship of Uzbeks to, 41-2; tribal divisions, 43 n.; Kalmuck section of, 43, 71-2; place in pan-Turanism, 45; under Chingiz Khan, 48; and Kitai, 52; dynasty, 54; sons of Chinghiz, 54, 56; origin of Chaghatai, 55, 64; Chingiz Khan and, 55, 61; capture of Khorezm, 55-6; capture of Bukhara and Samarkand, 56; invasion of Russia and Europe, 56-7, 58, 70; *ulus* and *ordu*, 56-8, 60; extent of empire, 57, 61; become Yüan Emperors of China, 57; embrace Islam, 59-60; dislike of cities, 60, 62; compared with Russian Empire, 61. *See also* Babur, Chaghatai, Chingiz Khan, Golden Horde, Hulagu, Juchi, Kublai, Ogodai, Tatars, Timur, Tului

Morocco, 141

Moscow, 102, 103, 104, 108, 109, 110, 111, 114, 233. *See also* Kremlin

Mughuls, Emperors of India (1525–1857), 36-7, 64, 71. *See also* Akbar, Babur, Humayun, Mongols

Muhammad, Shah of Khorezm (1199–1220), 53-5

Murghab, river, 17, 202

Mustafa: (i) Chokai. *See* Chokai; (ii) Kemal. *See* Atatürk

Nadir Shah (i) of Persia (r. 1736–47), 67; (ii) of Afghanistan (r. 1929–34), 127 n.

Napoleon, 72, 80

Narin, tributary of Sir Darya, 15, 89

Nasrullah, Mangit Emir of Bukhara (1827–60), 4, 68

Nationalism: among Eastern Turks, 7-8, 127-30, 137, 264, 268; a common, for Turkistan, 47, 128-30, 148-9, 237-238, 244-6, 253-6; pre-revolutionary, 74-5, 88-91, 230-31; Soviet lip service to, 74, 90, 102, 105, 108, 139-40, 146, 149-51, 230; bourgeois or local native, 74, 90-91, 151, 160-61, 229, 230-38; of intellectual 'young' parties 101-2, 103-4, 118-19, 120, 231; Stalin and, 105, 108, 109-10, 112-13, 134, 142, 146, 149-51; Lenin and, 105, 110-12, 133-4, 150; in conflict with Doctrine of the Proletariat, 108, 149-151, 230; Enver and, 123-7; among the emigration, 130, 243-6, 253-6; undermined by cantonization, 143-9, 221; declared a deviation, 151, 160-161, 230-38; crushed by the Party, 151-2; fostered by lingua franca, 221 and n., 222, 253-4; focused in literature, 222-9; and Pokrovsky, 231; in conflict with Doctrine of the Lesser Evil, 231-2; and Great Russia, 232-4, 237; identified with pan-Islam and pan-Turkism, 238; and the faith, 239-242; proved by World War II, 246-256. *See also* Deviationism

Nauruzbai, Kazak patriot, 236

Navigation. *See* Inland waterways

Nebit (Neft) Dagh, oilfield in Turkmenia, 196, 212, 213

Nehru, Mr., 121. *See* North-West Frontier

Nejd, Saudi Arabia, 262

Nicholas, Grand Duke (XXth century), 200

Niedermeyer, von, German general and orientalist, 115

Nigeria, 141

Nisembay, Kazak poet (XIXth century), 224

Nogai, clan-name, 37, 41

Nomadism, Nomads: associated with the steppe, 29, 34-5, 47; characteristic of genuine Turkish stock, 33; attitude to the faith, 35, 239, 259-61; the sinews of migration, 35; mixed Turco-Mongolian stock of, 36-8, 41; represented by Kazaks, 42-3; encroachment on cultivation, 59; dependence of Timur on, 62; return as shepherd-kings, 65, 70; oppose Tsarist advance, 74-5; as justification for Tsarist advance, 75; forced south by conquest, 83-4; one force behind local nationalism, 100; dislike of dictators for, 145, 153; suppressed, 145, 153, 180, 184-8; collectivization, 153, 169, 17[illegible], 174-6; as proletarians, 171, 175-6, 182-3, 265; used as fodder for factory labour, 171, 182-3; way

000

of life on steppe, 180-82; way of life on mountain, 180-82; adherence to custom, 239; not Zealots, 262-3. *See also* Abilay, Collectivization, Kine Sari, Stock-breeding
North-West Frontier, of India (now Pakistan): consolidation of, v; a region of overlap, 3; scene of Ghilzai migrations, 42; tribes compared with Basmachis, 100, 121; German attempt to disorganize, 115; in 1946, 121; and Nehru, 121; fastness of Zealotism, 262. *See also* Abbott, Afridis, Pakistan, Peshawar, Wazirs, Yusufzai
Nukus, capital of Karakalpakistan, 145, 205
Nuri, brother of Enver Pasha, 115

Ob, Siberian river, 20, 207
Obedullah Khoja, Uzbek intellectual, 101
Oghush, river. *See* Vakhsh
Oghuz, Turkish tribal confederacy, 37, 41, 50-51
Ogodai, third son and successor of Chingiz (XIIIth century), 54, 56-8
Oil, 21, 190, 192, 196, 212-13
Oirat, Mongol tribe, 71
Omsk, Siberian city, 72
Orenburg (Chkalov), 72, 78, 105-6
Orsk, city, 72, 196, 199, 212
Orta Tav, hills, 20
Ortatili, lingua franca, 43, 221 n., 254. *See also* Languages
Osman (Othman): (i) founder of Ottoman dynasty (r. 1290–1326), 51; (ii) Khoja, Uzbek intellectual, 101, 118, 243
Osmanli, language, 126
Osmanlis, 19, 126. *See* Ottomans
Ossipov, Bolshevik renegade, 103-4
Ostministerium, 247, 249
Othman. *See* Osman
Otrar, ancient city of Khorezm, 55, 56, 60
Ottomans, the: war with Safavids, 28; descended from Oghuz, 37, 51; relationship with Eastern Turks in art, 45-6, 220; successors to Seljuks, 51; Othman, the eponym, 51; war with Nadir Shah, 67; kinship with Turkmens, 67; Enver and, 124; debt to Ali Shir Nevayi, 220; reaction to Crusades, 261. *See also* Osmanli(s), Turks (Western)
Oxus, vi, 14, 23 n. *See* Amu Darya
Özbek. *See* Uzbek
Ōzboy, dry river-bed, 23-6, 205, 207, 211. *See also* Amu Darya, Irrigation, Sir Darya

Pakistan, 3, 39 and n., 82 n., 254. *See also* N.-W. Frontier, Panjab, Peshawar
Pamirs, the, 1, 15, 39, 76, 82, 204. *See also* Amu Darya, Badakhshan, Sarikol
Pan-Islamism, 44, 126, 236
Panjab, Panjabis, 47, 82, 198, 200, 203, 254
Pan-Turanism, 44-5, 126
Pan-Turkism, 44-6, 236, 248
Paranja. *See* Veil
Paropamisus, mountains, 16
Party, the, 99, 151, 151-4, 238, 240. *See also* Bolsheviks, Dogmas
Pascal, 267
Pashtu, language of the Pathans, 21 n., 39, 86 n.
Pathans (Pashtuns, Pahktuns), 21 n., 39, 47, 121, 254
Paul, St., 89, 266
Peking, 56, 57
Penjdeh, district in Turkmenia, 76, 81
Perovsky, Russian general (1839), 77
Persia (Iran), Persian(s): neighbour to Russian Central Asia, v, 3, 116; Curzon's classic on, 5; name of north-eastern, 14; and Turan, 16-17; poets, 17, 40, 50 n., 220, 235; conquered by Mongols, 27; rise of Shiism in, 28, 35, 52 n., 65-6; influence on language and stock, 32-4, 40 and n., 49; rule in Transoxiana, 34, 49; attitude to the faith, 34-5, 39; Tajiks and, 39-40; conquered by Arabs, 48; place in Arab armies, 49; conquered by Seljuks, 51; Azerbaijan, 52 n.; war with Shaibani Khan, 65; Nadir Shah of, 67; Russian pressure on, 76; vestibule to India, 116; Bailey escapes to, 117. *See also* Iranian influences, Khorasan, Meshed, Persian Gulf
Persian dynasties. *See* Afshars, Ilkhans, Kajars, Reza Shah, Safavids, Samanids, Sassanians,
Persian Gulf, 27
Peshawar: outlook from, vi, 101; compared with Farghana, 28, 86, 89; trade with Bukhara, 71; news of Basmachis reaches, 101; fanaticism in, 239. *See also* North-West Frontier

Peter the Great (1672–1725), 77, 205
Petroleum. *See* Oil
Petropavlosk, city and railway centre, 72
Pipes, R. E., American research scholar, 107-9, Bibliography
Pishpek, 112, 148. *See* Frunze (ii)
Poetry, Heroic, 74, 222-4; Kazak and Kirghiz, 222-4, 224-8; Uzbek, 223, 229; Ottoman, 220, 242. *See also* Abay, Ahmed (i), Alaeddin, Alishir Nevayi, Cholpan, Maghjan
Pokrovsky, Russian historian (1868–1932), 231
Poland, 58
Political, British Indian Service, 116 and n.
Population, 2, 136, 138 and n., 162-72, 214
Portuguese, 27
Powindahs, 42. *See also* Ghilzai
Prester John, 53
Proletariat, Doctrine of the, 142-3, 149-151, 232
Punjab. *See* Panjab
Pushkin, 225

Q in transliteration, 269-72
Quincey. *See* De Quincey

Radek, Comintern leader, 113
Radloff, Russian scholar (1837–1918), 5, 30, Bibliography
Railways, 86-8, 192-6
Rayev, companion to Enver, 124-5
Rebat Tamgach, on Özboy, 24
Registan, central square at Samarkand, 62-3
Religion. *See* Ahmed Yesevi, Al-Ghazali, Clergy, Deviationism, Ismailis, Nationalism, Nomads, pan-Islam, *Sheriat*, Shiahs, Sunnis, Togan, *Ulema*, Yunus Emre, Zealotism
Reza Shah of Persia (r. 1925–41), 185
Rhodesia, 141
Roman script, 155-6, 253
Rosenberg, Nazi Minister, 247-8. *See* Ostministerium
RSFSR, definition of, 144 n.

Saadi, Persian poet (1184–1282 or 1291), 40, 225, 235
Safavids, Persian dynasty (1502–1736), 28, 35, 51, 65-6. *See* Erdebil
Said Mir Alim Khan. *See* Mir Alim
Saihun. *See* Sir Darya
Saksaul, desert flora, 208 and n.
Samanids, Persian dynasty (*circa* 872–999), 35, 49-50
Samarkand: mystery of, 4-5; unvisited from the West, 4-5; isolation of, 4-5, 258; conquered by Tsars, 5, 76, 83; taken and lost by Babur, 31; beauty of, 46, 62-3; under Karakhanids, 50; included in Chaghatai domain, 57; Timur and, 62-3; taken by Safavids, 65; violated by Nadir Shah, 67; connected by rail, 87; Uzbek spoken at, 221; clericalism at, 239
Sami. *See* Haji Sami
Samoylovich, Russian scholar, 30, 231, Bibliography
Sarikamish (i) in Turkmenia, 16, 23-4, 205; (ii) in Anatolia, 122, 125
Sarikol, mountain range and district, 15
Sarts, settled population in Transoxiana, 34, 39, 42, 105, 200
Sassanians, pre-Muslim Persian dynasty (overthrown in 642), 48
Satpaiev, Kazak scientist, 159-60
Schlesinger, R., publicist, 173 n., Bibliography
Schuyler, American Consul, 4-5, 20, 25, 43, 76, 77 n., 78 n., Bibliography
Scott, American mechanic, 190-91, Bibliography
Script. *See* Arabic, Cyrillic and Roman
Secession, right of, 105, 139, 149-51
'Second Baku', 190 and n., 196, 212
Seljuks, Turkish dynasty (*circa* 1037–1150 in Turkistan), 27, 37, 51, 55, 267. *See also* Turks, Seljuk
Semipalatinsk, 88, 104
Semirechye. *See* Yedisu
Serakhs, in Turkmenia, 202
Shahr-i-Sabz, 32 n., 44, 62. *See* Kesh
Shahzinda, shrine at Samarkand, 63
Shaibani Khan (d. 1510), Uzbek founder of Shaibanids (1500–99), 48, 64-6, 128
Shamanism, 242, 260
Shamil, Caucasian resistance leader (*fl.* 1820–60), 74, 126, 185
Shannon, river, 210
Shcherbina, Tsarist administrator, 84
Shahit, Islamic equivalent of a martyr (in battle), 124
Sheriat, the, 47, 84, 239
Shiahs, Shiism: in Persia, 28; becomes State religion under Safavids, 28, 35;

000

Ismaili sect of, 39 and n.; in Azerbaijan, 52 n., 251; antipathy between Sunnis and, 66, 71, 251. *See also* Sunnis

Shorsu, oilfield in S. Farghana, 196

Siberia, 19, 68, 69, 72, 83, 87, 190

Sikhs, 47

Silk Road, 19, 69

Sinkiang. *See* Chinese Turkistan

Sir Darya (Jaxartes, Saihun), river: and Amu Darya, 14-16, 23-6, 49, 227; and Kizilkum, 15; and Betpak Dala, 15; tributaries of, 15; issues from mountains, 16; old course of, 23-6, 53; Oghuz Turks cross the, 50; Russian conquest pushed up, 72, 86; as navigation channel, 86; railway up, 87; in relation to Soviet boundaries, 146-7, 209; as source of irrigation, 146-7, 201, 209; Kazaks on, 199; in poetry, 227. *See also* Farghana, Irrigation, Karakulja, Narin, Sukh

Skobelev, Tsarist commander: at Khiva and Kokand, 79; most distinguished Tsarist commander, 79; city named after him, 79, 104 and n.; victory at Gök Tepe, 79-81; butcheries, 79-80; tradition of ruthlessness, 79-80, 90, 252; character, 80-81; death, 80; lodestar of Stalin, 81; pushes Trans-Caspian railway, 87-8

Skrine, Sir C., Bibliography

South Africa, 141

Sparta, 191

SSR, definition of, 144 n.

Stalin, J. V.: negotiates with Togan, 7-8, 99, 109-10; high-priest of Soviet colonialism, 7, 134; as source, 9, 142, 144, 146, 149-51; temporizes with nationalist leaders, 105, 109-10; signs Declaration of Rights, 105; as Georgian understands nationalism, 110; Togan writes to, 112-13; related to Kaganovich, 134; real views on nationalism, 142, 150-51, 233-4; and Doctrine of Proletariat, 142, 149-51; attitude to Bukhara and Khiva, 144; justifies national frontiers in Central Asia, 146; professions and practice, 146, 149-51, 151-2; book on the National and Colonial question, 149-50, Bibliography; parodied, 151-152; action against nationalism by, 152-4; on linguistics, 157-9; and the cow, 188; foresight of, 189; as master-planner, 189, 206, 214; Farghana canal named after, 201; and conventional aesthetics, 237. *See also* Deviationism, Dogmas, Nationalism, Proletariat, Bibliography

Stalinabad (Dushembe), capital of Tajikistan, 118, 148

Statistics, 2 and n., 135-6, 162-72. *See* Census

Stein, Sir Aurel, archaeologist, 2, 22

Stepnoi Krai, Tsarist province, 143

Stock-breeding, 184-8

Stoddart, British envoy (d. 1841), 4, 68

Stolypin, Tsarist minister, 98, 164

Sudan, the, 141

Sukh, tributary of Sir Darya, 15

Sunnis, Sunniism: original identification of Persians with, 34-5; in most orthodox form, 35, 50 and n., 51; antipathy between Shiahs and, 66, 71, 251; exaltation of *ulema* by, 239; as creed of all Central Asian Turks, 251. *See also* Hanafi, Shiahs

Surkhab (Kizilsu), river, 23 n. *See* Vakhsh

Surkhan, tributary of Amu Darya, 15

Syzran, oilfield, 190 n.

Tagore, Rabindranath, 229

Tajikistan, Tajiks: area and population, 2, 171, 213; linguistic distribution of, 32-4, 146; bilingualism among Uzbeks and, 32, 34, 146, 244, 254; of Iranian stock, 32, 33, 34; overlap into Afghanistan, 32, 82; language uncertain criterion between Turks and, 34, 39; good cultivators and craftsmen, 39; distribution of Persian-speaking, 39; character of, 39-40; hill, 39, 67, 82; followers of Agha Khan, 39, 82-3; Persian poets as honorary, 40; Soviet characterization as focus of Persia, 40; influence in towns, 68; as refuge of Emir, 118; as ASSR, 144-5; as SSR, 145; adjustments of boundaries with Uzbekistan, 146; confused boundaries of, 146-8; in relation to rivers, 147, 209; irrigation in, 147, 209; Stalinabad capital of, 148; increase of population, 171; climate of, 181; stock-breeding in, 184; minerals in,

000

192, 196; cotton in, 197; hydro-electric stations in, 211; planning targets in, 213; distinctions and affinities, 254-5. *See also* Farghana, Pamirs, Stalinabad, Vakhsh
Takhya Tash, headworks of Turkmenian Canal, 195, 205, 206
Taklamakan, central desert of Sinkiang, 22
Talash, river, 18, 24, 25, 55
Tamerlane. *See* Timur
Tarim, river, 2, 22-3
Tashkent, capital of Uzbekistan: Tsarist conquest of, 5, 76; old name of, 14; Kaufmann starts from, 78; as capital of Tsarist Turkistan, 83, 87, 143; railway communications with, 87; approached from Transcaspia, 88; Bolshevik hold on, 102-3, 114, 117-118; Osipov at, 103; Austrian prisoners at, 115; Bailey at, 116-17; capital of Uzbekistan, 148; still the focus of Central Asia, 148, 212; coal near, 196; irrigation round, 197; Stalin institute at, 197; hydro-electric stations near, 211
Ta(r)tar(s): definition of, vi; in De Quincey, 29, 70, 133, 139, 173; amalgam of Turk and Mongol, 38, 41, 42, 59; and Golden Horde, 59; on Russian steppe, 83, 105, 141, 215; Russian intermingling with, 83, 141
Tauhid, the, part of the Muslim creed, 264
Tchaikovsky, Tsarist officer, 25
Teheran, 239
Tejen (Hari Rud), river, 17, 67, 76, 202
Tennessee Valley, 198, 204
Terek Davan (pass), 18
Thomas Aquinas, 267
Thucydides, 128
Tienshan, mountains, 1, 3, 15, 18, 19, 74, 185, 210, 212
Tiflis (Tbilisi), capital of Georgia, 123
Tigris, river, 14
Timur (Tamerlane) (r. 1369-1404), Timurid: Clavijo's embassy to, 4, 59; birthplace of 17, 62; name, 17 n.; summer retreat, 19; Babur descendant of, 31, 36; conquests, 32, 37, 62-4; essentially a Turk, 36; dynasty, 48, 62-4; his capital, 62; his monuments, 62-3; tradition of, 63-4, 260, 267; violation of grave of, 67; mentioned, 85, 190, 227; literature, 216-22
Tirich Mir, summit of Hindu Kush, 82
Tito, Josef B., 105
Tobol, tributary of Ob, 20, 207
Togan, Prof. Ahmed Zeki Velidi (Velidov), author of *Turkistan today*, vi, 8-9, 95, 244; nationalist leader, 7, 128-30; as historian, 7, 128-30; relations with Lenin and Stalin, 7, 8, 99, 109-11, 112-113; a Bashkurd, 7, 95 n., 99, 104-112; admirer of Enver, 7, 95, 99, 124-7; quotes Mahmud Kashghari, 19; describes Turkish Olympus, 19; on courses of rivers, 23-5; marshals tribal detail, 37 n.; on Tajiks, 40; on Town-Turks, 40-41; on Uzbeks, 41-42, 44, 129-30; on Kazaks, 43; on Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism, 44-46; on religion, 44-5, 130, 239-42; on Timur, 63; on Kine Sari, 74-5; on Russian imperialism, 81, 159; on Tsarist land policy, 84-5; on rebellion against Tsars, 88-91; in Bukhara, 95, 112, 124, 119-20; on Basmachis, 101, 124, 127-30; on intellectuals, 101, 120, 128, 130; letter to Lenin and Stalin, 112-13; on parties in Bukhara, 119-20; on Jemal Pasha, 122-3; on Junaid Khan and Haji Sami, 127-8; on cantonization, 148; on miscegenation, 159; on irrigation, 199-200; as source for Eastern Turkish literature, 223-9; gives credit for liberalism under Tsars, 224; his proverb on Turkish character, 238; professed Soviet contempt for, 257-8; his final message, 268
Toghay Sari, Basmachi leader, 120-21
Tokmak, 25
Tolstoy, Leo, 225
Toynbee, Prof. Arnold, 28, 261-3, Bibliography
Transalai, mountains, 15
Trans-Aral, railway, 87-8, 194
Transcaspia, 1, 13, 88
Trans-Caspian, railway (Central Asian Railway), 87-8, 193
Transcaucasia, 77, 105
Transliteration, 269-72
Transoxiana (Mavera-un-nahr): overlap between Muslim world and Russia, 3; old name, Mavera-un-nahr, 14; or Transoxania, 14 n.; rivers of, 17; change of course of rivers in, 23; oases of, 34-5, 38; sedentary population of, 34, 38, 141; Turkish civilization of,

000

36; Persian influence in, 40-42, 48-9, 220-21; Mongol element in, 41; Arab conquest of (690), 48, 257; revolt against Umayyids, 49; Abbasids in, 49; Samanids in, 49; Islam in, 49, 62; Karakhanids in, 50, 52; Karakitai in, 52-3; Mongol conquest of (1220), 55-6; Turkish reconquest of, 60; Timur in, 62; isolated by sectarianism, 66; Shaibanids in, 66; isolated by steppe, 71; Russian advance into, 83, 85; Russian colonization of, 98, 241; intensive cultivation of, 141; *Sheriat* in, 239; bigotry in, 265

Trans-Siberian railway, 72, 87-8, 194-5

Trotsky, Leo, 109-10, 112

Tsars, the: as forerunners of Soviets, 3-4, 161, 230-34, 252; isolate Turkistan, 5-6, 91, 134; oriental scholarship under, 5, 30, 222-3; material achievements, 10; Tsarist theories on rivercourses, 25-6; dominion in Siberia, 69, 72; reach Aral Sea, 72; reach Sir Darya, 72; conquer Kazak steppe, 74; justify conquest, 75-6; conquer Tashkent, Samarkand, 76; conquer Bukhara, Khiva, 76-9; under Peter the Great, 77, 205; overcome Turkmens, 79-81; violently suppress rebellions, 79-81, 88-91, 96; take Merv and Penjdeh, 81; occupy Pamirs, 82; retain Bukhara and Khiva as satellites, 83-4, 85; colonize the steppe, 83-5, 98, 163-5; press cotton cultivation, 85-6, 193; pursue railway construction, 86-8, 193-4; collapse, 90, 95; Soviet attitude to, 91, 206, 230-32, 233; intern prisoners in Turkistan, 96; neglect education, 97; exclude Turks from army, 98; Dumas, 101; supported by clergy, 102; as producers, 136; their administrative organization in Turkistan, 143, 190; attitude to irrigation, 153, 198-200, 206; Tsarist statistics, 162-5, 170, 172 n.; attitude to agriculture, 198-200; liberalism under, 224-5

Tuimazi, oilfield, 190 n.

Tului, Chingizid (XIIIth century), 27, 54, 56, 57

Tunis, 141

Turan, Turanian basin: definition of, 3, 14-15; rivers of, 14-15, 17-18, 20, 23-26; compared with Irak, 15; mountain-rims, 15-17, 227-8; partly below sea-level, 16; seen from South, 16-17, 129; and Iran, 17, 267; diversion of Arctic waters into, 20, 197, 204, 207; pre-Russian history, 30; pan-Turanism, 44-5; Persian influences in, 49; Buddhism in, 50; petty Emirs in, 68; Russian occupation of, 81-3

Turgay, river and town on Kazak steppe, 207

Turkey: focus of Western Turks, vi, 1; opposed to pan-Islamism, 45; and to political pan-Turkism, 45; Turcological research in, 45-6; and Turkish cultural bonds, 46, 155-6, 220, 228; Sunniism of, 50 n., 52 n., 66; rise of Ottomans in, 51-2; capture of Constantinople, 59 n., 64; captures Baku, 115; in World War I, 122; and Enver Pasha, 122, 127; and alphabets, 155-6; literary debt to Eastern Turks, 220; in Eastern Turkish poetry, 228. *See also* Atatürk, Ottomans

'Turkic', definition of, vii

Turkis, Turks of China, vi, 1, 219 n.

'Turkish', definition of, vii

Turkistan, Chinese, *q.v.*

Turkistan, Russian, 1-28 *et passim*

Turkistan (Yese), the town, 13, 46, 55, 62, 166, 242, 267. *See* Ahmed (i)

Turkmenia, Turkmen(s): really Western Turks, vi, 37, 41, 51, 148; area and population of, 2, 171, 213; linguistic distribution of, 32-3; overlap with Uzbeks in Khorezm, 32-3; distinctions and affinities, 47, 255; relations with Seljuks, 51, 67; and with Ottomans, 67; as tribal warriors, 67, 78-9; formidable resistance to Russian conquest, 67, 76, 78-9, 81, 85, 87; butchery by Kaufmann, 78-9; and by Skobelev, 79-80; scene of first railway in Central Asia, 87; climate of, 141; as part of Tsarist province, 143; as SSR, 144; in relation to other republics, 147; capital at Ashkabad, 148; stock-breeding in, 185; Canal, 189, 205-8, 211; oilfields in, 196, 212; Karakum Canal, 202; hydro-electric stations in, 211; cotton production in, 213; 1950 targets in, 213; epics, 223; deviationism among, 235. *See also* Gök Tepe, Irrigation, Kopet

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

OOO

Dagh, Krasnovodsk, Merv, Nebit Dagh, Tejen

Turks, Eastern (Central Asian): definition of, vi, 1; in Russian and Chinese Central Asia, 1; as field of Russian scholarship, 10, 30; confused origin of, 31, 33; subdivisions of, 32, 47, 143-9, 253-5; languages and stock-origin of, 32-4, 43, 47, 221 and n., 254; and Tajiks, 32, 34, 40, 254; antithesis of Cain and Abel, 34; Turkmens excluded except in geography, 37, 41, 51-2, 148; Kipchak ancestry, 37-8, 41; in political theory, 44-6; and Western Turks, 45-6, 52, 220; cultural links in Turkdom, 45-6; unified nationalism among, 47, 127-130, 148-9, 237-8, 244-6, 253-6; position early in XVIIIth century, 68-69; isolation and bigotry among, 68-9; and Golden Horde, 70; military tradition of, 98; exclusion from Tsarist service, 98; four forces among, 99-101; leaders of, 101, 113, 243; dilution by colonization, 140-43, 161, 162-71; possessed no proletariat, 142, 149-51; Soviet division of, 143-149, 221, 253; industrialization of, 166-71, 190-91, 192, 214; and emancipation of women, 179, 241-2, 264, 268; and nomadism, 180-84; and Ali Shir Nevayi, 220; their literature, 220, 222-9; attitude to the faith, 239-42, 250-51, 260-61; fight for Germany, 246-53; demand religious instruction, 250-51; Zealots and Herodians among, 262-3; new revelation among, 265; vision of future of, 267-8. *See also* Karakalpaks, Kazaks, Kirghiz, Turkis, Turkmens, Uzbeks

Turks, Oghuz, *q.v.*

Turks, Ottoman, *q.v.*

Turks, Seljuk: descended from Oghuz, 37, 51; conquests of, 51; defeat Byzantines, 51; kinship with Turkmens, 51; attitude to the faith, 51; collapse, 51; their successors, 51; struggle with Kitai, 52-3; their tyranny, 267

Turks, Town. *See* Kent-Turks and Sarts

Turks, Western: definition of, vi; descended from Oghuz, 37; kinship with Turkmens, 37, 51; links with Eastern Turks, 45-6, 52, 220, 241; move in Caucasus, 115; under Jemal and Enver, 122, 128; in literature, 220, 228, 242. *See also* Azeris, Enver, Ottomans, Turkey, Turkmens

Turk-Sib, railway, 88, 193

Tus, town in Persian Khorasan, 266

Ukraine, Ukrainians, 109, 140 and n., 163

Ulan Bator, capital of modern Mongolia, 57

Ulema, the: subjection to Persian influences, 40; bigotry of, 40, 45, 259; confined to cities, 40, 262; loyalty to Emir, 100, 102, 259; as conservatives, 119; as prototype of Communist rigidity, 259; no resurrection of, 264. *See also* Clergy, *Imams*

Ulu Tav, hills, 20, 74

Ulugh Beg, Timurid (d. 1449), 62, 64

Umayyids, Caliphate (661–750), 48-9, 257

'United States of Russia', 244-6

Ural, Urals, river, mountains: Bashkiria in, 7, 41, 106, 244; the Kipchak in, 37, 41; no dividing-line between Turkish tribes, 59; Kine Sari on, 74; Russianization both sides of, 83, 141, 215; mentioned, 99; Great Russians in, 107; outside Kazakistan, 189 n., 191; site of heavy industry, 190; focus of 'Second Baku', 190 n., 212-213; included in Greater Turkistan, 244; source of mercenaries under Germans, 246. *See also* Ishimbay, Magnitogorsk, Togan

Urgench, old capital of Khorezm, 14, 24-25, 53, 60, 66, 194

Urumchi, capital of Chinese Turkistan, 2

Ust Yurt, desert plateau, 16, 23

Uzbekistan, Uzbek(s): defined as Eastern Turks, vi; area and population of, 2, 171, 213; and Kipchaks, 20, 33, 37, 41; linguistic distribution of, 32-4; overlap into Afghanistan, 32; bilingualism with Tajiks, 32, 34, 146, 244, 254-5; mingling with Turkmens, Karakalpaks, and Kirghiz, 32-3; language, 32-4, 40 and n., 41, 221 and n., 254; and Kazaks, 33, 41, 145, 255; true, 33, 37, 42, 129-30; usurpation of name by Town-Turks, 40-41; Mangit and Nogai tribes of, 41; origin of name, 41; Uzbek

000

Khan, 42, 54, 59, 65; character of, 42, 43-4, 129-30; Jüre Beg, 43-4; distinctions and affinities, 47, 146-8, 253-256; Shaibanids, 54, 65-6; Janids and Mangits, 54, 66, 67-8, 95, 100, 118; Mongol mingling with, 59, 70; and Golden Horde, 65, 70; of Khiva and Bukhara, 66, 67-8, 95; conflict with Durranis, 71; revolt in 1916, 89-90; of Tashkent, 102; Lakai tribe, 101, 120-21, 124; in Basmachi movement, 129-30; tolerance of true, 130; percentage of population in USSR, 140 n.; as SSR, 144-5; includes Karakalpakistan, 145; adjustments with Tajikistan, 146; confusion of boundaries, 146-7; capital at Tashkent, 148; deviationists, 160, 235; cropping in, 197; irrigation in, 201, 202, 209; planning targets in, 213; industrialization of, 214; epics, 223, 235; poetry, 229; bourgeois-nationalism among, 160, 235; feudalism among, 235; leaders, 243; common ground with Tajiks, 254-5. *See also* Basmachis, Bukhara, Chokai, Farghana, Kayum Khan, Khiva, Samarkand, Tashkent, Transoxiana

Uzun Ada, old port on Caspian, 87

Vakhsh (Oghush, Kizilsu, Surkhab), main tributary of Amu Darya, from which name Oxus is probably derived, 15, 23 n., 197, 201, 211

Vambéry, Arminius, Hungarian Jewish scholar, 4, 30, 45, Bibliography

Veil, discarding of, 179, 241-2, 268. *See also* Women

Velidov, 7, 257. *See* Togan

Venice, 58, 63

Vienna, 64

Vladivostok, 87

Vlassov, Russian émigré leader, 249

Vogüé, Vicomte de, 5

Volga: and Özboy, 24; Turks (Tatars) on, 36, 41, 105, 141, 244, 246; Mongols reach, 57; Kalmucks on, 71-2; 'Second Baku' on, 190 n.; irrigation, etc., on, 204

Wakhan, Afghan border district, 21

Waterlogging, 198, 200, 208

Waterways, Inland, 86, 202, 204-5, 207-208. *See also* Irrigation

Wavell, Lord, 121 n.

Waziristan, Wazirs, 100, 121

Wiener (Winner), Dr., American Slavonic scholar, 46 n., Bibliography

Wilmot, Chester, title-page

Wolff, Dr., Anglican priest and explorer (early XIXth century), 4, Bibliography

Women, emancipation of, 179, 241-2, 264, 268

Wrangel, General, 97

Wurm, Dr. S., vi, Bibliography

Yakub Beg, Emir of Kashghar (*fl.* 1860-1880), 18

Yasa(k), the Turkish customary law, 47, 239

Yedisu (Semirechye), district of the seven rivers in N.E. Kazakistan, 18, 57, 103, 224, 227

Yeni Darya, former bed of Sir Darya, 24-5

Yenisei, Siberian river, 55, 207

Yese (Yassi), old name of town now known as Turkistan, *q.v.*

Yirav, minstrel poet, 223

Yüan, Mongol dynasty in China (1250-1367), 54, 57. *See* Kublai, Mongols

Yulduz, mountain pasture, 19

Yunus Emre, Anatolian mystic (d. 1308 ?), 46, 242

Yusuf Akchura, Azeri exile, 154

Yusufzai, tribe and district on N.-W. Frontier, 86

Zarafshan (Kohik), river, 17, 20, 71, 197, 201, 202-3

Zealots, 260-3

Zeki Velidi. *See* Togan

Zinoviev, 113

Zoroastrianism, 49

THE END

PRINTED BY R. & R. CLARK, LTD., EDINBURGH

113, 668 Bashkir RF3

[For information on the involvement of the Bashkirs in eastern Turkic nationalism during the Soviet period, see 2: Caroe, RL1 Soviet Central Asia, category 116, passim.]